J.J.R. VS. K.A.R. (FM-08-0542-19, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1268-20
J.J.R.1,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
K.A.R.,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________
Submitted October 25, 2021 – Decided November 19, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Firko.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County,
Docket No. FM-08-0542-19.
Kennedy & Vassallo, attorneys for appellant (Nancy
Kennedy Brent, on the briefs).
Law Offices of Lynda L. Hinkle, LLC, attorneys for
respondent (Jarred McCart, on the brief).
1
We use initials to protect the identity of the parties and children and to preserve
their confidentiality. R. 1:38-3(d)(13).
PER CURIAM
In this post-judgment custody and parenting time dispute, plaintiff J.J.R.
(father) appeals from the Family Part's December 11, 2020 order denying his
motion to change the residential custody status of the parties' daughter E.R.,
born in 2005. The judge granted defendant K.A.R.'s (mother) cross-motion to
compel cooperation relative to parenting time and granted her request for
counsel fees in the amount of $1,983 to be paid by plaintiff. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the decision to deny plaintiff's motion to change the residential
custody status of E.R., but we reverse and remand the award of counsel fees
because the judge did not address the factors required by Rules 5:3-5(c), 4:42-9,
and RPC 1.5(a).
I.
The following facts are derived from the motion record. The parties
divorced in April 2019, after a sixteen-year marriage. Two children were born
of the marriage: Z.R., born in 1998; and E.R., a daughter born in 2005, who is
the subject of the matter under review. Although not referenced in the final
judgment of divorce (FJOD), the parties executed a two-page property
settlement agreement (PSA) on March 16, 2019. On May 1, 2020, the parties
entered a consent order, which modified the FJOD.
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The FJOD granted joint legal custody of the parties' two children and
liberal, reasonable parenting time, as agreed to by the parties. Defendant was
designated as the parent of primary residence (PPR), and plaintiff was
designated as the parent of alternate residence (PAR). Plaintiff was ordered to
pay child support of $132 per week directly to defendant. The PSA reiterated
the terms of custody and parenting time but reduced the child support obligation
to $86 per week. After the consent order was entered, E.R.'s relationship with
defendant deteriorated to the point she no longer wanted to reside with
defendant.
According to defendant, she attributes E.R.'s unhappiness to her stricter
parenting style and "setting rules." On the other hand, plaintiff stated E.R.
informed him that defendant "is very belittling to her"; "does not take her
feelings into consideration"; "seems out of control of her emotions"; "is
attempting to manipulate [E.R.]"; "refuses to consider rational and logical
perspectives if they differ from her own thoughts"; and "is trying to cas t herself
as a victim."
Thereafter, E.R. began living with plaintiff. E.R.'s grades declined, which
defendant blamed on plaintiff's lack of structure and discipline, while plaintiff
pointed out the challenges of online learning during the COVID-19 pandemic.
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The parties' ability to co-parent worsened as evidenced by defendant's allegation
that plaintiff unilaterally took the then fifteen-year-old E.R. to a gynecologist to
obtain a birth control prescription. Defendant was not advised of the
prescription until plaintiff was on his way to a pharmacy to fill it.
Defendant also claims plaintiff took E.R. to another unspecified doctor's
appointment without her prior knowledge, and he refused to communicate with
her regarding E.R. Plaintiff refused to return E.R. to defendant's home.
Defendant alleges this failure to communicate adversely affects her relationship
with E.R., and plaintiff fails to encourage E.R. to reengage in individual and
joint therapy with defendant despite E.R.'s prior consistent attendance.
On September 17, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion seeking the following
relief: (1) "[a] change in the physical custody of the parties' minor [child],
[E.R.], . . . with [p]laintiff being named the [PPR]"; (2) "[p]arenting time to be
determined between the parties with substantial input from [E.R.]"; (3) "[a]
recalculation of child support"; and (4) any other equitable remedies. Defendant
filed a notice of cross-motion for post-judgment relief on November 23, 2020,
requesting the judge: (1) deny plaintiff's motions; (2) enforce the PSA as it
pertains to parenting time; (3) require E.R. to continue with therapy; and (4)
award her counsel fees and costs.
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Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the hearing on the motions was
scheduled to take place via Zoom on December 11, 2020. An email to the
parties' attorneys was sent on December 10, 2020, containing a Zoom link and
the date, time, meeting identification, and passcode for the hearing. The judge
heard oral argument from both counsel, and the litigants were allowed to appear
virtually.
Later that same day after the hearing, the judge issued a written fifteen-
page memorandum and order. The judge denied plaintiff's motion for a change
in the parental residency designation and to recalculate child support. The judge
highlighted that defendant is "the primary caretaker" of E.R. and "has greater
autonomy over the day-to-day decisions with the child." In his memorandum
and order, the judge found:
[p]laintiff has failed to meet his burden. The
circumstances he describes simply represent the
struggles of raising a teenager. As joint custodians, the
parties share "the legal authority and responsibility for
making 'major' decisions regarding the child's welfare,"
not "minor day-to-day decisions." Beck [v. Beck], 86
N.J. [480], 487 [(1981)]. Plaintiff has not followed that
principle. He has not encouraged E.R. to mend her
relationship with her mother, despite [d]efendant's
efforts to work on the issues that divide them. And
perhaps more troubling, he unilaterally decided to have
E.R. stop attending therapy and start taking birth
control pills. Such major decisions require consultation
between both joint custodial parents.
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Plaintiff suggests that parenting time for E.R.
should be her decision, asking that "[p]arenting time be
determined between the parties with substantial input
from the parties['] minor daughter." That would not be
appropriate. The parties must first get on the same
page, or at least in the same book, regarding parenting
of E.R. True, a child of her age should be heard. But
she should not have the final say. The parents (one or
both) cannot abdicate their role as parent to ensure the
health, safety and welfare to the very child for which
they are legally and morally responsible.
The judge ordered the parties to attend "either family therapy or
mediation" pursuant to Rule 1:40-5(a)(2).2 The judge also denied plaintiff's
request to recalculate child support because no changed circumstances were
established. As to defendant's cross-motion, the judge granted her request for
counsel fees and ordered plaintiff to pay the sum of $1,983 on an installment
2
Rule 1:40-5(a)(2) provides:
In addition to the general requirements of Rule 1:40-4,
the parties shall be required to attend a mediation
orientation program and may be required to attend an
initial mediation session. Mediation sessions shall be
closed to the public. The mediator and the parties
should consider whether it is appropriate to involve the
child in the mediation process. The mediator or either
party may terminate a mediation session in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 1:40-4(h).
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basis. Plaintiff's application to stay the counsel fee award pending his appeal
was denied by the judge.
II.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the following points:
(1) the judge failed to apply the best interests of the
child standard warranting reversal and remand;
(2) the judge's decision was not based on adequate,
substantial, and credible evidence;
(3) counsel fees were erroneously awarded to defendant
without application of the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors; and
(4) the judge erroneously proceeded without plaintiff
being present.
Appellate courts reviewing a trial court's findings adhere to a well -settled
standard of review. "The general rule is that findings by the trial court are
binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."
Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare v.
Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). Therefore, we will "not disturb the
'factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced
that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of
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justice.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (first alteration in original) (quoting Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
The conclusions of Family Part judges regarding child custody "are
entitled to great weight and will not be lightly disturbed on appeal." DeVita v.
DeVita, 145 N.J. Super. 120, 123 (App. Div. 1976) (citing Sheehan v. Sheehan,
51 N.J. Super. 276, 295 (App. Div. 1958)). Because this court recognizes "the
special expertise of judges hearing matters in the Family Part," Parish, 412 N.J.
Super. at 48 (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412), it will only disturb the Family Part's
factual findings if "they are 'so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of
justice.'" In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)
(quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 483-84). An appellate court, in consequence,
will only reverse the family court's conclusions if those conclusions are so
"'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark'" that they result in the denial of justice.
Parish, 412 N.J. Super. at 48 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting N.J. Div. of
Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). The Family Part's legal
conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.
Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 183 (2010).
Plaintiff argues the judge erred in failing to consider the best interests of
E.R. in assessing whether a change of custody and parental designation was
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appropriate. He also contends the judge disavowed the evidence and allowed
his "personal feelings about a fifteen-year-old's sexuality and bodily choices to
trump appropriate application of the law." Conversely, defendant asserts the
judge properly evaluated the evidence and did not need to reach the best interests
analysis because plaintiff failed to meet the threshold showing of a substantial
change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a review of the current custody
arrangement.
A judgment involving the custody of minor children is subject to
modification at any time based on significant changed circumstances that would
affect the welfare of the child. See Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184,
203-04 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Beck, 86 N.J. at 497; M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J.
Super. 425, 431 (App. Div. 1979)). The court's primary consideration is the best
interests of the child. A.J. v. R.J., 461 N.J. Super. 173, 181 (App. Div. 2019)
(quoting Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007)); Kinsella v.
Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 317 (1997). The court must focus on the child's "safety,
happiness, physical, mental[,] and moral welfare." Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J.
525, 536 (1956). As part of the analysis, the judge must consider the following
factors:
the parents' ability to agree, communicate and
cooperate in matters relating to the child; the parents'
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willingness to accept custody and any history of
unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on
substantiated abuse; the interaction and relationship of
the child with its parents and siblings; the history of
domestic violence, if any; the safety of the child and the
safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other
parent; the preference of the child when of sufficient
age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent
decision; the needs of the child; the stability of the
home environment offered; the quality and continuity
of the child's education; the fitness of the parents; the
geographical proximity of the parents' homes; the
extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior
to or subsequent to the separation; the parents'
employment responsibilities; and the age and number
of the children. A parent shall not be deemed unfit
unless the parents' conduct has a substantial adverse
effect on the child.
[N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c).]
A party seeking a change in custody bears the burden of making a prima
facie showing of a change in circumstances that affects the welfare of the child.
See Sheehan, 51 N.J. Super. at 287; Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J. Super. 108,
119 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 105) (citations omitted).
A plenary hearing is required only where "there is a genuine and substantial
factual dispute regarding the welfare of the children, and the trial judge
determines that a plenary hearing is necessary to resolve the factual dispute."
Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 105.
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Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the judge did not make an erroneous
custody and parenting time determination. The judge aptly stated that plaintiff's
argument only sought "a change in residential designation" and not a change in
custody. Applying N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 and the controlling case law, the judge
concluded it would be in the best interests of E.R. to have defendant continue as
"the primary caretaker." The judge highlighted the "suggestion that one party is
disparaging or blaming the other parent through the child and weaponizing t he
child in the parents['] unsettled disputes. . . . is unacceptable." In addition, the
judge noted "[i]t is detrimental to a child's emotional welfare."
Moreover, the judge informed the parties that if such conduct continued,
he "may have no choice but to consider what is in the best interests of the child."
The judge was correct in his analysis, which was based upon substantial credible
evidence in the record. And, the judge pointed out that defendant "has greater
autonomy over the day-to-day decisions with the child" citing Pascale v.
Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 600 (1995). The record supports the judge's findings and
conclusions, and he did not reach an erroneous finding on custody and parenting
time of E.R. We also conclude there was no reason for the judge to conduct an
interview of E.R.
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III.
In Family Part matters, Rule 5:3-5(c), Rule 4:42-9(a), N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23,
and interpretative case law "clearly outline necessary considerations when
imposing a counsel fee award." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 580 (App.
Div. 2017) (citing Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 94-95 (2005)). Any party in a
family action is permitted to recover attorney's fees so long as the party
requesting the fees supports its application with "an affidavit of services
addressing the factors enumerated by RPC 1.5(a) . . . . [and] a recitation of other
factors pertinent in the evaluation of the services rendered . . . ." R. 4:42-9(b).
Moreover, Rule 1:10-3 provides that a judge may award counsel fees on a
motion to enforce litigant's rights to the party accorded relief on the motion.
In exercising its discretion, the trial court must abide by N.J.S.A. 2A:34 -
23, requiring consideration of "the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel
fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of
either party." Mani, 183 N.J. at 93-94 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). Rule 5:3-
5(c), in turn, requires the trial court to consider the following factors:
In determining the amount of the fee award, the court
should consider, in addition to the information required
to be submitted pursuant to R[ule] 4:42-9, the following
factors: (1) the financial circumstances of the parties;
(2) the ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to
contribute to the fees of the other party; (3) the
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reasonableness and good faith of the positions
advanced by the parties both during and prior to trial;
(4) the extent of the fees incurred by both parties; (5)
any fees previously awarded; (6) the amount of fees
previously paid to counsel by each party; (7) the results
obtained; (8) the degree to which fees were incurred to
enforce existing orders or to compel discovery; and (9)
any other factor bearing on the fairness of an award.
[Id. (quoting R. 5:3-5(c)).]
Therefore, when considering a counsel fee application, the motion court
must consider whether the party requesting the fees is
in financial need; whether the party against whom the
fees are sought has the ability to pay; the good or bad
faith of either party in pursuing or defending the action;
the nature and extent of the services rendered; and the
reasonableness of the fees.
[Id. at 94-95 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).]
Fee awards should be disturbed "only on the 'rarest occasion,' and then
only because of clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super.
298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317
(1995)). A trial court's failure to consider the appropriate factors, make the
required findings, and state its conclusions of law, constitutes a clear abuse of
discretion. See Saffos v. Avaya Inc., 419 N.J. Super. 244, 271 (App. Div. 2011).
Ordinarily, the purpose of a counsel fee award in a matrimonial action is to
equalize the relative financial resources of the parties. J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J.
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Super. 475, 493 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 262 N.J. Super. 303,
307 (Ch. Div. 1992)).
"Simple omnibus references to the rules without sufficient findings to
justify a counsel fee award makes meaningful review of such an award
impossible . . . ." Loro v. Colliano, 354 N.J. Super. 212, 228 (App. Div. 2002).
If the court performs its obligation under the statute and rules, and "there is
satisfactory evidentiary support for the trial court's findings, 'its task is complete
and [a reviewing court] should not disturb the result, even though it . . . might
have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal.'" Reese v. Weis,
430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Beck, 86 N.J. at 496).
Conversely, a remand is appropriate if the trial court fails to adequately explain
an award or denial of counsel fees. See Giarusso v. Giarusso, 455 N.J. Super.
42, 54 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Loro, 354 N.J. Super. at 227-28).
Here, the judge awarded counsel fees without considering all relevant
factors. In its written statement of reasons, the judge simply found:
[d]efendant seeks reimbursement for her legal fees and
costs. Defense counsel filed the required certification
of services which notes [d]efendant's cost to defendant
against [p]laintiff['s] motion [is] $1,983. While the
court cannot find that [p]laintiff's motion was made in
bad faith, the position he espouses is in bad faith since
it is in direct contravention to the PSA and the FJOD.
Further, [p]laintiff is depriving [d]efendant of her
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parental rights by making unilateral decision[s] on
major issues regarding E.R. What is more,
[d]efendant's response and her cross-prayers for relief
are essentially a motion to enforce her rights under the
FJOD and the PSA. As such, she is entitled to financial
relief. The court has considered the factors of R. 5:3-
5(c). Her motion for counsel fees will be granted.
Turning to the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors, the judge failed to consider the
parties' financial circumstances, their respective ability to pay their own fees,
and the amount of fees already incurred and paid. See R. 5:3-5(c)(1), (2), (4),
(6); see also Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 47 (App. Div. 2011) (reversing a
trial court's grant of counsel fees, in part because the court "failed to analyze the
parties' relative incomes or plaintiff's ability to pay her own counsel fees .").
In arriving at the counsel fee award of $1,983, the judge provided no basis
as to how he calculated the amount. The judge was required to "determine the
'lodestar,' which equals the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by
a reasonable hourly rate." J.E.V., 426 N.J. Super. at 493-94 (quoting Yueh v.
Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 464 (App. Div. 2000)). Defendant's counsel
provided a certification in support of the application for counsel fees and costs
and a description of professional services provided. In opposition to defendant's
request for counsel fees and costs, plaintiff certified he "tried numerous times
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in good faith to resolve the issues" and therefore, counsel fees would be
"inappropriate in this matter."
The record also reflects that the judge also imputed bad faith to plaintiff
for contravening the terms of the PSA and FJOD. "[B]ad faith for counsel fees
purposes relates only to the conduct of the litigation." Mani, 183 N.J. at 95(citations omitted). "An award of attorney's fees to the adverse party is
appropriate if the court finds the proceedings to have been frivolous and
instituted for the purpose of harassment as well as abuse of the judicial system."
Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4.3.3 on R. 5:3-5 (2022).
By referring to the "reasonableness" and the "good faith" of the positions
a party has advanced, the rule indicates two discrete, but related concepts.
Advancing a losing argument, even if "ill-founded and perhaps misguided," does
not, by itself, prove bad faith. Tagayun v. AmeriChoice of N.J., Inc., 446 N.J.
Super. 570, 580 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super.
124, 144-45 (App. Div. 1999)). "Examples of bad faith include misusing or
abusing process . . . intentionally misrepresenting facts or law, or otherwise
engaging in vexatious acts for oppressive reasons." Slutsky v. Slutsky, 451 N.J.
Super. 332, 367 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Borzillo v. Borzillo, 259 N.J. Super.
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286, 293-94 (Ch. Div. 1992)). 3 The judge's finding that plaintiff acted in bad
faith is devoid of factual findings. The parties also did not provide sufficient
information regarding their financial circumstances to address the relevant
factors under Rule 5:3-5(c). We therefore reverse the judge's award of fees to
defendant and remand for a formal, detailed analysis by the court. What
occurred here contravened not only Rule 5:3-5(c), but Rule 4:42-9 and RPC
1.5(a) as well.
IV.
Finally, plaintiff's counsel contends he did not receive an email from the
court containing either Zoom log-in information or the time scheduled for the
hearing on December 11, 2020. Eventually, counsel for plaintiff logged into the
hearing but plaintiff himself could not, and oral argument proceeded without
him being present on the Zoom call. Plaintiff asserts the judge was unable to
properly assess his credibility to his detriment.
3
Although the Slutsky court also equated "bad faith" with "seeking relief not
supported by fact or law," 451 N.J. Super. at 367, we assume, by its citation to
Borzillo, it meant to say, "[t]o seek relief which one knows or should know that
no reasonable argument could be advanced in fact or law in support thereof."
Borzillo, 259 N.J. Super. at 293. As the Slutsky court observed, honestly
presenting an "ill-founded" argument does not constitute bad faith.
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Plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive, particularly in light of the unique
challenges courts have had to overcome during the global pandemic. Since early
2020,
New Jersey [c]ourts have operated primarily remotely
via platforms like Zoom, Microsoft Teams, and
telephone conferences, with the goal of preserving the
quality of justice our courts have traditionally striven to
provide when court was conducted in-person. Trial
courts and staff have undertaken a herculean effort in
rising to this unprecedented challenge.
[D.M.R. v. M.K.G., 467 N.J. Super. 308, 313 (App.
Div. 2021).]
Counsel, too, have undoubtedly had to respond to the many challenges generated
by the pandemic in their efforts to represent their clients. However, we discern
no error by the court.
The record shows that on December 10, 2020, an email was sent to counsel
for both parties, which contained a link and login information for the hearing
scheduled to take place the following day. Plaintiff's counsel's email address
was correctly listed in the "To" portion of the email. 4 That same email listed the
start time for the hearing. Counsel states she "sent emails and . . . placed phone
calls, attempting to alert the [c]ourt that she had not received the log -in
4
The email address that appears in the "To" line of the email matches the email
address used by counsel on the cover page of her brief.
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information or time of [c]ourt in the instant matter," but has not provided any
record of those efforts. Moreover, plaintiff's counsel did not advise the judge
the fact that plaintiff was not logged in and present at the hearing. There was
no manifest wrong or prejudice warranting reversal and no deprivation of due
process.
To the extent that we have not specifically addressed any of plaintiff's
remaining arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed in part, reversed, vacated, and remanded in part. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
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