DANIEL HUDSPITH v. BRITTANY FROYSLAND (FD-14-0141-20, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1187-21
DANIEL HUDSPITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRITTANY FROYSLAND,
Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________
Submitted September 20, 2022 – Decided October 6, 2022
Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
Docket No. FD-14-0141-20.
Ziegler, Resnick & Epstein, attorneys for appellant
(Steven M. Resnick, on the briefs).
DeTommaso Law Group, LLC, attorneys for
respondent (Michael J. DeTomasso and Gregory A.
Pasler, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Daniel Hudspith appeals from a Family Part order that denied his
motion to enroll his then five-year-old daughter, S.H.,1 at St. Therese School,
located in Succasunna, and directed that his daughter shall remain enrolled in
Riverview Elementary School (Riverview) in Denville. We affirm.
We take the following facts from the record. Plaintiff and defendant lived
together but were not married. Their daughter was born in November 2015. The
parties separated in September 2019. At that time, defendant sought and
obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against plaintiff pursuant to the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. In October
2019, the parties agreed to a consent order for civil restraints that established
custody, parenting time, and child support obligations and the domestic violence
proceeding was dismissed at defendant's request. The parties agreed to share
joint legal custody of their daughter and for plaintiff to have parenting time one
week on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, and the next week on Wednesday and
Thursday. That parenting time schedule was followed except for a short period
after plaintiff returned from an Air Force deployment in Jordan.
In November 2019, the parties amended the consent order and designated
defendant as the parent of primary residence (PPR) and plaintiff as the parent of
1
We refer to the parties' daughter by initials to protect her privacy.
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alternative residence (PAR). The order permitted defendant to continue residing
in plaintiff's home in Long Valley while plaintiff was deployed with the Air
Force. During this time, S.H. was enrolled in pre-school at the Goddard School.
After plaintiff returned from deployment, defendant moved to Mount Arlington
to allow S.H. to finish pre-school and then to Denville where defendant now
resides.
In June 2021, defendant filed a motion regarding financial issues and to
enforce litigant's rights. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion to permit him to enroll
S.H. (then five years old) at St. Therese Catholic School and to expand his
parenting time. Plaintiff also filed two unsuccessful emergent applications to
have his cross-motion decided before school began. The motions were
adjourned to October 19, 2021.
On September 17, 2021, the trial court granted plaintiff's third emergent
application to compel defendant to sign a non-retaining party statement of
understanding required by plaintiff's first expert, Mark Singer, Ed.D. and
ordered defendant to attend an appointment with him. Plaintiff retained a new
expert, Barry A. Katz, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist.
Dr. Katz conducted a child best interest evaluation concerning the choice
of school. He performed forensic interviews of the parties and S.H. and issued
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a report that recommended that S.H. attend St. Therese School, "where she will
have greater ease of access from across the homes, as well as, having the benefit
[of] an education that is in line with both parents' religious practices and values."
The court conducted a plenary hearing on November 10, 2021. By that
time, S.H. had already started kindergarten at Riverview. Plaintiff claimed that
without his consent defendant enrolled S.H. at Riverview in May 2021.
The parties and Dr. Katz testified. Dr. Katz was recognized as an expert
in psychology and his best interest evaluation report and letter correcting the
report were admitted in evidence.
Dr. Katz testified regarding what he deemed relevant to school choice. As
to stability, he noted that plaintiff believed that his home life was more "stable"
because he owns his home, whereas defendant had moved three times in the last
few years and had issues affording the cost of her rental. Plaintiff believed that
attending St. Therese would be a constant in S.H.'s life no matter where she
lives. Dr. Katz acknowledged that defendant "has no plans to move again
anytime in the future" and that she stated that she can afford her current home.
On cross-examination, Dr. Katz agreed that there was nothing stopping plaintiff
from selling his home and moving "tomorrow."
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Dr. Katz considered the fact that both parties want to raise S.H. Catholic,
and that is more readily available at St. Therese, whereas if she attended
Riverview, S.H. would have to take Confraternity of Christian Doctrine (CCD)
classes.2 S.H. was already baptized and attended St. Therese for orientation.
Plaintiff is a parishioner of St. Therese, attended school there, and the parties
took S.H. to church there. Defendant argued that S.H. did not need to go to
parochial school to receive a religious education. On cross-examination, Dr.
Katz agreed that S.H. could receive religious education without attending St.
Therese. Plaintiff likewise admitted that S.H. could receive a Catholic education
without attending St. Therese. Defendant testified that the parties always
planned on S.H. to attend public schools.
Defendant testified that she is current on her rent and can afford her
residence but paying for tuition at St. Therese would be a financial hardship.
Defendant also paid for S.H.'s after-school activities. Plaintiff contended that
the cost should be split equally, but on appeal now argues that cost is irrelevant
and he is offering to pay for the entire cost of St. Therese's tuition if necessary.
2
CCD classes educate children about the Catholic religion. See Feldman v.
Feldman, 378 N.J. Super. 83, 87 (App. Div. 2005) (briefly discussing CCD
classes).
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Defendant asserted that plaintiff enrolled S.H. at St. Therese without
discussing it with her and listed his fiancé as a contact instead of defendant.
Plaintiff responded that he only took S.H. to St. Therese for orientation to
reserve her spot and later included defendant as a contact person.
Defendant alleged abuse by plaintiff. Dr. Katz viewed questioning S.H.
about the alleged abuse to be alienating. 3
Dr. Katz considered the travel time difference between the schools.
Plaintiff lives in Long Valley, where the parties lived together before they
separated. Defendant now lives in Denville. The drive from plaintiff's home to
Riverview is forty-five minutes each way, whereas St. Therese is roughly
equidistant from the parties' homes, with travel time for each being about
twenty-five minutes. Plaintiff argued the longer travel time alienates him from
S.H. and limits his time with her. Defendant claimed it is only twenty to twenty-
five minutes from Long Valley to Denville. She also contended that plaintiff
could move into his father's home in Mount Arlington, which is closer. Plaintiff
responded that his father's home is not set up for S.H. to live there.
3
Although notarized letters from defendant and her mother stated that the
allegations were falsified, defendant maintained in her interviews that the
incidents were real. She claimed that plaintiff's father asked her to dismiss the
TRO.
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School starts at St. Therese at 7:55 a.m. and at Riverview at 8:40 a.m. Dr.
Katz noted that S.H. expressed she felt tired when she got to school after driving
from her father's home to Riverview. Defendant testified that S.H. never
expressed being tired to her.
Defendant emphasized that Riverview has a psychologist on staff while
St. Therese does not. Riverview also had significantly smaller class size.
Plaintiff noted that St. Therese has an aide for its kindergarten class and that its
student body is more diverse, consisting of students from other areas of the state.
These issues were not determining factors for Dr. Katz as he was not concerned
by the respective class sizes and saw no need for S.H. to receive therapy.
S.H. expressed positive feelings about Riverview, had friends there, and
participated in cheerleading and Girl Scouts activities at Riverview. Defendant
believed S.H. should remain enrolled at Riverview. Plaintiff testified that S.H.
attended a two-day orientation at St. Therese and has friends there. Dr. Katz
opined that S.H. "seemed pretty comfortable" with attending either school.
Overall, Dr. Katz concluded that S.H. "would excel in either school." He
acknowledged that both schools had good reputations and their quality was
relatively similar. Plaintiff claimed that he would "give the edge to St. Therese"
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in terms of quality but acknowledged there is "not a massive difference between
the level of education."
Dr. Katz found that "the distance from [Riverview] does impact upon
[S.H.'s] capacity for learning, as well as the time with her father[.]" He also
found defendant's stability to be questionable because of her history of
"allegations" against plaintiff and moving to get further away from him. Dr.
Katz concluded that it was in S.H.'s best interests to be transferred to St. Therese
as soon as possible, and that she would have no issues adjusting to the change.
On November 19, 2021, the judge issued an order and nineteen-page
statement of reasons that denied plaintiff's motion to enroll S.H. at St. Therese
and directed that she shall remain enrolled in Riverview. The order also denied
the motions in limine filed by plaintiff and defendant.
In his detailed statement of reasons, the judge engaged in a fulsome
analysis of the fourteen "best interests" factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-44 and
4
N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 enumerates the following custody factors: (1) the parents’
ability to agree, communicate and cooperate in matters relating to the child; (2)
the parents’ willingness to accept custody and any history of unwillingness to
allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse; (3) the interaction and
relationship of the child with its parents and siblings; (4) the history of domestic
violence, if any; (5) the safety of the child and the safety of either parent from
physical abuse by the other parent; (6) the preference of the child when of
sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent decision; (7)
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the reasoning expressed in Levine v. Levine, 322 N.J. Super. 558 (App. Div.
1999) and made the following findings.
On the first factor, the judge found that the parties were generally unable
to agree on matters concerning S.H. and "made unilateral decisions regarding
their preferred school for the minor child." "Further, [defendant] has made
allegations of abuse regarding herself and the minor child, while [plaintiff]
asserts that [defendant] has previously manufactured allegations of abuse and
testified that he initially feared that [defendant] would retaliate against him."
Although the parties agreed to raise S.H. Catholic, they could not agree on the
school she should attend.
On the second factor, the judge found the parties "demonstrate a sufficient
willingness to accept custody and parenting time." They historically abided by
the parenting time schedule and testified that they would help S.H. participate
in activities regardless of which school she attended. On the third factor, the
judge found S.H. had positive interactions with both parents. Similarly, on the
the needs of the child; (8) the stability of the home environment offered; (9) the
quality and continuity of the child’s education; (10) the fitness of the parents;
(11) the geographical proximity of the parents’ homes; (12) the extent and
quality of the time spent with the child prior to or subsequent to the separation;
(13) the parents’ employment responsibilities; and (14) the age and number of
the children.
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twelfth factor, the judge found that S.H. enjoys quality time with both parents
but had primarily resided with defendant in Denville since defendant became
PPR in October 2019.
On the fourth factor, the judge found there was no history of domestic
violence that would impact its decision. Although there was a prior history of
domestic violence, the parties agreed to dissolve the previous TRO and replace
it with a consent order for civil restraints. The court found the allegations that
plaintiff abused S.H. were unsubstantiated.
On the fifth factor, the judge found no evidence of harm or threats of harm
to S.H. Despite the previous TRO and allegations of abuse, the parties
demonstrated a desire to keep her safe.
On the sixth factor, the judge found S.H. was too young to express an
opinion about her choice of school and rejected any evidence indicating a
preference on her part. He found S.H.'s statements to Dr. Katz to be credible
except for expressing being tired from the commute from her father's house to
Riverview.
On the seventh factor, the judge found that Riverview better served S.H.'s
needs. S.H. did not exhibit any learning disabilities and according to Dr. Katz,
her speech acquisition skills are within normal range. The judge found no
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meaningful difference between the education and activities offered at either
school, except that St. Therese lacks an on-site psychologist. He noted that Dr.
Katz opined that S.H. would excel at either school. The judge also found that a
Catholic education could be achieved no matter which school she attended,
finding the difference of taking CCD classes after school to be trivial. The judge
found the smaller class size, the on-site child psychologist, and the fact that S.H.
participates in activities and has friendships at Riverview, weighed in its favor.
On the eighth factor, the judge found that both parties provided a stable
home for S.H. He found nothing to suggest that defendant cannot continue to
rent her residence in Denville and that she intends to stay there indefinitely. The
court judge found defendant's testimony about her prior moves "very credible
and honest" and that her risk of relocation was "minimal."
On the ninth factor, the judge found that both schools would maintain the
quality and continuity of S.H.'s education. He noted that Dr. Katz acknowledged
both schools have good reputations and that S.H. would fit in at either school.
The judge noted that S.H. primarily lives in Denville, and attendance at
Riverview will "allow [her] to maintain and develop peer relationships with
fellow students who live in the same community and maintain the continuity of
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friends." The judge found attending Riverview "will better maintain the quality
and continuity of [S.H.'s] education."
On the tenth factor, the judge found that both parents demonstrated their
fitness, and that S.H. expressed a positive relationship with them both. He also
found that both parties are gainfully employed and can provide for S.H. but this
factor was not dispositive. Similarly, on the thirteenth factor, the judge
reiterated that both parties are gainfully employed and there was no evidence
that their jobs would interfere with time spent with S.H.
On the eleventh factor, the judge found plaintiff's commute to Denville is
forty-five minutes, and his commute to St. Therese is twenty to twenty-five
minutes. He did not find it credible that S.H. would have to wake up much
earlier to attend Riverview because the school starts later than St. Therese, and
if S.H. were transferred to St. Therese, it would make defendant's commute
longer. (Pa40). The judge gave limited weight to this factor.
Finally, on the fourteenth factor, the court found that S.H. was the parties'
only child, who was about to turn six.
Considering the reasoning in Levine, the judge noted that the choice of
school for a minor child is "inherently subjective" but that it was in S.H.'s best
interests to continue attending Riverview. The judge mentioned that plaintiff
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"failed to demonstrate" that S.H.'s schooling at Riverview did not serve her best
interests. The judge noted that Dr. Katz did not find a "considerable difference
between the programs and services offered by the schools."
The judge distinguished certain facts in Levine, explaining that his
decision was not based "on the establishment of [S.H.] in the current school nor
relationships formed within the last six weeks of her attendance." Instead, the
judge found it was in S.H.'s best interests to remain at Riverview, which would
not impose the financial burden of tuition at St. Therese. Both schools were
good and S.H. will excel in either school. Attending Riverview will "allow
[S.H.] to maintain and develop peer relationships with fellow students who live
in the same community and maintain the continuity of friends." Finally, S.H.
will be able to attend CCD classes while attending Riverview. Based on these
findings, the judge determined that attending Riverview was in S.H.'s best
interests.
The parties filed cross-applications for an award of counsel fees. On
December 3, 2021, the judge denied defendant's application and granted
plaintiff's application in part, awarding him $5,918.50. The parties have not
appealed from that order.
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This appeal followed. Plaintiff raises the following points for our
consideration:
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RELYING ON
N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 AS A BASIS TO DETERMINE THE
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE ISSUE.
POINT TWO
IT IS IN THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST FOR HER
TO ATTEND ST. THERESE SCHOOL.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE
EVIDENCE RECORD AT TRIAL WAS FLAWED
AND DID NOT SUPPORT IT DENYING
[PLAINTIFF'S] APPLICATION FOR THE CHILD TO
ATTEND THE ST. THERESE SCHOOL SYSTEM.
A. The trial court erred in its analyses of Dr.
Katz's report and testimony.
B. The trial court improperly placed a higher
burden of proof on [plaintiff] and used the wrong
legal burden analysis regarding the school choice
issue.
C. The trial court did not properly consider all the
facts of the matter, especially the undisputed
facts.
D. The trial court erred when it relied on incorrect
facts from the trial record, evidence not in the
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trial record, and speculative assumptions, which
all led to findings not supported by the record.
We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Vijayant
Pawar in his comprehensive statement of reasons. We add the following
comments.
"We invest the family court with broad discretion because of its
specialized knowledge and experience in matters involving parental
relationships and the best interests of children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.
Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 427 (2012). To that end, we accord "great
deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part judges." Milne v.
Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012). "The general rule is
that findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate,
substantial, credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)
(quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). "Appellate courts owe
deference to the trial court's credibility determinations as well because it has 'a
better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a
witness.'" C.R. v. M.T., 248 N.J. 428, 440 (2021) (quoting Gnall, 222 N.J. at
428).
An appellate court will not overturn a Family Part judge's decision "unless
the trial court's factual findings 'went so wide of the mark that a mistake must
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have been made.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279
(2007) (quoting C.B. Snyder Realty, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 233 N.J.
Super. 65, 69 (App. Div. 1989)). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the
law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled
to any special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019)
(quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,
378 (1995)). We review legal issues de novo. R.K. v. F.K., 437 N.J. Super. 58,
61 (App. Div. 2014).
The factfinder is free to accept all, part, or none of an expert's testimony,
Brown v. Brown, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 478 (App. Div. 2002), "and may do so
even if that testimony is unrebutted by any other evidence," State v. M.J.K., 369
N.J. Super. 532, 549 (App. Div. 2004). "Indeed, a judge is not obligated to
accept an expert's opinion, even if the expert was 'impressive.'" M.J.K., 369
N.J. Super. at 549 (quoting State v. Carpenter, 268 N.J. Super. 378, 383 (App.
Div. 1993)). The factfinder determines the weight to be given to the expert
testimony. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. D.M., 414 N.J. Super. 56, 74
(App. Div. 2010).
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When choosing a school for a minor child from competing school districts,
the court considers the "best interests of the child." Levine, 322 N.J. Super. at
566. In Levine, we explained the subjective nature of that evaluation:
In the context of the best interests of a child, any
evaluation of a school district is inherently subjective.
Just as a student cannot be summed up by IQ, verbal
skills or mathematical aptitude, a school is more than
its teacher-student ratio or State ranking. The age of its
buildings, the number of computers or books in its
library and the size of its gymnasium are not
determinative of the best interest of an individual child
during his or her school years. Equally, if not more
important, are peer relationships, the continuity of
friends and an emotional attachment to school and
community that will hopefully stimulate intelligence
and growth to expand opportunity.
[Id. at 567.]
Plaintiff argues that in relying on Levine, the judge improperly shifted the
burden of proof onto him to prove that Riverview did not serve S.H.'s best
interests. We disagree. The sound reasoning in Levine, which involved a school
choice issue, was appropriately relied upon by the judge.
While the judge stated that plaintiff "failed to demonstrate" that S.H.'s
schooling at Riverview did not serve her best interests, we do not view that
statement as an indication that the judge shifted the burden of proof to plaintiff.
The comment merely reflected the judge's overall determination that attending
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Riverview was in S.H.'s best interests. Moreover, we used similar language in
Levine, stating "there is an absence of proof to suggest that [the child's] best
interests are not being served in the South Orange school district." Id. at 566.
The best interests of the child are the primary and overarching
consideration in deciding a dispute over which school a child should attend. Id.
at 565-66; Asch v. Asch, 164 N.J. Super. 499, 505 (App. Div. 1978). The best
interests factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 are not limited to initial custody
awards. They have been applied when determining whether relocation is in a
child’s best interests. Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 335 (2017). They have
also been applied in determining if home-schooling is in the best interests of the
children. R.K., 437 N.J. Super. at 67-68. We discern no error in considering
the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 in determining whether enrollment in
Riverview or St. Therese is in the child's best interests.
The parties share joint legal custody. While defendant's designation as
PPR did not afford her unilateral authority to make school choice decisions, S.H.
primarily resides with defendant in Denville (plaintiff has parenting time five
days each two-week cycle). Attending school activities and developing and
maintaining peer relationships with fellow students that live in Denville were
thus properly considered and given weight by the judge.
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Judge Pawar carefully considered the parties' testimony and Dr. Katz's
report and expert testimony. His findings are supported by substantial, credible
evidence in the record. His legal analysis is consonant with applicable law. We
discern no basis to disturb the decision that S.H. remain enrolled at Riverview.
Affirmed.
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