CARON ROMANS VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3011-17T2
CARON ROMANS,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
___________________________
Submitted November 12, 2019 – Decided March 3, 2020
Before Judges Vernoia and Susswein.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Caron Romans, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Suzanne Marie Davies, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Caron Romans, is a state prison inmate serving a fifteen-year
sentence for armed burglary, terroristic threats, and theft. He appeals from a
final agency decision by the Department of Corrections (DOC) denying his
request to be transferred to a residential community-release program (RCRP),
colloquially known as a halfway house. His application was initially approved
by both the Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) and the prison
administrator of the institution at which he was housed. The Office of
Community Programs and Outreach Services (OCPOS) intervened, however,
and denied the transfer based on Romans's classification file and the nature and
details of his offense.
The gravamen of Romans's appeal is that OCPOS has no authority to
overrule the ICC. Romans contends that pursuant to regulations duly
promulgated by the Commissioner, the ICC has exclusive authority to determine
whether inmates will be admitted to an RCRP. Although Romans's
interpretation of the applicable regulations is correct, we are constrained to
reject his argument in view of a rule exemption from N.J.A.C. 10A:20-4.5
granted by the Commissioner. That exemption changed the approval procedures
and gave OCPOS authority to deny Romans's application to the RCRP.
A-3011-17T2
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The decision where to place an inmate is left to the discretion of the DOC
Commissioner or his designee. The Commissioner has broad discretion not only
in deciding whether to place an inmate in a community-based program but also
in choosing a designee to make that decision in the Commissioner's stead. In
this instance, by granting an exemption from the approval process otherwise
specified in the regulation, the Commissioner lawfully exercised his authority
to add another layer of review and delegate to OCPOS the responsibility to
ensure that only appropriate candidates are admitted to an RCRP. We therefore
reject Romans's contention that DOC acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and
unreasonably in denying his admission into the program.
I.
As we have already noted, Romans's application was initially approved by
the ICC and prison administrator, but ultimately the OCPOS denied it. Romans
appealed from that final agency decision. DOC requested the case be remanded
so that it could reconsider the denial of Romans's application. We granted
DOC's motion, remanded the case, and retained jurisdiction.
DOC apparently recognized that the procedure it had followed in this case
did not comport with the review and approval/denial process set forth in its
regulations. The DOC Commissioner thereupon issued the rule exemption,
A-3011-17T2
3
creating another layer of review and delegating to OCPOS the authority to
approve or deny applications for transfer to a halfway house. DOC asserts the
rule exemption was necessary to ensure that inmates placed in community-based
residential programs do not pose an undue risk to public safety. DOC now relies
on that rule exemption to justify post hoc 1 the final agency decision that had
already been made to deny Romans's application. Having retained jurisdiction,
the case now returns to us for decision.
II.
Romans, appearing pro se, presents the following contention for our
consideration:
THE RESPONDENT[']S ACTIONS (DENIAL OF
PETITIONER[']S HALFWAY HOUSE
APPLICATION) WERE OUTSIDE OF THEIR ROLE
AS DEFINED IN [N.J.A.C.]10A:20-4.12, AS THEY
ARE REQUIRED TO FORWARD I.C.C.
1
We note that the retroactive application of the rule exemption in no way
implicates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The alteration of the
administrative review process in this case did not "impose[] additional
punishment to an already completed crime." Riley v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 219
N.J. 270, 285 (2014) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370 (1997)). A
change in custody status generally does not implicate the Due Process Clause,
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (limiting due process liberty
interests to freedom from a restraint imposing an atypical, significant hardship
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life), and absent punitive intent,
"the Ex Post Facto Clause does not bar a prison from changing the regulations
governing their internal classification of prisoners," Dyke v. Meachum, 785
F.2d 267, 268 (10th Cir. 1986).
A-3011-17T2
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APPROVALS AND PREPARE TRANSFERS TO THE
ASSESSMENT CENTERS UNLESS AN APPLICANT
WAS CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE
ENUMERATED IN N.J.S.A. 30:4-91.8, OF WHICH
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT. OTHERWISE THE
I.C.C. APPROVES/DISAPPROVES APPLICANTS
AND THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY PROGRAMS
FORWARDS APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS TO
ASSESSMENT CENTERS.
III.
We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles we must
apply, including the deference we owe to administrative agencies in general and
to the DOC Commissioner in particular. "The judicial capacity to review
administrative agency decisions is limited." Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J.
197, 210 (1997). As a general matter, we will "intervene only in those rare
circumstances in which an agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory
mission or with other State policy." George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk.
Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994). We may disturb a final agency action only if it is
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Brady, 152 N.J. at 210
We defer to administrative agencies in recognition of their "expertise and
superior knowledge of a particular field." Greenwood v. State Police Training
Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992) (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, 109 N.J. 575,
587 (1988)). Such deference certainly applies to decisions made by the DOC
A-3011-17T2
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Commissioner given "[t]he breadth and importance of the Commission er's
expertise and discretionary authority in matters of prison policy, regulation and
administration." Ortiz v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 406 N.J. Super. 63, 70 (App. Div.
2009).
Furthermore, an inmate does not have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in his or her custody status or housing assignment. Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 224–225 (1976); see also White v. Fauver, 219 N.J. Super. 170,
180 (App. Div. 1987) (noting an inmate has no constitutionally protected interest
in reduced-custody status). We have long recognized, in this regard, that
because inmates are sentenced to state prison, not to any particular institution or
program, they may be transferred by administrative action. Rocca v. Groomes,
144 N.J. Super. 213, 215 (App. Div. 1976). Indeed, the Commissioner "has
complete discretion in determining an inmate's place of confinement, N.J.S.A.
30:4-91.2." Smith v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 346 N.J. Super. 24, 29 (App. Div.
2001).
The Commissioner may circumscribe that discretion, however, by
adopting regulations. See id. at 33 (noting that discretion in determining
whether to grant reduced-custody status is guided by N.J.A.C. 10A:9-3.3(a)).
As a general matter, "an administrative agency ordinarily must enforce and
A-3011-17T2
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adhere to, and may not disregard, the regulations it has promulgated." Cnty. of
Hudson v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 152 N.J. 60, 70 (1997) (citing In re Waterfront
Dev. Permit, 244 N.J. Super. 426, 434 (App. Div. 1990)). However, an agency
may expressly reserve unto itself the power to waive a regulation. In re CAFRA
Permit No. 87-0959-5, 152 N.J. 287, 308 (1997) ("[A]n agency that seeks the
power to waive its substantive regulations should adopt a regulation pertaining
to any such waiver . . . .").
IV.
We turn next to the specific regulations governing the administration of
an RCRP. N.J.A.C. 10A:20-4.5(b)(1) provides that eligibility and suitability for
assignment to an RCRP "is determined by the Commissioner or designee."
Although decision-making authority thus rests ultimately with the
Commissioner, the question presented to us in this appeal is to whom the
Commissioner delegated this authority within the agency's organizational
structure.
In its present form, N.J.A.C. 10A:20-4.10(a) vests the ICC with the
authority to approve or deny an inmate's assignment to a residential program. 2
2
DOC does not dispute that the administrative code, as currently written, does
not grant OCPOS the authority to render final agency decisions regarding
A-3011-17T2
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This delegation is consistent with the general procedures relating to the
classification of inmates. See Shabazz v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 385 N.J. Super.
117, 122 n.1 (App. Div. 2006) ("Decisions as to custody status . . . are made by
the Institutional Classification Committee." (citing N.J.A.C. 10A:9-3.3(a))); see
also Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J. 239, 245 (1987) (noting a prior Departmental
standard vested in the ICC "sole authority to reduce or increase an inmate's
custody status"); Smith, 346 N.J. Super. at 31 (noting that a Department brief
"explain[ed] that 'custody status' decisions are made by the Institutional
Classification Committee").
The text of the current regulations suggest that the role of the OCPOS is
to administer the process of transferring the inmate to an appropriate program,
rather than deciding whether to admit the inmate into a program. See N.J.A.C.
10A:20-4.12 (requiring the OCPOS to prepare transfer orders, maintain waiting
lists, and assign inmates to Assessment and Treatment Centers); see also
N.J.A.C. 10A:20-4.2(a) (imposing upon OCPOS the responsibility "for the
administration, monitoring, and oversight" of RCRPs).
community-release applications. DOC's brief informs us that the Department is
currently in the process of amending its regulations to grant such authority .
A-3011-17T2
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It bears noting, however, the current regulations also assign to OCPOS
the authority to "select the program assignment for . . . inmate[s] approved by
the [ICC] for participation in a residential community program." N.J.A.C.
10A:20-4.8(g). In other words, although the current regulations do not authorize
OCPOS to make final admission and denial decisions, that office clearly plays
an important role in the placement process.
The text of the current regulations must be read in conjunction with t he
rule exemption, which provides that OCPOS reviews any approved applications
from the ICC. This provides enhanced checks and balances ensuring both
consistency and public safety. The rule exemption clearly was intended to make
OCPOS the Commissioner's designee for purposes of determining whether an
inmate should be admitted into the halfway-house program. We discern no legal
impediment to the Commissioner exercising his discretion by delegating this
task to OCPOS, especially given its experience and expertise in overseeing
community-based release programs. In sum, we do not read the statute or
regulations as prohibiting OCPOS from acting as the Commissioner's designee
pursuant to a duly issued rule exemption.
In reaching this conclusion, and in deferring to the Commissioner's
prerogative in selecting a designee best suited to identify appropriate candidates
A-3011-17T2
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for placement in halfway houses, we are mindful of concerted efforts by the
Executive Branch to facilitate successful prison reentry as a means of enhancing
public safety 3 and promoting social justice. Halfway houses and other
community-based residential programs are an important part of the inmate
reentry and reintegration process, providing an intermediate step between
imprisonment and parole. The DOC Commissioner has a keen interest not only
in ensuring public safety, but also in enhancing public confidence in these vital
programs. Adding another layer of administrative review to the application and
approval process, therefore, seems an appropriate exercise of the
Commissioner's discretion, one that cannot be characterized as arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable. Brady, 152 N.J. at 210.
Any contentions raised by Romans that we have not addressed lack
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
We emphasize that our ruling presupposes that the decision to deny
Romans's placement in a halfway house is not final and immutable. See Smith,
346 N.J. Super. at 31–32 (basing, in part, an affirmance of a decision to deny an
inmate's application for reduced custody status upon the opportunity for
3
The regulations clearly provide that candidates for participation in resident ial
release programs shall "[n]ot demonstrate an undue risk to public safety."
N.J.A.C. 10A:20-4.4(a)(2).
A-3011-17T2
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continuous review of the inmate's custody status). DOC in its brief assures us
that it will continue to review Romans's custody status and housing assignment.
Based on that assurance, we affirm the agency decision to deny him admission
to the RCRP.
Affirmed.
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