STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JEFFREY DESIR (008-04-18, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3581-18T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JEFFREY DESIR,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Argued November 30, 2020 – Decided December 22, 2020
Before Judges Fasciale and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County, Municipal Appeal No.
008-04-18.
Santo T. Alampi argued the cause for appellant
(Alampi & De Marrais, attorneys; Santo T. Alampi, on
the brief).
Craig A. Becker, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Mark Musella, Bergen County
Prosecutor, attorney; Craig A. Becker, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jeffrey Desir appeals from a March 11, 2019 order of the Law
Division finding him guilty of three drug-related offenses after a de novo
review of the record from the municipal court proceeding in accordance with
Rule 3:23-8. We affirm.
We summarize the facts from the municipal court proceeding. On April
3, 2017, Officer Gil Maynard saw a man using his cellphone while driving.
According to the officer, the driver "had his cell phone in his hand, and it was
up to be seen . . . . [H]e was holding it in his right hand as he was driving."
Maynard was unable to recall if the driver was talking on the speakerphone but
"remember[ed] seeing the illumination of the cell phone . . . ." Based on these
observations, the officer initiated a traffic stop. Prior to stopping the car,
Maynard noticed the "license plate frame obstruct[ed] . . . a clear view of [the]
license plate," in violation of New Jersey law. In reviewing the driver's
credentials, Maynard identified the driver as Desir.
As Officer Maynard approached the vehicle, he "could smell the odor of
marijuana," which he identified based on his police academy training. When
Maynard asked about the marijuana smell, defendant said he smoked
marijuana earlier. The officer asked defendant to step out of the car and called
for backup. According to Maynard, defendant "was trembling, as if he was
nervous."
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Officer Maynard advised defendant that he would conduct a search the
car based on the marijuana smell. During the search, defendant waited with
Officer Joseph Windt, who responded to Maynard's call for backup.
Officer Maynard's search produced a "bag of greenish-brown vegetation"
under the driver's seat, "a small envelope of rolling papers" hidden in the
center console, and "a large amount of money . . . located in the glove
compartment." The officer confronted defendant with these findings and saw
defendant "grabbing at his pants . . . specifically in the groin area. And every
time [defendant] pulled on his pants, [Officer Maynard] could smell marijuana,
. . . which made [him] believe that there was something hidden in his pants."
Defendant was arrested and taken to the police station.
At the station, Officer Maynard searched defendant. Although the
officer found nothing initially, he continued to smell marijuana. In accordance
with standard police procedure, Maynard attempted to remove defendant's belt.
As soon as the officer grasped the belt, defendant spun towards Maynard and
grabbed him. Because he continued to resist removal of his belt, additional
officers had to restrain defendant.
A higher-ranking officer intervened and spoke with defendant,
instructing him to cooperate. Defendant reached down into his pants and
"pulled out three bags. One clear bag containing a . . . white, powdery
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substance, with rocks in it that looked like . . . crack cocaine . . . [a]nd then . . .
two smaller bags of a green vegetation which [Maynard] believed to be
marijuana."
Defendant was charged with the following offenses: operating a vehicle
while in possession of narcotics, N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1; improper use of a cell
phone while driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.3; delaying traffic, N.J.S.A. 39:4-56;
improper display or obstruction of a license plate, N.J.S.A. 39:3-33; failure to
wear a seatbelt, N.J.S.A. 39:76.2(f); possession of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
10(a)(4); possession of drug paraphernalia, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2; resisting arrest,
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1); and failure to turn over a controlled dangerous
substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:36-10(c)(5).
A municipal court trial took place on February 28, 2018. Officers
Maynard and Windt testified on behalf of the State. Defendant, represented by
counsel, testified on his own behalf. After hearing the testimony and
considering the evidence, the municipal court judge found defendant not guilty
of possessing marijuana, delaying traffic, and failing to wear a seatbelt.
However, the municipal court judge found defendant guilty of the remaining
charges. He determined the officers' testimony to be credible and defendant's
testimony "somewhat incoherent," "all over the place," and "absolutely
incredible." The municipal court judge sentenced defendant to one-year
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probation, suspended his license for two years, and imposed $3,491 in fines,
fees, and court costs.
Defendant appealed his municipal court conviction to the Superior
Court, Law Division. Before the Law Division judge, defendant, represented
by new counsel, moved for the first time to suppress the physical evidence
seized by Officer Maynard. On November 2, 2018, the Law Division judge
conducted a trial de novo.
The Law Division judge issued a March 11, 2019 order and written
decision, reversing defendant's convictions for improper display or obstruction
of a license plate, resisting arrest, and improper use of a cell phone while
driving. He upheld defendant's convictions for possession of drug
paraphernalia, failure to turn over CDS, and operation of a motor vehicle while
in possession of narcotics. Collectively, the Law Division judge sentenced
defendant to one year of probation, two years' suspension of defendant's New
Jersey driving privileges and $3,491 in fines, fees, and court costs.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
Point I
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DID SHOW GOOD
CAUSE WARRANTING CONSIDERATION OF
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT’S SUPPRESSION
MOTION.
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Point II
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY
STOPPED ON APRIL 3, 2017 AND COUNSEL
SHOULD HAVE MADE AN APPROPRIATE
MOTION TO DISMISS AND SUPPRESS.
Point III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE INITIAL
MOTOR VEHICLE STOP WAS VALID, THE
WARRENTLES SEARCH OF THE MOTOR
VEHICLE WAS ILLEGAL.
"[A]ppellate review of a municipal appeal to the Law Division is limited
to 'the action of the Law Division and not that of the municipal court.'" State
v. Hannah, 448 N.J. Super. 78, 94 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Palma,
219 N.J. 584, 591-92 (2014)). "In reviewing a trial court's decision on a
municipal appeal, we determine whether sufficient credible evidence in the
record supports the Law Division's decision." State v. Monaco, 444 N.J.
Super. 539, 549 (App. Div. 2016). We must "determine whether the findings
made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence
present in the record." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). "When the
reviewing court is satisfied that the findings and result meet this criterion, its
task is complete and it should not disturb the result . . . ." Ibid.A review of a municipal court conviction by the Superior Court is
conducted de novo on the record. R. 3:23-8. The Superior Court should defer
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to the municipal court's credibility findings. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463,
470-71 (1999) (citing Johnson, 42 N.J. at 161-62). However, "[o]n a de novo
review on the record, the reviewing court . . . is obliged to make independent
findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining defendant's guilt
independently but for deference to the municipal court's credibility findings."
Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1.1 on R. 3:23-8 (2021).
We first consider defendant's argument that the Law Division judge
erred in refusing to consider the motion to suppress evidence despite his
failure to raise the issue in the municipal court. 1 He asserts there was good
cause to excuse the failure to file a motion to suppress because he relied on his
municipal court counsel, "was unaware of the procedural require[ments] with
respect to such a motion," and did not know the failure to raise such a motion
would constitute a waiver of that argument.
Rule 7:5-2(d), governing motions to suppress evidence, provides:
"Unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause, defendant's failure to
make a pretrial motion to the municipal court pursuant to this rule shall
constitute a waiver of any objection during trial to the admission of the
evidence on the ground that the evidence was unlawfully obtained." In
1
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the Law Division judge considered
defendant's arguments on the merits despite his failure to file a motion to
suppress evidence in the municipal court proceeding.
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addition, "issues not raised below will not be considered" unless "the issue is
of special significance to the litigant, to the public, or to the achievement of
substantial justice, and the record is sufficiently complete to permit its
adjudication . . . ." Borough of Keyport v. Maropakis, 332 N.J. Super. 210,
216 (App. Div. 2000) (first citing Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 149
N.J. 378, 391 (1997) and then citing Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barrow, 153
N.J. 218, 230 (1998)).
Here, the Law Division judge found defendant "had the opportunity to
raise the suppression issue before the [municipal] court but failed to do so" and
failed to establish good cause to excuse his misstep, rendering it inappropriate
for the suppression issue to be raised for the first time on the appeal to the Law
Division.
Nevertheless, the Law Division judge considered the merits of a motion
to suppress the physical evidence as if it had been raised in the municipal court
proceeding. Defendant argued the traffic stop was improper because there was
no "articulable and reasonable suspicion" supporting the stop. The Law
Division judge concluded that had the suppression motion been presented in
municipal court, "the illumination of [defendant's] phone while in his hand
provided adequate reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop." He
further explained that while there "might have [been] some speculative
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innocent explanation" why light was radiating from the phone, defendant's
conduct could also be reasonably "consistent with illegal conduct."
"Law enforcement officers 'may stop motor vehicles where they have a
reasonable or articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation has
occurred.'" State v. Barrow, 408 N.J. Super. 509, 517 (App. Div. 2009)
(quoting State v. Murphy, 238 N.J. Super. 546, 553 (App. Div. 1990)).
Reasonable suspicion is present when an officer is "able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Ibid. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion is less burdensome than a
preponderance of the evidence or probable cause but must be more "than an
'inchoate or unparticularized suspicion' or 'hunch.'" Ibid. (quoting United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). In other words, "[t]he State need not
prove that the suspected motor vehicle violation has in fact occurred, only that
the officer has a reasonable, articulable, and objective basis for justifying the
stop." Id. at 518 (citing Locurto, 157 N.J. at 470).
N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.3 provides:
The use of a wireless telephone or electronic
communication device by an operator of a moving
motor vehicle on a public road or highway shall be
unlawful except when the telephone is a hands-free
wireless telephone or the electronic communication
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device is used hands-free, provided that its placement
does not interfere with the operation of federally
required safety equipment and the operator exercises a
high degree of caution in the operation of the motor
vehicle.
"In evaluating the facts giving rise to the officer's suspicion of criminal
activity, courts are to give weight to 'the officer's knowledge and experience'
as well as 'rational inferences that could be drawn from the facts objectively
and reasonably viewed in light of the officer's expertise.'" State v. Citarella,
154 N.J. 272, 279 (1998) (quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 10-11 (1997)).
An officer may still have reasonable suspicion even if the acts could be
construed as "purely innocent" so long as "a reasonable person would find the
actions are consistent with guilt." Id. at 279-280 (quoting Arthur, 149 N.J. at
11).
Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied there was sufficient
credible evidence in the record to support the Law Division judge's finding
reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car. Officer Maynard, who was
deemed credible by the municipal court judge, testified he saw defendant
holding an illuminated phone while driving. As noted by the Law Division
judge, although there may have been innocent explanation for the phone's
illumination, the facts presented were reasonably consistent with conduct
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prohibited under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.3 and therefore it was not unreasonable for
Officer Maynard to stop defendant's car.
We next consider defendant's argument that if the stop was valid, the
officer lacked probable cause to search his car.2 In reviewing the record, we
disagree the officer lacked probable cause to search defendant's car.
The automobile exception "authorize[s] [a] warrantless search . . . when
the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband
or evidence of an offense and the circumstances giving rise to probable cause
are unforeseeable and spontaneous." State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 447 (2015)
(citing State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 233 (1981)). Probable cause "requires
nothing more than a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515
(2003) (quoting State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 214 (2002)).
"New Jersey courts have [long] recognized that the smell of marijuana
itself constitutes probable cause 'that a criminal offense ha[s] been committed
and that additional contraband might be present.'" State v. Walker, 213 N.J.
2Defendant failed to raise this argument before the municipal court judge and
the Law Division judge. We consider defendant's substantive assertion but
note, in accordance with Rule 2:6-1 and Rule 7:5-2(d), the argument was
waived.
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281, 290 (2013) (quoting Nishina, 175 N.J. at 516-17). The odor of marijuana
gives rise to probable cause to conduct a warrantless search in the immediate
area from where the smell emanated. State v. Myers, 442 N.J. Super. 287, 297,
n.5 (App. Div. 2015).
Once an officer smells marijuana emanating from a vehicle, the officer
has probable cause to arrest the driver, as well as to search the vehicle incident
to arrest. State v. Judge, 275 N.J. Super. 194, 202-03 (App. Div. 1994). There
is no requirement that suspected marijuana be found during the search. See
State v. Vanderveer, 285 N.J. Super. 475, 479 (App. Div. 1995) (holding the
difference in the drugs found – cocaine rather than marijuana – does not
invalidate a search based on the odor of marijuana, even where no marijuana
was found).
Here, Officer Maynard stopped defendant's car based on a reasonable
suspicion that defendant was using his cell phone while driving. As the officer
approached defendant's car, he detected an odor of raw marijuana. Maynard
asked about the source of the smell and defendant admitted he smoked
marijuana earlier. Officer Maynard then explained he was going to search
defendant's car based on the marijuana smell and that search found suspected
drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a large amount of cash.
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Having reviewed the testimony, we are satisfied that had a motion
challenging the warrantless search of defendant's car been presented to the
municipal court judge, the motion would have been denied based upon Officer
Maynard's credible testimony and application of the "plain smell" doctrine.
Further, defendant present no evidence that he had a license to legally
possess marijuana for medical use pursuant to the New Jersey Compassionate
Use Medical Marijuana Act (CUMMA), N.J.S.A. 24:6I-1 to -16. Moreover,
the CUMMA did not replace the "plain smell" doctrine. Rather, the CUMMA
"create[d] a limited exception allowing possession of marijuana for medical
use by qualifying patients who obtain the appropriate registry identification
card." Myers, 442 N.J. Super. at 298, 303 (holding the odor of marijuana gave
police probable cause to arrest defendant absent any indication that defendant,
or anyone in his car, was a registered qualifying patient or otherwise
authorized to possess medical marijuana).
Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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