STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. QUENTON C. JACKSON (14-03-0622, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1677-16T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
QUENTON C. JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued May 2, 2018 – Decided July 10, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez and Geiger.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Ocean County, Indictment No.
14-03-0622.
Clifford P. Yannone argued the cause for
appellant (Starkey, Kelly, Kenneally,
Cunningham & Turnbach, attorneys; Clifford P.
Yannone, on the brief).
Shiraz Imran Deen, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (Joseph D.
Coronato, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney;
Samuel Marzarella, Chief Appellate Attorney,
of counsel; Shiraz Imran Deen, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Quenton C. Jackson appeals from a January 3, 2017
order denying his motion for a new trial. Defendant, convicted
of second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-7(b), was sentenced on November 16, 2016, to a five-year
term of imprisonment subject to five years of parole ineligibility.
The court granted defendant's request that he be permitted
to represent himself on April 19, 2016, after a comprehensive
Faretta1 hearing. The judge did, however, direct defendant to
apply to the Office of Public Defender for standby counsel. The
application was granted, and defendant had standby counsel
available throughout the proceedings.
Jury selection was completed on July 26, 2016. The following
day, defendant failed to appear. Since defendant had been admitted
to Monmouth Medical Center,2 the judge adjourned the trial until
August 2, 2016.
On August 1, 2016, defendant failed to contact the court, as
he had been instructed, or to produce the documentation to
corroborate his hospitalizations, and a bench warrant issued for
1
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
2
In the transcripts of the proceedings, Monmouth Medical Center
is referred to by its former name, the Paul Kimball Hospital.
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his arrest. He was located on August 2, at Ocean Medical Center,3
just after he had been discharged. Trial resumed, and the jury
convicted defendant.
The facts leading to the charge can be described briefly.
Ocean County Prosecutor's Office Special Operations Group
detectives executed a warrant at defendant's residence related to
an ongoing drug distribution investigation. Officers recovered a
loaded black 9mm semi-automatic pistol from a sock hidden in a
recess near defendant's kitchen cabinets. Several practice range
shooting targets hung on a wall.
The detectives conducted a taped interview after defendant
signed a Miranda4 waiver. He admitted that he lived alone in the
home, but denied any knowledge regarding the handgun. When asked
about the target practice sheets hanging on the wall, defendant
responded that he had brought them home from a shooting range
where he uses 40mm rounds.
At the August 2 proceeding, the judge and defendant engaged
in the following exchange:
THE COURT: [Defendant], you are present.
We have had to have the Sheriff's Department
bring you in. It is 11:30. I believe they
had you here at around 11. Good morning. We
3
In the transcripts, Ocean Medical Center is referred to as Brick
Hospital.
4
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 A-1677-16T3
provided you with some water. Anything you
would like to say at this point in time?
[DEFENDANT]: Yeah, Your Honor. I'm not
feeling well.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
[DEFENDANT]: The Sheriffs came and got
me out of the hospital. That's where I was
at. The day that you called me for documents,
I couldn't get that to you because I was in
the hospital at the time, too.
THE COURT: All right. Well, do you have
any proof that you were in the hospital or
anything?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Well, you can provide that to
the [c]ourt. And I understand from my
officers that you were released from the
hospital, you were not admitted.
[DEFENDANT]: Released today. That was
today.
THE COURT: Excuse me, I'm talking.
That they in fact found you at Brick
Hospital after they had been to your house
last night; after they had been to your house
that you had given us your address this
morning. That you were not at either place.
That you were not at Paul Kimball Hospital
this morning where your parents thought you
were. And that they finally tracked you down
at Brick Hospital.
I'm informed by them that you were not
admitted to the hospital and that you have
been discharged from the hospital. And I have
no proof that you are not capable of
continuing with this trial.
For the record, you did not in any way
comply with my instructions, both to you by
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leaving a message on your phone as well as
speaking with your girlfriend on a number of
occasions, to provide the [c]ourt with proof
that you in fact were admitted to a hospital
and that you in fact had some diagnosis that
would not allow you to continue with the
trial.
You are here this morning and we are
ready to proceed.
Defendant contended he could not proceed:
THE COURT: Do you understand that,
[defendant]?
[DEFENDANT]: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You don't. All right. What
part don't you understand?
[DEFENDANT]: I don't understand none of
this. I'm ill right now and I don't know why
I'm here. I just got out of the hospital.
THE COURT: You're here because you
started the trial and you've been discharged
from the hospital.
[DEFENDANT]: I've been back to the
hospital.
THE COURT: And you haven't communicated
with the [c]ourt in any way, shape or form
since last Wednesday.
[DEFENDANT]: Well, I was in the hospital
last night, I was in the hospital today.
THE COURT: You've been discharged from
the hospital, sir.
[DEFENDANT]: I was in the hospital last
night.
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THE COURT: You've been discharged from
the hospital this morning, sir.
[DEFENDANT]: And I was in the hospital
in Bricktown today.
THE COURT: You've been discharged this
morning.
[DEFENDANT]: Where I got picked up.
That's where I got picked up.
THE COURT: So you're not going to
stipulate that that document shows that you
had a prior conviction in 2003 which can be
demonstrated to the jury to indicate that you
are a prior felon under the statute? Am I
correct in assuming that?
[DEFENDANT]: I can't tell you anything
right now, sir. I'm not in my right state of
mind, so.
THE COURT: All right. For the record,
the [c]ourt is looking at the defendant and
he appears to be sitting sort of properly in
his chair. He is dressed as he was dressed
the first day in what appears to be jeans and
sneakers and a shirt at this time.
During the Miranda hearing, defendant again claimed he was
unable to proceed:
THE COURT: [Defendant], any objection to
the [p]rosecutor playing a redacted version?
A version that doesn't have many things that
are in this past statement, I assume. . . .
You shook your head no, does that mean no,
[defendant]?
[DEFENDANT]: I can't even -- I can't
concentrate. I can't say. I plead the Fifth,
Your Honor.
6 A-1677-16T3
THE COURT: Okay. You can plead the
Fifth. The [c]ourt, for the record, indicates
that [defendant], when the portion came up
about the gun I was observing [defendant], his
eyes became completely wide open, he became
interested in what was being said on the
video.
When asked to comment about the proposed redactions, defendant and
the judge had the following exchange:
THE COURT: [Defendant], any comment on
any of that?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor. I can't
represent myself right now at this point.
THE COURT: And why is that, sir?
[DEFENDANT]: Because I can't think
clearly. My blood pressure is probably
through the roof right now and anxiety, so.
THE COURT: Well, I appreciate that. I'm
observing you all this time. You do not appear
to be in any distress whatsoever.
[DEFENDANT]: That's your opinion, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Yes, it is.
[DEFENDANT]: That's your opinion.
THE COURT: And I'm just placing on the
record that I'm observing you and that is
absolutely my opinion.
When asked if he wanted to continue to represent himself, or
was willing to allow standby counsel to "step in," defendant
responded that he would prefer to retain his own attorney. The
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court observed that defendant's similar request had been denied
the prior week, and that the issue had arisen back in January.
When the January request was made, defendant had contacted an
attorney, but had not actually retained her. Because the lawyer
had not yet been retained, the judge refused her request for an
adjournment since the jury was "on its way over to begin [the]
trial."
Defendant reiterated he could not proceed because of his
health, and the judge denied his request for postponement.
Defendant insisted that he could not stand when he addressed the
judge because he might faint "[f]rom the pressure, the high blood
pressure, the anxiety." The judge observed that defendant was
physically able to fully participate and had repeatedly expressed
his concerns on the record in a manner that corroborated the
judge's perspective that he was fit to proceed. The judge added:
"I am again placing on the record that I continue to observe you
and I feel [you are] competent to continue at this time."
The medical and hospital documentation defendant provided in
support of his application for a new trial stated that he suffered
from anxiety, depression, panic attacks, and high blood pressure.
Although defendant had gone for treatment to two different
hospitals, both discharged him after an overnight stay. The
medical documents included summaries finding defendant to be
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generally in normal health, not in need of further
hospitalizations.
In ruling on the motion for a new trial after review of the
documents, the judge held defendant was not prejudiced by being
compelled to try the matter despite his alleged health problems.
The judge said:
[T]he totality of the circumstances and the
events that occurred, including what
transpired before the trial, what transpired
with the [c]ourt's impression that there was
a delay tactic going on by the defendant in
firing a very competent attorney who had
obtained, in the [c]ourt's opinion, a plea
bargain that was beneficial, noting all of the
evidence that was presented against
[defendant], and he denied or decided to not
take the deal. That he then went into a delay
mode after that and did everything he could
after that to try to delay this trial.
So I find that, while the motion is
appropriate, it is out of time. But I will
still, for the record, indicate that I am
denying it both for that reason as well as for
the reasons given as far as that I do not find
that there was any prejudice to [defendant].
That I do not find that there has been any
medical evidence submitted that would show
that [defendant] in fact was not able to
participate from a competency standpoint, from
an ability to understand what was going on,
from an ability to represent himself in this
case. To understand that he had the right and
the ability to question the standby attorney
that the [c]ourt had appointed, to use the
services of that attorney if he had any
questions.
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And I also find that, clearly, based on
my observations and personal observations of
the defendant during the trial, that he was
more than capable and appropriate in preparing
his defense and presenting his defense and in
executing both his opening and closing
statements, his objections to evidence and all
things that an attorney would have done on his
behalf.
Could he have been represented better
with respect to certain things if he had an
attorney? I think that's probably true. But
the [c]ourt does not feel that he has the right
now to come back and say that certain things
were not done properly because he was not
familiar with court rules and things like that
and that he was too sick to continue. I think
his own reactions, his own demeanor proved
that he was capable of proceeding to trial at
that time. So I deny all of the requests that
were made on behalf of the defendant at this
time.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
APPLICATION TO POSTPONE THE TRIAL BECAUSE HE
HAD EXPERIENCED MEDICAL ISSUES THAT DEEMED HIM
UNFIT TO PROCEED AS AN INEXPERIENCED PRO SE
LITIGANT THUS DENYING APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL
IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO R. 3:20-1
BECAUSE HE WAS REQUIRED TO PROCEED AS AN
INEXPERIENCED PRO SE LITIGANT SUFFERING WITH
MEDICAL ISSUES THAT PREJUDICED APPELLANT AND
DEPRIVED HIM A FAIR TRIAL THUS CAUSING A
MANIFEST DENIAL OF JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW.
10 A-1677-16T3
I.
Whether to grant an adjournment of trial due to a defendant's
health difficulties is a matter within the discretion of the trial
court. State v. McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super. 242, 259 (App. Div.
1989); State v. Kaiser, 74 N.J. Super. 257, 271 (App. Div. 1962).
The trial court's decision "will not be deemed reversible error
absent a showing of an abuse of discretion which caused defendant
a 'manifest wrong or injury.'" McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super at 259
(quoting State v. Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395, 402 (App. Div.
1985)).
According to the Kaiser court,
Among those factors deserving consideration by
the court in the exercise of its discretion
are medical reports, personal observation of
the accused, the effect of a continuance upon
the State's ability to produce evidence at a
subsequent date, and whether or not the
accused will be better able to stand trial at
a later time.
[74 N.J. Super. at 271.]
We also consider "the clarity of the accused's testimony at trial
and the conduct of the trial court in granting defendant periods
of rest whenever . . . requested." Ibid. (citing State v. Pierce,
27 P.2d 1087, 1088 (Wash. 1933)).
Furthermore, a trial court's decision on a motion for new
trial "shall not be reversed unless it clearly appears that there
11 A-1677-16T3
was a miscarriage of justice under the law." R. 2:10-1. We defer
to the trial court with respect to "intangibles" not transmitted
by the record, including credibility and demeanor, but otherwise
make our own independent determination of whether a miscarriage
of justice occurred. Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 360 (1979);
Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 597-98 (1977); Dolson
v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6-8 (1969); Kimmel v. Dayrit, 301 N.J.
Super. 334, 355 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Caputa v. Antiles, 296
N.J. Super. 123, 138-39 (App. Div. 1996)).
II.
Although framed as two separate points of error, defendant
makes essentially the same argument as to both: that defendant's
health mandated an adjournment. To the contrary, our review of
the medical records supports the judge's conclusion that
defendant's health did not warrant a postponement. No due process
violation occurred because his application was denied.
Defendant's health issues were not disabling, and although he
attempted to be admitted into a second facility when discharged
from the first, he was quickly discharged from that hospital as
well. The trial judge repeatedly observed that defendant was
responding throughout the trial as capably as could be expected
from a self-represented litigant.
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When we review the Kaiser factors, that analysis supports the
trial judge's decision denying the motion for a new trial. The
medical records documented that defendant's medical problems were
not so serious as to impact his self-representation. The judge
repeatedly observed that defendant's demeanor, attentiveness, and
questions to witnesses established beyond question his ability to
proceed. Although the State would suffer minimal prejudice in
light of the nature of the charge, defendant's diagnosed conditions
are chronic. An adjournment would not have made a significant
change to defendant's anxiety, depression, and elevated blood
pressure. Independently weighing the Kaiser factors, we conclude
the judge did not err in denying defendant's motion for a
postponement upon his return to court after the execution of the
arrest warrant.
III.
Defendant's motion for a new trial was made out of time.
However, the judge nonetheless ruled on the merits. As we have
said, the judge found that defendant's conduct during the trial
was entirely appropriate. He denied the motion as untimely and
on the merits, and both decisions are supported by the record and
relevant precedent. The denial of the motion for a new trial was
not a miscarriage of justice.
Affirmed.
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