PARASTU SHARIFI v. PRINCETON MEDICAL CENTER, ETC. (L-1836-21, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0493-21
PARASTU SHARIFI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PRINCETON MEDICAL
CENTER, a/k/a PENN
MEDICINE PRINCETON
HEALTH CENTER,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________
Submitted June 8, 2022 – Decided July 20, 2022
Before Judges Gilson and Gummer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-1836-21.
Parastu Sharifi, appellant pro se.
Farkas & Donohue, LLC, attorneys for respondent
(Beth A. Hardy, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Parastu Sharifi, a patient who was admitted to and received treatment
at Princeton Medical Center, appeals an order dismissing her complaint with
prejudice due to her failure to file an affidavit of merit pursuant to the Affidavit of
Merit Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29. Because we agree plaintiff was required
to submit an affidavit of merit, we affirm.
I.
Plaintiff, representing herself, filed a complaint naming as the defendant
"Princeton Medical Center, A Health Center/Hospital AKA as Penn Medicine
Princeton [H]ealth Center" (PMC). In the complaint, plaintiff described
defendant as "a health care provider." In the civil case information statement
plaintiff filed with her complaint, plaintiff checked "Yes" in response to the
question, "[i]s this is a professional malpractice case?" Underneath where she
checked "Yes," the following instruction was provided: "If you have checked
'Yes,' see N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 and applicable case law regarding your obligation
to file an affidavit of merit."
Plaintiff made the following factual allegations in the complaint. On
March 10, 2020, plaintiff had "a massive panic attack." Plaintiff "suffered from
a nervous breakdown and feeling[s] of helplessness, anxiety, and hopelessness"
and was "crying and suffered from [] high blood pressure due to her emotional
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distress." "She started to cough severely, which resulted in her fainting due to
a drop in her blood oxygen level." The East Windsor Township Rescue Squad
"was called in to her rescue" and transported her to PMC. Plaintiff "was being
sent to the hospital to get help for her anxiety." Plaintiff "quickly regained
consciousness" but had "difficulty" in stopping her cough and in "control[ling]
her emotional state." Although plaintiff was aware of her surroundings, "she
was non[-]verbal and mentally extremely distressed." While her eyes were
closed and she was crying "nonstop," plaintiff "noticed" a rescue-squad member
directing the vehicle driver to take her to "a psychiatric part of the hospital."
After she arrived at "the hospital," plaintiff was "placed . . . on a bed" and
"noticed a female voice who was trying to undress her forcefully." Plaintiff held
onto her shirt to prevent hospital staff from underdressing her. Plaintiff "noted
that another hospital staff member told the nurse that you cannot undress her if
she is refusing to cooperate." A couple of minutes later, plaintiff heard a male
voice. He introduced himself to her as a doctor and "informed her of her rights
to refuse the treatment." According to plaintiff, "they injected her with a
medication without her consent . . . ."
A "short time" later, plaintiff calmed down, "perhaps due to the effect of
the medication." Recalling she had had her dog in her car while shopping,
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plaintiff "panicked for the dog's well being," got out of the bed, asked for her
shoes and belongings, and informed a nurse she was worried about her dog and
wanted to leave the hospital. The nurse asked plaintiff for information regarding
her car so hospital staff could request local police to assist plaintiff with her dog
until she was released from the hospital. After plaintiff provided that
information to the nurse, "about three or four security men entered the room and
pinned her to the bed and strapped her extremities by force to the bed." Plaintiff
"started to yield [sic] that she gives no consent to any treatment and she repeated
the sentence multiple times, 'I give NO consent to the hospital staff members for
any type of treatment.'" While plaintiff "was forcefully pinned to the bed, the
nurse injected her with another shot on her arm, again without her consent and
right after her refusal for treatment." Three "big male security staff on top of
her strapped her hands and ankles to the bed."
Plaintiff "was left in that condition for hours." She was "denied the right
to use the bathroom" and urinated on herself. "[A]fter hours of physical and
mental torture being pin[ned] in that position," plaintiff provided a requested
urine sample and was subsequently discharged.
Plaintiff claimed in the complaint that as a "result of these mistreatment
[sic] by these hospital staff," plaintiff "suffer[ed] severe emotional and mental
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distress, anguish, doubt, uncertainty, sleepless nights, degradation, headaches,
inconvenience, insecurity, fear, distrust and loss of enjoyment of life." Plaintiff
alleged "[a]nybody could go healthy in[to] this part of [the] hospital, and come
back totally mentally disturbed due to their unacceptable treatment of their
patients."
In the first count of the complaint, entitled "False Imprisonment, Physical
and Mental Torture, An Intentional Tort," plaintiff cited the "Rights of patients,"
N.J.S.A. 30:4-24.2, and asserted defendant had violated those rights. In the
second count, entitled "For Negligent Supervision, or Retention," plaintiff
accused defendant of breaching its "duty to exercise reasonable care and acted
negligently and carelessly in the hiring, training, and supervision by failing to
provide proper oversight for competency of [its] staff." Plaintiff specifically
faulted defendant for failing to ensure its staff followed its "'Patient Rights'
policy." In the third count, entitled "Intentional and Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress," plaintiff asserted defendant's employees had "acted in the
course and scope of their employ[ment]."
The case was assigned to "Track 2" for discovery purposes. The track-
assignment notice contained the following instruction: "if you believe that the
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track is inappropriate you must file a certification of good cause within [thirty]
days of the filing of your pleading."
Defendant filed an answer and included in its answer a demand for an
affidavit of merit pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. Defendant also filed a
certification of good cause to change the track assignment executed by defense
counsel. Defense counsel asserted the court had "incorrectly designated this
case as a Track II nonprofessional malpractice action" even though "[i]n her
[c]ase [i]nformation [s]tatement, [p]laintiff admitted the action is a
[p]rofessional [m]alpractice case." Defense counsel also contended the
allegations in the complaint clearly indicated plaintiff was alleging "professional
negligence on the part of physicians and nurses in the Emergency Department
for which an Affidavit of Merit would be required." In addition to the track
change, counsel asked the court to schedule a Ferreira conference. See Ferreira
v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144 (2003). In response, plaintiff
filed a "certification of rejection to change the track assignment," arguing she
had "not claimed malpractice in her complaint" but instead had "clearly
demonstrated in her complaint that her Rights as a Patient, pursuant to [N.J.S.A.]
30:4-24.2(d)(3) were bluntly violated by hospital staff."
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Defendant moved to change the track assignment. In support of the
motion, defense counsel certified that "[d]espite the allegations in the complaint
referencing alleged improper treatment in [d]efendant's emergency department
and [p]laintiff's case information statement designating this as a [p]rofessio nal
[m]alpractice case, the case was assigned to Track II instead of Track III."
Defendant's counsel further certified:
Princeton Healthcare System is a New Jersey nonprofit
corporation that operates Princeton Medical Center as
an acute hospital, licensed under N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2, and
is covered under the Affidavit of Merit Statute,
N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26. Additionally, to the extent
[plaintiff] seeks to impose liability on Princeton
Healthcare System for the alleged improper conduct of
its staff in the emergency department, including
licensed physicians and registered nurses, those
healthcare professionals are also included within the
definition of a licensed professional for which an
Affidavit of Merit is required.
Regarding plaintiff's claim her rights were violated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-
24.2(d)(3) when she was placed in temporary restraints, defense counsel
contended that claim "necessarily requires a review of the medical records and
a determination as to whether the physician deviated from accepted standards of
care when he issued an order for temporary restraints. By definition, that is a
professional malpractice claim for which an Affidavit of Merit is required to be
served." In opposition, plaintiff certified she "strongly believe[d] that
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[defendant's] motion to change the track assignment [was] an unfair tactic
played by the defendant's attorney to throw pecuniary or non-pecuniary
obstacles in the plaintiff's case."
The motion judge granted defendant's motion to change the track
assignment from Track II to Track III in an order dated May 14, 2021. The
judge found "[p]laintiff's complaint sounds, in part, in professional negligence"
and "[t]he allegation of improperly restraining plaintiff in the ER Department
requires an analysis of deviation from the standard of care in terms of the order
issued to temporarily restrain plaintiff." The judge also scheduled a Ferreira
conference to take place on June 4, 2021.
Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 14, 2021 order,
arguing in her certification that the allegations in her complaint were tort claims
rather than professional-malpractice claims and that the motion to change the
track assignment was a "dirty tactic" by defendant.
At oral argument of her reconsideration motion, plaintiff again argued "the
lawsuit is not about the medical malpractice" but about how she was restrained
against her will by doctors and nurses in the hospital. In opposition, defendant
contended "it is a professional liability case" and that the Affidavit of Merit
Statute applies to personal injuries "[r]esulting from an alleged act of negligence
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by a licensed person in his [or her] profession or occupation," which applied to
plaintiff because she was claiming emotional injuries resulting from her
hospitalization. Defendant also argued "a jury cannot determine whether or not
the order [to temporarily restrain plaintiff at the hospital] was appropriate . . .
without expert testimony, because jur[ors] aren't qualified to determine whether
emergency circumstances were there and whether that order was justifiable."
The motion judge agreed, finding plaintiff had to produce an affidavit of merit
because "this all evolves out of a decision and a judgment made by a licensed
professional, and that is why the [c]ourt believed . . . that this is a . . . track three
case that falls under the guise of professional malpractice and therefor e triggers
the need for an affidavit of merit." The motion judge also found "nothing has
changed" in plaintiff's argument for reconsideration and that the interests of
justice did not warrant reconsideration. The judge denied the reconsideration
motion in a June 11, 2021 order and scheduled a Ferreira conference to take
place on July 2, 2021.
During the July 2, 2021 conference, the court granted plaintiff a sixty-day
extension to serve an affidavit of merit, with a new deadline of August 6, 2021.
On or about July 23, 2021, plaintiff filed a motion asking the court to appoint
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an expert to provide an affidavit of merit. On August 9, 2021, defendant moved
to dismiss the case for failure to produce an affidavit of merit.
A different judge, Judge Alberto Rivas, heard oral argument of those
motions. When plaintiff again reiterated her argument that this action was not
a malpractice case, the judge explained to plaintiff why the case requires an
affidavit of merit:
THE COURT: -- you had an interaction -- now, I know
you don't agree with the interaction, I know you're not
happy with the result, but you had an interaction with
medical people at Princeton Medical Center. And so
you're questioning and you're challenging in your
lawsuit the fact that they kept you even though you
asked --
MS. SHARIFI: Against my will.
THE COURT: -- to leave. You asked to leave, they
didn’t let you leave, according to you you were
restrained, you were kept. So you disagree with that
and that's why you're suing. You're saying they should
not have kept you and that you're entitled to damages.
MS. SHARIFI: Correct.
THE COURT: Exactly.
MS. SHARIFI: They illegally kept me, that was my
point.
....
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THE COURT: So the defense is, listen, she came to the
medical center, we exercised -- and I'm not saying
they're right or wrong, but this is what the case is at this
point -- the plaintiff came to the hospital, she was
observed, a decision was made to keep her in the
hospital for observation, for treatment, or what have
you.
So that's what makes it a medical malpractice
case, because they exercised their medical judgment,
you said they exercised their medical judgment in the
wrong way and that they shouldn’t have kept you and
that you're entitled to damages. That's what that lawsuit
is all about.
Now, the law in New Jersey is crystal clear . . . .
If there's a case where someone is questioning the
medical decisions or actions or judgments of healthcare
professionals, be it a nurse, be it a doctor, be it any of
those people, the law says you have to file, the plaintiff
has to file an affidavit of merit . . . to say what Princeton
Medical Center did was not medically appropriate and
they should be held liable.
Nonetheless, plaintiff again argued the case was not about malpractice. She
contended defendant had "imprisoned [her] willfully without [her] consent for
hours" and "tortured" her. She continued to assert "[t]his is not a medical
malpractice, I am not claiming that they misdiagnosed me or they caused me a
permanent injury, this malpractice does not apply in this case."
Agreeing with the judge's analysis of why this case is a professional-
malpractice case requiring an affidavit of merit, defense counsel contended, "the
entire issue is whether or not those orders [to administer plaintiff medication
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and to order temporary restraints] were appropriately given in the circumstances
of this case" and argued "that question necessarily requires an analysis of th e
standard of care applicable to the emergency room physician and registered
nurse under those circumstances."
Judge Rivas found plaintiff had to file an affidavit of merit because she
was "challenging the medical judgment of the nurse and the doctor and saying
they had no right to do what they did." The judge again extended the deadline
for plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit, with a new due date of September 10,
2021. The judge instructed plaintiff she had until September 10, 2021, to file
an affidavit of merit and that if the affidavit of merit was not filed by that date,
the court would dismiss the complaint without defendant having to file a new
motion.
After plaintiff failed to file an affidavit of merit by September 10, 2021,
Judge Rivas issued an order on September 13, 2021, dismissing the complaint
with prejudice pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 and -29 due to plaintiff's failure
to serve an affidavit of merit.
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal stating she was appealing the September
13, 2021 order. On appeal, plaintiff argues the first motion judge erred in
granting defendant's motion to change the track assignment, and Judge Rivas
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erred in applying the Affidavit of Merit Statute to her "false imprisonment"
claim and dismissing the complaint in its entirety based on her failure to produce
an affidavit of merit. Unpersuaded, we affirm.
II.
We review de novo motions to dismiss based on failures to comply with
the Affidavit of Merit Statute, Castello v. Wohler, 446 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App.
Div. 2016), in part because they involve a legal determination, specifically "the
statutory interpretation issue of whether a cause of action is exempt from the
affidavit of merit requirement," Cowley v. Virtua Health Sys., 242 N.J. 1, 14-15
(2020), and in part because they involve a dismissal of a complaint for failure
to state a claim. "The submission of an appropriate affidavit of merit is
considered an element of the claim." Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216, 228
(2016). Thus, "[f]ailure to submit an appropriate affidavit ordinarily requires
dismissal of the complaint with prejudice." Ibid.; see also Cowley, 242 N.J. at
16 (noting our Supreme Court has construed the affidavit of merit statute "to
require dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance"). Accordingly, we limit
our inquiry to "examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face
of the complaint." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J.
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739, 746 (1989); see also Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo,
Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 107 (2019).
The Affidavit of Merit Statute requires
[i]n any action for damages for personal injuries,
wrongful death or property damage resulting from an
alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed
person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff
shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the
answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide each
defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed
person that there exists a reasonable probability that the
care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the
treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the
complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or
occupational standards or treatment practices.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.]
The purpose of the statute is "to weed out frivolous claims against licensed
professionals early in the litigation process." Meehan, 226 N.J. at 228. See also
Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty., Inc., 466 N.J. Super. 126,
131 (App. Div. 2021) (intent of Legislature was to ensure parties did not waste
time or resources on unnecessary litigation, including discovery), aff'd, 250 N.J.
368 (2022). Thus, pursuant to the statute, "a plaintiff must provide 'each
defendant' with an affidavit that indicates the plaintiff's claim has merit." Fink
v. Thompson, 167 N.J. 551, 559-60 (2001) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27).
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A "licensed person" includes a "physician in the practice of medicine or
surgery," "a registered professional nurse," and "a health care facility." N.J.S.A.
2A:53A-26(f), (i), (j). Plaintiff cannot dispute that the hospital and its doctors
and nurses fall within that definition.
Not every claim against a licensed person requires an affidavit of merit.
An "affidavit will only be needed when the underlying harmful conduct involves
professional negligence, implicating the standards of care within that
profession." McCormick v. State, 446 N.J. Super. 603, 613-14 (App. Div.
2016); see also id. at 614 (noting affidavit of merit not required in cases
involving a nurse who spills hot coffee on a patient or who falls and knocks
someone over).
In deciding whether a plaintiff must submit an affidavit of merit, courts
must look deeper than how parties designate their cases. "It is not the label
placed on the action that is pivotal but the nature of the legal inquiry." Couri v.
Gardner, 173 N.J. 328, 340 (2002). Instead of focusing on a label, "courts
should determine if the claim's underlying factual allegations require proof of a
deviation from the professional standard of care applicable to that specific
profession." Ibid. If that proof is necessary, "an affidavit of merit is required
for that claim, unless some exception applies." Ibid.A-0493-21
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Our courts have acknowledged a "common knowledge exception" to the
Affidavit of Merit Statute requirements. Cowley, 242 N.J. at 16. "In the
exceptionally rare cases in which the common knowledge exception applies,"
id. at 17, a plaintiff does not have to submit an affidavit of merit "where the
carelessness of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone of average
intelligence," Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985). "In those
exceptional circumstances," Cowley, 242 N.J. at 17, the "jurors' common
knowledge as lay persons is sufficient to enable them, using ordinary
understanding and experience, to determine a defendant's negligence without the
benefit of the specialized knowledge of experts," Est. of Chin v. St. Barnabas
Med. Ctr., 160 N.J. 454, 469 (1999). The common knowledge exception is
"properly invoked only when 'jurors are competent to assess simple negligence
occurring . . . without expert testimony to establish the standard of ordinary
care.'" Cowley, 242 N.J. at 19-20 (quoting Nowacki v. Cmty. Med. Ctr., 279
N.J. Super. 276, 292 (App. Div. 1995)). Examples of circumstances falling
under the common knowledge exception include a dentist extracting the wrong
tooth, Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 396-97 (2001), and a doctor reading
specimen numbers as actual test results, Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J.
398, 407-08 (2001).
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Plaintiff's complaint makes clear this case falls within the Affidavit of
Merit Statute. The factual allegations she recites in her complaint paint a picture
of a woman in extreme mental distress and "breakdown," whose blood oxygen
level had dropped and who had had a "massive panic attack," had lost
consciousness, could not stop coughing or crying, was unable to speak, and was
taken by a rescue squad to the hospital in an emergency. She faults the hospital
and its staff for administering medicine to her without her consent and for
restraining her when she attempted to leave. To prove her case, plaintiff
unquestionably would have to show defendant and its staff deviated from a
professional standard of care in how they treated her under those circumstances.
See, e.g., Ziemba v. Riverview Med. Ctr., 275 N.J. Super. 293, 302 (App. Div.
1994) ("The pivotal issue of whether defendants . . . took reasonable steps to
assess, take custody of, [or] detain . . . plaintiff for the purpose of mental health
assessment or treatment cannot be decided without competent expert testimony
establishing an appropriate standard of care and that such standard was breached
by defendants."). Plaintiff, therefore, is bound by the statutory requirement of
submitting an affidavit of merit, a requirement she failed to meet despite the
multiple extensions and opportunities provided to her.
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The common-knowledge exception does not apply here. The questions
raised by the facts of this case – whether and how a hospital should treat a
"mentally extremely distressed" patient who was refusing treatment and
threatening to leave; how a hospital should supervise its staff in and train its
staff for those emergent circumstances; whether defendant violated plaintiff's
rights when it attempted to treat her and prevented her from leaving the hospital
when she was in an extreme mental state – convince us this case is about more
than simple, ordinary negligence and involves matters falling outside jurors'
common knowledge and experience. See Cowley, 242 N.J. at 21-22 (finding
common-knowledge exception did not apply to a case concerning what a
hospital staff should have done when a patient refused treatment).
Accordingly, we conclude plaintiff had an obligation to provide an
affidavit of merit and Judge Rivas properly dismissed the case when plaintiff
failed to provide it.
Plaintiff in her brief argued about the order granting defendant's motion
for a track-assignment change. We review "only the judgment or orders
designated in the notice of appeal." 1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli,
Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 456, 459 (App. Div. 2004); see also Kornbleuth v.
Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 298-99 (2020) (same). An appellant who does not
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designate an order in a notice of appeal as being the subject of the appeal "has
no right to our consideration of th[at] issue." 1266 Apartment Corp., 368 N.J.
Super. at 459. Even if we were to consider plaintiff's argument regarding the
track-assignment order, our affirmance of the dismissal order renders it moot.
Affirmed.
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