Citation Numbers: 162 N.J. Super. 34, 392 A.2d 203, 1978 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1047
Judges: Milmed
Filed Date: 8/15/1978
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/11/2024
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This appeal .brings up for review the validity of certain rules promulgated by the State Commissioner of Insurance (Commissioner) concerning service and placement fees charged by insurance brokers, viz., N. J. A. C. 11 :;1-7.1 through 11:1 — 7.6. We stayed the effectiveness of the rules pending the appeal.
The thrust of appellants’ challenge is that (1) the rules were adopted in violation of “mandatory” procedural requirements, and (2) their adoption by the Commissioner was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
Prom our review of the record submitted we are entirely satisfied that within the perimeters of the extended proceedings which culminated in the adoption of the contested rules, there clearly was substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of the pertinent statutes and Administrative Code provisions. See Motyka v. McCorkle, 58 N. J. 165, 180 (1971); N. J. S. A. 52:14B-4(d). The Commissioner’s initial proposal “to adopt new rules concerning service and placement fees” was published in the New Jersey Register on October 9, 1975. See 7 N. J. R. 468. The notice called upon interested persons to “present statements or arguments in writing relevant to the proposed action on or before October 31, 1975, or at a hearing to be held at 10:00 a.m. on October 30, 1975,” at the Department of Insurance offices in Trenton. Statements were to be sent to Dr. Eleanor Lewis at the Department. At the public hearing held pursuant to the notice strong opposition to the proposal
While appellants concede that the Commissioner gave adequate notice to interested persons and afforded them an opportunity to be heard in regard to his initial proposal, they argue that the October 30, 1975 hearing on that proposal “did not satisfy the statutory requirements for a hearing with respect to the present rules adopted by the Commissioner [on May 24, 1977], since that hearing related to similar, but later substantively amended rules.” Appellants plainly misconceive the nature and purpose of the procedural safeguards provided by N. J. S. A. 17:1-8.2 et seq. and § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, N. J. S. A. 52:1413-4. Unquestionably, the Commissioner has broad authority to adopt rules concerning service and placement fees charged by insurance brokers. See N. J. S. A. 17:22-6.18, N. J. S. A. 17:1 — 8.1 and N. J. S. A. 17 :lC-6(e). In the exercise of that authority he gave and published the required 20 days’ notice of his intended action and afforded “all interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit data, views or arguments, orally or in writing.” N. J. S. A. 52:14B-4(a).
What has been said in regard to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act requirement of submission of a proposed agency rule for comment by interested persons, see 5 U. S. C. A. §553, is equally applicable here. Thus:
The requirement of submission of a proposed ruie for comment does not automatically generate a new opportunity for comment merely because the rule promulgated by the agency differs from the rule it proposed, partly at least in response to submissions.51
“51. A contrary rule would lead to the absurdity that in rule-making under the APA the agency can learn from the comments on its proposals only at the peril of starting a new procedural round of commentary.
As we have stated in an analogous context of rule-making proceedings before the Federal Communications Commission, where petitioners have argued that the Commission was ‘changing the rules in the middle of the game’ when it took into consideration factors not specifically indicated in its Section 4(a) notice under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 1001(a), ‘[sjurely every time the Commission decided to take account of some additional factor it was not required to start the proceedings all over again. If such were the rule the proceedings might never be terminated.’ Owensboro On the Air v. United States, 104 U. S. App. D. C. 391, 397, 262 F. 2d 702, 708 (1958) ; Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 93 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 346, 210 F. 2d 24, 28 (1954).”
[ International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus. 155 U. S. App. D. C. 411, 428, 478 F. 2d 615, 632 (D. C. Cir. 1973)].
And see Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, supplementing Administrative Law Treatise, § 6.01-1 at 169-172 (1976).
Appellants also argue that the rules as finally adopted are arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. We disagree. N. J. S. A. 17:22-6.18 sets out the Commissioner’s authority to promulgate rules regulating service fees charged
The amount of any such compensation must bear a reasonable relationship to the nature of the services performed [by the broker] and must not be discriminatory.
In no event shall the amount of compensation specified in * * * [the] written memorandum [of the party to be charged, upon which the broker’s right to compensation is based] he effective or enforceable to the extent that it exceeds the amount that is authorized under or pursuant to any regulation of the Commissioner of *** Insurance.
The action taken by the Commissioner in adopting the challenged rules “is entitled to the benefit of the customary rebuttable presumption of validity and regularity afforded to administrative regulations generally.” Motyka v. McCorkle, supra, 58 N. J. at 181. Appellants “have the burden of satisfying the court that the regulations are unreasonable.” Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kandle, 105 N. J. Super. 104, 118 (App. Div.) aff’d o.b. 54 N. J. 11 (1969). We are satisfied from our examination of the record not only that they have failed to sustain that burden, but rather that there is ample support in the record for the promulgated regulations. See, e.g., the hearing officer’s “Report of the Hearing of October 30, 1975 on Proposed Service Eees Rules,” and the Rules Officer’s “Supplemental Report on the Reopened Record Concerning The Service Eees Rule as Published September 9, 1976.”
In summary, we find the rules adopted by the Commissioner and published in the New Jersey Register on June 9, 1977, 9 N. J. R. 279-280, N. J. A. C. 11:1-7.1 to N. J. A. C. 11 :l-7.6, inclusive, to be valid and reasonable. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s action in adopting them is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed. The stay heretofore granted is dissolved.
Here, a trial-type hearing was neither mandated nor appropriate. See 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 7.06 at 429-432 (1958), and Supp. (1970) at 327-330. Additionally, opportunity for oral presentation, although afforded at the October 30, 1975 hearing, is not mandated by either M. J. S. A. 52:14B-4 or N. J. S. A. 17:1-8.2 et seq.
The text of the “readopted” rules was published in the New Jersey Register on June 9, 1977. 9 N. J. R. 279-280. See N. J. A. C. 35 :15-4.11 (b). As previously indicated, no new notice to interested persons affording them a further opportunity to be heard on the subject was required in the circumstances.
This authority, which was not added to N. J. S. A. 17:22-6.18 until 1966, L. 1966, c. 92, § 1, was obviously not in efEect when Coro Brokerage, Inc. v. Rickard, 29 N. J. 295 (1959), was decided. Accordingly, appellants’ reliance on the decision in that case is misplaced.