STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. REGINALD PIERRE (15-12-2922, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5274-16T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
REGINALD PIERRE, a/k/a
ANDRES TADEO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted November 14, 2018 – Decided November 30, 2018
Before Judges Yannotti and Natali.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 15-12-2922.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Rochelle Watson, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephen A.
Pogany, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
After the court denied his motion to suppress evidence from the
warrantless search of his car, and for admission to the Pretrial Intervention (PTI)
program, defendant Reginald Pierre conditionally pled guilty to one count of
second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). In
exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss count two of the
indictment which charged him with fourth-degree possession of a large capacity
ammunition magazine, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f), and recommend a non-custodial
sentence of probation. Defendant appeals and raises the following arguments:
POINT I
BECAUSE THERE WERE NUMEROUS DISPUTES
OF MATERIAL FACTS, INCLUDING WHETHER
DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE OBSTRUCTION
STATUTE – THE SOLE BASIS ASSERTED FOR
THE STOP – THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS REMISS IN
FAILING TO CONDUCT AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING. ALTERNATIVELY, EVEN UNDER THE
STATE'S VERSION OF THE INCIDENT, THE
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE DID NOT AUTHORIZE
ENTRY INTO THE CAR.
A. BY FAILING TO CONDUCT AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO RESOLVE
NUMEROUS FACTUAL DISPUTES, THE
TRIAL JUDGE ERRED .
B. EVEN IF THE POLICE HAD REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO STOP DEFENDANT'S CAR,
THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE DID NOT
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PERMIT ENTRY INTO THE CAR TO
RECOVER THE HANDGUN.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S REJECTION FROM PTI FOR HIS
FIRST OFFENSE, POSSESSION OF A WEAPON HE
LEGALLY PURCHASED IN FLORIDA,
CONSTITUTED A PATENT AND GROSS ABUSE
OF DISCRETION.
A. DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED
EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES TO
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
PTI.
B. THE PROSECUTOR ABUSED HER
DISCRETION BY PLACING UNDUE WEIGHT
ON FACTORS INHERENT IN EVERY
UNLICENSED POSSESSION CASE AND
PENALIZING DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE
OFFENSE OCCURRED IN NEWARK, A CITY
"OVERWHELMED BY GUN RELATED
VIOLENCE."
C. DESPITE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE TO
THE CONTRARY, THE PROSECUTOR'S
RELIANCE ON DEFENDANT'S PURPORTED
GANG MEMBERSHIP, WHICH WAS BASED
ON A HEARSAY STATEMENT, WAS AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
D. THE PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED
REFERENCES TO PRIOR DISMISSED
MUNICIPAL CHARGES VIOLATED THE
SUPREME COURT'S STRICT PROHIBITION
ON CONSIDERING ARRESTS OR
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DISMISSED CHARGES FOR ANY
PURPOSES.
E. DEFENDANT'S REJECTION FROM PTI
SUBVERTS THE PURPOSES OF THE
PROGRAM AND IS A CLEAR ERROR IN
JUDGMENT.
Having reviewed defendant's arguments in light of the record and
applicable law, we affirm.
I.
The charges against defendant arose out of a motor vehicle stop in
Newark. According to the State, on July 13, 2015, at approximately 8:40 p.m.,
detectives from the Newark Violence Reduction Initiative and Gang
Enforcement Unit were patrolling an area known for drug and gang activity and
gun violence. Detectives reported observing a black Chevrolet Camaro with
Florida license plates stopped in the middle of the road, obstructing traffic with
its car doors wide open. Detectives claimed they observed defendant arguing
with a man near the Camaro and, believing a carjacking might occur, moved
closer to investigate. Defendant shouted to the other individual, "[l]et's get the
fuck out of here," and entered the driver's seat of the Camaro.
The detectives then parked one of their cars on the driver's side of the
Camaro and the other unmarked vehicle parked slightly ahead. The detectives
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reported observing defendant fumbling with an object between his legs. As
detectives approached the Camaro from both sides with their flashlights, the y
observed a black handgun protruding from under the driver's seat on the
floorboard. After removing defendant and the passenger from the vehicle, the
police seized a 9 mm handgun with one live 9 mm gold ball round in the chamber
and fourteen, 9 mm gold ball rounds in the magazine. A box of 9 mm
ammunition was also seized from the vehicle's center console.
After defendant failed to provide a valid permit to carry the handgun, he
was arrested and, in addition to the two counts in the indictment, was issued a
motor vehicle summons for obstruction of traffic, N.J.S.A. 39:4-67.
Subsequently, defendant provided the State with a copy of a New Jersey
Firearms Purchaser Identification Card, issued on November 18, 2013, and a
receipt from a firearms store in Florida, showing that the handgun was lawfully
purchased. A search of the Firearms Investigation Unit records revealed,
however, that defendant did not possess a firearm carry permit and the handgun
was not registered.
Defendant disputed the State's version of events and contended that the
warrantless search lacked probable cause and exigency, and the seizure of the
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evidence1 "was not justified by the plain view exception." In his counter
statement of facts, defendant maintained that: (1) when the police stopped him,
he "was safely double[-]parked on a quiet street and was in no way obstructing
traffic;" (2) his car's doors were not wide open but only the "front passenger car
door was ajar;" (3) he was not engaged in an argument and the individual he was
speaking with was a friend; (4) he was not "fumbl[ing] with a gun;" and (5)
when the police exited their cars he was sitting in his vehicle and was
"immediately ordered . . . out of his car."
The court denied defendant's motion based on the parties' submissions.
The court concluded that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because
defendant "readily admit[ted] to . . . [a] motor vehicle violation" and "the
balance of defendant's counter statement of facts . . . [were] not relevant to the
disposition of [the] case." The court explained that the defendant's admission
of being "double[-]parked on a public street . . . provided a reasonable,
articulable basis or cause to conduct an investigatory stop," and "the officer's
observations and subsequent seizure of the handgun was permissible pursuant
1
On appeal, defendant does not address the ammunition seized from the console
and we therefore consider any objections to that evidence waived. See N.J. Dep't
of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 505 n.2 (App. Div. 2015)
("An issue that is not briefed is deemed waived upon appeal.").
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to the plain view doctrine and, accordingly, not a violation of defendant's
constitutional rights . . . ."
The prosecutor denied defendant's request for admission in the PTI
program and explained the bases for that decision in a detailed May 10, 2016
letter that addressed the factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). The court upheld
the prosecutor's determination and concluded in its oral ruling that the
prosecutor's decision did not represent a patent and gross abuse of discretion or
misapplication of the statutory criteria.
II.
Defendant first maintains that the court erred in denying his motion to
suppress without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We review a trial court's
denial of an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. State v. Broom-
Smith, 406 N.J. Super. 228, 239 (App. Div. 2009).
When a defendant moves to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless
search, Rule 3:5-7(b) requires the State to file "a brief, including a statement of
the facts as it alleges them to be." The defendant must then file "a brief and
counter statement of facts." R. 3:5-7(b). That counter statement of facts must
present "something more than the naked conclusion that the warrantless search
was illegal, in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing pursuant to [Rule] 3:5-
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7(c)," State v. Hewins, 166 N.J. Super 210, 215 (Law Div. 1979), and the facts
must be "sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural." Ibid.(quoting United States v. Ledesma, 499 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1974)). "[O]nly
when the defendant's counter statement places material facts in dispute [is] an
evidentiary hearing . . . required." State v. Green, 346 N.J. Super. 87, 90 (App.
Div. 2001).
We disagree with defendant's argument that an evidentiary hearing was
required because his car was allegedly "safely double[-]parked" on a quiet
Newark street with only the passenger door slightly ajar, and thus he was not
"interfere[ing] with or interrupt[ing] the passage of other . . . cars or vehicles . .
. " as proscribed by the obstruction statute. N.J.S.A. 39:4-67. As the court
correctly noted, defendant admitted to a separate motor vehicle violation when
he stated that he was double-parked. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-138(m) ("[e]xcept when
necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the directions
of a traffic or police officer or traffic sign or signal, no operator of a vehicle
shall . . . park the vehicle . . . [o]n the roadway side of any vehicle stopped or
parked at the edge or curb of a street). That violation "provided a reasonable,
articulable basis . . . [for the detectives] to conduct an investigatory stop." See
State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639-40 (2002) ("A lawful stop of an automobile
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must be based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense, including
a minor traffic offense, has been or is being committed."); see also State v.
Amelio, 197 N.J. 207, 211-12 (2008). Thus, a hearing was not required to
resolve immaterial factual disputes regarding whether defendant's vehicle was
actually impeding traffic or if defendant was arguing with his friend before the
detectives approached his car.2
Defendant also admitted he was sitting in his vehicle when the detectives
approached. He did not allege "definite, specific [and] detailed" facts, Hewins,
166 N.J. Super at 215, disputing that the detectives, without entering his car,
illuminated the interior of his vehicle with their flashlights, and observed the
gun under the driver's seat on the floorboard. Thus, whether or not defendant
was "fumbling with his gun" was irrelevant.
2
We acknowledge that the trial court seemed to credit statements and
observations by the detectives, disputed by defendant, that his double-parked
vehicle was obstructing traffic. Because we have concluded an evidentiary
hearing was not required in light of defendant's admission that he was double-
parked, we need not address whether a hearing was necessary to establish if
defendant's car was obstructing traffic or if the detectives had a basis to stop
defendant's vehicle because they reasonably believed defendant was engaged in
criminal activity.
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III.
We also disagree with defendant's contention that even if the detectives
had reasonable suspicion to stop him, they were not permitted by the plain view
doctrine to seize the handgun. Under the United States Constitution and the
New Jersey Constitution, individuals have the right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ⁋ 7. "A
warrantless search is presumed invalid unless it falls within one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Cooke, 163 N.J.
657, 664 (2000). The plain view doctrine is a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 235-38 (1983). The State
bears the burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish that the
warrantless search or seizure was justified in light of the totality of the
circumstances. State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 337-38 (2010).
For the plain view doctrine to apply, the State must establish three
elements. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 236-37. First, the officer "must be lawfully in
the viewing area." Id. at 236. Second, the officer must "inadvertently" 3 discover
3
In State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 99 (2016), our Supreme Court "reject[ed]
the inadvertence prong of the plain view doctrine because it requires an inquiry
into a police officer's motives and therefore is at odds with the standard of
objective reasonableness that governs [the Court's] analysis of a police officer's
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the evidence, "meaning that he did not know in advance where evidence was
located nor intend beforehand to seize it." Ibid. This requirement is intended
to "prevent the police from engaging in planned warrantless searches." State v.
Damplias, 282 N.J. Super. 471, 478 (App. Div. 1995). Third, the officer must
have "probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity."
Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 237 (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42 (1983)).
Here, when detectives approached defendant’s double-parked car at 8:40
p.m., they were in a lawful position when they shined their flashlights in
defendant's car and observed the handgun. Second, there was no evidence
before the court to conclude the detectives had prior knowledge of the gun’s
existence or location or an intent to seize it. Finally, under the circumstances,
the detectives had probable cause to associate a loaded handgun located under
the driver's seat of a defendant's vehicle with criminal activity.
conduct . . . ." Because the Gonzales Court's holding was applied prospectively,
and the search here occurred before the Supreme Court's decision, we assess the
propriety of the seizure in accordance with the pre-existing, three-prong criteria.
Under the previous standard, the inadvertence prong was satisfied if the
detectives "did not know in advance where evidence was located nor intend
beforehand to seize it." Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 236.
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IV.
We also conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error in
affirming the prosecutor's decision to deny defendant's admission into the PTI
program. The court appropriately determined that the prosecutor's decision was
not a patent and gross abuse of discretion.
A prosecutor's decision to admit or reject a defendant from a PTI program
is given "extreme deference," State v. Kraft, 265 N.J. Super. 106, 112 (App. Div.
1993), and a trial or appellate court must find "a patent and gross abuse of
discretion" to overturn a prosecutor's decision. Ibid. The court may not
"substitute [its own] discretion for that of the prosecutor," even if the decision
appears harsh. Id. at 112-13 (alteration in original). Further, it must be
presumed that a prosecutor "considered all relevant factors before rendering a
decision." Id. at 112 (quoting State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J., 503, 509 (1981).
PTI is a "[statewide] diversionary program through which certain
offenders are able to avoid criminal prosecution by receiving early rehabilitative
services expected to deter future criminal behavior." State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J.
236, 240 (1995). In assessing a defendant's fitness for PTI, a prosecutor must
comply with Rule 3:28 and consider the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
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12(e), which include the details of the case and defendant's past criminal record.
State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 621 (2015).
The purpose of the PTI program is to "offer an alternative to prosecution
and to promote deterrence through rehabilitation for qualified applicants." State
v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 197 (2015) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12). Extreme deference
is given to the prosecutor's decision because: 1) a prosecutor's "fundamental
responsibility" is to "decide whom to prosecute," and 2) "a primary purpose of
PTI [is] to augment, not diminish, a prosecutor's options." Kraft, 265 N.J. Super.
at 111.
The PTI guidelines provide that defendants "charged with first or second-
degree offenses [are] presumptively ineligible for admission" to PTI. Pressler
& Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 3:28-1 (2018). To overcome
this presumption, a defendant must demonstrate compelling extraordinary
circumstances or "something 'idiosyncratic' in his or her background." Nwobu,
139 N.J. at 252 (quoting State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1, 7 (1990)).
Defendant contends that his legal purchase of the handgun in Florida
should overcome the presumption against admission into the PTI program. He
also claims that his immigration from Haiti as a child without either parent,
graduation from high school, completion of one year of college, former
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employment, and acceptance to college establishes the necessary extraordinary
circumstances warranting admission. We disagree.
As defendant committed a second-degree offense, he was presumptively
ineligible for PTI and was required to demonstrate compelling extraordinary
circumstances to over this presumption. The prosecutor correctly determined
that defendant "has not shown anything unusual and compelling justifying his
admission" and concluded that defendant's admittance would "depreciate the
seriousness of his Graves Act offense."
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly placed undue weight
on the nature of his offense when considering the N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) factors.
Specifically, he maintains that the prosecutor's assessment of certain
aggravating factors "all rel[ied] on the same generic characteristics of every
second-degree unlicensed gun possession offense," and undue weight was
placed on the location of his offense and the neighborhood crime rates.
Defendant's claim is without merit. The prosecutor thoroughly and correctly
discussed the relevant factors in her May 10, 2016 letter, which included a
specific analysis of seven aggravating and four mitigating factors.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly relied on the
detectives' allegation that defendant identified himself as a member of a Haitian
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gang. Defendant claims that the prosecutor was obliged to consider defendant's
denial of gang membership and the possible language barrier that may have
caused the detectives to incorrectly report that defendant volunteered himself as
a member. We are satisfied that the prosecutor examined all relevant facts and
evidence when she exercised her discretion in rejecting defendant's application.
Under such circumstances, she was "free to disbelieve statements presented by
defense witnesses and to instead credit the anticipated contrary testimony of the
State's witnesses." State v. Lee, 437 N.J. Super 555, 568 (App. Div. 2014).
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly considered his prior
dismissed municipal charges contrary to K.S., 220 N.J. 190. In K.S., our
Supreme Court held an applicant's "prior dismissed charges may not be
considered for any purpose" where the facts related to the arrest are in dispute,
or have not been determined after a hearing. Id. at 199. From our review of the
prosecutor's May 10, 2016 letter, it is clear that she alluded to defendant's
dismissed charges to rebut his claims that his then-current charges
"represent[ed] [his] first contact with the criminal justice system" and did not
serve as a basis for his rejection.
Indeed, when discussing mitigating factor nine (the applicant's criminal
record and the extent he presents a substantial danger to others), the prosecutor
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specifically acknowledged that defendant's municipal charges were dismissed .
The prosecutor also stated that despite the dismissals, and defendant's
possession of a loaded handgun, "the State . . . consider[s] defendant's lack of
criminal convictions or adjudications as a mitigating factor." Further, when
discussing mitigating factor twelve (history of physical violence towards
others), the prosecutor again noted the dismissal of defendant's municipal
charges and concluded "defendant does not have a history of the use of physical
violence towards others."
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor's decision "subvert[s] the
goals of [PTI]." He claims criminal sanctions will harm his future education
and employment prospects and are too burdensome for a first-time offender with
a lawfully purchased gun. While the prosecutor noted that defendant "may
possess some positive qualities," she determined that defendant's circumstances
were not extraordinary to overcome the presumption against PTI. The
prosecutor's decision was not a patent and gross abuse of discretion.
To the extent not addressed, defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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