Citation Numbers: 140 N.J. Super. 414, 356 A.2d 426, 1976 N.J. Super. LEXIS 932
Filed Date: 4/6/1976
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/18/2024
The sole remaining issue on this appeal and cross-appeal
In March 1968 one Nicholas Corallo (Nicholas) applied to the board for financial assistance based upon a need generated by physical disability. He executed an agreement to reimburse providing generally for reimbursement of the assistance grants and pledging unscheduled real and personal property as security therefor. Peter Corallo (Peter), father of Nicholas, was appointed protective payee.
In January 1969 Nicholas was awarded and paid Social Security disability benefits in the amount of $826.10 retroactive to Eebruary 1968. The board demanded reimbursement, and on April 17, 1969 Peter, acting for Nicholas, repaid the board $826. On January 10, 1973 the United States Supreme Court declared that § 207 of the Social Security Act (42 U. S. G. A., § 407) barred the State of New Jersey from reaching the federal disability payments to one situated as was Nicholas. Philpott v. Essex Cty. Welfare Board, 409 U. S. 413, 415, 93 S. Ct. 590, 34 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1973).
Peter demanded a return of his $826, apparently by a letter dated January 24, 1973. A response, dated January 31, 1973, signed by an administrative supervisor on behalf of counsel to the board, rejected the request and advised Peter that the United States Supreme Court decision prohibiting welfare reimbursement from Social Security benefits “became effective January 10, 1973. It does not entitle your son Nicholas to any refund from this Board.”
Nicholas and Peter commenced suit for return of the $826, for interest from April 17, 1969 and for costs. The judgment below mandated the return of the money, but denied interest and costs. The appeal by the board has been dismissed, (see n. 1, supra) The cross-appeal of the Corallos from the denial of interest is before us for determination.
Our affirmance is reached upon a number of considerations. First, interest is not the unqualified right of the prevailing litigant. East Orange v. Palmer, 52 N. J. 329, 336 (1968). Instead, in matters of interest not involving contractual obligation therefor, a trial judge is invested with broad discretion to allow interest in accordance with principles of equity. Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, Inc., 64 N. J. Super. 134, 155 (App. Div. 1960), certif. den. 34 N. J. 66 (1961). Certainly the very uncertain state of the law prior to Philpott
Affirmed. No costs to any party on either the appeal or the cross-appeal.
The appeal of the Essex County Welfare Board from the judgment below, adverse to its contentions in all respects except the interest issue, was dismissed, apparently on account of the failure of appellant to perfect its appeal. R. 2 :9-9.
Tlie Daw Division (104 N. J. Super. 280 (Daw Div. 1969)) and the Appellate Division (109 N. J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 1970)) were reversed by our Supreme Court (59 N. J. 75 (1971)) which was, in turn, reversed by the United States Supreme Court (409 U. S. 413, 93 S. Ct. 590, 34 D. Ed. 2d 608 (1973)).