TURBO FINANCIAL IMPROVEMENT, LLC VS. GLADYS COLLINS (DC-014921-19, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0113-20
TURBO FINANCIAL
IMPROVEMENT, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GLADYS COLLINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted December 2, 2021 – Decided December 10, 2021
Before Judges Alvarez, Haas, and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Docket No. DC-014921-19.
Franklin S. Montero, attorney for appellant.
Romi S. Law, attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Gladys Collins appeals from an August 27, 2020 order granting
a judgment of possession and warrant of removal in favor of plaintiff Turbo
Financial Improvement, LLC, a September 10, 2020 order denying an order to
show cause to vacate the August order, and a September 18, 2020 order denying
a motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
We glean the following facts from the record. On October 24, 2019,
plaintiff acquired property from Cash Flow Capital G, LLC (Cash Flow). After
learning defendant occupied the property, plaintiff filed an ejectment action
seeking a writ of possession. Defendant did not appear at the ejectment hearing,
claiming she was late due to a doctor's appointment. The court entered an
ejectment order on February 27, 2020.
Defendant moved for reconsideration. She attached to the motion: a copy
of a lease effective October 1, 2019 through September 30, 2021 and signed by
her and Edward Espinal on behalf of Cash Flow, a document allegedly proving
she paid property taxes, and a check and wire transfer defendant claimed were
advanced rent payments. The March 2017 wire transfer stated defendant sent
$100,000 on behalf of Cash Flow to a company in China, care of a client of Cash
Flow. The August 2018 check totaling $20,000 was drawn on defendant's
account payable to Cash Flow. Defendant's motion was granted unopposed
because plaintiff's counsel contracted COVID-19 and could not file opposition.
The trial judge vacated the order for possession, restored defendant to the
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property, and granted her "credit for all rent advancements made to the previous
owner of record."
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. At oral argument, 1 plaintiff alleged
the tenancy was not disclosed before purchase and that plaintiff and defendant
never had a landlord tenant relationship. Plaintiff maintained neither the wire
nor the check proved rent payment because the wire was sent to China on behalf
of Cash Flow and the check had no notation it was for rent. Plaintiff also pointed
out that both transactions predated Cash Flow's ownership of the property.
Defendant filed opposition. She supplied a certification from Espinal
supporting her claims of a lease and rent credits. Espinal claimed defendant
paid him $120,000 which he "used to purchase the property in exchange for
credit towards rent . . . ."
Following oral argument, the judge granted plaintiff's motion and found
as follows:
Plaintiff's certification and exhibits credibly
demonstrate that defendant was untruthful in her
previous moving certification with respect to the so-
called "advanced rent payments" and prior lease. At
best, defendant has failed to adequately demonstrate
any reason why a judgment of possession should not be
entered in favor of plaintiff. At worst, defendant
1
We refer to the transcript of the oral argument because plaintiff's motion
pleadings are not part of the appellate record.
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committed what are potentially actionable or criminal
misrepresentations.
The judge entered an order dated June 2, 2020, reinstating the judgment of
possession, stating: "Any alleged credit for rent advancement made to [the]
previous owner . . . is vacated and it is determined that no rent credit was
advanced to [the] previous owner of record[.]" The judge stayed the judgment
of possession pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 106, 2 which imposed pandemic-
related eviction restrictions.
In August 2020, plaintiff filed an order to show cause to enforce the
ejectment order. Plaintiff argued the court should grant ejectment pursuant to a
provision in EO 106 permitting relief from the eviction moratorium in the
interests of justice. Plaintiff noted EO 106 was intended to protect tenants who
could not pay rent during the pandemic, not defendants who had defrauded the
court and were not even legal tenants. Defendant opposed plaintiff's request,
denied any fraudulent conduct, and argued she and her children would suffer a
greater harm than plaintiff if removed from the property.
2
Exec. Order No. 106 (Mar. 19, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 553(a) (Apr. 6, 2020).
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Neither defendant nor her counsel appeared for oral argument. Plaintiff's
counsel argued his client purchased the property with a hard money loan,3 could
not refinance the property because he was not occupying it, and had to make
alternative housing arrangements. Counsel reiterated there was no evidence
defendant was ever a tenant.
The trial judge found the rent documents defendant submitted "were, in
fact, fraudulent." The judge concluded that the interests of justice weighed
"much more favorably in plaintiff's . . . side than that of defendant, particularly
because of the fraud perpetrated by the defendant." She then entered the August
27, 2020 order granting plaintiff possession.
After defendant was served with the lockout notice, she filed an order to
show cause to vacate the August order and halt the lockout. Her counsel
certified he did not appear for oral argument because he did not receive the
Zoom link.
On September 10, 2020, the judge denied the order to show cause. She
reiterated her finding that defendant "perpetrated a fraud on the [c]ourt by
3
"Hard money loans are considered loans of 'last resort' or short-term bridge
loans. These loans are primarily used in real estate transactions, with the lender
generally being individuals or companies and not banks." Troy Segal, Hard
Money Loan, Investopedia (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/h/hard_money_loans.asp.
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submitting documents that were falsified by the [d]efendant for the sole purpose
of allowing her to remain in the home to the detriment of [p]laintiff." Regarding
defense counsel's claim about the Zoom link, the judge found:
As was clearly stamped on the bottom of the [order to
show cause,] the parties had the responsibility to
contact the [c]ourt to obtain Zoom information to
participate in the hearing. Defense counsel failed to do
so and now is attempting to [persuade] the [c]ourt by
this last minute effort and the [c]ourt finds she has not
met the standard under Crowe v. [De Gioia], 90 [N.J.]
126 [(1982)].
Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the judge denied on
September 18, 2020. The judge found defendant did not meet her burden of
proof under Rule 4:49-2 and concluded the "[f]ailure to appear for oral argument
is not a proper reason for a [m]otion to [r]econsider."
I.
Defendant challenges the August 27 order, arguing the judge failed to
address the basis for the motion. She also claims the judge did not make findings
of fact or conclusions of law.
We review denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.
Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (citing Kornblueth v.
Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020)). "An abuse of discretion arises when a
decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from
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established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Pitney Bowes Bank,
Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor,
171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).
We are convinced defendant's arguments lack merit. See R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E). The judge adequately explained her findings at the August 27 oral
argument. She reiterated these findings in the subsequent order denying
reconsideration. These findings were not reversible error.
II.
Defendant argues the September 18 order was entered in error because the
judge's interpretation of EO 106 was flawed. Notwithstanding this argument,
her brief asserts: "Defendant is not arguing the fact that she would have had to
leave the property. . . . Plaintiff has already been granted possession of the
property once the moratorium was lifted but in the interest of justice, why punish
. . . [d]efendant and her two minor children who had just started school."
The "appellate function is a limited one: we do not disturb the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that
they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]"
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Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting
Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)).
The September 18 order was not erroneous. EO 106 stayed eviction proceedings
and lockouts while the order was in effect "unless the court determines . . . that
enforcement is necessary in the interest of justice." Exec. Order No. 106, 52
N.J.R. at 553(a).
The trial judge followed EO 106 and properly balanced the parties'
interests when she denied defendant's motion to halt the lockout. Defendant
concedes plaintiff is entitled to possession. Finally, the lockout order was not
stayed pending appeal and has already been executed.
Affirmed.
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