STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. TROOPER MEGAN HABINA (NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3401-19
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
TROOPER MEGAN HABINA,
#7870,
Respondent-Appellant.
____________________________
Argued October 21, 2021 – Decided December 2, 2021
Before Judges Alvarez and Haas.
On appeal from the New Jersey Division of State
Police, Docket Nos. 2016-0581 and 2017-0009.
Claudia J. Gallagher argued the cause for appellant
(Chance & McCann, LLC, attorneys; Kevin P.
McCann, Claudia J. Gallagher and Matthew Weng, on
the briefs).
Jana R. DiCosmo, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting
Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Alexis F. Fedorchak,
Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Megan Habina appeals from a March 31, 2020 final agency decision of
the Superintendent of the New Jersey Division of State Police terminating her
employment as a state trooper. The Superintendent adopted the Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) John S. Kennedy's initial decision sustaining two out of three
disciplinary charges against Habina, and recommending her termination. The
Superintendent agreed that "in light of the gravity of [r]espondent's actions, the
appropriate penalty . . . is termination . . . ." We affirm for the reasons stated by
the Superintendent.
Sometime in October or November 2016, while on duty, Habina lost the
alcohol influence report (AIR) necessary to complete the paperwork for a drunk
driving arrest. She consulted with Trooper Casey McPartlin, who suggested she
contact the Alcohol and Drug Testing Unit (ADTU) to retrieve a copy. Instead,
Habina used another unrelated AIR to create a replacement AIR and signed
McPartlin's name to it without his knowledge or consent. Habina admitted her
actions, but insisted no harm was done because she used a report with the same
blood alcohol percentage and changed no substantive information. She feared
the repercussions of losing the AIR. As a result, she was served with three
charges: acting or behaving in an official capacity to the personal discredit of
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the member or the Division (a violation of Article 6, § 2.A, of the Rules and
Regulations of the Division); making a false or misleading official report, or
knowingly entering into Division books or records inaccurate, false, or
misleading information (a violation of Article 5, § 16, of the Rules and
Regulations of the Division); and performing her job responsibilities in a
"culpably inefficient manner" (a violation of Article 5, § 5, of the Rules and
Regulations of the Division).
On a separate occasion, Habina wrote a burglary investigation report
alleging K.G. was a suspect because Habina had compared his driver's license
picture to a surveillance video. K.G. did not have a New Jersey driver's license.
Furthermore, Habina provided the address of an acquaintance of the suspect,
falsely claiming it was "obtained through a Division database," when that simply
was not true. The Division learned of this false report when K.G. complained
that these inaccuracies had "contributed to his arrest and incarceration."
When interviewed about the false report in the company of a union
representative, Habina said that she was uncertain whether she found K.G.'s
license, but asserted that she utilized the license of K.G.'s similar-looking son.
Habina's report also inaccurately listed dates that other troopers assisted her with
the case, which they could not corroborate. She admitted her report "was not
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factual." As a result of this false report, Habina was served with the same
charges as in the AIR matter.
The Superintendent noted in the agency decision that police officers are
public servants held to a high standard. Furthermore, trooper discipline is within
the agency's managerial prerogative due to the importance of maintaining
discipline among the state police.
The Superintendent did not credit Habina's attack on the Internal Affairs
interview regarding the burglary report. Her expert testified at the
administrative law hearing that she was unfairly questioned. The
Superintendent found no merit to this argument, because among other reasons,
Habina did not dispute the substance of the charges making the claim
immaterial.
As the Superintendent explained, Habina
intentionally and inappropriately altered a Division
record in connection with an arrest, including signing
the name of a [s]tate [t]rooper on the document without
his consent or knowledge. Further, her investigation
report of a burglary contains various inaccuracies,
including the basis for the identification of the suspect.
[Habina's] claims of lack of experience or fear of
discipline do not excuse or lessen the severity of her
misconduct and misjudgment. Further, her allegation
of inadequate supervision, in an attempt to shift
responsibility for her behavior to her supervisors, also
lacks merit. [Habina's] misconduct violated the
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standards of professionalism required of a [s]tate
[t]rooper.
The Superintendent also quoted the ALJ, who in his decision stated that Habina
had "broken the public trust" by so substantially deviating from the behavior
expected of a law enforcement official.
Now on appeal, Habina raises the following points:
POINT I
THE STATE DID NOT PROVIDE PROOF THAT
TROOPER HABINA ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT
OR CLEARLY KNEW THE POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES SHE WAS CHARGED WITH
VIOLATING.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERLOOKING THE
EVIDENCE THAT DET. SGT. RYON BARCLAY'S
INTERVIEW WAS UNFAIR AND BIASED.
These arguments are so lacking in merit as to not warrant much discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The Division need not prove that a
trooper signed to acknowledge written guidelines in order to hold that trooper
accountable for falsifying information. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has
stated, it is a law enforcement official's primary duty to "enforce and uphold the
law." In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 576-77 (1990) (quoting Moorestown v.
Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965)). Habina should have
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known falsifying the AIR report and signing another trooper's name without his
knowledge or consent violated Division policies, even if she never received
written standards to that effect.
The same is true with regard to the false burglary report. Even if we
accepted Habina's expert's opinion for the sake of argument, which we do not,
the internal investigations officer's credibility or "bullying" behavior is
ultimately irrelevant. Habina falsified the suspect's identification—which may
have caused his incarceration—and inaccurately recorded the involvement of
other officers in the investigation. As the ALJ aptly pointed out, this conduct
alone would have cast doubt on Habina's future investigations.
"Our review of administrative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd. of
Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011). We uphold an
administrative agency's final decision unless clearly "arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, or . . . lack[ing] fair support in the record." Ibid. (quoting In re
Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)). We are "in no way bound by an agency's
interpretation . . . of a strictly legal issue . . . ." Ibid. (quoting Mayflower Sec.
Co. v. Bureau of Sec. in the Div. of Consumer Affs. of the Dep't of Law & Pub.
Safety, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)). Thus, an agency's purely legal conclusions are
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reviewed de novo. Ibid. In this case, we uphold the administrative agency's
reasonable, factually supported, and legally sound final decision.
Affirmed.
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