DCPP VS. C.T.W. AND M.H., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF T.S.W. (FG-11-0010-17, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1498-17T4
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
C.T.W.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
M.H.,
Defendant.
_________________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP
OF T.S.W., a Minor.
_________________________________________
Submitted October 29, 2018 – Decided November 5, 2018
Before Judges Sabatino and Haas.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County,
Docket No. FG-11-0010-17.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Cecilia M.E. Lindenfelser, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Nicholas Logothetis, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor (Meredith A. Pollock, Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel; Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant C.T.W. 1 appeals from the Family Part's November 9, 2017
order in this guardianship case terminating her parental rights to her daughter,
T.S.W. We affirm.
Defendant's involvement with the Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (the "Division") dates back to her own childhood. She has a long
history of substance abuse, homelessness, mental illness, and domestic violence.
Defendant's parental rights to her other seven children, all of whom are no longer
in her care, have terminated. Tory's biological father, M.H., has not been
significantly involved in her life and he did not appeal the trial court's
1
We use initials for the parties and their family members in order to protect the
identity of the minor child, who we shall refer to by the fictitious name "Tory."
See R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
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termination of his own parental rights.
Defendant left Tory at the hospital at her birth in July 2004. They have
never lived together for any significant period of time. Following several years
of services attempting reunification, Tory was placed in a group home due to
her serious special needs. Among other things, Tory has exhibited severe
behavioral issues, including sexual aggressiveness, fire-setting, and assaultive
conduct. As of the time of the October 2017 guardianship trial, Tory was a
candidate for select home adoption. Defendant, meanwhile, continues to
struggle with substance abuse, homelessness, mental illness, and domestic
violence issues.
At the guardianship trial, the Division's expert testified that defendant,
who had been offered an assortment of services including substance abuse
treatment, counseling, psychiatric evaluations, psychological evaluations,
supervised visits, family team meetings, and transportation, was still not capable
of providing safe parenting for Tory. The expert stressed that Tory needed
permanency, that Tory's placement in a group home was appropriate, and that
given Tory's serious special needs and the mother's own limitations,
reunification could pose a danger to both defendant and Tory.
After trial, the court terminated the rights of both parents. Defendant
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appeals, arguing that the judge erred by finding the Division had established, by
clear and convincing evidence, the third and fourth prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C -
15.1(a). In particular, defendant contends as to prong three the court did not
sufficiently consider alternatives to termination, and, as to prong four, did not
provide a proper analysis of whether termination would cause the child more
harm than good. Defendant does not appeal the court's findings on the first and
second prongs of the statutory test, see N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1) and (2), nor
does she argue that the Division failed to make reasonable efforts to provide her
with services under prong three. The Law Guardian supports the Division in
advocating the termination of defendant's parental rights.
When seeking the termination of a parent's rights under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a), the Division has the burden of establishing the following statutory
criteria:
(1) The child's safety, health or development has been
or will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
delay of permanent placement will add to the harm.
Such harm may include evidence that separating the
child from his resource family parents would cause
serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm
to the child;
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(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to
provide services to help the parent correct the
circumstances which led to the child's placement
outside the home and the court has considered
alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more
harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); see also N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-11 (1986)
(reciting the four controlling standards later codified in
Title 30).]
These four statutory factors are not "discrete and separate" but instead,
"they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard
that identifies a child's best interests." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J.
337, 348 (1999). The Division must prove each of the four factors by clear and
convincing evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527,
554 (2014)(citation omitted).
The scope of review on appeals from orders terminating parental rights is
limited. We should uphold the trial court's findings, so long as they are
supported by "adequate, substantial, and credible evidence." Id. at 552 (citation
omitted). The decision should only be reversed or altered on appeal if the trial
court's findings were "so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice."
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004) (quoting
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In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). Likewise, the appellate
court must give considerable deference to the family court judge's expertise and
opportunity to have observed the witnesses firsthand and evaluate their
credibility. R.G., 217 N.J. at 552-53.
Applying this deferential standard of review to the trial court's decision in
this case, in light of the factual record and the governing law, we affirm the final
judgment, substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Audrey Peyton
Blackburn's November 9, 2017 oral opinion. We add only a few comments.
As to prong three of the statute, it is manifest that, as she concedes,
defendant was offered abundant services by the Division. Possible alternative
caretakers of Tory were reasonably ruled out by the Division, particularl y in
light of her special needs. A kinship legal guardianship ("KLG") arrangement
failed.
Defendant argues that Tory should be placed in a long-term group home.
However, the Division and the trial court reasonably concluded that it was
preferable to terminate defendant's parental rights and allow Tory to be eligible
for adoption by a resource parent who might offer her permanency in a home
with appropriate support system.
We likewise reject defendant's assertion that the evidence at trial was
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insufficient under prong four, the "best interests" test. The unrefuted expert
proof shows that defendant has developed no meaningful relationship with Tory,
and that defendant is incapable of addressing Tory's needs as a child, let alone
her special needs.
We also reject, as without merit, defendant's claim that the trial court
exhibited a bias against defendant because she is mentally ill. The evidence in
the record objectively shows that termination would not cause this child more
harm than good. Moreover, defendant failed to appear for the scheduled bonding
evaluation and, at one point, walked out of the trial before it concluded, after
proclaiming that "[w]hatever they want to do with [Tory], they could do."
The inescapable truth is that defendant has had fourteen years to become
a capable parent to this child with special needs. She simply cannot realistically
fulfill that role despite the provision of many services.
All of defendant's other contentions lack sufficient evidence to warrant
discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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