LEANDER WILLIAMS v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1174-21
LEANDER WILLIAMS,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE
BOARD,
Respondent.
___________________________
Argued October 3, 2022 – Decided October 18, 2022
Before Judges Currier, Enright and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; John P. Flynn, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin,
Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Suzanne Davies, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Leander Williams challenges the December 15, 2021 final
agency decision of respondent State Parole Board, which affirmed the special
condition that Williams enter a 180-day residential treatment program (RTP)
upon his administrative parole release. We affirm.
Williams, now fifty-one years old, has been arrested forty-five times since
he was a teenager; he has twenty prior convictions, most of which are drug
related. Williams has served at least eight prison sentences. While incarcerated
between 2007 and 2009, he participated in an organizational scheme to provide
contraband to fellow inmates. Additionally, he has a history of multiple
probation and parole violations.
In July 2019, Williams was sentenced under various indictments to an
aggregate eight-year prison term, with a four-year period of parole ineligibility,
following convictions for: third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous
substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); two counts of third-degree
possession of a CDS with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3); two counts of third-degree
distributing a CDS near school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a); and fourth-degree
contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a).
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While serving this aggregate sentence, Williams engaged in treatment for
substance abuse with Alcoholic Anonymous, the Bo-Robinson Treatment and
Assessment Center and the Harbor House. In April 2021, he submitted to a
mental health parole evaluation and the evaluator determined Williams was a
"medium risk for recidivism." The evaluator also opined "[t]he likelihood of . . .
Williams successfully completing a projected term of parole is fair to poor due
to [his] past criminal lifestyle, limited pro[-]social problem-solving skills,
insufficient pro-social support network, limited education and drug relapse
risk." (emphasis added).
In September 2021, a Board panel reviewed and certified Williams for
administrative parole release under the recently enacted Earn Your Way Out
(EYWO) Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55b.1 The panel also imposed a special
condition mandating Williams's participation in an RTP for a minimum of 180
days. Williams became eligible for parole the following month, having served
out his minimum sentence.
In October 2021, Williams administratively appealed the special
condition, arguing the Board lacked the statutory authority to compel his
participation in an RTP once he qualified for administrative parole release under
1
The EYWO Act became effective February 1, 2021.
A-1174-21
3
the EYWO Act. He further argued the special condition created an undue
hardship for him because it interfered with his ability to see his wife, who was
hospitalized and terminally ill with cancer.
On November 10, 2021, two Board panel members affirmed the special
condition.2 Nine days later, Williams requested that his administrative appeal
be considered by the full Board. Before the full Board had the opportunity to
address his appeal, Williams was released to the RTP and subsequently
completed the 180-day program.3
In December 2021, shortly after Williams commenced the RTP, his parole
officer (PO) granted Williams's request to visit his wife in the hospital. On the
day of the scheduled visit, the PO advised Williams he was a "flight risk" and
2
The two-person Board panel initially recommended the duration of the RTP
be reduced to a minimum term between 90 and 180 days.
3
The State previously moved for dismissal of this appeal, contending it was
moot. We denied its application in June 2022, and at argument, the State
conceded it no longer seeks dismissal of the appeal on this basis. Moreover,
because we are satisfied the issues in controversy here are capable of evading
review, we exercise our discretion to resolve them, notwithstanding Williams's
completion of the RTP. See Zirger v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 144 N.J. 327, 330
(1996).
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needed an escort to the hospital due to his history of violating parole.4 Williams
became "defensive and belligerent" with his PO and questioned why he was
assigned to the RTP. Because Williams became increasingly "verbally
aggressive" and "argumentative," the PO told him to return to the housing unit
and "regroup." Based on Williams's ongoing behavioral problems, the visit was
postponed to the following day. 5
On December 15, the full Board affirmed the panel's imposition of the
RTP as a special condition of Williams's administrative parole release. The
Board concluded:
[p]ursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(b), an inmate
released on administrative parole shall be subject to the
provisions and conditions established by the
appropriate Board panel in accordance with the
procedures and standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.59. The Board also finds that pursuant to N.J.S.A.
30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a)[,] in addition to the general
conditions of parole, the Board panel may impose
additional special conditions of parole in an offender's
case deemed reasonable . . . to reduce the likelihood of
recurrence of criminal behavior. The Board finds . . .
Williams participated in Alcoholics Anonymous . . .[,]
the Bo-Robinson Treatment and Assessment Center . . .
and . . . Harbor House . . . . . However, . . . [he] has a
4
On one occasion, Williams absconded from parole supervision and had no
contact with his parole supervisor for approximately three months before he was
arrested.
5
Williams's wife passed away eighteen days after the visit.
A-1174-21
5
substantial criminal history involving drugs; . . . [and]
is currently incarcerated for four drug[-]related
offenses; . . . [His] offenses involve him selling cocaine
and crack cocaine; [his] record reflects that he used
cocaine in his teenage years and consumed alcohol
daily; and . . . [he] has had several probation and parole
opportunities in the past with violations[,] including
failure to complete the Stages To Enhance Parolee
Success Program. Therefore, the Board concurs with
the Board panel's assessment that the imposition of the
special condition requiring . . . Williams'[s] successful
completion of a residential community program
was . . . reasonable . . . to reduce the likelihood of
recurrence of criminal behavior. The Board finds it
imperative that . . . Williams receives additional
programming to address his criminal behavior and
substance abuse history, as well as obtain additional
life/job skills, and that he will be able to participate in
such programming in a residential community program.
....
The Board finds that placement in the Electronic
Monitoring Program or release to the community is not
appropriate at this time as it is imperative that . . .
Williams receive additional program[m]ing in a
residential community program.
Shortly after the full Board issued its decision, Williams moved for
emergent relief before us, seeking vacatur of the RTP condition. We denied the
application, but subsequently granted his request to accelerate his appeal. The
Supreme Court also denied Williams's request for emergent relief, noting, as we
had, that Williams could apply to the Board for visits with his wife.
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On appeal, Williams urges us to reverse the Board's imposition of the RTP
as a special condition. He again contends the Board "lacks statutory authority
to parole an inmate who qualifies for administrative parole release under the
[EYWO] Act to a residential facility." In addition, he argues "the special
condition mandating that [he] remain in a residential facility" was "arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable" because it did "not reasonably reduce the
likelihood of recurrence of criminal behavior and amount[ed] to an undue
hardship." We are not persuaded.
The scope of our review of an administrative agency's decision is limited.
See Malacow v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (App. Div. 2018).
"Our review of the Parole Board's determination[s] is deferential in light of its
expertise in the specialized area of parole supervision." J.I. v. N.J. State Parole
Bd., 228 N.J. 204, 230 (2017) (citing McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347
N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002)). We affirm an agency determination
unless it "'went so far wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made.'"
N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 547 (App. Div. 1988)
(quoting 613 Corp. v. State, Div. of State Lottery, 210 N.J. Super. 485, 495
(App. Div. 1986)).
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We recognize "[t]o a greater degree than is the case with other
administrative agencies, the Parole Board's decision-making function involves
individualized discretionary appraisals." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166
N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (citing Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348,
358-59 (1973)). Such appraisals are presumed valid. McGowan, 347 N.J.
Super. at 563. Therefore, "[w]e will reverse a decision of the Board only if the
offender shows that the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable, lacked credible
support in the record, or violated legislative policies." K.G. v. N.J. State Parole
Bd., 458 N.J. Super. 1, 30 (App. Div. 2019) (citations omitted). But an agency's
statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W.
Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002).
It is well established "[t]he Parole Board 'is the administrative agency
charged with the responsibility of deciding whether an inmate satisfies the
criteria for parole release under the Parole Act of 1979[, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45
to - 123.76].'" Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 250 N.J. 431, 477 (2022) (quoting
In re Application of Hawley, 98 N.J. 108, 112 (1984)).6 Under this Act, the
6
Williams's crimes were committed after substantial revisions to the Act were
adopted in 1997. "Under the current version of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53, the Board
may deny parole if it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an 'inmate
has failed to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation or that there is a
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Board has "broad authority" to "discharge . . . its responsibilities," which
responsibilities "include imposing 'specific conditions of parole.'" J.K. v. N.J.
State Parole Bd., 247 N.J. 120, 131 (2021) (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.48(d);
30:4-123.59(b)(1)). Additionally, the Parole Act of 1979 allows the Board to
parole an inmate to a residential facility if the inmate would not otherwise be
released under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(d).
As our Supreme Court recently noted,
[i]n describing the types of conditions that the Board
may impose [under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59(b)(1)], the
Legislature did not enumerate an exclusive list, but
rather provided that "[s]uch conditions shall include,
among other things, a requirement that the parolee
conduct himself in society in compliance with all laws
and refrain from committing any crime." Ibid.(emphasis added). For purposes of statutory
construction, we view legislative use of the words
"include, among other things," ibid., as "term[s] of
enlargement, not of limitation," Zorba Contractors, Inc.
v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 282 N.J. Super. 430, 434
(App. Div. 1995) [(citation omitted)]. Accordingly, the
Legislature's use of those terms here indicates that it did
not intend to specify every permissible condition of
parole that the Board may impose.
[J.K., 247 N.J. at 131-32.]
reasonable expectation that the inmate will violate conditions of parole imposed
pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59] if released on parole at that time.'" Berta v.
N.J. State Parole Bd., 473 N.J. Super. 284, 304 n.8 (App. Div. 2022).
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Mindful of the Court's expansive view in this regard, we observe that
under the EYWO Act, certain inmates are entitled to administrative parole
release
at the time of primary or subsequent parole eligibility
provided that:
(1) the inmate has not been previously convicted
of, adjudicated delinquent for, or is currently
serving a sentence imposed for any crime
enumerated in [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d)]; [N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(c) or (g)]; [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2)]; or
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26];
(2) the inmate has not committed any prohibited
acts required to be reported to the prosecutor
pursuant to regulations promulgated by the
commissioner during the current period of
incarceration, and has not committed any serious
disciplinary infraction, designated in regulations
promulgated by the commissioner as a prohibited
act that is considered to be the most serious and
results in the most severe sanctions, within the
previous two years;
(3) the inmate has completed relevant
rehabilitation programs, as determined by the
Department of Corrections and State Parole
Board, available at the correctional facility . . . ;
and
(4) crime victims have received notification as
required by law.
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[N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(a) (emphasis added).]7
And pertinent to this appeal,
an inmate who meets the criteria set forth [under
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(a)] . . . . shall, during the term
of parole supervision, remain in the legal custody of the
Commissioner of Corrections, be supervised by the
Division of Parole of the State Parole Board, and be
subject to the provisions and conditions established by
the appropriate board panel in accordance with the
procedures and standards set forth in [N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.59].
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(b) (emphasis added).]
Notwithstanding the wording of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(b), Williams
claims an inmate paroled under the EYWO Act "is automatically entitled to
'administrative parole release' . . . if [the parolee] meets certain objective
criteria" and the parolee cannot be subjected to the condition of an RTP. In
response, the State argues
nothing in the plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.59(d) indicates that it represents the only
circumstance in which the Board can parole an inmate
to a residential facility. Nor does its plain language
restrict the Board from imposing a special condition of
parole to a residential facility for inmates released
under administrative parole.
7
Once an inmate meets the criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55d(a), "a
[Board panel] hearing shall not be required." N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.155d(b).
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Courts "construe the words of a statute 'in context with related provisions
so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.'" Spade v. Select Comfort
Corp., 232 N.J. 504, 515 (2018) (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of
Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 570 (2017)). If the plain language leads to a clear and
unambiguous result, the court's job is complete, Matter of Commitment of
W.W., 245 N.J. 438, 449 (2021), and the court applies "the law as written."
Kaminskas v. Off. of the Att'y Gen., 236 N.J. 415, 422 (2019). Courts "turn to
extrinsic tools to discern legislative intent . . . only when the statute is
ambiguous, the plain language leads to a result inconsistent with any legitimate
public policy objective, or it is at odds with a general statutory scheme." Shelton
v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 429 (2013).
Guided by these principles, we agree with the State that the plain language
of the EYWO Act does not preclude the Board from imposing the special
condition of an RTP for an inmate granted administrative parole release.
Further, the EYWO Act explicitly permits the Board to set parole conditions "in
accordance with the procedures and standards set forth in . . . [N.J.S.A.] 30:4-
123.59," the same statute that has been read expansively by our Court in
recognition of the Board's "broad authority."
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We also are not convinced Williams has demonstrated a legal basis for us
to conclude the Board's decision was arbitrary or capricious. To the contrary,
when the Board determined it was reasonable for Williams to complete an RTP
"to reduce the likelihood of recurrence of criminal behavior," it cited numerous
reasons for affirming the special condition, including that Williams: had "a
substantial criminal history involving drugs"; was "currently incarcerated for
four . . . drug[-]related offenses . . . [including] him selling cocaine and crack
cocaine"; and "had several probation and parole opportunities in the past with
violations." Moreover, the Board deemed "it imperative that . . . Williams
receive[] additional programming to address his criminal behavior and
substance abuse history," but also to "obtain additional life/job skills," noting
such programming was available "in a residential community program."
The Board's findings are amply supported in the record and entitled to our
deference. See J.I., 228 N.J. at 230. Further, considering Williams's extensive
criminal history, his longstanding struggle with substance abuse, and his
multiple probation and parole violations, we discern no basis to conclude the
Board's decision to have Williams participate in a specific RTP — a program
tailored to assist him with specific issues and provide him with "life/job skills"
— was arbitrary or capricious.
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In reaching this determination, we do not ignore that Williams participated
in substance abuse treatment programs prior to his administrative parole release.
But the Board recognized Williams engaged in treatment with Alcoholics
Anonymous, the Bo-Robinson Treatment and Assessment Center, and the
Harbor House while incarcerated, and still found it "imperative" he participate
in additional programming. We perceive no reason to second-guess the Board's
conclusion, given the individualized assessment it undertook before outlining
the issues Williams needed to address. It also is worth noting the Board's
assessment was not altogether different from that of the evaluator who
conducted a mental health evaluation of Williams months before his release. In
fact, the evaluator determined Williams was "a medium risk for recidivism" and
concluded the "likelihood of . . . Williams successfully completing a projected
term of parole" was "fair to poor" for a variety of reasons, including his "past
criminal lifestyle" and "drug relapse risk."
Finally, we address Williams's contention the Board's imposition of the
RTP as a special condition constituted an undue hardship. To support his
argument, Williams highlights his inability to be with his wife when she was
dying of cancer; he also stresses he was his eighteen-year-old son's sole
caregiver when the condition was imposed. Although we recognize Williams's
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absence from the lives of both family members likely exacerbated an already
difficult situation, we cannot conclude his placement in the RTP was an undue
hardship.
"Under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.6(a), '[t]he appropriate Board panel or the
Board may modify or vacate a condition of parole at any time for cause.'" J.K.,
247 N.J. at 134 (quoting N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.6(a)). Further, a parolee may appeal
a Board's decision to impose a condition on parole if "[t]he condition . . . will
impose an undue hardship on the parolee or inmate." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-
4.1(b)(1). The burden to prove the Board acted unreasonably rests with the
appellant. See Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 304 (App.
Div. 1993).
Here, it is evident Williams was given the opportunity to visit his wife
after his administrative parole release. Also, as the Supreme Court and we
observed when denying his applications for emergent relief, Williams was free
to make an application to the Board for additional visits with his wife.
Moreover, he admits his son had reached majority by the time Williams was
paroled and released to the RTP. Under these circumstances, Williams falls
short of meeting his burden and showing his assignment to the RTP, a program
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designed to enhance his chance of success on parole, amounted to an undue
hardship.
Affirmed.
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