STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MEREDITH N. ROGERS (09-03-0291, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3295-10T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MEREDITH N. ROGERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted October 27, 2020 – Decided December 16, 2020
Before Judges Gilson and Moynihan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 09-03-
0291.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Andrew R. Burroughs, Designated Counsel,
on the briefs).
Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Nicole Handy, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
On November 25, 2008, D.C., a seventeen-month-old child, died and
medical doctors later testified at trial that his death was caused by blunt force
trauma consistent with being violently shaken and struck. 1 A jury convicted
defendant Meredith Rogers of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A.
2C:11-4(a), as a lesser-included offense of murder, and second-degree
endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). Defendant was
sentenced to forty-seven years in prison with a period of parole ineligibility as
prescribed by the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
Defendant challenges his convictions, contending that errors during the
proceedings deprived him of a fair trial. He also challenges his sentence,
arguing it was excessive. We reject both these arguments and affirm.
I.
The facts were established at a trial where the State called twelve
witnesses, including D.C.'s mother, a friend of defendant, law enforcement
personnel, several treating doctors, and two medical experts. After his motion
for acquittal was denied, defendant elected to testify, but he did not call any
experts or other witnesses.
1
We use initials for the victim and fictitious names for certain witnesses to
protect the privacy interests of the victim's family and the witnesses.
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2
At the time of D.C.'s death, his mother – C.D. (Cathy) – was dating
defendant. Defendant would often spend the night at Cathy's apartment where
she lived with D.C. and two of her daughters.
On November 24, 2008, Cathy left D.C. in defendant's care while she went
to work, and her daughters were at school. When Cathy came home later that
day, she saw defendant sitting on the couch with D.C., who had an ice pack on
his head. Cathy observed bruises on D.C.'s forehead and face. Defendant told
Cathy that D.C. had fallen down the stairs.
Cathy took D.C. to a hospital where Dr. Lisa Liner examined D.C. Dr.
Liner testified that she conducted complete physical and neurological
examinations of D.C. She observed that D.C. had a hematoma on the right side
of his head, some bruising on his face and left ear, but no neurological
abnormalities. Dr. Liner also ordered a CAT scan and the result showed no
fractures, bleeding, or brain injury. Accordingly, Dr. Liner informed Cathy that
D.C. was fine, and she discharged him from the hospital.
After visiting D.C.'s father, Cathy and D.C. returned home. At
approximately 8:30 that evening, Cathy put D.C. to bed. Approximately two
hours later, at 10:30 p.m., Cathy and defendant went into her bedroom, where
they engaged in sexual intercourse. Defendant then went down to the kitchen to
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get some food. When he came back to the bedroom, he asked Cathy if D.C.
could sleep with them and he brought D.C. into the room. While defendant and
D.C. were eating chips and watching television, Cathy fell asleep.
Shortly thereafter, Cathy was awoken by defendant telling her that the
baby was not moving. Cathy got up and saw that D.C. was not moving, his skin
appeared grayish, his eyes were half open, and his limbs were limp at his side.
Cathy placed her hands under D.C.'s back and attempted to shake him and told
him to "stop playing." When D.C. remained unresponsive, Cathy asked
defendant to call 911.
At approximately 12:40 a.m. on November 25, 2008, several police
officers responded to Cathy's home. The officers found D.C. unresponsive; he
had no pulse and was not breathing. One of the officers observed an odor of
alcohol coming from defendant's mouth and saw alcohol containers on the
counter. D.C. was then transported to the hospital by an ambulance.
Dr. Shonola DaSilva testified that she examined D.C. on the morning of
November 25, 2008 at the hospital. She observed that D.C. had bruises on his
abdomen and face and that he was unable to move parts of his body and could
not speak. A CAT scan was conducted, and x-rays were taken of D.C.'s head,
chest, and abdomen. Dr. DaSilva observed that D.C. was bleeding internally in
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different parts of his head. Dr. DaSilva thereafter reviewed the CAT scan taken
the prior day and did not observe that same bleeding. Dr. DaSilva opined that
D.C. had multiple intracranial bleeds caused by trauma. At approximately 11
a.m. on November 25, 2008, doctors informed Cathy that D.C. was dead.
Thereafter, Dr. Liner was shown pictures of D.C. that were taken from the
autopsy. Dr. Liner testified that the picture showed many more bruises than
when she examined D.C. the day before his death. Dr. Liner pointed out that
there were additional bruises on D.C.'s face, under his chin and cheek, and on
his abdomen.
Cathy continued to date defendant for several months after D.C.'s death.
She testified that in December 2008, defendant contacted her late one night and
asked her to pick him up in Philadelphia. When she went to get defendant, he
appeared to have been physically assaulted because he had blood coming down
his face and a "busted" lip. After Cathy brought defendant back to her home, he
told her he "knows how D.C. feels now." Thereafter, Cathy ended her
relationship with defendant.
At trial, the State also called S.F. (Sam), who was a friend of defendant.
While incarcerated on an unrelated charge, Sam had requested to speak to a
detective to provide information concerning defendant. Sam testified that after
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D.C.'s death, he had spoken with defendant on several occasions. According to
Sam, defendant stated that he was "stressed out" about the situation and
eventually confessed that he was drinking and under the influence of narcotics
on the night before D.C.'s death. Defendant then stated that he had grabbed D.C.
to stop him from crying, but when D.C. would not stop, defendant "blacked out"
and punched and shook the baby. Defendant then told Sam that as D.C.
continued to cry, defendant hit him until D.C. became unresponsive.
The State also called two medical experts: Dr. Lucy Rorke-Adams, a
neuropathologist, and Dr. Ian Hood, the Burlington County Chief Medical
Examiner. Dr. Rorke-Adams examined D.C.'s brain, spinal cord, and eyes. She
detailed the numerous injuries she observed to D.C.'s brain, including fractured
corpus callosum fibers, various hemorrhages, and evidence of oxygen
deprivation. Dr. Rorke-Adams opined that D.C.'s injuries were not consistent
with those suffered by a child who fell down steps. Instead, she opined that the
injuries D.C. sustained would require angular acceleration, as when a child is
shaken, causing the brain to rotate. She also opined that it would have taken a
very strong level of force to cause the injuries that she observed in D.C.'s brain.
Dr. Rorke-Adams also found that D.C.'s right eye showed extensive
hemorrhaging in front of, behind, and in the retina. She described the injuries
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as "very characteristic of child abuse," and again explained that those injuries
would require violent shaking of the child.
Dr. Hood testified as an expert in forensic pathology. He opined that
D.C.'s injuries were not consistent with a child falling down stairs. He observed
a knuckle pattern on the infant's face and explained those injuries were caused
by blunt force trauma. Dr. Hood went on to opine that the bruises on D.C.'s
buttocks were caused by fairly forceful and discrete blunt trauma. He observed
that the child had either been hit with a relatively small object or had been
thrown against an object that would make those kinds of bruises. Dr. Hood also
opined that the child's bruises could have only been caused by trauma. In that
regard, Dr. Hood opined that D.C. had been shaken and that the cause of his
death was closed head injury and spinal cord trauma. Ultimately, Dr. Hood
opined that the child's death was a homicide.
At the close of the State's case, defendant moved for an acquittal. The
court denied that motion and defendant elected to testify. Defendant testified
that D.C. fell down stairs on November 24, 2008. Defendant went on to testify
that as he was going to sleep later that night, he noticed that D.C. was not
moving. He stated that he never shook the infant or hurt him in any way.
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After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, a jury convicted
defendant of first-degree aggravated manslaughter and second-degree
endangering the welfare of a child. At his sentencing, which took place in
January 2011, the State argued that the court should sentence defendant as a
persistent offender in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3. The court determined
that defendant would be sentenced to an extended term and that NERA applied
to his aggravated manslaughter conviction. Accordingly, the court sentenced
defendant on the manslaughter conviction to a term of forty-seven years in
prison, with eighty-five percent of that term to be served without parole
eligibility. On the endangering the welfare of a child conviction, defendant was
sentenced to a concurrent term of ten years in prison with five years of parole
ineligibility.
In March 2011, defendant filed a notice of appeal. Later that year,
however, the appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute. After various
motions, in June 2019 we granted defendant's motion to vacate the dismissal and
reinstate his appeal. Accordingly, defendant now appeals from his conviction s
and sentence.
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II.
On appeal, defendant makes six arguments, which he articulates as
follows:
POINT I – THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
ALLOWED THE STATE'S WITNESS TO TESTIFY
ABOUT DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT AFTER HE
HAD BEEN ASSAULTED IN PENNSYLVANIA.
POINT II – THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY
ALLOWING THE STATE'S EXPERT TO TESTIFY
ABOUT THE CAUSE OF D.C.'S INJURIES.
POINT III – THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL UNDER COUNT
ONE.
POINT IV – THE TRIAL COURT'S CUMULATIVE
ERRORS DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR AND
RELIABLE TRIAL.
POINT V – TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
BY FAILING TO INVESTIGATE AND CALL A
REBUTTAL EXPERT WITNESS THAT D.C.'S
FATAL INJURIES COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED
BY FALLING DOWN THE STAIRS AND LANDING
ON A GUARD GATE.
POINT VI – DEFENDANT'S [FORTY-SEVEN]-
YEAR AGGREGATE SENTENCE WAS
MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.
(1) As the State's motion for an extended term was
deficient, the imposition of an extended term by the
trial was improper.
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(2) As the trial court double counted the application
of certain aggravating factors, the matter should be
remanded for re-sentencing.
(3) The trial court erred when it found no mitigating
factors applied in this case.
1. The Testimony About Defendant's Statement
Defendant contends that Cathy should not have been permitted to testify
about an incident where defendant had been assaulted in Pennsylvania and his
alleged statement that "he knows how [D.C.] feels now." Defendant argues that
neither the incident nor the statement was relevant, and both should have been
excluded under N.J.R.E. 403.
Before Cathy provided this testimony, the State alerted defense counsel
and counsel objected. The trial judge overruled defendant's objection , finding
that while the statement was subject to different meanings, it was relevant to the
disputed issue of whether D.C. had been assaulted. The court also found that
the incident and related statement were not substantially more prejudicial than
probative.
"A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed on
appeal for abuse of discretion." State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 157 (2011).
"Considerable latitude is afforded" to trial court evidentiary rulings and they
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will be reversed "only if [they] constitute[] an abuse of discretion." State v.
Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 449 (2017) (quoting State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 385
(2015)).
Under N.J.R.E. 403, a trial court can exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. State
v. Williams, 240 N.J. 225, 237-38 (2019). If the trial court weighs the probative
value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, such a ruling should only be
overturned if it constitutes "a clear error of judgment." State v. Koedatich, 112
N.J. 225, 313 (1988).
Here, we discern no abuse of discretion or error. The incident and
defendant's statement were relevant to the material issue of whether D.C. was
hurt by accidentally falling down stairs or an assault by defendant. While we
agree with the trial court that the defendant's statement was subject to varying
interpretations, the interpretation and weight were questions for the jury. See
Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 502 (App. Div. 2007) (it is
within the "province of a jury" to determine the weight of the evidence). In
addition, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding that the
probative value of the incident and defendant's statement were not substantially
outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.
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2. Testimony by Dr. Rorke-Adams
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by permitting Dr. Rorke-Adams
to testify about the cause of D.C.'s injuries because those opinions were not set
forth in her expert report. In her report, Dr. Rorke-Adams listed the observations
she made of the damage suffered in D.C.'s brain, spinal cord, and eyes. She did
not offer an expert opinion about what could have caused the damage. The trial
judge overruled defendant's objection and allowed Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify
about the causes of D.C.'s injuries. The trial court found that there was no
surprise or prejudice to defendant because defendant had long been on notice
that the State contended that he had shaken and punched the child.
"The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015).
Expert testimony that deviates from the pretrial expert report may be excluded
if the court finds "the presence of surprise and prejudice to the objecting party."
Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Portadin, 321 N.J. Super. 558, 576 (App. Div.
1999). If the trial court allows an expert to go beyond her or his report, the court
should consider (1) the absence of design to mislead, (2) the absence of the
element of surprise if the evidence is admitted, and (3) the absence of prejudice
A-3295-10T3
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that would result from the admission of the evidence. Westphal v. Guarino, 163
N.J. Super. 139, 146 (App. Div. 1978).
We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to permit
the testimony by Dr. Rorke-Adams. There is nothing in the record that indicates
a design to mislead. Just as significantly, there was no surprise or prejudice.
Defendant was aware of the State's theory of the case that he had caused D.C.'s
death by shaking and punching the child. Moreover, Dr. Rorke-Adams'
testimony was consistent with the report and testimony by Dr. Hood concerning
D.C.'s injuries and death.
3. The Motion for Acquittal
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion
for acquittal on the charge of first-degree murder. We disagree.
An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion for acquittal de novo,
applying the same standard used by the trial judge. State v. Williams, 218 N.J.
576, 593-94 (2014). "We must determine whether, based on the entirety of the
evidence and after giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony and
all the favorable inferences drawn from that testimony, a reasonable jury could
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid. (citing State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454,
558-59 (1967)). The reviewing court "must consider only the existence of such
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evidence, not its 'worth, nature, or extent.'" State v. Brooks, 366 N.J. Super.
447, 453 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 342
(App. Div. 1974)).
A person is guilty of murder when "(1) the actor purposely causes death
or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or (2) the actor knowingly cause s
death or serious bodily injury resulting in death[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and
(2). Here, the trial court correctly applied the Reyes standard and found that
there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to consider the charge of murder.
The trial court found that the State had presented medical testimony from both
Dr. Hood and Dr. Rorke-Adams that D.C. suffered injuries from trauma and
shaking. Moreover, the doctors had testified that those injuries caused the
child's death. We reject defendant's argument that there was no evidence
identifying him as the person who shook D.C. The testimony by Cathy provided
strong circumstantial evidence that defendant had purposely and knowingly
caused the child's death. Cathy testified that when she went to sleep, D.C. was
awake and eating chips. She went on to testify that when she was woken up,
D.C. was grayish and limp, and defendant was the only person who had been
with D.C.
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Cathy's testimony is corroborated by the testimony of defendant's friend
Sam. Sam testified that defendant confessed that he shook and punched D.C.
until he was unresponsive. While defendant argues that Sam later recanted his
statements to a defense investigator, the credibility of Sam's testimony was an
issue for the jury.
4. The Alleged Cumulative Errors
Having found no individual errors warranting a reversal, we reject
defendant's arguments that there were cumulative errors warranting a reversal.
Our review of the trial record convinces us that defendant was accorded a fair
trial and there were no errors that even when combined warrant a reversal of the
jury verdict. See State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 443 (2008); State v.
Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 538 (2007).
5. The Allegations Concerning Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
investigate and call a rebuttal witness to testify that D.C.'s fatal injuries could
have been caused by falling down the stairs and landing against a guard gate.
Generally, an appellate court will not consider ineffective assistance of counsel
claims on direct appeal "because such claims involve allegations and evidence
that lie outside the trial record." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992).
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We believe that defendant's arguments concerning the ineffective assistance of
his trial counsel are better left for a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR).
We make this ruling recognizing that defendant's direct appeal was
delayed for a substantial period. Nevertheless, the current record does not
disclose whether trial counsel acted deficiently or whether that failure to act
caused prejudice to the defense. Moreover, we note that after defendant's direct
appeal was dismissed, but before we allowed it to be reinstated, defendant filed
a petition for post-conviction relief which the trial court appropriately denied
without prejudice. Accordingly, defendant can address his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel by renewing his PCR petition.
6. The Sentence
Finally, defendant challenges his sentence. He contends that the State's
motion for an extended term was defective, that the sentencing court double-
counted certain aggravating factors, and that the court erred when it found that
there were no mitigating factors. We are not persuaded by any of these
arguments.
When the State seeks to have an eligible defendant sentenced to an
extended term, it is required to serve notice on defendant within fourteen days
of the return of the verdict. R. 3:21-4(e). When there are multiple convictions,
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the State's notice should identify the offense for which the State seeks extension.
State v. Thomas, 195 N.J. 431, 436 (2008).
When the State makes an application, the court can sentence a defendant
to an extended term as a persistent offender. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). A persistent
offender
is a person who at the time of the commission of the
crime is [twenty-one] years of age or over, who has
been previously convicted on at least two separate
occasions of two crimes, committed at different times,
when he was at least [eighteen] years of age, if the latest
in time of these crimes or the date of the defendant's
last release from confinement, whichever is later, is
within [ten] years of the date of the crime for which the
defendant is being sentenced.
[Ibid.]
The sentencing court thoroughly reviewed each of the statutory factors
and made findings on how defendant met the definition of a persistent offender.
The court also accepted the State's clarification that it wanted defendant to be
sentenced to an extended term for his aggravated manslaughter conviction. The
State had clarified that position in the sentencing memo and defendant has no
viable arguments that he was not on notice that the State was seeking an
extended sentence on his aggravated manslaughter conviction. Consequently,
we discern no abuse of discretion or reversible error in the trial court's decision
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to grant the State's motion for an extended term and to impose that extended
term on the aggravated manslaughter conviction.
We review the remaining sentencing determinations under a deferential
standard. State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 337 (2015) (quoting State v. Lawless,
214 N.J. 549, 606 (2013)). We do not substitute our judgment for "the judgment
of the sentencing court." Lawless, 214 N.J. at 606 (first citing State v. Cassady,
198 N.J. 165, 180 (2009); and then citing State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215
(1989)). Instead, we will affirm a sentence unless
(1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the
aggravating and mitigating factors found by the
sentencing court were not based upon competent and
credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application
of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the
sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the
judicial conscience."
[State v. Miller, 237 N.J. 15, 28 (2019) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70
(2014)).]
The trial court found five aggravating factors: one, the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the role of the actor, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1);
two, the gravity and seriousness of the harm inflicted on the victim, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(2); three, the risk defendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(3); six, defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the
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offenses of which he had been convicted, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6); and nine, the
need to deter defendant and others from violating the law, N.J.S.A. 2C:44 -
1(a)(9). All those findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the
record.
Moreover, the sentencing court did not double count aggravating factors
one and two. Defendant argues that the application of aggravating factor two
effectively double counts the elements for aggravated manslaughter. We
disagree. When finding aggravating factor two, the trial court relied on the fact
that D.C. was seventeen months old at the time of his death and was unable to
protect or defend himself in any way. Since a victim's age and vulnerability are
not elements of aggravated manslaughter, no double counting occurred. See
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1).
The trial court then considered defendant's arguments concerning
mitigating factors but determined that no mitigating factor applied. The court's
determination in that regard was also supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
Having determined that it would sentence defendant to an extended term
as a persistent offender, the forty-seven-year prison term imposed was within
the statutorily permissible range for the conviction of first-degree aggravated
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manslaughter. Given the nature of the crime, the sentence does not shock our
judicial conscious.2
Affirmed.
2
Defendant also contends that there were certain inaccuracies in the judgment
of conviction because it states that he waived his right to appeal, the sentence
was the product of a negotiated plea, and references a sentencing memo that was
not attached. We do not deem those misstatements sufficient to warrant a
remand because defendant was clearly convicted by a jury after a trial and he
can obtain the sentencing memo from the trial court.
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