STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. WILMER M. REYES (14-11-3597 AND 16-06-1751, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2499-20
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILMER M. REYES,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted August 2, 2022 – Decided August 9, 2022
Before Judges Geiger and Rose.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment Nos. 14-11-3597
and 16-06-1751.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Kevin J. Hein, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Wilmer M. Reyes appeals from a Law Division order denying
his motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). On appeal, defendant challenges
trial counsel's effectiveness, claiming counsel failed to advise him about the
immigration consequences of his guilty pleas, and claims the court erred by
denying PCR without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
We take the following facts from the record. In November 2014,
defendant was charged in Indictment No. 14-11-3597 with third-degree
possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1),
and third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(3).
In May 2015, defendant pled guilty to third-degree possession of CDS in
exchange for a recommended two-year non-custodial term of probation and
dismissal of the other count. During the plea hearing, defendant acknowledged
that he understood the charges he faced and the terms of the plea agreement, had
enough time to discuss the case with counsel, was satisfied with the services of
counsel, reviewed the questions on the plea forms with counsel and understood
the questions, answered the questions truthfully, signed and initialed the plea
forms, and understood the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. Defendant
further acknowledged he was born in the Dominican Republic and was not a
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United States citizen. The court engaged in the following colloquy with
defendant regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, with a
brief interjection by his counsel, Patrick E. Malloy:
THE COURT: Sir, do you understand that if you're
not a citizen of the United States, the guilty plea may
result in your removal from the United States or stop
you from being legally able to enter or reenter the
United States?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You also understand that you have a
right to seek individualized advice from an attorney
about the effect your guilty plea will have on your
immigration status; do you understand that, sir?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Sir, have you discussed with an
attorney the potential immigration consequences of this
plea?
DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: You circled yes.
MR. MALLOY: Judge, he discussed it with me.
DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MALLOY: He –
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THE COURT: Sir, would you like the opportunity
to do so, sir?
DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: You're sure, sir?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Sir, having been advised of the
possible immigration consequences and your right to
seek individualized legal advice on you immigration
consequences, do you still wish to plead guilty, sir?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And sir, you understand that
with this type of sentence, where it has a possible
penalty of up to five years, you could be deported, sir;
do you understand?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
Defendant acknowledged that he was pleading guilty voluntarily, was not
under the influence of any medication, drugs, or alcohol, understood the charge
he was pleading guilty to, and provided a factual basis for illegally possessing
heroin. Defendant indicated he had no questions for his attorney or the court.
The judge accepted the guilty plea, finding it was entered knowingly and
voluntarily and was supported by an adequate factual basis.
Defendant was sentenced on July 24, 2015. The judge found aggravating
factors three (risk of reoffending), six (prior criminal record), and nine (need for
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deterrence). N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), and (9). The judge also found
mitigating factors six (defendant will compensate the victim), and ten
("defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary
treatment"). N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(6) and (10). The judge found that the
mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors. Defendant was sentenced
in accordance with the plea agreement to a non-custodial two-year probationary
term and thirty hours of community service. The other charges were dismissed.
On March 6, 2016, defendant was arrested in Camden for eluding and
other offenses. In June 2016, defendant was charged in Indictment No. 16-06-
1751 with: second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b); third-degree receiving
stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a); fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A.
2C:29-2(a)(2) second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (handgun),
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); three counts of second-degree aggravated assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); three counts of third-degree aggravated assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2); second-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:12-1(b)(1); third-degree conspiracy to commit
aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:12-1(b)(2); and third-degree
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receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a). Defendant was represented by
different counsel on the second indictment.
The new charges resulted in a violation of probation (VOP) charge.
Defendant did not contest the VOP.
In September 2016, defendant pled guilty to second degree eluding in
exchange for a concurrent eight-year prison term, with no objection by the State
to intensive supervised parole, and dismissal of the remaining counts. During
the plea hearing, defendant testified that he understood English and had
completed high school. When asked if he was a citizen of the United States,
defendant answered: "Yes." Defendant acknowledged that he understood the
charges, had a sufficient opportunity to discuss the charges and the proposed
plea agreement with counsel, and was fully satisfied with counsel's advice and
services. He further acknowledged that he reviewed the plea forms with
counsel, read and understood the information on the plea forms, and answered
all the questions on the forms truthfully, understood the rights he was waiving
by pleading guilty, and was pleading guilty voluntarily. Defendant also
acknowledged that his guilty plea was a per se violation of his probation.
Defendant then gave a factual basis for his plea and acknowledged that he was
pleading guilty because he was guilty. The judge accepted the guilty plea,
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finding the plea was "entered knowingly and voluntarily, and that there [was] an
adequate factual basis for the plea."
Defendant was sentenced on October 21, 2016. The judge found
aggravating factors three, six, and nine, no mitigating factors, and that the
aggravating factors outweighed the non-existent mitigating factors. The judge
sentenced defendant to an eight-year term and dismissed the remaining counts
in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.
On the VOP, the judge found the guilty plea to eluding was a per se VOP.
The judge found aggravating factors three, six, and nine, determined that
mitigating factors six and ten no longer applied, and found the aggravating
factors outweighed the mitigating factors. The judge terminated defendant's
probation and resentenced him to a concurrent three-year term.
Defendant did not file a direct appeal from his conviction or sentence on
either indictment. Nor did he file a motion to withdraw either of his guilty pleas.
On October 20, 2020, defendant filed a timely motion for PCR based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant submitted a certification in support
of the motion, which stated that at the time of the plea on the first indictment,
trial counsel Patrick Malloy
reviewed the entire plea agreement form with me and
wrote or circled my answers. When I was before [the
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trial judge], the [c]ourt asked me, "Sir, have you
discussed with an attorney, the potential immigration
consequences of this plea?" I responded "no." The
[c]ourt said, "You circled Yes." Mr. Malloy responded
to the [c]ourt[,] "Judge, he discussed it with me." I
responded "Yeah."
Defendant represented that he "was not advised by Mr. Malloy at any time
during or prior to the [p]lea [h]earing of specific immigration consequences
which would result from my guilty plea." Defendant further represented that
when he appeared for sentencing on the first indictment, neither his
"immigration status nor the possible immigration consequences of [his]
[s]entence, were addressed by either the [c]ourt or [his] attorney."
Defendant acknowledged that during the plea hearing on the second
indictment, he responded affirmatively when asked by the same trial judge if he
was a citizen of the United States. Defendant alleges he "obviously
misunderstood the question and answered 'Yes' by mistake. What added to the
confusion was my knowledge that when I pled guilty previously before the same
[j]udge, he questioned me about my immigration status and he knew I was not a
citizen." Defendant noted that neither his immigration status nor the
consequences of his plea were discussed during the sentencing hearing .
Defendant challenged his plea, conviction, and sentence on that basis. He
noted the ICE detainer pending against him since March 2016.
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A different judge heard oral argument on the PCR motion on February 8,
2021, and rejected defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In his
comprehensive oral decision, Judge Mark K. Chase recounted the procedural
history, defendant's answers to questions on the plea forms regarding his
immigration status and consequences, and pertinent testimony during the plea
hearings.
After reviewing the applicable case law, Judge Chase found that during
the first plea hearing, defendant was advised and acknowledged that his plea
could have deportation consequences, and that he could have more time to speak
with an immigration attorney, but he expressed his desire to nonetheless proceed
with his guilty plea.
Judge Chase recounted defendant's answers to questions 17A, 17B, 17C,
17D, and 17F of the plea forms as to the first indictment.
First, question 17A of the plea form pertaining to
defendant's CDS conviction asked defendant if he was
a United States citizen. "No" is circled in response.
Question 17B asked, "Do you understand that if you are
not a citizen of the United States, this guilty plea may
result in your removal from the United States and/or
stop you from being able to legally enter or re-enter the
United States?" The "Yes" response is circled.
Question 17C asked, "Do you understand that
you have the right to seek individualized advice about
the affect your guilty plea will have on your
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immigration status?" The "Yes" response was circled.
Finally, question 17D says, "Have you discussed with
an attorney the potential immigration consequences of
your plea?" The "Yes" response is circled.
The plea form . . . directed that if . . . if the answer
is yes, to proceed to question 17F. 17F asked, "Have
you been advised of the possible immigration
consequences and of your right to seek individualized
legal advice on your immigration consequences? Do
you still wish to plead guilty?" "Yes" is circled in
response.
Judge Chase then discussed defendant's related testimony.
The record reflects during defendant's plea
hearing on his CDS conviction Judge Polansky asked
the defendant if he went over the plea form with his
counsel, he understood each question, he gave counsel
truthful answers, if counsel wrote answers as the
defendant provided them, and if he reviewed the
answers after they were written. To each question,
defendant answered in the affirmative. Defendant
additionally answered in the affirmative that he signed
and initialized the forms certifying they contain truthful
answers. This line of questioning also pertains to
question 17, which pertains to immigration
consequences and defendant's right to seek individual
immigration advice.
After reciting defendant's testimony regarding immigration consequences,
Judge Chase explained:
In addition to the conversations that may have
taken place off the record with Mr. Malloy, defendant
is questioned by Judge Polansky more than once
whether he would like to seek independent legal advice
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regarding the immigration consequences of his plea and
whether he still wishes to plead guilty. Nothing in this
record reflects that counsel's performance was
substandard, that Mr. Malloy has a lack of [knowledge
of] Federal immigration law, and that the counsel -- or
that Mr. Malloy was seriously hindered in his
representation of defendant.
The Padilla1 court holds that counsel must inform
. . . the court whether the plea carries a risk of
deportation. Based on the plea transcript, Mr. Malloy
did, in fact, go through the plea form with defendant
where he would have had the opportunity to inform his
client that his plea carries a risk of deportation.
Judge Chase then addressed the second indictment:
As to defendant's eluding conviction, the record
demonstrates that defendant maintained he was a U.S.
citizen in the plea form when yes was circled in
response to question 17A, which asked the defendant if
he was a citizen of the United States.
Furthermore, the defendant answered N/A, not
applicable, in response to question 17D, which asked
the defendant if he had discussed the immigration
consequences of his plea. As the plea colloquy
demonstrates in response to Judge Polansky's question
of whether defendant was a United States citizen,
defendant replied, "Yes." This was consistent with the
plea form on his eluding conviction where question 17
asked if defendant was a United States citizen, and
"Yes" was circled.
The defendant also acknowledged in response to
the judge's question that he read and understood all the
1
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
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questions and information in the plea form. He
answered them truthfully, that if the judge asked the
same questions again, his answers would be the same.
Indeed, defendant gave the same response when Judge
Polansky asked if he was a citizen and defendant
replied "Yes." While defendant now claims he
answered the question in error, his mistake cannot be
attributed to his counsel to establish deficiency.
Judge Chase distinguished the facts in State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J.
129 (2009) and Padilla.
Unlike in Nuñez-Valdéz, defendant here was not given
assurances, nor does he contend that counsel materially
misinformed him about the immigration consequences
of his plea. And unlike in Padilla, defendant was not
told to not worry about the immigration consequences.
....
It is also important to note Judge Polansky
advised defendant that he had the right to seek
independent legal advice regarding his immigration
status; to which, defendant declined.
Considering these facts, Judge Chase reasoned:
In this matter, not only did defendant Reyes'
attorney performance not fall below the professional
norm, he did not give defendant Reyes false, misleading
-- misinformed or inadequate advice, but the second
prong in either matter has not been met that he was
prejudiced.
Accordingly, this Court finds defendant has not
satisfied that first prong for . . . ineffective assistance
of counsel. Even if, as I was just saying, there was
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ineffective assistance of counsel, . . . defendant has not
demonstrated that the outcome of the proceeding may
have been different.
In regards to that, we do have to ask if there is a
reasonable probability that but for counsel's
unprofessional errors -- which I found here were
professional -- the results of the proceedings would
have been different. This second prong requires
demonstrating that defendant was actually prejudiced
by counsel's alleged deficient performance. This
requires a demonstration or reasonable probability that
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the results of
the proceedings would have been different. Only the
complete denial of one[']s rights to counsel justifies the
reviewing court to presume defendant was prejudiced.
For these reasons, Judge Chase found defendant did not show trial
counsel's performance was deficient or that defendant was prejudiced. As to the
prejudice prong, the judge further reasoned that
the plea form and the plea hearing colloquy
demonstrates, defendant was told that he could be
deported as a result of his guilty plea, and that he would
seek individualized advice from the attorney regarding
immigration consequences. He acknowledged that and
indicated he understood that; and he also indicated that
he did not want to do that, but he wanted to go forward
with the plea.
The judge also noted that on the second indictment, the plea agreement
avoided potential consecutive sentences and serious aggravated assault and
Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6, charges were dismissed. Additionally,
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[defendant] was presented with an opportunity to not
accept the plea, to seek legal advice from an
immigration attorney, and he could have asked the
court to do so. However, he chose to knowingly and
voluntarily enter his plea agreement rather than proceed
to trial.
His decision to proceed with the plea is not the
product of substandard performance of his attorney. He
has not shown, but for the substandard performance of
the attorney, the outcome of the case may have been
different. As such, defendant has . . . failed to
demonstrate that but for counsel's alleged error, there
was a reasonable probability that he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on proceeding
to trial on the charges under the full indictment.
....
And in regards to the second case, defendant lied
under oath and stated he was a citizen. He should not
be able to benefit from these misdeeds now that he's
been caught and placed in an ICE facility.
The judge concluded that defendant had not established a prima facie case
of ineffective assistance of counsel and was not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. Accordingly, his PCR application was denied as to both indictments.
This appeal followed. Defendant argues he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on his claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to inform him adequately of the deportation consequences of his pleas .
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We disagree and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge
Chase in his comprehensive oral decision. We add the following comments.
"[W]here the [PCR] court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we may
exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the trial court has drawn
from the documentary record." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373
(App. Div. 2014). We review a PCR court's legal conclusions de novo. State v.
Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013).
When considering ineffective assistance of counsel claims, "[j]udicial
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential," and courts "must
indulge a strong presumption" that counsel's performance was reasonable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). To succeed on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant first must establish
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"
and, second, "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Id. at 687-88, 694; accord State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the
Strickland two-pronged standard). "A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J.
560, 583 (2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52).
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Both the United States Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court
have extended the Strickland/Fritz test to challenges of guilty pleas based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162-63
(2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012); State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J.
434, 456-57 (1994). Defendant must demonstrate with "reasonable probability"
that the result would have been different had he received proper advice from his
attorney. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Thus,
in a conviction based on a guilty plea, defendant must show "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, [defendant] would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial," Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59 (1985) (footnote omitted), and doing so "would have been rational under the
circumstances," Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372. See also Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. at
139 (adopting the same test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
A defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing by
simply raising a PCR claim. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App.
Div. 1999) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992)). An evidentiary
hearing is required only when: a defendant establishes a prima facie case in
support of PCR; the court determines there are disputed issues of material fact
that cannot be resolved by review of the existing record; and the court
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determines that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted.
State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10(b)). To establish a
prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must present
legally competent evidence rather than mere "bald assertions." Cummings, 321
N.J. Super. at 170. We review a trial court's decision to deny a defendant's
request for an evidentiary hearing under an abuse of discretion standard. State
v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119, 140 (App. Div. 2000).
"It is now well-settled that a defense attorney 'must tell a client when
removal is mandatory – when consequences are certain' in order to provide
effective assistance of counsel." State v. L.G.-M., 462 N.J. Super. 357, 365
(App. Div. 2020) (quoting State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 380 (2012)).
"Accordingly, 'when counsel provides false or affirmatively misleading advice
about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, and the defendant
demonstrates that he would not have pled guilty if he had been provided with
accurate information, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has been
established.'" Ibid. (quoting Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 351).
"Conversely, where 'the law is not succinct and straightforward . . ., a
criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration
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consequences.'" Ibid. (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369); see also Gaitan, 209
N.J. at 381 (holding that where deportation is not mandatory, "counsel must
highlight for noncitizen clients that entering a guilty plea will place them at risk
of removal"). "Failure by counsel to adhere to these requirements constitutes
deficient representation, satisfying the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz
standard." L.G.-M., 462 N.J. Super. at 365; see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369;
Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 380 (same).
Governed by these standards, we agree with Judge Chase that defendant
failed to satisfy either prong under the Strickland/Fritz test and was unable to
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood his PCR claims would ultimately succeed
on the merits. We reach this conclusion for several reasons. Trial counsel did
not affirmatively misrepresent the immigration consequences of the guilty pleas.
The plea forms and plea hearing testimony belie defendant's claims. Trial
counsel successfully negotiated a favorable plea agreement that resulted in the
dismissal of numerous serious charges and avoided consecutive prison terms.
The evidence against defendant on both indictments and the VOP was strong.
Defendant has not proffered any viable defense to the charges he faced. More
fundamentally, defendant has not demonstrated there was a reasonable
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probability that but for counsels' alleged errors, he would not have ple aded
guilty and insisted on going to trial, and that doing so would have been rational.
In sum, defendant did not satisfy either prong of the Strickland/Fritz test.
PCR was properly denied without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
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