D.A.M. v. M.J.M.

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3390-18T4
D.A.M.
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
M.J.M.
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Argued January 23, 2020 – Decided August 6, 2020
Before Judges Nugent, Suter and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County,
Docket No. FM-18-0644-14.
Mark W. Rufolo argued the cause for appellant (Stern
Kilcullen & Rufolo, LLC, and Donahue Hagan Klein &
Weisberg, LLC, attorneys for appellant; Mark W.
Rufolo and Stephanie Frangos Hagan, of counsel and
on the briefs; Kaitlyn A. Lapi, on the briefs).
Brian G. Paul argued the cause for respondent
(Szaferman Lakind Blumstein & Blader, PC, attorneys;
Brian G. Paul, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant M.J.M. appeals from a judgment of divorce,
amended final judgment of divorce, and certain paragraphs of an order entered
the same day as the amended final judgment of divorce. The question presented
by this appeal is whether the parties were lawfully married. Their Jewish
marriage certificate, the Ketubah, was duly signed by the friends who witnessed
the ceremony and the Rabbi who performed it. The Certificate of Marriage was
signed by two witnesses, by the Rabbi who performed the ceremony, and by
local registrar, and is a filed public record in the New Jersey State Department
of Health. For more than twenty years, defendant and plaintiff D.A.M
held themselves out to their friends and society as a married
couple. They have filed tax returns as a married couple filing jointly, and they
have owned property as tenants by the entireties.
In 2014, however, when plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce, defendant
moved to dismiss it on the ground they had never been legally married. He
contended, among other claims, the Rabbi who presided over the religious
ceremony provided false information on the parties' Certificate of Marriage, the
parties did not have a marriage license for the religious ceremony, and the
marriage was absolutely void from its inception. Following a hearing, the trial
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court rejected defendant's claims and entered a judgment of divorce, which the
court amended. We affirm.
The trial court conducted a hearing to determine the validity of the
marriage. The chronology of material events is undisputed. The parties had
neither applied for nor obtained a marriage license when Rabbi Arnold Gluck
performed a religious wedding ceremony on December 5, 1993. Plaintiff,
defendant, two witnesses, and the Rabbi signed a Ketubah, which Rabbi Gluck
explained was a Jewish marriage certificate, "one of the three ways according to
Jewish law that a couple becomes married." Rabbi Gluck admitted that by
performing a ceremony without executing a civil license, he was "coloring
outside the lines." He explained to the parties that it was inappropriate in the
context of the "civil aspect" to complete the ceremony without a marriage
license, and he instructed them to obtain one.
On December 10, 1993, five days after the ceremony, the parties met with
the Bedminster Township clerk to obtain the marriage license. They designated
the "Intended Date of Marriage" as December 5, 1993. Noting the
inconsistency, the clerk told them there was a problem with the application, it
was improper to have a ceremony without a marriage license, and that a second
ceremony would be necessary.
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Inexplicably, the clerk nonetheless issued the marriage license with the
December 5, 1993 wedding date. She issued the license on December 21, 1993.
It expired January 21, 1994.
Three months after issuing the license and two months after it expired, the
clerk contacted the parties on March 21, 1994, regarding the status of the license
because it had not been recorded. Acting on defendant's instructions, the clerk
sent the license to Rabbi Gluck.
Within the next few days, defendant met with Rabbi Gluck and the
witnesses who had signed the Ketubah. They signed the marriage
certificate. Rabbi Gluck misstated as December 12, 1993, the date the religious
ceremony had taken place—thus representing the ceremony had occurred one
week after its actual date and nine days before the clerk issued the marriage
license on December 21, 1993.
The Rabbi wrote to the municipal clerk on March 28, 1994, asked what
had become of the marriage license, and noted perhaps she expected
that someone would pick it up. He also wrote: "Most importantly, I hope that
there will not be any difficulty in processing the license at this time. The
wedding took place on Dec. 12 in Hillsborough, NJ at Temple Beth-El. I
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officiated in accordance with Jewish tradition, and all is proper and in order in
this regard."
On April 5, 1994, the municipal clerk forwarded the completed Certificate
of Marriage and marriage license to the local registrar of vital statistics. The
local registrar received, signed and recorded the completed Certificate of
Marriage and marriage license on April 8, 1994. The certificate has been on file
since then. It states the parties were ceremoniously married before the license
was issued.
Although the parties do not dispute either the chronology of events or the
documentary evidence produced during the hearing, they dispute the
significance they attached to the documents. Based on portions of plaintiff's
deposition admitted into evidence at the hearing, plaintiff claimed she believed
the parties were legally married after receiving the Certificate of Marriage from
the State in April 1994. Plaintiff stated: "I had a ceremony, I received legal
documentation from the State of New Jersey. To me there was no need to repeat
what the [S]tate already recognized, that I was legally married."
According to defendant's testimony at the hearing, plaintiff knew there
was a problem with the marriage. He testified that when they went to the
municipal clerk's office to obtain a marriage license, the clerk specifically told
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them they would need to repeat the ceremony. Defendant insisted the
Bedminster Township clerk expressly told plaintiff she must have another
ceremony. Defendant also claimed that periodically he suggested to plaintiff
they renew their vows or take other measures that he thought would resolve any
question about the legality of their marriage. Plaintiff would not hear of it.
Unlike plaintiff, defendant was aware at the outset there was a problem
with the marriage. He testified he was concerned through 1997 or 1998, when
he "forgot about the issue with the paperwork."
As previously noted, during the marriage the parties filed joint tax returns.
They held themselves out as husband and wife, joined a country club as husband
and wife, filled out as husband and wife private school applications for their
children, and obtained automobile insurance in their joint names as spouses.
Defendant designated plaintiff as his spouse on his health insurance policy.
Defendant also acknowledged the parties purchased real estate as joint tenants
by the entirety.
The trial court resolved the credibility issues in plaintiff's favor. The court
found plaintiff believed the parties' marriage was valid from its inception.
Conversely, the court rejected defendant's argument that four or five years after
the marriage he forgot about the issue with the paperwork. The trial court found
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the parties' marriage was legally valid, determining, among other conclusions,
the equitable doctrines of quasi-estoppel and laches precluded defendant from
challenging its validity.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
ERROR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THE PARTIES
WERE LAWFULLY MARRIED AND ISSUED A
JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE, IN VIOLATION OF THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF N.J.S.A. 37:1-2 AND
N.J.S.A. 37:1-10, WHICH RENDER UNLAWFUL
AND ABSOLUTELY VOID AB INITIO ANY
PURPORTED MARRIAGE CONDUCTED
WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING A MARRIAGE
LICENSE.
1. The Purported Marriage Was
Unlawful Because The Parties Failed
To First Obtain A Marriage License
And Present It To The Officiant, In
Violation Of N.J.S.A. 37:1-2.
2. The Purported Marriage Was
Absolutely Void Because The
Parties Failed To Comply With The
Two-Step Process Of First Obtaining
A Marriage License And Then
Participating In A Solemnization
Ceremony Performed By An
Authorized Person, In Violation Of
N.J.S.A. 37:1-10.
3. The Trial Court Erroneously Found
That The Parties Purported Marriage
Was Not Valid Based Upon The
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Incorrect Determination That
Although The State Requires Both A
License And A Solemnization, It
Does Not State That Taking Them In
The Wrong Order Renders The
Marriage Absolutely Void.
POINT II: THE DOCTRINES OF QUASI-ESTOPPEL
AND RATIFICATION ARE INAPPLICABLE AS
ANY PURPORTED MARRIAGE WAS VOID AB
INITIO.
We affirm, substantially for the reasons expressed by the trial court in its
oral and written opinions. We add the following comments.
N.J.S.A. 37:1-10, effective July 18, 1939, states in pertinent part:
[N]o marriage contracted on and after December first,
nineteen hundred and thirty-nine, shall be valid unless
the contracting parties shall have obtained a marriage
license as required by section 37:1-2 of this Title, and
unless, also, the marriage, after license duly issued
therefor, shall have been performed by or before any
person, religious society, institution or organization
authorized by section 37:1-13 of this Title to solemnize
marriages; and failure in any case to comply with both
prerequisites aforesaid, which shall always be
construed as mandatory and not merely directory, shall
render the purported marriage absolutely void.
We have previously noted the statute's purpose:
As appears from the statement attached to the bill
(Assembly No. 10) which was enacted as chapter 227
of the Laws of 1939, "the purposes of this bill [were]
two-fold." First, it would insure that there would be no
evasion of the then recently enacted statute (L. 1938, c.
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126; N.J.S.A. 37:1-20, et seq.) requiring blood tests of
persons intending to marry and the filing with the
application for a marriage license of a certificate
showing that the applicants are not infected with
syphilis. Second, it would eliminate "the many abuses
arising from common law marriages and the countless
claims of marital relations under this loose form of
matrimony" and make "possible the maintenance of
proper records, desirable from the State's standpoint as
well as from either spouse's."
[In re Estate of Silverman, 94 N.J. Super. 189, 193-94
(App. Div. 1967).]
Here, these objectives were achieved. First, defendant acknowledged
during his testimony he and plaintiff both got blood tests because the marriage
license would not have issued without the blood tests. He added: "I was happy
to learn I didn't have [s]yphilis which is the reason for the blood test." Next,
their obtaining a marriage license avoided for the entire duration of their
marriage "the many abuses arising from common law marriages and the
countless claims of marital relations under this loose form of matrimony[.]"
Estate of Silverman, 94 N.J. Super. at 194. Last, the filed marriage certificate
made "possible the maintenance of proper records, desirable from the State's
standpoint as well as from either spouse's." Ibid. We also note the statute's two
mandates—the obtaining of a marriage license and a ceremony performed by an
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authorized official—were satisfied, albeit not in the order required by the
statute.
The doctrine of "[q]uasi-estoppel" dictates "an individual is not permitted
to 'blow both hot and cold,' taking a position inconsistent with prior conduct, if
this would injure another, regardless of whether that person has actually relied
thereon." Heuer v. Heuer, 152 N.J. 226, 237 (1998) (quoting Kazin v. Kazin, 81
N.J. 85, 94 (1979)). The doctrine is "designed to prevent a party's disavowal of
previous conduct if such repudiation would not be responsive to the demands of
justice and good conscience." Ibid. (quoting Carlsen v. Masters, Mates, & Pilots
Pension Plan Tr., 80 N.J. 334, 339 (1979)).
Here, permitting defendant to disavow his twenty-year marriage would
hardly be responsive to the demands of justice. Rather, permitting the result
defendant seeks would undermine one of the two purposes of the marriage
statute and would be tantamount to countenancing two decades of fraud
perpetrated on plaintiff, the federal government, the state government, and
others. We conclude the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of quasi-
estoppel to avert such injustices.
We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to
be without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
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Affirmed.
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