STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JERRY A. JONES (12-12-0865, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0100-17T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JERRY A. JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted October 16, 2018 – Decided October 26, 2018
Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment No. 12-12-0865.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Amira R. Scurato, Designated Counsel;
William P. Welaj, on the brief).
Michael A. Monahan, Acting Union County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Milton S.
Leibowitz, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jerry A. Jones appeals from a July 31, 2017 order denying his
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We
affirm.
On March 1, 2013, by negotiated agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to
one first-degree and two second-degree sexual assault offenses, and one fourth-
degree count of criminal sexual contact. The State agreed to dismiss the
remaining twenty-one counts of the indictment and recommended an aggregate
thirteen-year term in prison subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
7.2. Defendant appealed and an excessive sentencing panel affirmed defendant's
sentence. State v. Jones, No. A-0644-13 (App. Div. Jan. 14, 2014).
On June 9, 2016, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition and an amended
petition on February 15, 2017, which he supplemented by appointed PCR
counsel's February 6, 2017 brief and May 1, 2017 letter. Before the PCR court,
defendant maintained he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and was
"innocent of [the] charges . . . [but] was coerced by trial counsel to plead guilty."
PCR counsel added that defendant was denied effective assistance because
"[trial] counsel failed to competently prepare defendant's case" and "conduct a
full and complete pre-trial investigation", including interviewing witnesses,
which would have demonstrated that a guilty plea was unwarranted.
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Further, in his May 1, 2017 letter to the PCR court, PCR counsel asserted
that defendant's petition should be granted because "he established a colorable
claim of innocence and he has strong grounds to withdraw his plea" under the
test set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). At oral argument, however,
PCR counsel explicitly advised the court that he was not making a motion to
retract defendant's guilty plea but merely cited Slater "in conjunction with the
argument that the guilty plea [was not] voluntary."
The PCR court denied defendant's petition for reasons detailed in a
comprehensive oral decision. The court noted that defendant failed to present
any evidence, by way of certification or otherwise, to support his claim that trial
counsel failed to investigate his case. As to defendant's claim that trial counsel
failed to interview central witnesses, the court noted that defendant failed to
identify specifically any such witnesses. Further, the court explained that
defendant's claim that he was coerced into pleading guilty was nothing more
than a bald, unsupported allegation and was belied by the plea colloquy where
defendant admitted his guilt, gave a detailed factual basis for the crimes, stated
his plea was given voluntarily without coercion, and was satisfied with his
counsel's representation. The court also denied defendant's request for an
evidentiary hearing.
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Defendant appeals, arguing:
POINT I
THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COURT ERRED
IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT
AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE
FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL
REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL.
We find insufficient merit in defendant's arguments to warrant extended
discussion in a written opinion, Rule 2:11-3(e)(2), and add only the following
brief comments.
As for defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective because he was
unprepared for trial and coerced him to enter the plea, the PCR court correctly
applied the Strickland/Fritz1 test and concluded that defendant only made
unsupported assertions expressing his subjective belief about the state of
counsel's preparation. Defendant failed to supply a certification that specifically
identified anything in the record that established a prima facie case of
ineffectiveness or otherwise suggested the need for an evidentiary hearing. See
State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997).
1
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J.
42, 58 (1987).
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Further, defendant's claim that counsel coerced his guilty plea is belied by
the colloquy between the trial court and defendant during the plea hearing. The
trial judge patiently and carefully reviewed the matter with defendant who
acknowledged that he understood he was waiving his right to trial. Defendant
also affirmed that no one forced him to enter into the plea agreement or to plead
guilty.
Finally, defendant's reliance on Slater is misplaced. A motion to withdraw
a guilty plea must be made before sentencing, "but the court may permit it to be
made thereafter to correct a manifest injustice." R. 3:21-1. Here, defendant
never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and when the PCR court inquired
of PCR counsel if his May 1, 2017 letter was a request by defendant to withdraw
his plea, PCR counsel explicitly stated it was not. Thus, we reject any attempt
by defendant to raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Zaman v. Felton,
219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014).
However, even were we to address the issue substantively, our review of
the record confirms there is no basis under Slater to vacate defendant's plea.
Nowhere in the record does defendant establish a colorable claim of innocence
and as we have detailed, any claim that defendant was coerced into entering his
plea is baseless. Finally, the plea was on extremely favorable terms for
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defendant. Thus, neither Slater nor Strickland/Fritz provide any support for
defendant to withdraw his negotiated plea.
Affirmed.
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