In the Matter of an Initiative Petition for the Adoption of an Ordinance to Amend the Jackson Township Administrative Code

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0517-13T1
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
INITIATIVE PETITION FOR THE September 8, 2014
ADOPTION OF AN ORDINANCE TO
AMEND THE JACKSON TOWNSHIP APPELLATE DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.
_____________________________________
Argued February 26, 2014 — Decided September 8, 2014
Before Judges Grall, Nugent, and Accurso.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-
1217-13.
Renée Steinhagen argued the cause for
appellants Nicolas Antonoff, Catherine V.
Giancola, Richard F. Davidson, Raymond J.
Cattonar, and Roger E. Downing (Zazzali,
Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum & Friedman, and
New Jersey Appleseed Public Interest Law
Center, Inc., attorneys; Ms. Steinhagen and
Flavio L. Komuves, on the brief).
Kevin N. Starkey argued the cause for
respondents Mayor and Township Council of
Jackson Township (Starkey, Kelly, Kenneally,
Cunningham & Turnbach, attorneys; Mr.
Starkey, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NUGENT, J.A.D.
This appeal involves a governing body's pre-election
challenge to an ordinance proposed in an initiative petition.
The trial court declared a section of the ordinance unlawful
but, notwithstanding a severance clause in the ordinance,
declined to sever the unlawful section and order that the
excised ordinance be placed on the ballot. We affirm. We
conclude that the trial court had the authority to hear the pre-
election challenge to the proposed ordinance. We further
conclude that the court did not have the authority to revise the
ordinance and order that the altered ordinance be placed on the
ballot.
I.
Appellants, Nicolas Antonoff, Catherine V. Giancola,
Richard F. Davidson, Raymond J. Cattonar, and Roger E. Downing,
were the Committee of Petitioners responsible for an initiative
petition to amend a Jackson Township ordinance. Respondents are
the Mayor and Council of Jackson Township. Jackson Township is
organized under the Optional Municipal Charter Law (the Faulkner
Act), N.J.S.A. 40:69A-1 to -210. The power of local self-
government in municipalities organized under the Faulkner Act
includes, with some exceptions, the right of voters to "propose
any ordinance and . . . adopt or reject the same at the polls,
such power being known as the initiative." N.J.S.A. 40:69A-184.
"Any initiated ordinance may be submitted to the municipal
council by a petition signed by" a required percentage of legal
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voters. Ibid.; see also N.J.S.A. 40:69A-185 (setting forth the
procedures for the referendum process).
The petition must contain "the names and addresses of five
voters, designated as the Committee of the Petitioners, who
shall be regarded as responsible for the circulation and filing
of the petition and for its possible withdrawal as hereinafter
provided." N.J.S.A. 40:69A-186. As previously noted,
appellants are the Committee of Petitioners responsible for
filing the petition and proposed amended ordinance that are the
subject of this appeal.
The events that led to the initiative in this case began in
November 2011 when two of the appellants, Catherine V. Giancola
and Raymond J. Cattonar, prepared a "Jackson Township
Feasibility Study" on the topic of "Insourcing [the] Legal
Department." Their study "relied on, among other things,
extensive interviews of knowledgeable persons, and a thorough
review of available literature on the matter."
The purpose of the study was to "ascertain whether it is
more cost effective to retain an in-house legal staff versus
outsourcing Jackson Townships [sic] legal needs," which was the
practice at the time. The study recommended, as a cost-saving
measure, employing in-house counsel and a paralegal instead of
outsourcing legal work to a private firm. The study also
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proposed a shared-services agreement between the Township and
the Jackson Board of Education (the Board), in which the
Township's new in-house counsel would also handle legal matters
for the Board, at no additional cost. The Township and the
Board would still be able to retain outside counsel for
specialized legal services that could not be handled by the new
in-house attorney and paralegal.
From November 2011 through January 2012, appellants
"oversaw the drafting of the petition and ordinance" that
proposed to amend the Township's code provisions concerning its
legal department and municipal attorney. The ordinance
provides:
1. Section 3-87 of the Jackson
Township Administrative Code is amended to
read as follows:
A. There is hereby created the Department
of Law, the head of which shall be the
Director of Law, who shall be the Municipal
Attorney. The Director of Law shall be a
full-time salaried position, the
compensation for which shall be fixed by the
Council. There is also created the position
of Paralegal Specialist within the
Department of Law which shall be a full-time
salaried position, the compensation for
which shall be fixed by the Council. No
full-time attorney of the Division of Law
shall engage in any other practice of law
for compensation unless the Mayor, in a
signed writing, has approved the particulars
of such other employment or practice of law.
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B. The Director of Law and the Paralegal
Specialist shall be appointed by the Mayor
with the advice and consent of the Township
Council and, unless provided by other law,
shall serve at the pleasure of the Mayor and
Council. The Municipal Attorney shall be a
graduate of an accredited law school duly
admitted to the practice of law in the State
of New Jersey for at least five years and an
attorney at law of the State of New Jersey
in good standing.
C. In order to efficiently and competently
discharge the duties of the Division of Law,
the Director of Law, within the limits of
available appropriations, may retain other
attorneys, paraprofessionals and other
staff, either on a full- or part-time
salaried or contract basis. Any retention
of the services of other persons shall not
be effective until disclosure of the
person(s) retained and the purpose of their
retention is made in writing to the
Municipal Council at a public meeting.
D. The Division of Law, acting through its
Director or such other person who has been
delegated authority by the Director, shall
be a legal advisor to the Mayor, Council and
all departments, except as otherwise
provided by the Charter or the Township
Code. The Division of Law, acting through
its Director or such other person who has
been delegated authority by the Director,
shall prosecute and defend actions and
proceedings by and against the Township and
every department thereof. In furtherance of
these general powers and without limitation
thereto, the Division shall:
(1) Advise the Council and its members, the
Mayor and other officers of the Township, as
to all matters which may be submitted for
its opinion.
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(2) Review and approve all contracts,
deeds, documents and instruments prior to
the execution thereof by or on behalf of the
Township.
(3) Institute litigation and conduct
appeals from orders, decisions or judgments
affecting any interest of the Township as
determined in its discretion to be necessary
or desirable.
(4) Subject to the approval of [the]
Council, have the power to enter into any
agreement, compromise or settlement of any
litigation in which the Township is
involved.
(5) Render opinions in writing upon any
question of law submitted by the Mayor, the
Council, the Business Administrator,
Municipal Clerk, Tax Assessor, or the head
of any department.
(6) Maintain a record of all actions,
suits, proceeding and matters which relate
to the Township's interest and report
thereon from time to time as the Mayor or
Council may require.
(7) Attend such Council meetings as
requested by [the] Council.
(8) Have such other and different
functions, powers and duties as may be
provided by the Charter, this chapter or
other ordinance; and
(9) At the request of the Jackson Township
Board of Education or the duly-appointed
officials thereof, and provided there is no
conflict of interest under the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law regarding
conflict of interest, provide the services
described in this Section D to the Board of
Education, without additional fees or
compensation.
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2. All ordinances inconsistent
with this Ordinance are repealed to the
extent of their inconsistency.
3. This Ordinance shall take
th
effect on the 30 day following its approval
by the Mayor and Council or, if submitted to
and approved by the voters pursuant to
[N.J.S.A.] 40:69A-184 et seq., on the 30th
day following certification of the election
results pursuant to [N.J.S.A.] 19:20-1 et
seq.
4. The provisions of this
Ordinance are severable. If any part of
this Ordinance, or application of this
ordinance, shall be ruled illegal,
unconstitutional or void, the remaining
parts of this ordinance shall be unaffected
by such ruling. Every person signing an
initiative petition proposing this
ordinance, and every person voting to
approve this Ordinance, would have signed
the petition and/or voted to approve this
ordinance notwithstanding the possibility
that one or more parts of this Ordinance or
applications of this Ordinance might be
ruled illegal, unconstitutional or void.
In addition to the ordinance, a proposed question and
interpretive statement for the election ballot were drafted.
They stated:
QUESTION. Shall the Ordinance submitted by
initiative petition, amending Section 3-87
of the Jackson Township Administrative Code
("Department of Law") and providing for a
full-time salaried Director of Law and other
staff, and authorizing the Board of
Education to use the services of the
Division of Law, be adopted?
INTERPRETIVE STATEMENT. This Ordinance
proposes to amend the Jackson Township
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Administrative Code to provide for a full-
time salaried Director of Law and other
professional and nonprofessional staff. It
would also authorize the Board of Education,
in appropriate circumstances, to use the
legal services of the Division of Law for
its legal needs. The Ordinance would
replace the current system of relying
exclusively on part-time attorneys
compensated by hourly rate rather than
salary for the legal needs of the Township.
A "Yes" vote is a vote to approve the
Ordinance. A "No" vote is a vote against
the Ordinance.
After appellants obtained the required number of signatures
for the petition, they filed it, and the municipal clerk
presented it to the members of the Township Council, who voted
unanimously to decline to adopt it. The ordinance would have
been placed on the ballot following the Council's action, but
after some delays not relevant to this appeal, the Mayor and
Council filed a complaint for declaratory judgment. In their
complaint, they alleged that provisions of the ordinance were
illegal, including the provision that provided for shared
services with the Board of Education. Appellants answered, and
the trial court disposed of the matter on cross-motions for
summary judgment after the parties briefed and orally argued
their positions.
Recognizing "countless examples of why the democratic
process should be reserved to the people at all times under the
Faulkner Act," the court nevertheless noted that paragraph
8 A-0517-13T1
1(D)(9) of the proposed ordinance conflicted with the Uniform
Shared Services and Consolidation Act (USSCA), N.J.S.A. 40A:65-1
to -35, which was enacted "to effectuate agreements between
local units for any service or circumstance intended to reduce
property taxes through the reduction of local expenses."
N.J.S.A. 40A:65-2(c). The court explained that the USSCA
required local units to enter an agreement to share services and
concluded "that the provision of the ballot question which
compels legal services to be provided to the Board of Education
at [its] request if not approved by the Township Committee would
ultimately fall."
Having so concluded, the court framed the dispositive issue
as whether it could "excise out that portion of the [o]rdinance
which violates the shared services agreement." As to that
issue, the court concluded that "[t]o do so the [c]ourt would
have to, in the [c]ourt's opinion, wholly change the intent of
the initiative." The court explained that excising the shared
services section of the proposed ordinance "would remove . . .
half of the relief sought."
The court believed that by excising paragraph 1(D)(9), the
proposed ordinance would be "eviscerated." Explaining that
courts should be reluctant to impose their will to make
petitions better, in that "[t]he will of the people should be
9 A-0517-13T1
protected and these [p]etitions should be recognized as
sacrosanct," the court concluded that severing the shared
services provision of the proposed ordinance would have a
significant impact on the will of the voters. Consequently, the
court declared the petition and proposed ordinance null and
void. Appellants appealed from the court's implementing order.
II.
Appellants present the following arguments for our
consideration1:
I. EVEN IF SUBPARAGRAPH D(9) OF THE
ORDINANCE WERE DEFECTIVE, THE ROBUST
SEVERABILITY CLAUSE IN THE PROPOSED
ORDINANCE REQUIRED THE REMAINING
UNCHALLENGED PORTIONS OF THE ORDINANCE TO BE
PRESENTED TO THE VOTERS.
II. NEW JERSEY COURTS SHOULD NOT ENTERTAIN
PRE-ELECTION CHALLENGES TO PARTS OF A
CITIZEN INITIATIVE, AS SUCH CASES ARE NOT
RIPE FOR RESOLUTION UNDER THE DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS ACT OR GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
JUSTICIABILITY.
"We review de novo the grant or denial of a motion for
summary judgment." Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 91
(2013). Moreover, the material facts in this case are
undisputed and this appeal presents for our review issues of law
1
We have renumbered appellants' arguments as I and II. In their
brief, their first point heading addressed issues the trial
court decided in their favor. Respondents state explicitly that
they do not challenge those rulings on this appeal.
10 A-0517-13T1
only. "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled
to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm.
of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
We address appellants' second argument first.
Differentiating between "substantive" pre-election challenges to
initiative ordinances on one hand, and "procedural" or
"jurisdictional" challenges on the other, appellants argue that
the courts of this State should not entertain a challenge to the
substantive validity of such an ordinance. Relying upon James
D. Gordon, III, & David B. Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Review
of Initiatives and Referendums, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 298
(1989), appellants submit that such pre-election substantive
judicial review "involves issuing an advisory opinion, violates
ripeness requirements, undermines the policy of avoiding
unnecessary constitutional questions, and constitutes
unwarranted judicial interference with a legislative process."
Appellants maintain that "[r]esearch has not revealed any New
Jersey case where a court, in derogation of the generally-
applicable principles regarding ripeness, advisory opinions, and
separation of powers, has interfered with a legislative proposal
that, as here, is only alleged to be partially invalid, and
invalid on substantive grounds, not jurisdictional."
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Appellants also argue that the courts should not entertain
pre-election declaratory judgment challenges to proposed
ordinances because such challenges contravene the express
language of the Declaratory Judgments Act.
Appellants' argument that the Declaratory Judgments Act,
N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to -62, does not authorize a challenge to a
pre-election initiative ordinance, has previously been rejected.
In City of Newark v. Benjamin, 144 N.J. Super. 58, 65 (Ch.
Div.), aff'd o.b., 144 N.J. Super. 389 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd
o.b., 75 N.J. 311 (1978), the defendants, in challenging a
proposed ordinance, "argue[d] that an action for a declaratory
judgment under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 is not the proper procedure
because there exists no municipal ordinance to be construed."
The court noted that there were several cases "in which
declaratory judgments were sought before an ordinance had been
enacted. In each of these cases the courts declared the rights
of the parties and in each held the proposed ordinance invalid."
Ibid. (citing McCrink v. Town of W. Orange, 85 N.J. Super. 86
(App. Div. 1964); Smith v. Twp. of Livingston, 106 N.J. Super.
444 (Ch. Div.), aff'd o.b., 54 N.J. 525 (1969); Twp. of Sparta
v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. 519 (App. Div. 1973), certif. den.,
64 N.J. 493 (1974)).
12 A-0517-13T1
The court explained that such decisions carry out the
purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act, id. at 65-66, which is
"to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity
with respect to rights, status and other legal relations."
N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51. The court reasoned that "[i]f an ordinance
is invalid on its face, it would be a useless expenditure of
effort and money to submit it to the electorate before its
validity has been determined." Benjamin, supra, 144 N.J. Super.
at 66-67. We agree with the reasoning in Benjamin.
Accordingly, we reject appellants' argument that pre-election
initiative ordinances cannot be challenged under the Declaratory
Judgments Act.
We also decline to follow an analytical framework in which
the result is determined by whether a challenge to a pre-
election initiative ordinance is characterized as
"substantive," as distinguished from "procedural" or
"jurisdictional." Our courts have neither adopted such
classifications nor used them to determine whether an issue is
ripe for adjudication. See e.g., Comm. to Recall Robert
Menendez v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79, 101 (2010) (quoting Benjamin,
supra, 144 N.J. Super. at 66) (explaining that "when the law
giving rise to an election 'is defective on its face,' there is
'good reason' to review the law's validity before voting");
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Clean Capital Cnty. Comm. v. Driver, 228 N.J. Super. 506, 510
(App. Div.) ("Ordinarily, [a] court's review of the validity of
an initiative ordinance prior to its enactment is limited to
whether it is defective on its face, or the petitioners have
failed to follow the statutory requirements."), certif. granted
in part and denied in part and modified by, 134 N.J. 468 (1988).
Existing precedent provides our trial courts with an adequate
framework for determining whether it is appropriate to decide
pre-election challenges to initiative ordinances.
Our opinion should not be construed as either determining
that the trial court correctly decided that paragraph 1(D)(9) of
the initiative ordinance was invalid on its face or as rejecting
as implausible the argument that paragraph 1(D)(9) could have
been construed as implicitly requiring compliance with the
USSCA. As respondents point out, those issues have not been
raised in this appeal and thus we do not consider them.
We now turn to appellant's argument that the trial court
erred by not severing paragraph 1(D)(9) from the initial
ordinance and submitting the remainder of the ordinance to the
voters. Appellants argue that "even if subparagraph (D)(9) of
the ordinance were defective, the robust severability clause in
the proposed ordinance required the remaining unchallenged
portions of the ordinance to be presented to the voters." They
14 A-0517-13T1
reason that the severability clause "affirmatively states the
intentions of the petition's drafters, its signers, and its
voters, that they wanted the ordinance to proceed even if it was
struck down in part." They nevertheless acknowledge that "there
is no clear New Jersey precedent that applies severability
provisions in the context of citizen initiatives."
Respondents contend the trial court properly recognized
that it would be required to re-write a substantial portion of
the initiative petition, including the question and
interpretative statement. They point out that "no legal
authority exists in New Jersey law for a court to re-write an
initiative petition through the doctrine of severability." They
further contend that precedents concerning severability clauses
in statutes and ordinances enacted and adopted "simply do not
apply" to initiative petitions. They maintain that "even if the
severability doctrine does apply to the [i]nitiative [p]etition,
the defective portions are so interwoven with the valid
portions, the [p]roposed [o]rdinance can no longer stand."
Whether a court may sever an unlawful clause from an
ordinance proposed in an initiative petition and order the
excised ordinance placed on the ballot, rather than having the
petitioners begin the initiative process anew, is a question our
courts have not answered. The issue has received attention
15 A-0517-13T1
elsewhere. The jurisdictions that have addressed it appear to
be divided along the lines of the parties to this action. For
instance, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that the courts of
that state have the authority to sever invalid portions of
ordinances proposed by initiative. McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska,
762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988). The court reasoned
that circumspect judicial exercise of the
power to sever impermissible portions of
initiatives will promote, rather than
frustrate, the important right of the people
to enact laws by initiative. Striking the
entire initiative on the ground that one
sentence of secondary importance is
constitutionally invalid would be strong
medicine. Such a decision forces the
sponsors to choose between abandoning their
efforts altogether and submitting a new
application and expending, for the second
time, the significant time and effort
required to generate public enthusiasm and
gather the requisite number of
signatures. This would seriously impede the
ability of the people to initiate laws,
particularly when, as is often the case, the
sponsors of an initiative are grass roots
groups with limited resources.
[Id. at 93 (footnotes omitted); accord City
of Colorado Springs v. Bull, 143 P.3d 1127,
1128 (Colo. App. 2006).]
The contrary view, as explained in an early decision by a
California appellate court, is that if a provision in an
ordinance proposed by initiative is invalid, the entire
initiative and ordinance must be invalidated. Bennett v.
16 A-0517-13T1
Drullard, 149 P. 368 (Cal. App. 1915). The California appeals
court explained:
Here is a power granted unto the people, to
propose their own laws for adoption,
provided certain legal procedure be followed
to properly place said laws before the
voters. Assume, if you please, that certain
features are included in such proposed laws
or in connection therewith, which appealed
to the voter, and in fact served as the
controlling influence inducing him to sign
the petition. Has he not the right to
assume, and should not the law protect him
in the assumption, that he will have the
opportunity and right to vote for the
matters which he has petitioned for? Or,
shall the law permit the alteration of the
measures which he has proposed and
petitioned for, to the extent that he will
be unable to recognize the same when he
comes to cast his ballot?
In fact, is not the whole theory of
initiative legislation based upon the
security that the legislation proposed and
petitioned for by the people shall be voted
upon at the polls by them without
interference, revision, or mutilation by any
official or set of officials?
[Id. at 370. But see AFL v. Eu, 686 P.2d
609, 629 n.27 (Cal. 1984) (noting that an
earlier California Supreme Court opinion
"left open the test of severability [for
initiatives] in preelection review" and
stating that "it would constitute a
deception on the voters for a court to
permit a measure to remain on the ballot
knowing that most of its provisions,
including those provisions which are most
likely to excite the interest and attention
of the voters, are invalid."); Bighorn-
Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil, 138 P.3d
220, 230 (Cal. 2006) ("When a significant
17 A-0517-13T1
part of a proposed initiative measure is
invalid, the measure may not be submitted to
the voters.").]
Here, the parties cite to and argue the cases in other
jurisdictions that support their respective positions. We
choose to resolve the issue based on the Faulkner Act itself and
existing precedent in this State.
Indisputably, in Faulkner Act municipalities there is a
"strong public policy favoring the right of the voters to
exercise their power of initiative." Clean Capital, supra, 228
N.J. Super. at 510 (examining an initiative ordinance under the
Optional County Charter Law). That policy derives from the
Faulkner Act's goal "to confer upon municipalities the greatest
possible power of local self-government consistent with the
Constitution of this State." Mun. Council of Newark, supra, 183
N.J. at 363 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
For that reason, "[s]tatutory provisions for initiative . . .
[should] be liberally construed to effect the salutary objective
of popular participation in local government." Concerned
Citizens of Wildwood Crest v. Pantalone, 185 N.J. Super. 37, 43
(App. Div. 1982).
Those same considerations, however, mandate minimal
judicial interference in the initiative process. As previously
noted, pre-election judicial review of the validity of an
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initiative ordinance "is limited to whether it is defective on
its face, or the petitioners have failed to follow the statutory
requirements." Clean Capital, supra, 228 N.J. Super. at 510;
cf. Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez, supra, 204 N.J. at 101
(noting there is good reason for pre-election judicial review
when the law giving rise to an election is defective on its
face).
The Faulkner Act itself supports that result. The Act
provides that if, within twenty days of an initiative petition's
submission to the municipal clerk, the municipal council "shall
fail to pass an ordinance requested by an initiative petition in
substantially the form requested . . . the municipal clerk shall
submit the ordinance to the voters unless" the Committee of
Petitioners withdraws it. N.J.S.A. 40:69A-191 (emphasis added).
We agree with respondents that this language requires that
initiative petitions under the Faulkner Act reach the voters in
substantially the same form as presented to the petitioners.
Moreover, in view of the strong policies underlying the
Faulkner Act, courts should not be making what are often
subjective decisions about the intent of voters who have signed
initiative petitions. This case illustrates the point.
Notwithstanding the severability clause, the parties have made
equally plausible arguments about the significance to the
19 A-0517-13T1
petition's signatories of paragraph 1(D)(9) of the proposed
ordinance.
The policies underlying the Faulkner Act would not be
served by the court severing part of the ordinance based on its
subjective evaluation of the significance of the school board
and severability clauses, then rewriting the ordinance, ballot
question, and interpretative statement. If a voter signs a
petition in a certain form, he or she should expect to see the
proposed ordinance in substantially that same form on the
ballot. A court cannot discern with any certainty which
provisions of an initiative ordinance induced each voter to sign
it. It is not the role of the courts to interfere with the
legislative powers granted to citizens of Faulkner Act
municipalities.
Affirmed.
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