STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. BLAKE G. TANNEN (16-06-0718, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1447-19T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BLAKE G. TANNEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted May 28, 2020 – Decided June 29, 2020
Before Judges Koblitz, Whipple and Mawla.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County,
Indictment No. 16-06-0718.
Dario Albert Metz & Eyerman LLC, attorneys for
appellant (Shelley D. Albert, on the briefs).
Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent (Craig Allen Becker, Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
On leave to appeal granted, defendant Blake G. Tannen seeks a reversal
of the trial court's November 13, 2019 order denying his motions to vacate his
guilty plea and to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the State failed to
accept temporary custody of defendant for sentencing in New Jersey while he
was incarcerated in New York, in violation of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (IAD), N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1 to -15. We affirm.
I. Factual Background.
Defendant was charged in a June 17, 2016 indictment with second-degree
sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1). On July 18, 2016, defendant entered a
guilty plea to the indictment. Defense counsel recorded on the guilty plea form
that defendant was facing a suspended four-year prison sentence.1 His sentence
was also conditioned on parole supervision for life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4;
registration under Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23; and no contact with the
1
Prior to the allocution, the State told the judge that if defendant was determined
to be a repetitive and compulsive sex offender after an evaluation at the Adult
Diagnostic and Treatment Center (Avenel), he would have to go to prison. The
judge told defendant he would then have "to spend time at" Avenel. The judge
in his opinion and both the State and defense in their appellate briefs agree that
defendant's plea agreement called for a four-year suspended term. We note that
defendants found to be repetitive and compulsive offenders may be sentenced to
probation with a condition of out-patient treatment. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(b).
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victim under Nicole's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8. Defendant's sentencing in New
Jersey was originally scheduled to take place in October 2016.
Defendant failed to appear for the sex offender evaluation because he was
arrested in New York and charged on August 13, 2016 with committing sexual
assault crimes in New York. Defendant was convicted after a trial in New York
and sentenced on March 9, 2018 to a seven-year prison term and other
mandatory penalties. The Bergen County court issued a bench warrant as a
detainer.
Defendant initiated a request for transport to the Bergen County jail on
June 27, 2018, pursuant to the IAD. The same day, the New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision sent a letter to the
Bergen County Prosecutor asking the State to accept temporary custody of
defendant for final disposition of the New Jersey matter. On July 12, 2018, the
Warrants and Extraditions Unit of the Bergen County Sheriff's Office declined
to take custody of defendant because defendant had already entered a guilty plea
and was pending sentencing.
On June 27, 2019, defendant filed motions to vacate his guilty plea and to
dismiss the indictment. The judge denied defendant's motions based on State v.
Miller, 277 N.J. Super. 122, 127 (App. Div. 1994), where we determined that
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the IAD did not apply to a defendant facing sentencing after the entry of a guilty
plea. The court ordered defendant to be returned to Bergen County for
sentencing upon completion of his New York term. He has a conditional release
date of August 9, 2022.
Defendant presents a single issue on appeal:
I. THE STATE VIOLATED THE INTERSTATE
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS.
II. Legal Analysis.
"As a 'congressional sanctioned interstate compact,' the interpretation of
the IAD 'presents a question of federal law.'" State v. Pero, 370 N.J. Super. 203,
214 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442 (1981)).
"Questions related to statutory interpretations are legal ones" and therefore, we
review those conclusions de novo. State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017).
"The overriding goal of all statutory interpretation 'is to determine as best
we can the intent of the Legislature, and to give effect to that intent.'" Ibid.(quoting State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 604 (2014)). "[T]he best indicator of
that intent is the statutory language" to which we give its "ordinary meaning and
significance." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). "In order to
construe the meaning of the Legislature's selected words, we can also draw
inferences based on the statute's overall structure and composition." S.B., 230
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N.J. at 68. If the intent is clear on its face, "then the 'interpretative process is
over.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222, 232 (2010)).
"The [IAD] is a compact entered into by [forty-eight] States, the United
States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one
State's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State." New York v.
Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000); State v. Baker, 198 N.J. 189, 192 n.1 (2009).
The IAD "creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, i.e.,
a legal order that requires a State in which an individual is currently imprisoned
to hold that individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may
be tried by a different State for a different crime." Alabama v. Bozeman, 533
U.S. 146, 148 (2001). The IAD "provides for expeditious delivery of the
prisoner to the receiving State for trial prior to the termination of his sentence
in the sending State." Ibid.The purpose of the IAD, codified in New Jersey at N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1 to
-15, "is 'to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such
[outstanding] charges and determinations of the proper status of any and all
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints' and to
provide 'cooperative procedures' for making such determinations." State v.
Perry, 430 N.J. Super. 419, 424-25 (App. Div. 2013) (alteration in original)
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(quoting 18 U.S.C. app. 2, art. I; N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1). The IAD "shall be
liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes." N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-9.
"Article III of the [IAD] gives a prisoner incarcerated in one State the right
to demand the speedy disposition of 'any untried indictment, information or
complaint' that is the basis of a detainer lodged against him [or her] by another
State." Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 718-19 (1985). Article III(a) provides,
in pertinent part:
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a
party State, and whenever during the continuance of the
term of imprisonment there is pending in any other
party State any untried indictment, information or
complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been
lodged against the prisoner, he [or she] shall be brought
to trial within 180 days after he [or she] shall have
caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his [or her]
imprisonment and his [or her] request for a final
disposition to be made of the indictment, information
or complaint: provided that for good cause shown in
open court, the prisoner or his [or her] counsel being
present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may
grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3(a).]
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"Failure to abide by the [180-day] time limit set forth in Article III requires
dismissal of the indictment as set forth in Article V." Pero, 370 N.J. Super. at
207. Article V(c) states:
If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept
temporary custody of said person, or in the event that
an action on the indictment, information or complaint
on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is
not brought to trial within the period provided in Article
III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the
jurisdiction where the indictment, information or
complaint has been pending shall enter an order
dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer
based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-5(c).]
The 180-day period to bring the prisoner to trial "does not commence until
the prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges against him [or her] has
actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction
that lodged the detainer." Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52 (1993); see also
Pero, 370 N.J. Super. at 215.
Defendant argues that, while he was incarcerated in New York, the State
deprived him of his right under the IAD to be sentenced in New Jersey within
180 days of the prosecutor's receipt of his request. Defendant rejects the trial
court's reliance on Miller, arguing that the court overlooked a key fact that the
defendant in Miller waived his statutory rights under the IAD. He argues that,
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based on the intent and plain language of the statute, the IAD should apply to
sentencing.
In Carchman, the Supreme Court of the United States examined the
language of Article III of the IAD and determined:
Article III by its terms applies to detainers based on
"any untried indictment, information or complaint."
The most natural interpretation of the words
"indictment," "information," and "complaint" is that
they refer to documents charging an individual with
having committed a criminal offense. . . . This
interpretation is reinforced by the adjective "untried,"
which would seem to refer to matters that can be
brought to full trial, and by [Article] III's requirement
that a prisoner who requests final disposition of the
indictment, information, or complaint, "shall be
brought to trial within 180 days."
[Carchman, 473 U.S. at 724.]
The Court concluded that the "language of the [IAD] therefore makes clear that
the phrase 'untried indictment, information or complaint' in [Article] III refers
to criminal charges pending against a prisoner." Id. at 725.
Citing to the Supreme Court's findings in Carchman, in Miller we stated:
Since Carchman was decided, federal and state courts
appear to uniformly conclude that the IAD does not
apply to either Article III or Article IV cases following
disposition by plea or verdict. See, e.g., United States
v. Coffman, 905 F.2d 330, 332 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Currier, 836 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1987)
(Article IV(e) contention rejected because the IAD does
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not apply "to those who have been convicted but not yet
sentenced"); Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355,
1369 (Colo. 1993) (plurality opinion); State of
Minnesota v. Lewis, 422 N.W.2d 768, 771-72 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988) (term "trial" in the IAD does not include
sentencing); State of Washington v.
Barefield, 756 P.2d 731, 733-34 (Wash. 1988) (the
IAD does not apply to sentencing detainers).
[Miller, 277 N.J. Super. at 127.]
The trial court's reliance on Miller is not misplaced. Although Miller
involved a defendant who gave up his IAD rights by seeking return to New York
before sentencing, we made clear that the primary reason the defendant was no t
entitled to the safeguards of the IAD was because we agreed with the reasoning
of federal and state courts.
Following his guilty plea, defendant voluntarily left New Jersey and
committed sexual crimes in New York for which he was arrested, convicted and
sentenced. Defendant, who was incarcerated in New York, was awaiting
sentencing in New Jersey at the time of his IAD request.
Defendant argues that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been
violated and notes that sentencing is among the stages of a prosecution deemed
"critical" for Sixth Amendment purposes. Defendant brings to our attention
United States v. Coleman, No. 13-356, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151949 (E.D. Pa.
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Nov. 5, 2015), a 2015 decision that relies on this speedy trial reasoning.2 We
are unconvinced by that court's reasoning. In 2016, the Supreme Court held in
Betterman v. Montana that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to a speedy trial
"does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded
guilty to criminal charges." 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2016). The
right "does not extend beyond conviction, which terminates the presumption of
innocence." Id. at 1618. While the speedy trial right does not apply, the Court
stated that "[a]fter conviction, a defendant's due process right to liberty, while
diminished, is still present. He retains an interest in a sentencing proceeding
that is fundamentally fair." Id. at 1617.
Bergen County is geographically close to New York State, where
defendant is incarcerated. Defendant sought to be brought to his New Jersey
sentencing. He may be suffering practical consequences in New York from a
New Jersey sentencing detainer lodged against him. Because defendant has a
fundamental fairness right to a timely sentencing, we urge the State to bring him
to New Jersey expeditiously.
2
We do not interpret Rule 1:36-3 as precluding our citation to unpublished
opinions of the federal courts. Daniels v. Hollister Co., 440 N.J. Super. 359,
367 n.7 (App. Div. 2015).
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As the trial court properly found, the right to final disposition within 180
days under the IAD does not apply to defendant's post-plea sentencing, and thus,
the State did not violate defendant's statutory rights by not accepting temporary
custody while he was incarcerated in New York.
Affirmed.
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