N.T.B. v. D.D.B.

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4542-13T2
N.T.B., APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff-Respondent, September 9, 2015
v. APPELLATE DIVISION
D.D.B.,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________________
Submitted April 27, 2015 – Decided September 9, 2015
Before Judges Lihotz, Espinosa and St. John.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Cumberland
County, Docket Nos. FV-06-1087-14 and FV-06-
1078-14.
Robert S. Greenberg, attorney for appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ST. JOHN, J.A.D.
In this appeal, we must determine whether a spouse's
destruction of a door within the couple's jointly-owned marital
home may constitute the predicate act of "criminal mischief,"
N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3, thereby supporting a finding of an act of
domestic violence pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. The matter
arises from two domestic disputes between plaintiff-husband
N.T.B. and defendant-wife D.D.B. During the course of separate
incidents, plaintiff destroyed audio speakers located within
defendant's bedroom and later broke down her bedroom door.
After plaintiff broke down the door, defendant struck him in the
face. The parties filed cross-complaints alleging domestic
violence. Following a non-jury trial, the Family Part judge
denied defendant's request for a final restraining order (FRO).
The judge granted plaintiff's request and entered an FRO against
defendant to protect plaintiff from further abuse.
Defendant argues the trial judge erred in holding
plaintiff's destruction of the speakers did not amount to
criminal mischief because the speakers were not the "property of
another." N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1). Further, she avers the judge
erroneously determined plaintiff's conduct was insufficient to
establish "harassment" under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. Finally,
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the trial judge's conclusion she committed an act of "simple
assault," N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a), which involved domestic violence
supporting the entry of an FRO against her.
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial judge's
determination that the bedroom door was not the property of
2 A-4542-13T2
another under N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3. However, we deem this
concession to be misinformed and we choose to address this
important question to clarify the rights of spouses when the
issue arises in the context of whether conduct amounts to
domestic violence. See R. 2:10-5; cf. Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J.
Super. 509, 524 (App. Div. 2011) (holding exercise of original
jurisdiction proper where the question raised "implicates the
public interest" and is "purely one of law [with] no facts
bearing on that question . . . in dispute").
Upon our review, we hold plaintiff's destruction of the
door forming part of the jointly-owned marital home constituted
criminal mischief through harm to the "property of another," and
plaintiff's conduct supported a finding of domestic violence.
Additionally, we determine the judge's findings as to
plaintiff's destruction of the speakers were insufficient,
requiring remand for further findings as to which of the parties
maintained a tangible property interest in those items. We
affirm the judge's rejection of defendant's argument that
plaintiff committed an act of domestic violence through the
predicate act of harassment. Lastly, we conclude the trial
judge failed to set forth sufficient facts or legal analysis
supporting the decision to enter an FRO against defendant on the
basis of her striking plaintiff, and remand for a determination
3 A-4542-13T2
of whether she acted in self-defense or defense of the parties'
child, who was also present.
I.
The record discloses the following facts and procedural
history. The parties were married in March 2012. Prior to the
marriage, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO)
against defendant after she burned him with a curling iron. The
order memorializing this TRO is not included in the record
before us.
At the time of the events giving rise to this appeal, the
parties resided together with their eight-year-old daughter in a
jointly-owned home. Plaintiff filed for divorce in December
2013 and, as of March 2014, the spouses were sleeping in
separate bedrooms within the home.
On the evening of March 30, 2014, defendant was listening
to music on speakers located in her bedroom. Plaintiff became
upset regarding the volume of the music, and told her to lower
it. Defendant refused, at which point plaintiff entered
defendant's bedroom and poured juice on the speakers. When the
juice failed to silence the music, plaintiff proceeded to tear
the speakers' plug from the wall, take them into the bathroom
and throw them into the toilet.
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The following evening, the parties were arguing in the
living room. Accompanied by the parties' child, defendant went
into her bedroom and locked the door. According to defendant,
plaintiff attempted to open defendant's bedroom door and, upon
realizing it was locked, shouted: "Don't lock no motherfucking
doors in my house." Plaintiff disputed the statement. He then
broke the door open by slamming his body against it, splintering
the door frame in the process. Defendant alleged plaintiff then
prevented her from leaving the room. In order to get around him
and out of the room, defendant stated she slapped plaintiff in
the face. Plaintiff denied obstructing his wife's path, and
testified she punched him in the face without provocation while
she was storming out of the room.
The spouses subsequently filed cross-complaints, each
seeking an FRO against the other, which were consolidated for
trial before the same Family Part judge. The parties were the
sole witnesses at the FRO hearing.
Defendant argued plaintiff's actions in destroying her
speakers and breaking down the bedroom door constituted both
criminal mischief and harassment, thereby justifying a finding
of an act of domestic violence and the entry of an FRO against
him. Plaintiff averred defendant's striking him as she was
leaving her bedroom on the evening of March 31 established an
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act of domestic violence through the predicate act of simple
assault.
Following testimony, the judge reviewed each party's
allegations under the two-pronged framework provided by Silver
v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). She
denied defendant's request for an FRO against plaintiff. In so
ruling, the judge first concluded, as to criminal mischief,
defendant failed to meet her burden of establishing domestic
violence by a preponderance of the evidence because "the
speakers and the bedroom door [were] within the marital home
that is shared by the parties, both appearing to be marital
property," and therefore were not the "property of another" as
required by N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3. "In other words," the judge
reasoned, "the statute does not prohibit a person from causing
damage to their own property." Regarding harassment, the judge
similarly held defendant failed to establish any of the elements
constituting the offense as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.
In assessing plaintiff's request for an FRO on the basis of
defendant's striking him, the judge held he proved by a
preponderance that defendant struck him in the face, "[w]hether
by way of a slap or . . . a punch."1 As to Silver's second
1
The court rejected plaintiff's argument defendant committed
an act of domestic violence by harassment, stating: "It may be
(continued)
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prong, the judge determined an FRO was necessary to protect
plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence by defendant.
Although cognizant of the courts' concern "with the serious
policy implications of permitting allegations of this nature to
be branded as domestic violence and used by either spouse to
secure rulings on critical issues" in subsequent divorce
proceedings, Murray v. Murray, 267 N.J. Super. 406, 410 (App.
Div. 1993), the judge concluded the history of defendant's
violent behavior towards plaintiff — as demonstrated by the
earlier grant of a TRO against her prior to the marriage —
wholly supported the entry of an FRO.
Defendant appeals both the denial of her request for an FRO
and the grant of the FRO against her. We consolidated the
matters on appeal.
II.
Our review of a Family Part judge's findings following a
bench trial is a narrow one. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
411 (1998). "In our review of a trial court's order entered
following trial in a domestic violence matter, we grant
substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact and
(continued)
annoying to him [having to] liv[e] in the same house with her,
but it doesn't satisfy the definition of harassment because [the
court] can't find that [defendant] does that with the purpose to
harass [plaintiff]."
7 A-4542-13T2
the legal conclusions based upon those findings." D.N. v. K.M.,
429 N.J. Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013), certif. denied, 216
N.J. 587 (2014). In other words, we will neither "'engage in an
independent assessment of the evidence as if [we] were the court
of first instance,'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 433 (App. Div. 2002) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)),
nor "disturb the 'factual findings and legal conclusions of the
trial judge unless [we are] convinced that they are so
manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the
interests of justice.'" Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J.
474, 484 (1974)). On the other hand, where our review addresses
questions of law, a "trial judge's findings are not entitled to
that same degree of deference if they are based upon a
misunderstanding of the applicable legal principles." Z.P.R.,
supra, 351 N.J. Super. at 434 (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v.
Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
A.
We first must determine whether plaintiff's actions, as
found by the trial judge, support a finding of an act of
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domestic violence through the predicate act of criminal
mischief. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a).
The PDVA was enacted in furtherance of New Jersey's "strong
policy against domestic violence." Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at
400. Domestic violence occurs when an adult or emancipated
minor commits one or more of the enumerated acts upon a person
covered by the PDVA. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). When determining
whether to grant an FRO pursuant to the PDVA, a trial judge must
engage in a two-step analysis. Silver, supra, 387 N.J. Super.
at 125-26. "First, the judge must determine whether the
plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible
evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred." Id. at 125; see also
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) (providing that an FRO may only be granted
"after a finding or an admission is made that an act of domestic
violence was committed"); R. 5:7A(d) (mirroring the language of
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)).
However, the occurrence of a predicate act does not, by
itself, warrant the issuance of an FRO. Corrente v. Corrente,
281 N.J. Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1995); Peranio v. Peranio,
280 N.J. Super. 47, 54 (App. Div. 1995). The second inquiry
determines "whether the court should enter a restraining order
that provides protection for the victim." Silver, supra, 387
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N.J. Super. at 126; see also J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476
(2011) (explaining that an FRO should not be issued without a
finding by the court that "'relief is necessary to prevent
further abuse'" (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b))).
Criminal mischief, as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a), is
one of the predicate acts constituting domestic violence.
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(10). Under N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1), an
individual is guilty of criminal mischief if he or she
"[p]urposely or knowingly damages tangible property of another."
Here, there can be no dispute plaintiff acted "purposely or
knowingly" and did, in fact, "damage" the door and speakers.
Therefore, we limit our inquiry to whether those items damaged
were "property of another" as used in the criminal mischief
statute. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1).
N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3 itself does not define what constitutes
"property of another." However, the model jury charge for
criminal mischief instructs trial judges, "[w]here appropriate,
[to] charge that property of another includes property partly
owned by defendant in which any other person has an interest
which defendant is not privileged to infringe." Model Jury
Charge (Criminal), "Criminal Mischief – Purposeful or Knowing
Damage to Tangible Property (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1))" (2005)
(citing N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1(h)); cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(f) (for
10 A-4542-13T2
purposes of arson statute, "[p]roperty is that of another . . .
if any one [sic] other than the actor has a possessory, or legal
or equitable propriety interest therein"); N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1(h)
(for purposes of theft and related offenses, "'[p]roperty of
another' includes property in which any person other than the
actor has an interest which the actor is not privileged to
infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an
interest in the property").
The trial judge concluded defendant failed to prove that
plaintiff damaged the "property of another" because the door and
its frame were "marital property" and the statute does not
prohibit plaintiff from damaging his own property. We disagree.
The record demonstrates that the parties acquired the home
during their marriage. "The Legislature has determined that a
tenancy by the entirety shall be created when 'a husband and
wife together take title to an interest in real or personal
property under a written instrument designating both of their
names as husband and wife.'" Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley,
Inc. v. Asterbadi, 389 N.J. Super. 219, 229 (Ch. Div. 2006)
(quoting N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.2(a)), aff'd in part and remanded in
part, 398 N.J. Super. 299 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 195 N.J.
521 (2008); see also N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.3 ("No instrument creating
a property interest on the part of a husband and wife shall be
11 A-4542-13T2
construed to create a tenancy in common or a joint tenancy
unless it is expressed therein or manifestly appears from the
tenor of the instrument that it was intended to create a tenancy
in common or joint tenancy.").
A tenancy by the entirety is a form of joint property
ownership available only to spouses that is created "when
property is held by a husband and wife with each becoming seized
and possessed of the entire estate." Asterbadi, supra, 389 N.J.
Super. at 227. Each co-tenant enjoys the right of survivorship:
"after the death of one, the survivor takes the whole." Ibid.
(citing 13 New Jersey Practice, Real Estate Law and Practice §
5.6, at 67-68 (John A. Celentano, Jr.) (2d ed. 2002)).
Notwithstanding the genesis "based on the unity of husband and
wife at common law, [tenancies by the entirety] survive as a
means of protecting marital assets during coverture and as
security for one spouse on the death of the other." Ibid. at
228 (citing Freda v. Commercial Trust Co. of N.J., 118 N.J. 36,
46 (1990)).
Therefore, although "[a] tenant by the entirety can
alienate his or her right of survivorship, and a judgment
creditor of either spouse may levy and execute upon such right,"
neither tenant may force the involuntary partition of the
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subject property during the marriage. Ibid. at 227.2 Similarly,
the ability of a judgment creditor of one of the spouses to
"levy upon and sell that spouse's right of survivorship as well
as his or her undivided one-half interest in the life estate for
the joint lives of the tenants . . . remains subject to the
survivorship interest of the non-debtor spouse." Ibid.
Despite these well-settled protections for and limitations
upon tenants by the entirety that serve to distinguish the
estate from other forms of joint property ownership, "[e]ach
tenant by the entirety is a tenant in common with the other
during the joint lives of the spouses." Newman v. Chase, 70
N.J. 254, 259 (1976); see also Vander Weert, supra, 304 N.J.
Super. at 345 ("In sum, it is, during the marriage, essentially
an undivided tenancy in common for the joint lives of the
spouses subject to the right of survivorship of each."). As we
have previously explained, a tenant in common has "an undivided
interest . . . that encompasses the entire property." Burbach
2
"Upon divorce, the tenancy by the entirety was historically
converted, by operation of law, into a tenancy in common, the
interest of each spouse then defined as a determinable undivided
one-half interest subject to partition or execution sale."
Vander Weert v. Vander Weert, 304 N.J. Super. 339, 346 (App.
Div. 1997). This automatic conversion of the estate, as a
matter of law upon divorce, persists. See Di Santo v. Adase,
116 N.J. Super. 226, 228 (App. Div. 1971) ("An absolute divorce
terminates the marital relationship and converts an estate by
the entirety into a tenancy in common.").
13 A-4542-13T2
v. Sussex Cnty. Mun. Utils. Auth., 318 N.J. Super. 228, 233
(App. Div. 1999). Each co-tenant "'has a separate and distinct
freehold title,'" and each holds his or her "'title and interest
independently of the others.'" Ibid. (quoting 4 Thompson, Real
Property § 1795 (1979)); see also Dorf v. Tuscarora Pipe Line
Co., 48 N.J. Super. 26, 34-37 (App. Div. 1957); Ross v. Ross, 35
N.J. Super. 242, 246-47 (Ch. Div. 1955). Thus, it is clear that
plaintiff and defendant each held a separate and distinct
interest in the home.
We therefore conclude, in breaking down defendant's bedroom
door, plaintiff did destroy property of another and therefore
committed the predicate act of criminal mischief. N.J.S.A.
2C:25-19(a)(10). To conclude otherwise would permit a spouse to
purposely and maliciously totally destroy his or her jointly-
owned marital home, without sanction, leaving no recourse for
the innocent spouse to secure an FRO on the basis of the home's
ruin. We cannot abide such a result and are therefore
constrained to reverse. We hold that plaintiff's actions
resulted in damage to defendant's undivided interest in the home
as a tenant by the entirety and, thus, the trial judge erred in
determining that plaintiff had not damaged "property of another"
under N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1).
14 A-4542-13T2
Furthermore, we disagree with the trial judge's conclusion
that plaintiff's pouring juice on the speakers, tearing them out
from the wall, and throwing them in the toilet did not establish
criminal mischief through damage to the property of another.
Before the Family Part judge, defendant testified the speakers
belonged to her and, as such, were kept in her bedroom.
Plaintiff, contrarily, averred: "[t]hose speakers . . . [were]
marital property. They were purchased during our marriage and
they were . . . an article located inside of our home."
In rejecting defendant's argument, the judge did not set
forth any facts supporting the proposition the parties jointly
purchased the speakers or any other indicia that plaintiff had a
tangible interest in the speakers as personalty. Nor did the
judge undertake the requisite legal analysis to determine
whether the speakers, as personal property, were the "property
of another" for the purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a).
We therefore reverse the trial judge's holdings that
neither the door nor the speakers were the "property of another"
under the criminal mischief statute. As to the door, having
determined it was the "property of another" pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2C:17-3(a), the destruction of which thereby constituting an act
of domestic violence, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(10), we remand for a
determination of whether an FRO is necessary to protect defendant
15 A-4542-13T2
from harm. See Silver, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 126-27.
Regarding the speakers, on remand, the Family Part judge should
make specific factual findings as to when, how and by whom they
were purchased, for the purpose of determining whether plaintiff
enjoyed any tangible proprietary interest in them.
In order to assist the trial judge in the determination, we
add the following comment. We disagree with the proposition
that, under New Jersey law, any personal property acquired
during the marriage automatically becomes joint property. At
common law, "[t]here [was] no tenancy by the entirety in
personal property in this State." Kelly v. Kelly, 135 N.J. Eq.
75, 77 (Prerog. Ct. 1944); see also State, Dep't of Treasury v.
Myndyllo, 225 N.J. Super. 302, 308 (App. Div. 1988) (holding
"that the proceeds of a conveyance of realty are personalty and
cannot be held by the entirety"). In 1988, the Legislature
enacted N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.2, which recognizes the establishment
of a tenancy by the entirety in personal, as well as real,
property. Although it departs from the common-law rule, the
statute requires that, for acquired personalty to be considered
joint property held by the entirety, the spouses must "take
title to an interest [therein] . . . under a written instrument
designating both of their names as husband and wife." N.J.S.A.
46:3-17.2(a). Absent evidence of such an instrument, the
16 A-4542-13T2
common-law prohibition against personal property being held by
the entirety prevails.
B.
Defendant also challenges the trial court's conclusion that
plaintiff's destruction of the speakers and the door did not
support a finding of an act of domestic violence through the
predicate act of harassment. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13).
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 provides, in pertinent part:
[A] person commits a petty disorderly
persons offense if, with purpose to harass
another, he:
a. Makes, or causes to be made, a
communication or communications
anonymously or at extremely
inconvenient hours, or in
offensively coarse language, or
any other manner likely to cause
annoyance or alarm;
b. Subjects another to striking,
kicking, shoving, or other
offensive touching, or threatens
to do so; or
c. Engages in any other course of
alarming conduct or of repeatedly
committed acts with the purpose to
alarm or seriously annoy such
other person.
The trial judge determined defendant failed to establish
harassment under any of the statutory elements. On appeal,
defendant contends the judge erred with respect to subsection
(c), arguing plaintiff's actions amounted to a "course of
17 A-4542-13T2
alarming conduct" supporting a finding of an act of domestic
violence. We disagree.
The Supreme Court has held that a violation of subsection
(c) "require[s] a course of alarming conduct or a series of
repeated acts, along with proof of a purpose to alarm or
seriously annoy." J.D., supra, 207 N.J. at 486. Defendant has
not alleged, nor does the record suggest, plaintiff committed
any repeated objectionable acts. Therefore, plaintiff "can only
be in violation of subsection [(c)] if he engaged in a 'course
of alarming conduct' within the meaning of the statute." Ibid.
(quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c)).
Even though N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) does not define "course of
conduct" as it applies to harassment, the Legislature has
clarified that in other contexts, such as stalking, "two or
more" instances of behavior covered under the statute is
sufficient. See N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a)(2). Since plaintiff
admits to destroying the speakers and defendant's bedroom door
on separate nights — two distinct occasions — there can be no
dispute he engaged in a "course of conduct" as contemplated by
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.
However, in addition to a repeated act or course of
conduct, "the statute requires that the victim . . . be the
target of harassing intent." J.D., supra, 207 N.J. at 486.
18 A-4542-13T2
"Although a purpose to harass can be inferred from a history
between the parties, that finding must be supported by some
evidence that the actor's conscious object was to alarm or
annoy; mere awareness that someone might be alarmed or annoyed
is insufficient." Ibid. at 487 (citation omitted). Similarly,
"[t]he victim's subjective reaction alone will not suffice;
there must be evidence of the improper purpose." Ibid.
We agree with the trial judge defendant failed to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff's purpose in
undertaking his course of conduct was to harass her. Regarding
the speakers, plaintiff testified he destroyed them to stop the
loud music he found so objectionable. He further stated he
broke down defendant's bedroom door "out of frustration." In
her testimony, defendant did not rebut plaintiff's explanation
of the motivation underlying these two acts. Consequently, we
conclude defendant did not establish that plaintiff acted with
the intent to harass her. We affirm the trial judge's
determination the facts did not support a finding of domestic
violence through the predicate act of harassment.
C.
Finally, we must determine whether the trial judge erred in
granting plaintiff's request for an FRO against defendant,
through the predicate act of "simple assault," N.J.S.A. 2C:25-
19 A-4542-13T2
19(a)(2), on the basis of her striking him in the face after he
broke down the door.
As we have noted, the grant of an FRO under the PDVA
requires application of Silver's two-step analysis. Silver,
supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-26. First, the court must
determine whether one of N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)'s predicate acts
has occurred. Ibid. at 125. Where the record supports such a
finding, it must then analyze whether an FRO is necessary to
protect the victim from further abuse. J.D., supra, 207 N.J. at
476.
"Although this second determination . . . is most often
perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a
restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the
factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29[(a)(1)-(6)], to protect
the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further
abuse." Silver, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 127. The
nonexclusive statutory factors include the "previous history of
domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including
threats, harassment and physical abuse," the "existence of
immediate danger to person or property," and the "best interests
of the victim and any child." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)-(2), (4).
Here, the judge found defendant committed the predicate act
of simple assault, "[w]hether by way of a slap or by way of a
20 A-4542-13T2
punch," and did so "[either] out of frustration or out of an
effort to get by him more quickly as she made her way out of the
house." The implications which attach to the reason for the
striking of plaintiff have legal consequences unaddressed by the
court. If she hit her husband in order to flee from him, as she
testified, she may be entitled to a self-defense justification,
N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4, a defense-of-her-daughter justification,
N.J.S.A. 2C:3-5, or both. Since the judge made no finding, we
are constrained to reverse the grant of the FRO against
defendant. See J.D., supra, 207 N.J. at 488 ("In entering the
FRO, the trial court did not sufficiently articulate findings
and conclusions consistent with the statutory standards and our
independent review of the record leaves us unsure that there is
sufficient evidence to sustain the issuance of the order.").
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Given the trial
judge's credibility findings, we remand to a different Family
Part judge. We do not retain jurisdiction.
21 A-4542-13T2