STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. STANLEY L. WILLIAMS (12-12-1090, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Alt hough it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0503-17T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STANLEY L. WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted July 24, 2018 – Decided January 15, 2019
Before Judges Ostrer and Vernoia.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 12-12-
1090.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Robert C. Pierce, Designated Counsel;
William P. Welaj, on the brief)
Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Andre R. Araujo, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
OSTRER, J.A.D.
Defendant Stanley L. Williams appeals from the denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief (PCR), without an evidentiary hearing. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to: first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-
1(b); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-4(a); and second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-
2(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1. He was sentenced to a thirteen-year custodial term
on the robbery charge, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2, concurrent to five-year terms on the remaining counts.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration.
POINT I
THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COURT ERRED
IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF SINCE HE FAILED
TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL
REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL.
POINT II
THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COURT ERRED
IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION, IN
PART, ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS PURSUANT
TO RULE 3:22-4.
We review de novo a PCR court's factual findings and legal conclusions
made without an evidentiary hearing. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004).
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In reviewing defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, we apply the
two-prong Strickland test, adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). We consider (1)
whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, and (2) whether
defendant suffered resulting prejudice, that is, whether there is "reasonable
probability" that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Ibid. Applying that standard, we affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts from the State's official version of the
offense, defendant's allocution, and that of one of his co-defendants. On the
morning of July 22, 2011, defendant and three other men – David Green, Brian
Kent, and Edwin Sanchez – planned the robbery of a residence they believed
contained drugs and money. That night, defendant and Green entered the
residence while Kent remained in the getaway car. Sanchez was not present,
although he was the plan's "mastermind," according to Kent and Green.
Inside the home, a female resident woke to a loud noise. She investigated
and found two intruders trying to get into her son's room. Her son opened his
door. One of the intruders engaged in a scuffle with the woman, while the other,
brandishing a gun and speaking with a Jamaican accent, demanded money from
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her son. The woman was struck in the head and received a large contusion. Her
son attempted to wrestle his intruder until a gunshot was fired causing the son
to retreat. The two intruders left with cash and marijuana.
Defendant and the other three men were later apprehended. Kent entered
into a cooperation agreement with law enforcement for this incident and an
unrelated crime; he pleaded guilty to robbery and conspiracy to commit burglary
and robbery; and ultimately received a five-year NERA sentence. Green entered
into a plea agreement as well, and received a five-year NERA sentence. Sanchez
received a seventeen-year custodial term, though the record is not clear if this
followed a guilty plea or a trial.
Kent and Green both provided statements to investigators. Green said that
he used a Jamaican accent during the robbery to disguise his identity. He also
said defendant fired the gun in the house. Kent said defendant provided the gun
for the robbery.
During his plea hearing, defendant said he possessed the gun and
brandished it inside the residence in order to intimidate the occupants. He also
stated he reviewed his discovery with his attorney. At defendant's subsequent
sentencing proceeding, his attorney did not argue for a lesser sentence than the
one specified in the plea agreement.
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On direct appeal, we affirmed defendant's sentence as neither excessive
nor unduly punitive. State v. Williams, No. A-0282-15 (App. Div. March 9,
2016).
II.
Defendant contends his plea attorney provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by: (1) failing to review discovery that allegedly indicated that Green,
not he, discharged the weapon in the house they invaded; and (2) failing to
advocate for a sentence more lenient than defendant's plea agreement
contemplated, particularly in light of the sentences Kent and Green received.
Defendant also contends that his appellate attorney was ineffective by failing to
raise the issue of disparate sentencing before the ESOA panel. We are
unpersuaded.
Regarding the first point, defendant focuses on the female victim's
statement, provided in discovery, that the intruder with the Jamaican accent
discharged the weapon. Based on Green's statement that he used the accent,
defendant contends the victim's statement proved he did not discharge the
weapon. He argues his counsel should have used this information to obtain
dismissal of the charges, argue for a lesser sentence, or to negotiate a better plea
agreement.
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As to those contentions we need not reach the first prong of the Strickland
test, because defendant has failed to establish prejudice under the second prong.
See State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) ("Although a demonstration of
prejudice constitutes the second part of the Strickland analysis, courts are
permitted leeway to choose to examine first whether a defendant has been
prejudiced, and if not, to dismiss the claim without determining whether
counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient."). A motion to dismiss the
charges would not have succeeded. Notwithstanding the victim's statement,
Green's assertion that defendant discharged the weapon, and Kent's statement
that defendant supplied the weapon used in the robbery, provided probable cause
for the weapons charges against defendant. It is not ineffective to withhold a
meritless motion. State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007). Nor is it reasonably
probable that reliance on the victim's statement would have secured a more
favorable plea agreement or sentence. The prosecutor was already aware of the
victim's statement.
Moreover, in the context of a PCR petition challenging a guilty plea based
on the ineffective assistance of counsel, the second prong is established when
the defendant demonstrates a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on
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going to trial," State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)), and that "a
decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances," Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010). Defendant fails
to make that showing here.
Defendant's contentions regarding his sentence fare no better. He failed
to show a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been more
favorable had his counsel made the disparity argument at sentencing or on
appeal. Uniformity in sentencing is a major objective of the criminal justice
system. See State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 231-32 (1996). Uniformity promotes
fairness and public confidence. Ibid. But not all divergent sentences are unfair
or unjust. Ibid. "The question therefore is whether the disparity is justifiable
or unjustifiable." Id. at 232-33. We consider whether the individuals receiving
the disparate sentences were similarly situated or not. See State v. Case, 220
N.J. 49, 63 (2014).
In this case, defendant received a thirteen-year term of imprisonment
while Kent and Green both received five-year terms. However, defendant was
an older man, and had a more extensive criminal record than his co-defendants.
Williams was thirty-nine years old at the time of the offense. As an adult, he
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had been arrested over twenty times, including six indictable offenses. He was
extended-term eligible. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3. By contrast, Kent had
cooperated with law enforcement. Green was twenty years old at the time of
conviction and had significantly less contact with the criminal justice system.
In light of these facts, Kent and Green were not similarly situated to defendant.
Notably, defendant received a shorter sentence than Sanchez.
As we conclude defendant's argument lacks substantive merit, we need
not reach the question whether it was procedurally barred by Rule 3:22-4.
Affirmed.
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