ERICK ESTIL VS. NEW JERSEY TRANSIT BUS OPERATIONS, INC. (L-0690-20, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0260-20
ERICK ESTIL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT
BUS OPERATIONS, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent.
Submitted December 13, 2021 – Decided December 29, 2021
Before Judges Messano and Rose.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-0690-20.
Fusco & Macaluso, PC, attorneys for appellant (Amie
E. DiCola, on the brief).
McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP,
attorneys for respondent (John J. Periano and David M.
Alberts, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Erick Estil appeals from the August 27, 2020 Law Division order
confirming an arbitration award that resulted in the termination of his
employment as a bus driver for New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc. (NJT).
Estil contends the trial judge erroneously failed to determine the award was the
product of undue means, and the arbitrator failed to consider relevant evidence.
NJT counters that Estil lacked standing to challenge the arbitrator's award, his
application to vacate the award was untimely, and his substantive arguments
lack merit. We affirm because Estil's application was untimely and otherwise
lacked merit.
The procedural history and facts regarding Estil's termination are set forth
at length in the arbitrator's thirty-one-page opinion and award and, for the
purposes of this appeal, need not be repeated in the same level of detail. In the
early afternoon of May 28, 2016, Estil was driving an NJT bus in the course of
his duties, when he turned left at a Newark intersection, struck a pedestrian in
the crosswalk, and ran over her legs with the front and rear wheels of the bus.
The pedestrian suffered severe injuries, including the loss of both legs above the
knee. A neighborhood store's surveillance camera captured the accident.
NJT and the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 819 (Union), of which
Estil is a member, were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The
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CBA recognized NJT's managerial rights, including the right to "discharge
[employees] for proper cause." The CBA also provided for resolution of
disputes between NJT and the Union through a four-step grievance procedure,
concluding with binding arbitration before a tripartite panel.
Following an internal investigation, NJT discharged Estil in August 2016,
finding the accident was "severe, preventable," and caused by "gross
negligence." Pursuant to a grading system, Estil was assessed the maximum of
sixteen points, requiring his termination. After further proceedings, Estil's
grievance remained unresolved and was arbitrated before a Union-designated
arbitrator, an NJT-designated arbitrator, and a jointly-selected neutral arbitrator.
The tripartite panel was asked to determine whether NJT "ha[d] proper cause to
suspend and discharge Mr. Estil" and, if not, to determine the proper remedy.
At the arbitration, which spanned six non-consecutive days between
November 16, 2017 and April 1, 2019, Estil did not testify but the Union
presented the testimony of its safety specialist, Brian Sherlock. NJT called six
witnesses including Dale Sulpy, its senior safety director, and Steven Schorr,
who was qualified by the panel as an expert in accident reconstruction. The
panel also considered the surveillance video footage depicting the accident ,
among other exhibits.
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By split decision, the panel concluded NJT "had proper cause to charge
Mr. Estil with gross negligence, and terminate him for the accident that occurred
on May 28, 2016." The opinion and award were issued by the neutral arbitrator
on September 26, 2019. The Union member of the panel dissented on September
30, 2019, and the award was delivered to the Union that same day.
The Union elected not to challenge the arbitration award, but through
undated correspondence from its attorney, authorized Estil to pursue an appeal
at his own expense and in his own name. The Union's attorney also indicated
he "believe[d] N.J.S.A. []2A:23B-23 provides 120 days in which to appeal," but
"caution[e]d" that the forty-five-day deadline cited by Estil's attorney "may be
accurate or may be relying on the standard for court based arbitrations, which in
[his] understanding, are non-binding and may be appealed de novo. Labor
arbitrations are not akin to those [standards]."
On January 27, 2020 – nearly four months after the Union received notice
of the award – Estil's retained counsel filed a verified complaint against NJT in
the Law Division, seeking to vacate the award under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.1 The
1
Although Estil was not a party to the arbitration, he did not move for leave to
intervene. See N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7 (providing "[a] party to the arbitration may
. . . commence an action" to vacate an award). Instead, his complaint was filed
in his name only.
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next day, the motion judge issued an order to show cause and the matter
proceeded in a summary manner. See R. 4:67-1; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7.
Following briefing, oral argument was held on July 20, 2020.
Anticipating NJT's procedural arguments, Estil asserted the Union granted him
permission "to stand in [its] place and to pursue this matter at his own cost with
his own attorney." Estil nonetheless acknowledged he was not a party to the
CBA, and the CBA did not address whether the Union could delegate to a
member its right to challenge an arbitration award. Further, Estil argued his
application was timely made within the 120-day limitation set forth in N.J.S.A.
2A:23B-23, although he acknowledged his action was filed under N.J.S.A.
2A:24-8, which establishes a three-month deadline to confirm, vacate, or modify
an award.2 Estil also asserted the court could relax the time constraints under
N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7 for good cause.
As to the merits, Estil advanced two grounds for vacating the award.
Citing N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a), Estil claimed the award was reached by undue
2
As we have explained, "New Jersey has three sets of arbitration laws: N.J.S.A.
2A:23A-1 to -19, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32, and N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 to -11." Port
Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. Police Benevolent Ass'n,
Inc., 459 N.J. Super. 278, 285 (App. Div. 2019). Relevant here, when the
Legislature passed N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32 in 2003, it "explicitly preserved
N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 to -11 as it applies to disputes arising from [CBA]s." Id. at
285-86.
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means because the arbitrator impermissibly found gross negligence in the
absence of a definition of that term under the CBA. Secondly, Estil claimed the
arbitrator failed to "hear or consider the expert testimony of Mr. Sherlock" under
N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(c).
Following arguments, the trial judge reserved decision and thereafter
issued a ten-page statement of reasons accompanying the August 27, 2020 order.
The judge squarely addressed the issues raised in view of the applicable legal
principles and the parties' CBA.
As a preliminary matter, the judge correctly recognized: "An individual
employee is not deemed a formal party to a grievance arbitration provided for
in a [CBA] that limits the power to invoke arbitration exclusively at the
discretion of the union." Nonetheless, the trial judge was persuaded Estil was
an "intended beneficiary" of the agreement and "clearly ha[d] an interest in this
matter." Because Estil submitted documentation from the Union that
"purport[ed] to convey authorization . . . to pursue an appeal," the judge
concluded Estil presented a "colorable argument that he ha[d] acquired standing
from the [U]nion."
However, the trial judge determined Estil's action was time-barred under
the three-month time limitation set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7, which he
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recognized "applies to all arbitrations arising from [CBA]s." As the judge noted,
plaintiff's complaint "asserted violations of N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a) and (c)."
Because the arbitration award was received by the Union on September 30,
2019, the judge therefore concluded Estil's January 28, 2020 complaint was filed
nearly one month after the December 30, 2019 deadline.
Nonetheless, the trial judge also addressed the merits of Estil's
application. Recognizing the judiciary's limited role in reviewing arbitration
awards, the judge noted "labor arbitration awards can be overturned only in the
narrowest of circumstances." The court may vacate an arbitration award only:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption,
fraud[,] or undue means;
(b) Where there was either evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof;
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
being shown therefor, or in refusing to hear evidence,
pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any
other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any
party; [or]
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly
executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8].
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Analyzing the applicable subsections, (a) and (c), the trial judge found
Estil failed to meet his burden. As to subsection (a), the judge surveyed Supreme
Court precedent noting, for example: "'[U]ndue means' ordinarily encompasses
a situation in which the arbitrator has made an acknowledged mistake of fact or
law or a mistake that is apparent on the face of the record . . . ." Borough of E.
Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 203 (2013) (alteration
in original) (quoting Off. of Emp. Rels. v. Commc'n Workers of Am., 154 N.J.
98, 111-12 (1998)). Undue means does not however, "include situations . . .
where the arbitrator bases his decision on one party's version of the facts, finding
that version to be credible." Loc. No. 153, Off. & Pro. Emps. Int'l Union v. Tr.
Co. of N.J., 105 N.J. 442, 450 n.1 (1987).
The trial judge rejected Estil's assertion that, because "the CBA does not
define gross negligence," the award was procured by undue means. Instead, the
judge found NJT established the gross negligence standard through Sulpy, who
testified about the industry standards and applicable point system, which
assigned the maximum of sixteen points to the accident, thereby "necessitating"
Estil's discharge. The judge explained: "Sulpy has handled over 1000
pedestrian crashes in his career. He testified that [Estil] should have been able
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to see the pedestrian . . . in the crosswalk. The court finds no mistake of fact or
law in the arbitrator's determination."
Referencing our Supreme Court's decision in Shelton v. Restaurant.com,
Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 440 (2013), the judge reasoned "undue means should be
calibrated in light of that phrase's neighboring words 'fraud' and 'corruption.'"
The trial judge found "nothing in the record concerning an error that [wa]s so
gross as to suggest fraud or misconduct." Rather, Estil "dispute[d] the weight
assigned to the evidence by the arbitrator" but clearly, "the arbitrator assigned
greater weight and credibility to some evidence over other [evidence] in this
matter." The judge elaborated:
During the course of the arbitration proceeding, the
panel was presented with and considered both physical
and demonstrative evidence and live witness testimony
of the incident. . . . There was a video camera that
captured the incident and showed the pedestrian
walking in the crosswalk with the right-of-way. The
video also shows [Estil] making a sweeping left turn
rather than a square . . . left turn. Evidence was
presented that had [Estil] made a square . . . left turn
the accident would not have happened. There was
testimony that the type of left turn ma[de] by [Estil] was
in violation of his training. [Estil] stated that the
pedestrian was running across the street when he struck
her. The video did not support his statement that the
pedestrian was running. It showed the pedestrian
walking.
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The accident reconstructionist Stephen Schoor's
testimony included a video animation that depicted the
accident from the perspective of [Estil]. Dale Sulpy
testified and established relevant industry standards and
training of bus operators that [were] considered by the
arbitrator. Sulpy specifically testified that [Estil] failed
to appropriately scan and failed to make a square turn
as he was trained to do. . . .
The arbitrator also considered the testimony of an
eyewitness that was on the bus at the time of the
accident. The police cited [Estil] for failure to yield.
Although [he] did not testify, [his] conflicting
statements . . . were introduced and considered by [the]
arbitration panel. The evidence mentioned here is not
exhaustive.
The judge therefore found the arbitrator reasonably rejected the Union's
argument that Estil's "actions could not be found to be grossly negligent without
some proof of fault on [his] behalf."
The trial judge also was not persuaded that the arbitrator refused to
consider evidence under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(c). At issue was Sherlock's
testimony that the pedestrian could have been in Estil's "blind spot" just prior to
the accident. Noting Sherlock testified at the hearing, the judge found "clearly
this [wa]s not the case where testimony was precluded." Moreover, the judge
rejected Estil's contention that Sherlock's testimony was "uncontroverted"
because NJT's expert, Schorr, "considered and rejected [Sherlock's] blind spot
theory" during his testimony. Accordingly, the judge concluded the arbitration
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panel considered and "determine[d] the credibility, value[,] and weight" of
Sherlock's testimony.
On appeal, Estil reprises his argument that the arbitration award should be
vacated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 (a) and (c). Estil does not address the
timeliness of his complaint, other than to assert in passing that good cause
existed to extend the deadline and NJT was not prejudiced by his late filing.
Well-established principles guide our analysis. "Judicial review of an
arbitration award is very limited." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228
N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel.
Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276 (2010)). "An arbitrator's award is not to be cast
aside lightly. It is subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a
statutory basis justifies that action." Ibid. (quoting Kearny PBA Loc. No. 21 v.
Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979)).
As our Supreme Court has held: "Arbitration can attain its goal of
providing final, speedy and inexpensive settlement of disputes only if judicial
interference with the process is minimized; it is, after all, 'meant to be a
substitute for and not a springboard for litigation.'" Barcon Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-
Cnty. Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179, 187 (1981) (quoting Korshalla v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 154 N.J. Super. 235, 240 (Law Div. 1977)). With that goal in mind,
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"[a]rbitration should spell litigation's conclusion, rather than its beginning." E.
Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. at 201 (quoting N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Loc. 196,
I.F.P.T.E., 190 N.J. 283, 292 (2007)). Indeed, "[t]he public policy of this State
favors arbitration as a means of settling disputes that otherwise would be
litigated in a court." Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 556 (2015).
In sum, arbitrators are granted broad powers to decide issues of fact and
law, and their decisions "are given collateral estoppel effect by reviewing
courts." Barcon, 86 N.J. at 187. As a result, "courts grant arbitration awards
considerable deference." E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. at 201. Because
a trial court's decision to affirm or vacate an arbitration award is a decision of
law, however, our review is de novo. Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111,
136 (App. Div. 2013).
Having considered Estil's contentions in view of the governing legal
principles, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Similar to the trial judge, we conclude
Estil's complaint was untimely under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7, and Estil failed to
establish good cause that would otherwise excuse his late filing. We
additionally conclude, as did the trial judge, that the abundance of evidence
before the tripartite panel refuted Estil's substantive claims under N.J.S.A.
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2A:24-8 (a) and (c). Because we have concluded Estil's action was time-barred,
we need not decide whether he had standing to file his Law Division action.
However, because we have reached the merits of Estil's complaint, we add the
following brief remarks.
Generally, union members lack standing to challenge a labor arbitration
award where the parties to the CBA were the employer and the employee's
union. Although New Jersey has a liberal approach to standing generally, Jen
Elec., Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, 197 N.J. 627, 645 (2009), N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7 clearly
provides "[a] party to the arbitration may . . . commence an action" to vacate an
award. (Emphasis added). Because only the Union and NJT were parties to the
CBA in this case, only they could invoke binding arbitration in a discharge case,
thereby becoming parties to the arbitration with the ability to ultimately
challenge the resulting award.
Indeed, no Federal or New Jersey cases – cited or located in our research
– extend standing to commence such an action to a union member except where
there is an alleged breach of the duty of fair representation by the union. See
e.g., Vosch v. Werner Cont'l, Inc., 734 F.2d 149, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1984). As
noted in Vosch, a trial court's jurisdiction is proper where "the plaintiff alleged
a violation of the duty of fair representation, or the [CBA] did not create a
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grievance mechanism." 734 F.2d at 155 n.10. Our Supreme Court has taken a
similar approach. See Saginario v. Attorney General, 87 N.J. 480, 501 n.1
(1981) (Clifford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). No such claims
were made in this case.
Further, we are not aware of any authority that empowers the Union to
confer standing on an employee when the Union opts not to appeal an arbitration
award under similar circumstances. Nonetheless, because the Union, through
counsel, expressly "authorize[d]" Estil "to pursue such an appeal of the decision"
here, we discern no error in the trial judge's determination that Estil made a
"colorable argument" that he "acquired standing from the [U]nion." We hasten
to add our decision is limited to the specific circumstances of this matter.
Affirmed.
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