MARIA E. OLAVARRIA VS. TAKASAGO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (USA) (L-8973-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1839-18T4
MARIA E. OLAVARRIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TAKASAGO INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION (USA) , WILLIAM
BUSHMAN, RICARDO MENDOZA,
and SAMANTHA ECKERS, individually,
Defendants-Respondents.
____________________________________
Argued January 8, 2020 – Decided January 27, 2020
Before Judges Fuentes, Haas and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-8973-17.
Kevin G. Roe argued the cause for appellant.
Charles A. Strenk argued the cause for respondents
(Kiernan & Strenk, attorneys; Charles A. Strenk and
Patrick B. Kiernan, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff appeals from the Law Division's November 16, 2018 order granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment, and dismissing plaintiff's complaint
that alleged defendants violated the terms of an implied employment contract by
terminating her from her position as a customer service manager. We affirm.
The facts, as derived from the evidence submitted by the parties in support
of, and in opposition to, the summary judgment motion, are fully detailed in Judge
Rachelle L. Harz's well-reasoned and comprehensive written decision. Therefore,
we recite only the most salient facts from that decision and, like Judge Harz, view
them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party. Polzo v. Cty.
of Essex, 209 N.J. 51, 56 n.1 (2012) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995)).
In 2004, plaintiff began working for defendant Takasago International
Corporation (Takasago) as an at-will employee. Over the years, Takasago
promoted her several times and, at the time of her termination, she held the title of
customer service manager at Takasago's fragrance manufacturing and warehousing
facility in Harriman, New York.
In 2016, Takasago hired a new employee to serve as the company's demand
planning manager (manager). Plaintiff alleged the manager "proceeded to bully
her way around the workforce, [and] interfer[ed] with and disrupt[ed] the daily
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operation of departments unconnected to her job or duties[.]" Although the
manager was not her supervisor, plaintiff asserted the manager was verbally
abusive and when plaintiff complained, the manager responded "by sending
[plaintiff] a barrage of impertinent, harassing e-mails and would engage in child-
like temper tantrums, while cursing and throwing things around her office."
Plaintiff claimed she reported the manager's behavior to her supervisors, but
they did not investigate the manager's conduct. Takasago terminated plaintiff's
employment on January 17, 2017.
In December 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint against Takasago and three of
its employees, including the manager. After defendants moved for summary
judgment in August 2018, plaintiff filed a seven-count, second amended complaint
with the permission of the court. Plaintiff alleged: (1) wrongful termination in
bad faith pursuant to implied contract (count one); (2) breach of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing (count two); (3) negligent hiring and retention of the manager
(count three); (4) oral defamation by the manager causing a loss of reputation
(count four); (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (count five); (6)
negligent infliction of emotional distress (count six); and (7) harassment on a
vicarious liability theory (count seven).
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As an initial matter, plaintiff argued that summary judgment was
inappropriate because the parties had not yet completed discovery. Although
plaintiff filed her first complaint in December 2017, she did not serve
interrogatories upon defendants until three weeks after they filed their motion for
summary judgment in August 2018. Plaintiff never served any deposition notices
for any of Takasago's employees.
Judge Harz concluded that plaintiff's failure to seek discovery more
promptly was not an impediment to consideration of defendants' motion for
summary judgment. As the judge recognized, R. 4:46-1 permits a party to file a
motion for summary judgment prior to the close of discovery. When such a motion
is filed, claims of incomplete discovery will not defeat summary judgment if
further discovery will not patently alter the outcome. Wellington v. Estate of
Wellington, 359 N.J. Super. 484, 496 (App. Div. 2003). A party opposing a motion
for summary judgment on the grounds that discovery is incomplete must
"demonstrate with some degree of particularity the likelihood that further
discovery will supply the missing elements of the cause of action." Badiali v. New
Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 555 (2015) (quoting Wellington, 359 N.J.
Super. at 496). Indeed, the party "must specify what further discovery is required,
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rather than simply asserting a generic contention that discovery is incomplete."
Trinity Church v. Lawson-Bell, 394 N.J. Super. 159, 166 (App. Div. 2007).
Plaintiff did not provide any certifications to the trial court stating with
particularity the information further discovery might produce. Therefore, Judge
Harz proceeded to consider defendants' summary judgment motion.
Although plaintiff was an at-will employee, her primary contention both
before the trial court and here on appeal is her assertion in count one that Takasago
wrongfully terminated her "in bad faith pursuant to [an] implied contract" created
by the forty-one page Employee Handbook (handbook) it gave her at the beginning
of her employment.
By way of background, it is well-settled that, absent a contractual
arrangement to the contrary, employment is at-will. Bernard v. IMI Sys., Inc., 131
N.J. 91, 106 (1993). An at-will employee may be discharged from employment
for any reason, with or without cause, Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99
N.J. 284, 290 (1985), subject to the specific protections afforded by such laws as
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, as well
as the interests of public policy. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72
(1980). However, "an implied promise contained in an employment manual that
an employee will be fired only for cause may be enforceable against an employer
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even when the employment is for an indefinite term and would otherwise be
terminable at will." Woolley, 99 N.J. at 285. Therefore, if an employment manual
creates an implied contract, the nature of the employment relationship is changed,
and the employer must abide by the terms of the manual. Id. at 292.
In order to ensure that such a contract is not formed, the employment manual
must have "a clear and prominent disclaimer[.]" Id. at 285. The key inquiry when
determining whether an employee handbook gives rise to a contract is "the
reasonable expectations of [the] employee[.]" Witkowski v. Thomas J. Lipton,
Inc., 136 N.J. 385, 393 (1994). To be effective, a disclaimer must clearly advi se
the employee that the provisions therein do not constitute an enforceable contract
of employment and must be placed "in a very prominent position[.]" Woolley, 99
N.J. at 309. The requirement of prominence may be satisfied in a variety of ways,
so long as it is "separated from or set off in a way to attract attention." Nicosia v.
Wakefern Food Corp., 136 N.J. 401, 415 (1994). Where reasonable jurors could
not differ in opinion regarding whether a document constitutes an implied contract,
summary judgment is appropriate. Troy v. Rutgers, 168 N.J. 354, 366 (2001).
In applying these principles, Judge Harz carefully examined the provisions
of the handbook, and noted that it included a disclaimer on its first substantive
page. This disclaimer stated:
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INTRODUCTION AND DISCLAIMER OF
CONTRACT
The policies outlined in this booklet should be regarded
as management guidelines only, which in a developing
business will require changes from time to time. This
handbook is not all-inclusive, but is intended solely to
provide general information to our employees. Takasago
retains the right to make decisions involving employment
as needed. This handbook supersedes and replaces all
prior handbooks.
.…
The employee handbook and other plan documents are not
contractual in nature and do not guarantee any
continuation of benefits.
Takasago abides by employment-at-will, which
permits the corporation or the employees to terminate
the employment relationship at any time, for any
reason. Neither the policies contained in this employee
handbook, nor any other written or verbal
communication are intended to create a contract of
employment or warranty of benefits. The corporation
also has sole discretion to add to, delete, or change any
policy contained in this employee handbook except
employment-at-will.
While we hope your employment relationship with
Takasago will be mutually rewarding and long-term,
THIS HANDBOOK SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED
AS, AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE, A CONTRACT
OF EMPLOYMENT, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
OR FOR ANY SPECIFIC DURATION. YOUR
EMPLOYMENT WITH TAKASAGO IS AT WILL AND
CAN BE TERMINATED AT ANY TIME, WITH OR
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WITHOUT CAUSE, BY EITHER YOU OR
TAKASAGO.
Judge Harz concluded that this disclaimer was "effective" in preventing the
creation of a Wooley implied contract between plaintiff and Takasago. The judge
noted that the disclaimer was "in bold print" and "capitaliz[ed]" the most important
provisions. It was also prominently placed at the very beginning of the handbook.
The disclaimer clearly stated that employees were "at-will" and could be
terminated at any time and for any reason. The handbook also stated that the at -
will employment policy could not be changed. Thus, Judge Harz found that "no
reasonable employee could read this [disclaimer] and come to the conclusion that
this handbook creates an employment contract with Takasago." Accordingly, the
judge rejected plaintiff's assertion in count one of her complaint that she could not
be terminated absent cause.
In so ruling, Judge Harz considered and rejected plaintiff's argument that the
"Standards of Conduct" section of the handbook set forth "due process" procedures
that Takasago failed to follow during her employment. This section of the
handbook states:
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
Each employee has an obligation to observe and follow
Takasago's policies and to maintain proper standards of
conduct at all times. If an individual's behavior interferes
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with the orderly and efficient operation of a department,
corrective measures, up to and including termination will
be taken. Disciplinary action may include a verbal
warning, written warning, suspension and discharge. The
appropriate disciplinary action imposed will be
determined by Takasago, in its sole discretion. Takasago
does not guarantee that one form of action will necessarily
precede another.
.…
We emphasize that discharge decisions will be based on
an assessment of all relevant factors.
.…
Takasago may consider an employee's job performance,
prior violation of our work rules, and other relevant
circumstances in determining whether to counsel, warn,
suspend or discharge an employee. It is up to Takasago's
management, in its sole discretion, to decide whether
corrective action, up to and including dismissal, is
appropriate.
Nothing in this policy is designed to modify our
employment-at-will policy.
Judge Harz concluded that this section of the handbook did "not create a
Wooley contract for two reasons. First, the disclaimer [quoted above] states the
employment at-will policy is the only policy Takasago will never alter." The
handbook reiterates this point at the end of the Standards of Conduct section by
"stat[ing] in bold and italicized print, 'Nothing in this policy is designed to modify
our employment-at-will policy.'"
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Just as importantly, Judge Harz found that unlike in Wooley, where the
employee handbook stated that certain procedures "must" be followed before an
employee could be terminated, 99 N.J. at 312, "Takasago's handbook leaves the
termination decision at the 'sole discretion' of Takasago[,]" and also uses the
permissive word "may," rather than the mandatory word "must," in stating that
Takasago "may consider" several factors in making the termination decision.
Thus, Judge Harz concluded "that Takasago's employee handbook had an effective
disclaimer, and consequently, no Wooley contract exists."
Moreover, the disclaimer specifically stated that all of "[t]he policies
outlined in this booklet should be regarded as management guidelines only," and
that "[n]either the policies contained in this employee handbook, nor any other
written or verbal communication are intended to create a contract of employment
or warranty of benefits." (emphasis added). Because Takasago was not required
to follow the management guidelines set forth in the handbook, its employees
could not rely on it as a source for "benefits" or other employment protections that
might be available if the employees had an express or implied employment contract
with the company.
Judge Harz then turned to plaintiff's remaining contentions and found that
they also lacked merit. Because plaintiff did not establish she had an implied
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contract with Takasago, the judge stated there could be no breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing as plaintiff alleged in count two of her amended
complaint. See Wade v. Kessler Inst., 172 N.J. 327, 345 (2002) (holding that there
must be an express or implied contract in order to find that the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing has been breached).
Judge Harz next found that plaintiff failed to demonstrate any of the required
elements for her negligent hiring, defamation, intentional infliction of emotiona l
distress,1 and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims in counts three
through six of her amended complaint.
The judge also rejected plaintiff's assertion in count seven that she was
"harassed" by the manager because
New Jersey law does not recognize a hostile work
environment cause of action in which the harassment was
not due to an employee's association with a protected
class. See Vasough v. Kierce, 437 N.J. Super. 218, 225
(App. Div. 2014). In other words, there is no cause of
action for general bullying, mistreatment by a nasty boss,
or failure of the employee to address incivility in the work
place. [Ibid.]
1
With respect to plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in
count five, Judge Harz treated defendants' summary judgment motion as a motion
to dismiss this count because this was the only new claim plaintiff raised in her
amended complaint.
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Plaintiff did not assert she was harassed due to her association with a protected
class under the LAD and, therefore, the judge concluded her claim in this count
was also meritless. This appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff raises the same arguments that Judge Harz rejected in
her thorough written opinion granting defendants' motion for summary judgment.
She again argues that despite the effective disclaimer set forth at the very
beginning of the handbook, Takasago was nevertheless bound to follow the
guidelines it set forth in the handbook. Plaintiff also contends that summary
judgment was premature because she had not completed discovery.
Our review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo, applying the same
legal standard as the trial court. Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015) (citing
Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014)). "Summary
judgment must be granted if 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories[,] and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'" Town of Kearny v.
Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 91 (2013) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).
Thus, we consider, as the trial judge did, whether "the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
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party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed
issue in favor of the non-moving party." Ibid. (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 540). If
there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then "decide whether the trial
court correctly interpreted the law." Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super.
486, 494 (App. Div. 2007) (citing Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J.
Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998)). We accord no deference to the trial judge's
conclusions on issues of law and review issues of law de novo. Nicholas v.
Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013).
We have considered plaintiff's contentions in light of the record and these
applicable legal principles. We are satisfied that Judge Harz thoroughly and
correctly addressed the issues in her written opinion, and properly granted
summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiff's appellate arguments are without
sufficient merit to warrant further discussion here. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Therefore,
we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in the judge's comprehensive
November 16, 2018 decision.
Affirmed.
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