STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. R.K v. (03-04-0222, CAPE MAY COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3594-16T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
R.K.V.,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted October 4, 2018 – Decided October 30, 2018
Before Judges O'Connor and Whipple.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Cape May County, Indictment No. 03-04-
0222.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Alison S. Perrone, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Jeffrey H. Sutherland, Cape May County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Gretchen A. Pickering,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant R.K.V.1 appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
I
On October 23, 2003, a jury convicted defendant of seven counts of
first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a); four counts of
second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); one count of second-degree
sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c); and nine counts of second-degree
endangering the welfare of a minor, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). On January 23,
2004, defendant was sentenced in the aggregate to a sixty-seven year term of
imprisonment, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
7.2.
Defendant filed a direct appeal. We affirmed his convictions; however,
because NERA did not apply to some of the convictions, we vacated the
NERA component of the sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing.
See State v. R.K.V., No. A-3575-03 (App. Div. Dec. 22, 2005). On April 6,
2006, the trial court sentenced defendant, in the aggregate, to a sixty-seven
1
We use initials to protect the victim’s privacy.
2
A-3594-16T4
year term of imprisonment, and imposed a twenty-three year period of parole
ineligibility. Defendant filed a direct appeal of his sentence; on September 21,
2010, defendant's sentence was affirmed by our excessive sentencing oral
argument panel, see Rule 2:9-11. On September 9, 2011, the Supreme Court
denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Venzie, 208 N.J. 336
(2011).
In December 21, 2011, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey; that
petition was dismissed without prejudice on February 3, 2012. Defendant filed
an amended petition. On March 7, 2013, the District Court dismissed that
petition with prejudice and denied defendant's request for a certificate of
appealability.
Defendant appealed and, on August 14, 2013, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit denied defendant's request for a certificate of
appealability and, on October 9, 2013, denied his petition for a rehearing en
banc. On February 24, 2014, the United States Supreme Court denied
defendant's application for certiorari, and on May 5, 2014, his petition for a
rehearing was denied.
3
A-3594-16T4
On February 12, 2016, defendant filed his first petition for PCR. The
issues defendant raised before the PCR court relevant to those on appeal are:
the appeals of his convictions and sentence tolled the time bar imposed in Rule
3:22-12(a)(1); his ignorance of the law constituted excusable neglect, see Rule
3:22-12(a)(1)(A); and enforcement of the time bar would result in a
fundamental injustice because trial counsel failed to seek the recusal of the
judge who presided over his suppression hearing, during which he challenged
the admissibility of certain statements he had made to the police.2
As for the latter allegation, defendant claimed the judge had a conflict of
interest because, when she sat in the Family Part, she presided over an
adoption hearing in which she granted defendant's application to adopt the
victim, who had been a foster child in his home. Defendant argued that,
during the suppression hearing, the judge may have felt responsible for
permitting defendant to adopt the victim and, thus, was motivated to rule
against him at the suppression hearing to assuage her remorse. It is not known
when the adoption hearing was conducted or even if it was contested.
On November 15, 2016, the PCR court entered an order denying
defendant's request for post-conviction relief. The court found defendant's
2
The judge who presided over the suppression hearing did not preside over
the trial.
4
A-3594-16T4
petition time barred under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1), rejecting defendant's argument
the delay in filing his petition was due to excusable neglect and there was a
reasonable probability that, if his factual assertions were found to be true,
enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice. See Rule
3:22-12(a)(1)(A).
On the issue of fundamental injustice, the PCR court found there was no
basis to conclude the judge who presided over the suppression hearing was
predisposed or motivated to rule against defendant merely because she handled
the adoption hearing. The PCR court also noted defendant could have but did
not raise the question of the judge's alleged partiality on direct appeal,
although he otherwise challenged her ruling on his suppression motion. As
previously stated, we affirmed defendant's convictions on appeal.
II
On appeal, defendant presents the following point for our consideration.
POINT I: THE PCR COURT ERRED IN
DISMISSING DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS TIME BARRED
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO FILE HIS
PETITION WITHIN FIVE YEARS OF HIS
CONVICTION WAS DUE TO EXCUSABLE
NEGLECT AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE TIME
BAR WOULD RESULT IN A FUNDAMENTAL
INJUSTICE.
5
A-3594-16T4
Defendant's specific arguments are those which he asserted before the PCR
court.
To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must
satisfy the two-prong test formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J.
42, 58 (1987). First, a defendant must show "that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the
Sixth Amendment." Id. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
To satisfy prong one, [a defendant] ha[s] to overcome
a strong presumption that counsel exercised
reasonable professional judgment and sound trial
strategy in fulfilling his responsibilities. [I]f counsel
makes a thorough investigation of the law and facts
and considers all likely options, counsel's trial strategy
is virtually unchallengeable. Mere dissatisfaction with
a counsel's exercise of judgment is insufficient to
warrant overturning a conviction.
[State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013) (third
alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).]
Second, a defendant must prove he suffered prejudice due to counsel's
deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A defendant must show
by a "reasonable probability" that the deficient performance affected the
outcome. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. "A reasonable probability is a probability
6
A-3594-16T4
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J.
560, 583 (2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52).
"If [a] defendant establishes one prong of the Strickland-Fritz standard, but not
the other, his claim will be unsuccessful." State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280
(2012).
Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A) states:
(a) General Time Limitations.
(1) First Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief. Except as provided in paragraphs
(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4) of this rule, no
petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule
more than 5 years after the date of entry
pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 of the judgment
of conviction that is being challenged
unless:
(A) it alleges facts showing that the delay
beyond said time was due to defendant's
excusable neglect and that there is a
reasonable probability that if the
defendant's factual assertions were found
to be true enforcement of the time bar
would result in a fundamental
injustice . . . .
We concur with the PCR court that defendant's petition is time-barred
and, because defendant failed to show excusable neglect and that enforcement
of the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice, that time bar cannot be
7
A-3594-16T4
relaxed. Generally, a defendant's first PCR petition must be filed within five
years of the date the judgment of conviction is entered, "unless it alleges facts
showing that the delay beyond said time was due to defendant's excusable
neglect and that there is a reasonable probability that if the defendant's factual
assertions were found to be true enforcement of the time bar would result in a
fundamental injustice." R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A).
Defendant's first petition for PCR was filed on November 15, 2016. The
first judgment of conviction is dated January 23, 2004 and the amended one is
dated April 6, 2006, making the filing of the PCR petition well beyond the
five-year time limit. In general, the five-year time period is neither stayed nor
tolled by an appellate or other proceeding, see State v. DiFrisco, 187 N.J. 156,
165-67 (2006), and the fact defendant was not knowledgeable about the law
does not satisfy the exceptional circumstances standard. See State v. Dugan,
289 N.J. Super. 15, 22 (App. Div. 1996) (holding a misunderstanding of the
meaning of Rule 3:22-12 does not constitute excusable neglect); State v.
Merola, 365 N.J. Super. 203, 218 (Law Div. 2002) ("Ignorance of the law and
rules of court does not qualify as excusable neglect.").
Finally, even if defendant demonstrated excusable neglect, there is no
evidence or indication the judge who decided the suppression motion was in
8
A-3594-16T4
any way influenced by her decision in the adoption matter. Defendant's
hypothesis the judge had qualms about her previous decision to permit
defendant to adopt the victim and, thus, sought to mollify those feelings of
regret by denying defendant's suppression motion, is just rank speculation.
Therefore, defendant failed to show there is a reasonable probability that, even
if counsel did not seek the judge's recusal, enforcement of the time bar would
result in a fundamental injustice. See R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A).
In summary, we are satisfied defendant did not establish he is entitled to
a relaxation of the time limit in Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A). Further, even if there
were no time bar, there is no evidence the judge who decided the suppression
motion had a conflict of interest. Accordingly, even if defendant were able to
meet the first prong of the Strickland standard, he could not meet the second
prong. Defendant did not provide any evidence there is a reasonable
probability that trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness affected the outcome.
See Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.
Affirmed.
9
A-3594-16T4