STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MICHELLE PADEN- BATTLE (15-03-0584, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1320-17T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
June 16, 2020
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
MICHELLE PADEN-BATTLE,
a/k/a MICHELLE A. PADEN,
MAMA MICHELLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Argued telephonically May 21, 20201 –
Decided June 16, 2020
Before Judges Fisher, Accurso and Gilson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 15-03-0584.
Tamar Yael Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Monique D. Moyse,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
1
The matter had originally been listed in January 2020 for disposition on the
written submissions since neither party requested oral argument. The court sua
sponte rescheduled the matter for oral argument and invited the Attorney
General and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey to participate as
amici curiae in light of the troubling issue posed in defendant's third point. Both
accepted our invitation; we are grateful for their involvement.
Emily M.M. Pirro, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex
County Prosecutor, attorney; Emily M.M. Pirro, of
counsel and on the brief).
Sarah D. Brigham, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New
Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney;
Sarah D. Brigham, of counsel and on the brief).
Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for amicus
curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
(American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
Foundation, attorneys; Alexander R. Shalom, on the
brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FISHER, P.J.A.D.
At the conclusion of an eight-day trial, a jury convicted defendant
Michelle Paden-Battle of kidnapping Regina Baker, conspiracy to commit
kidnapping, and felony murder. The jury acquitted defendant of Baker's murder,
as well as conspiracy to commit murder and two weapons offenses, but the judge
enhanced defendant's sentence because he determined that defendant "ordered"
Baker's "execution."
In this appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the judge's instructions on the
kidnapping charge were erroneous and that she was prejudiced by the judge's
A-1320-17T4
2
repeated reference in his jury charge to other participants as defendant's
"kidnapping co-conspirators"; (2) the judge failed to charge either the
affirmative defense of duress, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9, or the felony-murder affirmative
defense described in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); and (3) the judge imposed an
excessive sentence. We agree that the jury verdict did not allow the judge to
sentence defendant as if she was convicted of first-degree kidnapping and that
the verdict should have been molded to reflect a conviction of second-degree
kidnapping. We otherwise affirm the convictions, but we remand for
resentencing not only because the judge sentenced defendant as if she had been
convicted of first-degree kidnapping, but also because he based his sentence on
the facts as he found them, instead of the facts found by the jury.
To understand our disposition, it is necessary to consider the factual
record. The jury heard testimony that at 4:30 a.m., on June 19, 2012, Essex
County detectives received instructions to process a homicide in a structure on
15th Street in Newark. In that vacant residence, police discovered the body of
a deceased female. Jersey City Police Department detectives soon arrived to
ascertain whether the deceased female was Baker, the victim of an alleged
kidnapping that had occurred at approximately 10:15 p.m., on June 16, 2012, on
Bidwell Avenue in Jersey City. The Jersey City detectives advised their Essex
A-1320-17T4
3
County colleagues that they had obtained a surveillance video, which appeared
to show the kidnapping on Bidwell Avenue. The victim found in Newark was
identified as Baker through fingerprint analysis.
During the investigation on 15th Street, a statement was taken from a
woman in the area of Ocean and Bayview Avenues in Jersey City sometime after
9:00 p.m., on June 16, 2012, who was approached by four females and three
males looking for Regina Baker. This woman provided Essex County detectives
with a description of the seven individuals, one of whom was Omar Martin.
Defendant was also identified as one of the seven.
Meanwhile, Jersey City detectives identified one of the females present
during the kidnapping depicted on the video as Davia Younger, who was then
arrested and charged with kidnapping and conspiracy to commit kidnappin g.
Younger gave a statement that Karon Adams admitted to her that he shot and
killed Baker. She also identified Adams' girlfriend, Frencheska DePena. All
these individuals – Martin, Adams, DePena, and defendant – were arrested.
Additional information led to the arrest of Damon Zengotita and Cierra Long.
Defendant and others were indicted. Defendant was charged with:
second-degree conspiracy to commit kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; first-degree
kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1); first-degree conspiracy to commit murder,
A-1320-17T4
4
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2); first-degree
felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); second-degree possession of a handgun
without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); second-degree possession of a firearm
for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); and first-degree criminal gang
activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-29.2
Martin and Adams pleaded guilty to kidnapping, conspiracy to commit
murder, aggravated manslaughter, and unlawful possession of a handgun , and
were sentenced to twenty-year prison terms. Younger pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to commit kidnapping and received a five-year prison term. Long
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit kidnapping and was sentenced to a term
of 135 days.
At trial, Long, Martin and Younger testified for the State. Defendant
testified on her own behalf.
Long testified she was a member of the Mob Piru set of the Bloods.
Defendant was known to her as "Mama L," a First Lady in the Looters 3 Park
Piru set of the Bloods. According to Long, a First Lady is the highest rank that
2
This gang activity charge was later dismissed.
3
The transcript at times refers to "Looters" as "Lueders."
A-1320-17T4
5
can be attained by a female member of the Bloods and that those beneath a First
Lady are required to follow her commands.
Long lived with defendant at her home on Littleton Avenue in Newark.
She testified about a call she received from defendant on the night in question,
ordering her to return home and then go with defendant to Jersey City. Long
overheard defendant arguing on the telephone with Baker, an alleged First Lady
of the MOB Piru set of the Bloods in Jersey City. She also testified that Baker
had been labeled "food," meaning other gang members are permitted to beat or
kill that person so labeled. Baker was "food" because, in defendant's view, she
had been falsely claiming she held a higher rank in the gang than in reality.
According to Long, when she arrived at the Littleton Avenue residence,
defendant, DePena, and Adams were there; Martin and Zengotita soon arrived
in the latter's car. They all rode together – after a stop to get a brake light fixed
– to Jersey City. On the ride, defendant was on the phone, advising they were
on the way to Jersey City to get Baker, that Baker was "food," and that defendant
"wasn't going another day without handling the situation." Once in Jersey City,
they received information that Baker was at Natassia Hernandez's residence on
Bidwell Avenue. On arriving, Hernandez came out and defendant told her, "[g]o
A-1320-17T4
6
get Rage,[4] tell her to come downstairs." Baker stepped into the doorway, and
defendant began to argue, telling Baker she was "here to fight you" and that
Baker was going to come back with them to Newark.
During the argument, Martin "got in [Baker's] face" and then walked to
the corner where Long saw Adams give Martin a gun. Martin then returned and
held the gun to Baker's head while he and Adams pulled Baker toward
Zengotita's car to force her into the trunk. Baker resisted and Martin hit her in
the face with the gun and, along with DePena and Younger, Martin and Adams
forced Baker into the trunk. They all then entered the vehicle and drove off.
According to Long, during the ride from Jersey City to Newark, defendant
realized that Baker might have had a phone in her possession, so they stopped
the car along a nearby waterway; defendant Martin, who was still armed, got out
of the car to retrieve Baker's phone. Baker handed her phone to defendant, who
threw it in the nearby river. The group then resumed their trip to Newark. Once
there, the car stopped at defendant's residence, where defendant, Long, Younger,
and DePena exited and then walked to the Ville, the location where Martin,
Adams and Zengotita had brought Baker and were displaying her to others.
Long overheard defendant say to Martin and Adams, "[y]ou know what y'all got
4
Baker's nickname.
A-1320-17T4
7
to do," which Long understood as an instruction for Martin and Adams to kill
Baker.
Long testified that she, defendant, DePena, and Younger returned to
defendant's residence where defendant said to them, "[t]his could be any one of
y'all." Later, Martin and Adams arrived and told defendant, "it's done."
Defendant asked who shot Baker, and Adams admitted he did.
Martin testified as well, acknowledging that he held a rank equal to
defendant's First Lady rank. Two days before the killing, he was told that
defendant wanted to speak to him, so he and Zengotita went to defendant's
residence – Long, Adams, DePena, and defendant were already there – and
found that defendant was angry and talking about a dispute on Facebook in
which Baker was falsely claiming her gang status. Defendant expressed her plan
to go to Jersey City and bring Baker back to Newark. She asked Martin for a
gun, so he left one at her residence.
Martin also testified that on June 16, he, Long, DePena, Adams and
Zengotita met defendant at her Newark residence, drove first to get a brake light
fixed, and then traveled to Jersey City, where they looked for Baker; they then
also met up with Younger and another. They learned Baker was at Hernandez's
residence on Bidwell Avenue and drove there.
A-1320-17T4
8
Martin testified that during defendant's encounter with Baker on Bidwell
Avenue, he felt "they [were] taking [too] long to handle the situation," so he
retrieved the gun, held it to Baker's head, and when she further resisted, he hit
her on the head with the gun, following which he and Adams forced Baker into
the trunk. He also corroborated what Long said about the ride to Newark,
including the stop on the way, although he testified that he and not defendant
took the phone from Baker and threw it over a fence into the river.
Martin also testified that, after dropping off defendant, Long, DePena, and
Younger at defendant's residence, they drove to the Ville, where they opened
the trunk to show Baker to others. When defendant and the other women arrived,
defendant told Martin and Adams to "handle the situation," which Martin
understood as an instruction to kill Baker. Martin, Adams, and Zengotita then
drove the vehicle to an abandoned building on 15th Street. Martin testified that
he saw Adams take Baker out of the trunk and bring her inside. Baker asked
that they not kill her and to tell her kids she loved them. While waiting outside,
Martin heard the sound of three gunshots inside. After, Adams, Martin, and
Zengotita went to defendant's residence to let her know that "the situation was
handled."5
5
Younger also testified to a similar version of these events.
A-1320-17T4
9
Defendant testified. She said she is known in the community as "Momma
Elm," but denied gang membership. She denied ordering a hit on Baker and
denied conspiring with anyone concerning what occurred in June 2012. She
testified that on June 16, she went to Jersey City with Adams, Long, and DePena,
as well as Martin, whom she only first met that evening. Her intention was to
diffuse an argument between Long and Baker about someone spitting on Long.
When Baker came out of Hernandez's residence, defendant asked where the
women who spit on Long were. With that, Baker and Martin began to argue,
with Baker saying, "I know you didn't bring no lil niggers to fight." Martin said,
"I'm not no lil nigger" and demanded respect from Baker, pulled a gun and
pointed it at her. Defendant claimed she did not know anyone in the group was
in possession of a weapon until that moment.
Defendant testified that she was frightened when she saw Adams and
Martin force Baker into the trunk, but she got into the vehicle's front seat
because Martin pointed the gun at her and said, "get the fuck in the car."
Defendant testified that after they arrived at her Newark residence, Martin
ordered the women out and told them "this could happen to any one of y'all."
Defendant and the other women ran into defendant's residence, and the others
drove off. The next day, defendant moved out of her residence and into her
A-1320-17T4
10
boyfriend's apartment out of concern that Martin would be coming after her,
Long and Younger.
Having heard and considered this and other testimony and evidence, the
jury found defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping,
and felony murder, and acquitted her of murder, conspiracy to commit murder,
and the weapons charges.
At sentencing, the trial judge merged the kidnapping and conspiracy
convictions into the felony murder conviction for purposes of sentencing, and
imposed a sixty-year prison term, subject to an eighty-five percent period of
parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2,
and a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the Graves Act,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c).
Defendant appeals. Her merits brief contains three multi-faceted parts, in
which she argues: (1) the judge's jury instructions were erroneous in numerous
respects; (2) the judge failed to instruct the jury on two applicable defenses; and
(3) the sentence was based on improper considerations and excessive.
I
In her first point, defendant argues she was deprived of due process and a
fair trial because:
A-1320-17T4
11
A. The Kidnapping Charge Failed to Instruct the Jury
on the Essential Element Which Could Elevate
Kidnapping From a Second-Degree Crime to a First-
Degree Crime, thereby Lowering the State's Burden and
Depriving [Defendant] of Due Process, and, as a Result,
her Convictions for Kidnapping, Felony Murder, and
Conspiracy to Commit Kidnapping Require Reversal.
B. The Court's Charges on Conspiracy – Both as the
Inchoate Crime and as Vicarious Liability – Lessened
the State's Burden of Proof and Invaded the Province of
the Jury Because the[] [Judge] Repeatedly Referred to
the Other People in Question as "Kidnapping Co-
Conspirators."
C. The Court Expanded the Indictment by Adding an
Additional Factual Basis for a Kidnapping Conviction,
Causing Prejudice.
We find insufficient merit in the third aspect of this point to warrant further
discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2),6 and discuss the first and second
aspects separately.
6
As for our rejection of the argument that the judge expanded the indictment in
charging the jury on kidnapping, we would add only the judge's actions were
consistent with State v. Smith, 279 N.J. Super. 131, 147-48 (App. Div. 1995).
There was no error because defendant was already on notice, from other parts
of the indictment, that she was charged with the first-degree murder of Baker,
and there was no prejudice because defendant was, in fact, acquitted of both
purposeful and knowing murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and the weapons
charges.
A-1320-17T4
12
A
As to the initial facet of the first point, defendant contends the jury's
verdict could not support a conviction of first-degree kidnapping because the
judge did not instruct the jury on all the elements that would make it so. In
considering this contention, we note that the indictment charged defendant with
kidnapping as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1), which declares, in relevant
part, that a person is guilty of kidnapping if that person "unlawfully removes
another from [her] place of residence . . ., or a substantial distanc e from the
vicinity where [she] is found, or if [she] unlawfully confines another for a
substantial period, with [the] purpose[] . . . [t]o facilitate commission of any
crime or flight thereafter." The Legislature declared that such conduct
constitutes "a crime of the first degree" but "[i]f the actor releases the victim
unharmed and in a safe place prior to apprehension, it is a crime of the second
degree." N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(1).
There is no dispute that the judge instructed the jury on the elements
contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1), but he did not instruct the jurors or seek
from them a determination as to whether defendant "release[d] the victim
unharmed and in a safe place prior to [her] apprehension," N.J.S.A. 2C:13-
1(c)(1). Notwithstanding the undisputed absence of a jury finding on this last
A-1320-17T4
13
factor, the judge sentenced defendant as if she was convicted of first-degree
kidnapping.
Defendant argues in this point that the lack of instructions on this last
factor deprived her of a fair trial and due process. We disagree. The trial was
fair and the process provided was sufficient. The judge's failure to ask the jury
to make the findings necessary to render this kidnapping a crime of the first-
degree simply means, as we held in State v. Casilla, 362 N.J. Super. 554, 570-
71 (App. Div. 2003), that the verdict rendered means defendant had been
convicted of only second-degree kidnapping.
The State argues that the factual differences between this case and Casilla
require a different conclusion or, in the alternative, that we should depart from
Casilla. We disagree in both respects. The circumstances in Casilla are not
fundamentally different from what occurred here. And the State has not
persuaded us that Casilla was wrongly decided or that we should plot a different
course. In reality, the State seems to argue that the last element that renders
kidnapping a first-degree offense was undisputed or implicit in the jury's verdict.
But, as Judge Skillman wrote for this court in Casilla, such a verdict – even
coupled with a finding of felony murder – cannot be interpreted as including an
understanding that defendant "failed to release [the victim] unharmed." Id. at
A-1320-17T4
14
567. No matter how obvious the presence of that factor may seem to the State
or the trial judge,7 defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial includes a right
to have the jury find, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of a particular
offense. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); State v. Grenci, 197 N.J.
604, 622 (2009); State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189, 202 (1986).
While defendant contends that the absence of such an instruction deprived
her of a fair trial, we again rely on what we said in Casilla in concluding that we
should simply recognize that the jury convicted defendant of only second-degree
kidnapping.
B
As to the second facet of this first point, defendant contends a new trial is
warranted because the instructions on conspiracy suggested to the jury that it
could assume a conspiracy had occurred. This argument is based on the judge's
repeated reference throughout the charge to Martin, Adams, Zengotita, Long,
Younger, and DePena, as the "kidnapping co-conspirators." By using this
shorthand descriptor to refer to the other alleged participants, defendant argues
7
And is it so obvious that this element was implicitly included in the jury verdict
when the jury acquitted defendant of murder and conspiracy to commit murder?
A-1320-17T4
15
that the judge either eliminated or lessened the jury's need to find beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of a conspiracy.
The State refers us to that part of the jury instructions in which the judge
advised the jury that the conspiracy was alleged and it was up to the jurors to
determine whether the other individuals and defendant actually conspired; he
explained the State's allegations and, within that explanation, advised that the
other alleged actors would be referred to throughout his instructions as "the
kidnapping co-conspirators":
[T]he State contends that the defendant committed the
crime of kidnapping by her own conduct. The State
also alleges that the defendant is legally accountable for
this kidnapping based upon the conduct of her co-
conspirators. More specifically, the State alleges that
the crime of kidnapping was committed by Omar
Martin, Karon Adams, Damon Zengotita, Cierra Long,
Davia Younger and Francheska DePena (hereinafter the
kidnapping co-conspirators) and that the defendant is
legally accountable for the crime of kidnapping
committed by these persons because the defendant and
these persons allegedly conspired to commit that crime.
In short, the judge advised the jury that he would refer to those individu als
alleged to be defendant's kidnapping co-conspirators as the "kidnapping co-
conspirators." Unfortunately, the judge did not use a preferable shorthand
phrase, such as "alleged kidnapping co-conspirators."
A-1320-17T4
16
The question for us is whether the absence of a word like "alleged" in the
shorthand phrase caused prejudice. That is, we must consider whether, with
each utterance of "kidnapping co-conspirators" the jurors likely assumed the
judge was communicating his or the State's belief there was a kidnapping
conspiracy and that the others conspired with defendant. Beyond the judge's
earlier definition of what he meant by "kidnapping co-conspirators," which we
quoted above, the State argues that the following instruction repeated for the
jury the fact that whether there was a kidnapping conspiracy and whether that
conspiracy was with one or more of the individuals so described was for the jury
to decide:
[A]fter consideration of all the evidence, if you find
beyond a reasonable doubt that a kidnapping co-
conspirator committed the crime of kidnapping and also
that the defendant conspired with that kidnapping co-
conspirator to commit that crime, then you must find
the defendant guilty of the crime of kidnapping. If, on
the other hand, you have a reasonable doubt that a
kidnapping co-conspirator committed the crime of
kidnapping, that the defendant conspired with that
kidnapping co-conspirator to commit that crime, or
both, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the
kidnapping through co-conspirator liability.
We agree. While the judge's repetition of "kidnapping co-conspirator" was
problematic, the inclusion in the charge of a definition of what the judge meant
by that phrase, as well as other instructions that clarified that it was for the jury
A-1320-17T4
17
to decide beyond a reasonable doubt whether there was a conspiracy and the
identity of those with whom defendant may have conspired, removed any cloud
that the absence of the word "alleged" with each repetition may have caused.
Moreover, we note that defense counsel did not object, thereby requiring
defendant to show this repeated descriptor was capable of producing an unjust
result. R. 2:10-2. Although a better practice would call for the inclusion of the
word "alleged" in such a descriptor, we do not find this aspect of the judge's
charge to be plainly erroneous.
II
In this appeal, defendant also argues that the judge erred by failing to
instruct the jury on: (a) the felony murder defense, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3), and
(b) the defense of duress, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9. Defendant did not request these
instructions at trial, so we examine the record on these points by resorting to the
plain-error standard to determine whether their absence was "clearly capable of
producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. We consider, first, the felony murder
defense.
A
In considering the failure to sua sponte charge the felony murder defense,
the Court in State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 86-87 (2010), determined that the
A-1320-17T4
18
same standard that is applied when a defendant hasn't requested instructions on
lesser-included charges applies to a defendant's failure to request the statutory
affirmative defense to felony murder. In short, "if [defense] counsel does not
request the instruction, it is only when the evidence clearly indicates the
appropriateness of such a charge that the court should give it." Id. at 87. We,
thus, turn to the evidence to determine whether all four prongs were "clearly
indicate[d]" so as to warrant such a sua sponte instruction. Ibid.
The statutory defense to felony murder applies when there is proof that
when the defendant "was not the only participant in the underlying crime," it is
an affirmative defense that the defendant:
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way
solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the
commission thereof; and
(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any
instrument, article or substance readily capable of
causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort
not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding
persons; and
(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other
participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument,
article or substance; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other
participant intended to engage in conduct likely to
result in death or serious physical injury.
A-1320-17T4
19
[N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3).]
There was evidence in the record to support a finding by the jury on the
first three prongs. As to the first, the jury heard testimony that defendant was
not the person who shot and killed Baker. And while there was testimony to
support a finding that she ordered the "hit" on Baker, defendant testified to the
contrary. As to the second, there was evidence that defendant was not armed
with a deadly weapon during the kidnapping and, again, she testified that she
was never in possession of a gun during the events in question. The third prong
requires proof that defendant had no reasonable ground to believe that any other
participant was armed with a deadly weapon. Defendant testified she did not
know anyone was in possession of such a weapon until she saw Martin pull out
a gun and point it at Baker in Jersey City. Long and Younger provided similar
testimony.
Our consideration of the fourth prong, however, does not lead to such a
certain conclusion. Defendant testified that she was aware the women with
whom she traveled to Jersey City had a quarrel with Baker and that they planned
to fight her. There was also testimony that defendant was aware that her fellow
travelers were gang members. Although defendant testified that she went to
Jersey City to diffuse the quarrel, the Bidwell Avenue surveillance footage
A-1320-17T4
20
allegedly revealed that defendant watched as Baker was forcibly shoved, at
gunpoint, into the trunk, suggesting defendant reasonably believed at least some
of the other participants intended to cause serious bodily injury.
Even if we were to view the evidence expansively to reach a conclusion
that the fourth prong was "clearly indicat[ed]," we find no prejudice to
defendant's right to a fair trial by the omission of the statutory affirmative
defense. In Walker, the Court found that a trial court's failure to charge the
defense did not constitute plain error because there "the findings of the jury
negated most of the factors required to establish the affirmative defense,"
stating:
[I]n addition to felony murder, the jury convicted
defendant of conspiracy, robbery, reckless
manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of knowing
or purposeful murder, and possession of a knife. For
those convictions, the jury had to conclude that
defendant aided the commission of the homicidal act,
(reckless manslaughter); possessed a deadly weapon,
(possession of a knife); had reason to believe the
codefendant was armed with a knife, (conspiracy and
reckless manslaughter); and engaged in conduct likely
to result in death or serious physical injury, (reckless
manslaughter). Thus, the jury, although not charged
with the affirmative defense to felony murder, found
against defendant on most, if not all, of the four prongs
of the defense.
[203 N.J. at 78, 90.]
A-1320-17T4
21
It is true the jury acquitted defendant of conspiracy to commit murder, murder,
and both weapons offenses; that would support her argument about the first two
prongs of the affirmative defense. But the jury convicted defendant of
conspiracy to commit kidnapping and kidnapping and, therefore, found facts that
would have negated the defense's fourth prong. So, we reject the argument that
the judge's failure to sua sponte instruct on this defense was clearly capable of
producing an unjust result.
B
We also examine defendant's argument that the judge erred by failing to
instruct the jury on the defense of duress in the same manner, since defendant
failed to request that instruction at trial. To repeat, a trial judge's obligation to
charge the jury on a defense not urged by a defendant is not a self -executing
duty. State v. Rivera, 205 N.J. 472, 489-90 (2011). The duty arises only when
the evidence clearly indicates the need for or clearly warrants the unrequested
jury instruction. Ibid.
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9 makes it an affirmative defense "that the actor engaged
in the conduct charged . . . because he [or she] was coerced to do so by the use
of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his [or her] person or the person of
another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his [or her] situation would
A-1320-17T4
22
have been unable to resist." The burden of introducing "some evidence of the
defense" is on the defendant, while the burden of proof is "on the State to
disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Romano,
355 N.J. Super. 21, 35-36 (App. Div. 2002).
Defendant argues that the need for such an instruction was clearly
indicated by the evidence. She refers to her own testimony that she was engaged
in a verbal dispute with Hernandez when Martin pulled out a gun and point ed it
at Baker's head. Defendant testified that she became "scared" when she watched
Baker get forced into the trunk and did not "know what was going on at that
point." She also claimed that once seated in the front passenger seat, she began
to cry while Martin, in the backseat, yelled and held the gun pointed toward her.
That version, however, was not supported by the testimony of others.
Neither Long nor Younger testified they saw Martin point the gun at defendant
or heard him yell at her to get in the car. Moreover, the surveillance video fails
to substantiate defendant's belated claim of coercion. Instead, the video shows ,
as the prosecutor argued at trial, that after the trunk lid closed on Baker,
defendant "wave[d] [the others] on" and the others got into the car, while no one
at that time was pointing a gun at defendant. As the prosecutor argued,
defendant "[c]almly hand[ed] the phone back, walk[ed] over, [and] [got] into the
A-1320-17T4
23
front seat." The video reveals that others are "shocked" by what has occurred,
but defendant "finish[ed] her phone conversation, watch[ed] as they put [Baker]
in the trunk of that car, [and] wave[d] them into the car," after which defendant
"calmly g[o]t into that car."
We agree that the evidence does not "clearly indicate" the need for the
affirmative defense of duress and that its absence from the jury charge was not
capable of producing an unjust result in light of the jury's other findings.
III
In her third point, defendant argues that the trial judge "unquestionably
abused [his] discretion and imposed a manifestly excessive sentence." Her
argument consists of the following six subpoints:
A. The Sentencing Court Improperly Relied on
Evidence Contrary to the Jury's Verdict to Enhance
[Defendant's] Sentence.
B. The Trial Court Relied on Improper Evidence to
Support . . . Finding[s] of Aggravating Factors,
[Specifically] . . . Aggravating Factor[s] Three, . . .
Five, . . . Six, . . . [and] Nine.
C. The Court Improperly Balanced Aggravating and
Mitigating Factors.
D. [Defendant's] Sentence was Grossly and
Erroneously Disproportionate From Those of Martin
and Adams.
A-1320-17T4
24
E. [Defendant's] Sentence was Illegal Because the Jury
Did Not Find That She was Guilty of First-degree
Kidnapping, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, and First-
degree Kidnapping was the Basis For All Three
Charges at Sentencing.
F. The Sentencing Court's Bias and Overreaching
Requires a Remand for Resentencing and/or New Trial
Before a New Judge.
We do not reach all of defendant's arguments, including her contention that the
sentence was disproportionate when compared to those imposed on others,
because we agree, for the reasons that follow, that defendant must be
resentenced.
First, we note the judge merged the second-degree conspiracy conviction
and the first-degree kidnapping conviction into the first-degree felony murder
conviction, and imposed a sixty-year prison term, with parole ineligibility
periods based on both the No Early Release Act and the Graves Act. Because
defendant was sentenced as if convicted of first-degree kidnapping when, in fact,
she was convicted only of second-degree kidnapping, we must vacate the
sentence imposed and remand for resentencing. Second, resentencing is
necessitated by the judge's utilization of his own view of the facts, which
contradicted the jury's verdict.
A-1320-17T4
25
To start, what seems to have been put aside at sentencing was that the jury
acquitted defendant of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and both weapons
offenses. Instead, in sentencing defendant, the judge determined that defendant
was the prime mover in all that occurred; for example, the judge declared at
sentencing that
Michelle Paden-Battle set forth a series of events. She
orchestrated, she was the master mind, she was the
supervisor, she was the driving force in this
kidnap[p]ing and execution of Regina Baker.
[Emphasis added.]
In other statements, the judge stressed that defendant: used "her apparent
authority within the Bloods [in declaring] that Regina Baker was food and that
her life shall cease"; was "the moving force behind this senseless act of
brutality"; exercised her "desire to impose gang-discipline [as] the motive for
the murder of Ms. Baker"; and was "more culpable [than the shooter] due to her
supervisory role over these co-defendants [in] the commission of the
kidnap[p]ing and homicide" (emphasis added). In essence, the judge sentenced
defendant based on his own view of the evidence, finding that even though
defendant "did not pull the trigger," others did "on her orders" (emphasis
A-1320-17T4
26
added).8 The State candidly acknowledges that this is what the judge did,
arguing in its brief that "[i]t was not improper for [the judge] to credit evidence
that the jury did not." We disagree.
"An acquittal is accorded special weight." United States v. DiFrancesco,
449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); see also State v. J.M., 438 N.J. Super. 215, 233-34
(App. Div. 2014), aff’d as modified, 225 N.J. 146 (2016). An acquittal means
that the defendant retains the presumption of innocence; that the State failed to
rebut that presumption. The Supreme Court stated long ago that "a presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law." Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). The
Court invoked this concept again when reaching its landmark decision in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. at 362-63, as did our own Supreme Court in State v. Hill, 199
N.J. 545, 559 (2009).
If this "presumption of innocence" still constitutes a bedrock
constitutional principle, then it must mean that once acquitted, the accused must
8
It is certainly true that defendant was convicted of felony murder, but that
verdict was not based on defendant having "order[ed]" Baker's "execution." Had
the jury found that fact beyond a reasonable doubt, it would have convicted
instead of acquitted her of first-degree murder.
A-1320-17T4
27
be viewed as innocent – not just not guilty – of the acquitted charge. See State
v. Cote, 530 A.2d 775, 785 (N.H. 1987). 9 Here, the jury's acquittal of defendant
on the murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and the weapons charges
constituted at sentencing hardly a "speed bump." United States v. Bell, 808 F.3d
926, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Millett, J., concurring).
It may be, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that a sentencing judge
may do what this judge did because of United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148
(1997), although Watts' vitality is doubtful when considering it was soon
followed by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), both of which placed considerable limits on a
sentencing judge's use of facts other than those found by a jury through the
constitutionally-required reasonable-doubt standard. In fact, in a footnote, the
Booker majority observed that "Watts, in particular, presented a very narrow
question regarding the interaction of the [Federal Sentencing] Guidelines with
9
The Attorney General, in his amicus brief, relies on State v. Kelly, 406 N.J.
Super. 332, 347 (App. Div. 2009), in suggesting an acquittal is not an actual
finding but simply acknowledgement of the State's failure to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. We disagree. Our Supreme Court has recognized that the
presumption of innocence "is an instrument of proof created by the law in fav or
of one accused, whereby his innocence is established until sufficient evidence
is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created." Hill, 199 N.J.
at 559 (emphasis added and quoting Coffin, 156 U.S. at 459).
A-1320-17T4
28
the Double Jeopardy Clause, and did not even have the benefit of full briefing
or oral argument." Booker, 543 U.S. at 240 n.4. That footnote prompted
Michigan's highest court to observe that the five-member Booker majority had
given Watts "side-eye treatment" and "explicitly limited it to the double-
jeopardy context," People v. Beck, 939 N.W.2d 213, 224 (Mich. 2019), not
applicable here.
In Beck, 939 N.W.2d at 229-30, the Court concluded that a sentencing
judge's use of acquitted conduct constituted a due process violation, as have
other state courts. See Bishop v. State, 486 S.E.2d 887, 897 (Ga. 1997); McNew
v. State, 391 N.E.2d 607, 612 (Ind. 1979); Cote, 530 A.2d at 785; People v.
Black, 821 N.Y.S.2d 593, 596-97 (App. Div. 2006); State v. Marley, 364 S.E.2d
133, 139 (N.C. 1988). The practice has also been criticized by a circuit judge
now sitting on the Supreme Court. See Bell, 808 F.3d at 928 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (stating that "[a]llowing judges to rely on acquitted or uncharged
conduct to impose higher sentences than they otherwise would impose seems a
dubious infringement of the rights to due process and to a jury trial"). And other
circuit judges, albeit a minority, have joined the chorus in criticizing the
practice. See United States v. Brown, 892 F.3d 385, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(Millett, C.J., concurring) (asserting that "allowing courts at sentencing 'to
A-1320-17T4
29
materially increase the length of imprisonment' based on conduct for which the
jury acquitted the defendant guts the role of the jury in preserving individual
liberty and preventing oppression by the government"); United States v.
Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)
(recognizing "[s]uch a sentence has little relation to the actual conviction, and
is based on an accusation that failed to receive confirmation from the defendant's
equals and neighbors"); United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1349 (11th Cir.
2006) (Barkett, J., concurring) (stating a "strong[] belie[f] . . . that sentence
enhancements based on acquitted conduct are unconstitutional under the Sixth
Amendment, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment"). See
also James J. Bilsborrow, Note, Sentencing Acquitted Conduct to the Post-
Booker Dustbin, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 289, 333 (2007); Barry L. Johnson,
The Puzzling Persistence of Acquitted Conduct in Federal Sentencing, and What
Can Be Done About It, 49 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1, 26 (2016); Orhun Hakan
Yalincak, Critical Analysis of Acquitted Conduct Sentencing in the U.S.:
"Kafka-Esque," "Repugnant," "Uniquely Malevolent" and "Pernicious"?, 54
Santa Clara L. Rev. 675, 723 (2014); Mark T. Doerr, Note, Not Guilty? Go to
Jail. The Unconstitutionality of Acquitted-Conduct Sentencing, 41 Colum. Hum
Rts. L. Rev. 235, 252-56 (2009); Lucius T. Outlaw III, Giving an Acquittal Its
A-1320-17T4
30
Due: Why a Quartet of Sixth Amendment Cases Means the End of United States
v. Watts and Acquitted Conduct Sentencing, 5 U. Denv. Crim. L. Rev. 173, 187-
89 (2015). We share Judge Bright's sense of "wonder" at "what the man on the
street might say about this practice of allowing a prosecutor and the judge to say
that a jury verdict of 'not guilty' for practical purposes may not mean a thing."
United States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764, 778 (8th Cir. 2008) (concurring
opinion).
Even if we were willing to assume that Watts is not offensive to federal
constitutional principles, there is nothing in our jurisprudence that suggests the
New Jersey Constitution would fail to give an acquittal the rightful place at
sentencing it deserves. Our Supreme Court has recently spoken about this
subject. In State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 326-27 (2019), the Court considered
an appeal of a sentence where the judge had relied on a view of the evidence on
which the jury was deadlocked, and expressed concerns about a sentencing
judge's use of such information when the defendant faced the potential of being
tried again on the deadlocked counts. However one might view Tillery's impact
on an acquitted charge, the Court clearly held that courts should not consider
evidence offered on deadlocked charges at sentencing "unless and until the
defendant no longer faces the prospect of prosecution for those charges." Id. at
A-1320-17T4
31
327. Despite its references to Watts, the Court did not resolve the question
posed here about the significance of an acquittal at sentencing.
Instead, not long after Tillery, the Court granted certification to consider
the precise issue now before us. If, as the State has argued, Tillery was
dispositive, the Court would not have had to grant certification in another case
to resolve this very issue. See State v. Melvin, 240 N.J. 549 (Jan. 31, 2020),
granting certification in State v. Melvin, No. A-4632-17 (App. Div. July 8,
2019). The Court's order granting certification expressly decla res the Court's
intention to determine whether "the sentencing judge could consider defendant's
conduct even though the jury acquitted defendant of the underlying crimes."
Melvin, 240 N.J. at 549. Until the Court resolves the issue posed in Melvin, we
do not view Tillery as conclusive and we cannot agree, based on existing
principles, that a sentencing judge may adopt a view of the evidence in marked
contrast to a jury's acquittal.
Tillery, as mentioned, does not resolve the issue before us. If anything, it
supports our view because the Court ended the practice of sentencing judges
using their own view of evidence adduced at deadlocked proceedings. If judges
are foreclosed from considering evidence of charges on which the jury was
deadlocked – because it would unfairly expose the defendant to the potential of
A-1320-17T4
32
being punished twice for the same offense – why, once the deadlock is resolved
in a defendant's favor, would it be appropriate for a sentencing judge to disavow
the verdict by sentencing a defendant as if convicted of the acquitted charge?
To condone consideration of evidence that led to an acquittal eviscerates the
very spirit of the double jeopardy clause, let alone the accused's rights to the
presumption of innocence and a trial by jury. If the double jeopardy clause
prevents multiple punishments and protects against multiple prosecutions, it
must also preclude the relitigation of, and punishment for, a crime that a jury of
the defendant's peers and neighbors determined defendant did not commit.
Lastly, we conclude – and we do not understand the State to argue
otherwise – that the judge's belief that defendant ordered Baker's execution,
despite the jury verdict, enhanced the sentence imposed. That is, the judge
imposed a sixty-year prison sentence because of his view of the evidence; he did
not express his own personal view of the evidence for any other reason. In
speaking for the Court in Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740 (1948), Justice
Jackson wrote that a sentencing judge's consideration of acquitted conduct
"savors of foul play or of carelessness," and when uncertain about its influence
on a sentence, an appellate court is "not at liberty to assume that items given
such emphasis by the sentencing court did not influence the sentence." A review
A-1320-17T4
33
of the sentencing transcript suggests no doubt that the sentence was enhanced
because the judge believed defendant ordered Baker's execution; to the extent
there is doubt, enhancement based on inappropriate information must be
assumed. Id. at 740-41. And, so, we remand for resentencing not just because
the judge could not lawfully sentence defendant on first-degree kidnapping, but
also because the judge relied on a view of the evidence the jury refused to adopt.
In sentencing a defendant, the judge's "sense of moral outrage" cannot trump the
jury's verdict. See State v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530, 571 (App. Div. 2011).
We need not express a view on the other sentencing arguments presented
by defendant 10 because we deem such an analysis unnecessary in light of the
10
For example, the judge applied both aggravating factor six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a)(6), which allows a sentencing judge to consider "[t]he extent of the
defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which
[s]he has been convicted," and mitigating factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7),
which allows the court to consider that the defendant "has no history of prior
delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial
period of time before the commission of the present offense." Since the r ecord
reveals that defendant's criminal history includes only third-degree convictions,
in 1998 and 2000, for which she received probationary terms, and nothing else
until committing the offenses discussed here, it is understandable why
mitigating factor seven would have application; considering the same facts, it is
not clear how or why aggravating factor six would apply at the same time. In
any event, in light of our disposition of this appeal, we need not further examine
this issue or the application of the other aggravating factors that defendant
challenges in this appeal, including defendant's argument that by applying
aggravating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), which allows for consideration
A-1320-17T4
34
other circumstances discussed above, all of which require that defendant be
resentenced by a different judge. See State v. Kosch, 458 N.J. Super. 344, 355
(App. Div. 2019); Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. at 573; State v. Henderson, 397 N.J.
Super. 398, 416 (App. Div. 2008), aff'd and modified on other grounds, 208 N.J.
208 (2011).
***
To summarize, we affirm defendant's convictions, with the exception that
we hold the jury verdict must be understood as reaching the conclusion that
defendant committed second-degree kidnapping. We also conclude that the
judge erroneously enhanced the sentence based on his personal view that
defendant committed the offenses for which she was acquitted. We, therefore,
vacate the sentence, remand for resentencing by another judge, and entry of a
new judgment of conviction.
that defendant will commit another crime, that was apparently based on
defendant's refusal to confess or concede her guilt or because the judge believed
defendant perjured herself both at trial and in her allocution. See State v. Poteet,
61 N.J. 493, 495-98 (1972). Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence of defendant's gang membership on which the judge relied in finding
aggravating factor five, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(5), which allows the judge to
consider the substantial likelihood that the defendant is involved in organized
crime. On resentencing, we expect the next judge to reexamine all these issues
anew.
A-1320-17T4
35
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
A-1320-17T4
36