Citation Numbers: 28 N.J. Tax 541
Filed Date: 5/28/2015
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The Director of the State Division of Taxation (Division or State) appeals from a January 3, 2013 decision of the Tax Court holding that the taxpayer, the Residuary Trust A U/W/O Fred E.
The facts and procedural history are recited at length in the Tax Court’s opinion and will not be repeated here. To summarize, the Trust was created by decedent Kassner’s will. In 2006, the Trust owned no assets in New Jersey. Its sole trustee resided in New York and administered the Trust exclusively outside of New Jersey. The Trust owned shares in four travel companies, which were New Jersey S corporations. The Trust paid New Jersey tax on nearly $3 million of its net pro rata share of the S corporations’ income that was allocated to New Jersey. It did not pay New Jersey tax on income allocated to states other than New Jersey, or on about $98,000 of interest income.
There was no issue as to whether the S corporation income was properly allocated between in-state and out-of-state sources. However, in 2009, the Division issued the Trust a Notice of Deficiency, based on this factual and legal assertion: “[s]inee there are assets located in New Jersey, the undistributed income must be reported as New Jersey income.” On the taxpayer’s appeal, the Tax Court characterized the issues as: “(1) whether New Jersey may properly tax the undistributed income of a testamentary trust; and (2) whether ownership of stock in a New Jersey S corporation constitutes ownership of New Jersey assets.” Residuary Trust A supra, 27 N.J.Tax at 71.
The Tax Court judge acknowledged that by statute, New Jersey taxes the New Jersey gross income of trusts, including the net gains or income derived through a trust, and taxes the undistributed income or gains of a trust. Id. at 72 (citing N.J.S.A. 54A:2-1; N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1(h); and N.J.S.A. 54A:5-3). However, applying reported Tax Court precedent, the judge held that New Jersey cannot tax a trust’s undistributed non-New Jersey income if the trustee, assets and beneficiaries are all located outside New Jersey, because in that situation the trust lacks minimum contacts
The judge rejected the Division’s argument that the Trust owned assets in New Jersey merely by virtue of its owning stock in four New Jersey S corporations. The judge concluded that “the owner of stock in an S corporation does not own or hold title to the underlying assets of the corporation.” Id. at 77. The judge also rejected the contention that the Trust had minimum contacts with this State by virtue of its having filed a New Jersey tax return for 2006 (NJ-1041) and used a New Jersey address on the return.
The judge further noted that since 1999, the Division’s official published guidance had advised taxpayers that the Division was following Pennoyer and Potter, and that no tax would be owed in the factual situation presented by this case. Id. at 74 n.7. That is, no tax would be assessed if all of the trust assets and trustees were located outside New Jersey. See State Tax News, Winter 1999, at 7.
Our review of the Tax Court’s decision granting summary judgment is de novo, using the same legal standard employed by the trial court. Waksal v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 215 N.J. 224, 231, 71 A.3d 878 (2013). We owe special deference to the expertise of the Tax Court, although we do not defer to its interpretation of statutes. Ibid.
On this appeal, the Trust urges that we need not reach the constitutional issue, but should affirm based on the square corners doctrine.
The square corners doctrine requires the government to deal fairly with its citizens, eschewing inequitable practices. See CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Bor. of Lebanon Planning Bd., 414 N.J.Super. 563, 585-86, 999 A.2d 1151 (App.Div.2010); Sellers v. Bd. of Trs. of Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 399 N.J.Super. 51, 59-60, 942 A.2d 870 (App.Div.2008).
We have in a variety of contexts insisted that governmental officials act solely in the public interest. In dealing with the public, government must “turn square corners.” This applies, for example, in government contracts. Also, in the condemnation field, government has an overriding obligation to deal forthrightly and fairly with property owners. It may not conduct itself so as to achieve or preserve any kind of bargaining or litigational advantage over the property owner. Its primary obligation is to comport itself with compunction and integrity, and in doing so government may have to forego the freedom of action that private citizens may employ in dealing with one another.
Similarly, the statutory provisions governing substantive standards and procedures for taxation, including the administrative review process, are premised on the concept that government will act scrupulously, correctly, efficiently, and honestly.
[F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Bor. of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 426-27, 495 A.2d 1313 (1985) (citations omitted).]
We have applied the doctrine in the context of tax appeals, as has the Tax Court. See Toys ‘R’ Us, supra, 300 N.J.Super. at 171-73, 692 A.2d 111; Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc. v. City of Millville, 25 N.J.Tax 591, 602-04 (Tax 2010); Gastime, supra, 20 N.J.Tax at 168-69. In this ease, since 1999, the Division’s official guidance publication gave taxpayers unequivocal advice that undistributed trust income would not be taxable if the trustee was not a New
We agree with the Tax Court that the doctrine was appropriately applied to preclude the Division from applying to the Trust’s 2006 income a standard the Division did not announce until 2011. As we observed in a case involving an ordinance that a local government adopted and then tried to eschew mid-litigation:
For almost a half-century, our State’s public policy jurisprudence has expressly insisted that governmental agents and units of government observe certain standards and norms-particularly during litigation-that are beyond reproach. See F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 426 [495 A.2d 1313] (1985) (prohibiting a municipality from taking litigational advantage of another party under the “turn square corners” doctrine); Gruber v. Mayor and Twp. Comm., 73 N.J.Super. 120, 127 [179 A.2d 145] (App.Div.), aff'd, 39 N.J. 1 [186 A.2d 489] (1962) (applying an equitable remedy against government in the interest of holding the municipality to a standard of “rectangular rectitude”).
[CBS Outdoor, Inc., supra, 414 N.J.Super. at 585-86, 999 A.2d 1151.]
We need not determine here whether the new criterion is constitutionally permissible, or whether the Division was required to adopt the criterion in a regulation rather than simply announcing it in a newsletter. However, in this context, application of the square corners doctrine bears a close relationship to our decisional law concerning the adoption of regulations. That is, an agency may not spring upon the regulated community a new policy, never before announced, and apply it retroactively. See Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 336-37, 478 A.2d 742 (1984). That conduct is especially inappropriate when, as here, it occurs in the middle of a taxpayer’s appeal. See CBS Outdoor, supra, 414 N.J.Super. at 586, 999 A.2d 1151.
Affirmed.
The Trust explained that the return was prepared by a tax preparer who mistakenly failed to put the Trustee’s New York address on the form and instead listed the New Jersey address of the S corporations. There was no factual dispute that the Trustee lived in New York.
The State Tax News is "a bi-monthly newsletter published by the Division itself.” Airwork Service Div. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 290, 295, 478 A.2d 729 (1984). We have recognized it as an official Division publication. Toys 'R' Us v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 300 N.J.Super. 163, 692 A.2d 111 (App.Div.1997).
Ordinarily, we will not reach a constitutional issue if a case can be decided on a narrower ground. Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. Cnty. of Morris, 186 N.J. 78, 80, 891 A.2d 1202 (2006) (internal citations omitted); A.Z. v. Higher Educ. Student Assist. Auth., 427 N.J.Super. 389, 394-95, 48 A.3d 1151 (App.Div.2012). In this case, the taxpayer’s counsel explained at oral argument that, once the trustee received the Division’s 2011 guidance — which advised that the Division would impose tax on non-New Jersey income if a trust also earned income from New Jersey — she could respond by simply distributing the Trust's income instead of retaining it, thereby avoiding any potential tax. The problem in this case, as explained by counsel, is that the trustee relied on prior Division guidance in retaining the income in the Trust, on the understanding that it would not be taxed. Based on this explanation, we are further persuaded that the interests of justice do not require us to adjudicate the constitutionality of the Division’s current regulatory policy. In fact, it is questionable whether the Trust has a genuinely adversarial interest in that issue. Moreover, we believe that a constitutional adjudication by this court should be based on a properly created and complete record, which the Division should present first to the Tax Court, rather than changing its factual and legal assertions between that forum and this court.
This concession is in the State’s brief and was repeated at oral argument. In response to our specific questions, the Division’s counsel advised us that the State was not arguing that the taxpayer owns the S corporations or that it owns