M.M. VS. PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION (L-4751-15, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0561-17T4
M.M.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-
HUDSON CORPORATION,
Defendant-Respondent.
____________________________
Argued October 2, 2018 – Decided November 1, 2018
Before Judges Rothstadt, Gilson, and Natali.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-4751-15.
Patrick J. Finn argued the cause for appellant (Steven
M. Lafferty, attorney; Patrick J. Finn, on the brief).
Lauren T. Grodentzik argued the cause for respondent
(Port Authority Law Department, attorneys; Lauren T.
Grodentzik, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff M.M. is a former employee of defendant Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corporation (PATH or defendant). 1 She alleges that she suffers from
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of being exposed to diesel
fumes while at work. On the day that she was exposed to the fumes, she fainted
and was taken to the hospital. She appeals from an August 4, 2017 order
granting summary judgment to PATH and dismissing with prejudice her claims
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 to 60. She
also appeals from a September 15, 2017 order denying her motion for
reconsideration.
This appeal centers on the question of whether plaintiff's fainting is a
sufficient physical impact to bring her claim for emotional distress within the
ambit of the zone-of-danger test defined by federal courts interpreting FELA.
We hold that plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to satisfy the physical impact
prong of the zone-of-danger test. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting
summary judgment to defendant and remand for further proceedings.
I
We take the facts as developed in the summary judgment record and view
them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Plaintiff was employed as a senior
1
We use initials for plaintiff to protect her privacy interests.
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signal designer for PATH. As part of her responsibilities, plaintiff worked on
circuit and wiring detail changes and often performed that work inside PATH
train tunnels.
On December 9, 2012, plaintiff reported to work, and at approximately
2:45 p.m. she entered a train tunnel. When she entered the tunnel, she smelled
diesel fumes and saw blue smoke. As she walked farther into the tunnel, she
observed that the blue smoke and diesel odor was coming from two idling trucks.
She telephoned the trainmaster to report the diesel fumes and to request that the
vent fans in the tunnel be activated. Shortly thereafter, the fans were turned on,
but they ran for only one hour from approximately 3 p.m. to 4 p.m. Plaintiff
also donned two dust masks.
At approximately 6 p.m., plaintiff was working at a table in a relay room,
located in the tunnel, and she began to feel dizzy. She put her head down on the
table to rest, fainted, fell off the chair, and the right side of her head and body
hit the floor. Plaintiff's supervisor notified the trainmaster, an emergency squad
was dispatched, and plaintiff was removed from the tunnel and transported to a
hospital.
At the hospital, plaintiff received a computed tomography (CT) scan of
her head. A CT scan combines a series of x-ray images to create three-
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dimensional views of body organs and tissues. Gale Encyclopedia of Medicine,
1106-07 (4th ed. 2012). The CT scan revealed no injuries or medical issues.
Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital later that night. Her final diagnosis
was "syncope," that is, fainting.
The next day, plaintiff followed up with her psychiatrist, whom she had
been seeing since approximately 2001. The psychiatrist had been treating
plaintiff for symptoms related to bipolar disorder and had prescribed medication
for plaintiff. On December 10, 2012, the psychiatrist increased the amount of
medication prescribed to plaintiff. Thereafter, the psychiatrist diagnosed
plaintiff with PTSD and opined that it was a consequence of the incident on
December 9, 2012. In a letter dated January 6, 2017, the psychiatrist reported
to plaintiff's counsel that plaintiff "continues to demonstrate symptoms of
posttraumatic suffering." The psychiatrist then opined:
I am of the opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, that patient's psychological suffering is the
direct result of severe stress from the 12/09/2012
accident, which caused impairment of patient's mental
state. Patient continues to suffer from chronic
symptoms of depression and anxiety and her prognosis
for full recovery was poor at the time of last evaluation.
In addition to seeing a psychiatrist, plaintiff was also receiving therapy
from a licensed psychologist. Between 2001 and December 9, 2012, plaintiff
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visited with her psychologist on a biweekly basis. For several months after the
December 9, 2012 incident, plaintiff saw her psychologist twice a week. The
psychologist reported that plaintiff "was functioning at a very high level" prior
to December 2012. After the incident, the psychologist opined that plaintiff was
suffering from severe PTSD. In a letter sent to plaintiff's counsel, dated March
30, 2017, the psychologist opined:
It is my impression that [plaintiff] will not be able to
return to work and her inability to return to work is
based on a lack of trust for anyone outside of her
family, which was brought on by her significant
difficulty at PATH and the inconsistency with which
the administration treated her.
Following the incident on December 9, 2012, plaintiff did not return to
work until October 28, 2013. At that time, she was assigned to "desk duty" as
directed by a PATH psychologist. While on "desk duty," plaintiff was not to
work in the "field," which included the train tracks and tunnels. After working
several days, on November 4, 2013, plaintiff left her position with PATH and,
thereafter, she did not return to work. Accordingly, plaintiff has not been
employed since November 4, 2013.
On November 18, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint against PATH seeking
damages under FELA for the emotional distress injuries she suffered from the
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December 9, 2012 incident. 2 Specifically, plaintiff claims that she suffers from
PTSD. While she acknowledges that she did not suffer any permanent physical
injury on December 9, 2012, she asserts that she suffered a physical impact when
she fainted and fell to the floor.
The parties engaged in and completed discovery. During discovery,
plaintiff was deposed, and her counsel produced the letters from her psychiatrist
and psychologist, which described plaintiff's PTSD. Just before the close of
discovery, PATH moved for summary judgment. In opposition, plaintiff
produced an expert report from a toxicologist who opined that the exposure to
the diesel fumes caused plaintiff to faint on December 9, 2012.
The trial court heard oral arguments on the motion on August 4, 2017.
That same day, the court entered an order granting summary judgment to PATH
and dismissing plaintiff's FELA claim with prejudice. The court explained its
ruling on the record. The trial court found that plaintiff's case was similar to the
United States Supreme Court case in Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v.
Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997). In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that
emotional distress damages could not be recovered under FELA by a worker
2
State and federal courts are vested with concurrent jurisdiction to hear FELA
cases. 45 U.S.C. § 56.
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who was disease-free, but had been exposed to asbestos. Id. at 432. The trial
court here reasoned that "if asbestos is not within the zone of danger as per the
Supreme Court of the United States, then diesel fumes/carbon monoxide is not
within the zone of danger." The trial court then reasoned:
[T]he fumes and/or carbon monoxide present by - -
presented by plaintiff was that of a simple physical
contact with a substance that might cause a disease at a
substantially later time and, therefore, the claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress may not be
upheld under FELA, therefore, summary judgment is
granted.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. On September 15, 2017, the court
denied plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff now appeals.
II
On appeal, plaintiff makes four arguments. She contends that the trial
court erred (1) in determining that she did not sustain a physical impact; (2) in
failing to distinguish the facts of her case from the facts in Buckley; (3) in
misinterpreting Buckley; and (4) in denying her motion for reconsideration. All
of the arguments presented by plaintiff involve one overriding issue —did
plaintiff suffer a physical impact within the meaning of the zone-of-danger test
when she was exposed to diesel fumes? We are persuaded that plaintiff has
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alleged a physical impact and, thus, defendant was not entitled to summary
judgment.
We review summary judgment orders de novo, applying the same standard
used by the trial court. Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (citing Mem'l Props., LLC v. Zurich
Am. Ins. Co., 210 N.J. 512, 524 (2012)). Summary judgment should be granted
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment o r
order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c); see also Templo Fuente De Vida Corp.,
224 N.J. at 199. When no issues of material fact exist, but a question of law
remains, our review of that legal issue is plenary. Templo Fuente De Vida Corp.,
224 N.J. at 199 (citing Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,
140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
Here, the question presented is whether plaintiff has brought a cognizable
claim for emotional injuries under FELA. A FELA claim brought in state court
is governed by federal law. Donovan v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 309
N.J. Super. 340, 348 (App. Div. 1998). FELA "makes common carrier railroads
liable in damages to employees who suffer work-related injuries caused 'in
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whole or in part' by the railroad's negligence." Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers,
538 U.S. 135, 140 (2003) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51). An employer has a duty
under FELA "to use reasonable care in providing employees a safe work
environment." Stevens v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 356 N.J. Super. 311, 319
(App. Div. 2003) (citing Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352 (1943)).
"[T]he quantum of evidence required to establish liability in a FELA case is
much less than in an ordinary negligence case." Kapsis v. Port Auth. of N.Y. &
N.J., 313 N.J. Super. 395, 403 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting Harbin v. Burlington
N. R.R. Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, an employer may
be held liable for risks that would be too remote to support liability at common
law. See Stevens, 356 N.J. Super. at 318-19.
Claims for emotional distress are permitted under FELA. Consol. Rail
Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 550 (1994). Such claims are divided into two
categories: (1) "[s]tand-alone emotional distress claims not provoked by any
physical injury," and (2) "emotional distress claims brought on by a physical
injury, for which pain and suffering recovery is permitted." Ayers, 538 U.S. at
147. In finding stand-alone emotional distress claims to be cognizable, the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged "the potential for fraudulent and
trivial claims" and the prospect that such suits could "lead to unpredictable and
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nearly infinite liability for defendants." Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 551-52. To
address those liability concerns, the Court adopted a zone-of-danger test, which
limits the scope of stand-alone emotional distress claims brought under FELA.
Id. at 554. Under the zone-of-danger test, claims are confined "to plaintiffs who:
(1) 'sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct'; or
(2) 'are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct' - that is, those
who escaped instant physical harm, but were 'within the zone of danger of
physical impact.'" Ayers, 538 U.S. at 146 (quoting Gottshall, 512 U.S. at
547-48).
In Buckley, the Court applied the zone-of-danger test to the plaintiff's
FELA stand-alone emotional distress claim that was solely based on his
exposure to asbestos, and not on any related disease or symptom. See 521 U.S.
at 427-30. The Court held that the plaintiff could not bring an emotional distress
claim under FELA for a fear of developing cancer stemming from the exposure
to asbestos. Id. at 432. In that regard, the Court reasoned that exposure alone
was insufficient to show a physical impact under the zone-of-danger test. Ibid.
The Buckley Court explained that "the words 'physical impact' do not encompass
every form of 'physical contact.'" Ibid. Accordingly, the Buckley Court held
that an asymptomatic plaintiff did not suffer a physical impact after "a simple
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physical contact with a substance that might cause a disease at a substantially
later time—where that substance, or related circumstance, threatens no harm
other than that disease-related risk." Id. at 430.
In ruling that exposure alone was not a physical impact, the Buckley Court
explained that emotional-distress claims that satisfy the zone-of-danger test
generally involve "a threatened physical contact that caused, or might have
caused, immediate traumatic harm." Id. at 430-31 (citing Deutsch v. Shein, 597
S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky. 1980) (holding that x-ray exposure was a "physical
contact" supporting recovery for emotional suffering where immediate harm to
fetus was suspected)). Moreover, the Buckley Court recognized that under
common law, "a plaintiff who exhibits a physical symptom of exposure [may]
recover" for emotional distress caused by such exposure. Id. at 432 (citing
Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1986); Mauro v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div. 1988)); see also
id. at 436-37 ("The common law permits emotional distress recovery for that
category of plaintiffs who suffer from a disease (or exhibit a physical symptom)
. . . thereby finding a special effort to evaluate emotional symptoms warranted
in that category of cases[.]").
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Here, plaintiff seeks recovery for the emotional injury of PTSD. She is
not seeking recovery for any physical injury. As such, her claim is a stand-alone
emotional distress claim that must satisfy the zone-of-danger test. Plaintiff
argues that she satisfies both prongs of the test. First, she argues she suffered a
physical impact when she was exposed to diesel fumes, inhaled the fumes, and
fainted. Second, she argues that working in the train tunnels with the diesel
fumes placed her in an immediate risk of physical harm. The trial court rejected
plaintiff's arguments, found her claim to be analogous to the claim in Buckley,
and held that plaintiff had not satisfied the zone-of-danger test.
In cases under FELA, whether a claimant has satisfied the zone-of-danger
test is a question of law, which on appeal is reviewed de novo. Smith v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 236 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir. 2000); Nelson v. Metro-North
Commuter R.R., 235 F.3d 101, 113 n.12 (2d Cir. 2000); Everett v. Norfolk S.
Ry. Co., 734 S.E.2d 388, 390 (Ga. 2012). Viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that she has pled a "physical impact" under
the zone-of-danger test as described in Gottshall and Buckley. Namely, plaintiff
was exposed to a noxious substance, diesel fumes, and suffered an immediate
physical symptom from that exposure—she fainted. See Buckley, 521 U.S. at
432, 437. Moreover, she immediately began to suffer from PTSD. We find
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plaintiff's exposure to diesel fumes constitutes a physical impact as the exposure
caused plaintiff to suffer the immediate physical harm of fainting.
The parties disagree as to whether the diesel fumes caused plaintiff to
faint, however, plaintiff has provided sufficient facts to create a genuine material
factual dispute on this issue. Namely, plaintiff has provided a toxicologist's
report authored by Donald A. Fox, Ph.D., dated July 21, 2017, wherein Dr. Fox
concludes: "[I]t is my professional opinion that, [M.M.'s] exposure to diesel
exhaust in the PATH tunnel and relay room on Sunday, December 9, 2012,
caused her syncope." Dr. Fox's report combined with plaintiff's testimony from
her deposition creates a factual dispute as to whether the diesel fumes caused
plaintiff to faint. 3 Accordingly, resolving this dispute is a matter for a jury.
We further conclude that the trial court incorrectly equated the facts
underlying the instant case with those in Buckley. In Buckley, the plaintiff
suffered no symptoms from his exposure to asbestos, and his emotional injury
was based on his fear of contracting an illness at some point in the future. 521
U.S. at 427. Here, plaintiff has pled that she suffered an immediate symptom,
3
Defendant argues we should not consider the toxicologist's report as it is a net
opinion that was not disclosed in discovery. The trial court made no evidentiary
rulings on the expert report. As such, we consider the report as part of the
record. On remand, the trial court may address the admissibility of the report.
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fainting, after she was exposed to the diesel fumes. She further argues that her
emotional injury of PTSD is an injury that developed directly after, and as a
result of the incident.
Federal case law does not foreclose a claim for stand-alone emotional
distress brought on by a single physical impact from a noxious substance. In
that regard, we have found no decision by the United States Supreme Court or
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that has precluded a
claim based on a one-time physical impact from exposure to noxious fumes.
Consequentially, we are persuaded that this case involves more than exposure
to "a substance that might cause a disease at a substantially later time[.]"
Buckley, 521 U.S. at 430. Instead, plaintiff's stand-alone claim for emotional
distress satisfies the zone-of-danger test because she suffered a physical impact
when she was exposed to diesel fumes that caused her to faint. Accordingly,
defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
We note that defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that
plaintiff had not satisfied the zone-of-danger test, and therefore, her stand-alone
claim of emotional distress was not cognizable under FELA. Defendant did not
challenge plaintiff's proofs as to any other element of negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Nonetheless, we comment briefly on the issue of causation.
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While it remains for the jury to determine whether plaintiff's exposure to the
diesel fumes caused her emotional injury of PTSD, for summary judgment
purposes, we find plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence connecting her
emotional injury to the diesel exposure. Namely, plaintiff has provided the
expert opinion of her psychiatrist who concluded that plaintiff developed PTSD
as a result of "the accident" that occurred in the train tunnels on December 9,
2012, which included plaintiff's exposure to the diesel fumes and her subsequent
fainting and falling.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
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