VAMA F.Z. CO. VS. PACIFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS (L-2375-18, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1020-19T1
VAMA F.Z. CO.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PACIFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
(L.L.C.) and DILIP RAHULAN,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________
Argued December 2, 2020 – Decided January 20, 2021
Before Judges Geiger and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-2375-18.
Steven L. Caponi, (Rome Blank) of the Delaware Bar,
admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellant
(K&L Gates LLP, attorneys; Reymond E. Yammine, of
counsel and on the briefs; Steven L. Caponi, on the
brief).
David C. Dreifuss argued the cause for respondent
(Dreifuss, Bonacci & Parker, PC, attorneys; David C.
Dreifuss, of counsel and on the brief; Paul M.
McCormick, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Vama F.C. Co. (Vama) appeals from a September 24, 2019 order
granting summary judgment to defendants Pacific Control Systems, L.L.C.
(Pacific) and Dilip Rahulan declaring that a foreign money-judgment Vama
obtained against defendants in the Court of First Instance in Dubai, United Arab
Emirates (UAE) (the Dubai judgment), was not recognized in New Jersey and
shall not be filed as a judgment in New Jersey. We affirm.
We derive the following facts from the record. Vama is a UAE
corporation whose majority owner is Tejas Shah. Pacific is a UAE limited
liability company located in Dubai, and Rahulan was its Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer. Rahulan is an Australian citizen who lived in Dubai until
May 1, 2016, when he moved to New Jersey.
During 2016, Shah attempted to cash two checks drawn on Pacific's
checking account that were payable to Vama. Both checks, signed with
Rahulan's name, were issued to pay a debt Pacific owed to Vama. The checks
totaled 21,852,500 UAE dirham (AED), or $5,949,255 on the dates they were
issued.1 Neither check cleared due to insufficient funds in Pacific's account.
1
The UAE dirham is the currency of UAE.
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2
In August 2016, Vama's attorney issued a notice informing Pacific and
Rahulan that the checks had been returned for insufficient funds, and that Vama
would take legal action if the debt was not paid. The notice listed Pacific and
Rahulan's address as "Dubai, Bur Dubai, Sheikh Zayed Street, TP 101423,
Techno Park."
Rahulan alleged that he did not sign either check, was not aware the
checks had been issued, and did not know the reason for issuance. He believed
his signature had been forged by Srinivasan Narasimhan, Pacific's former Chief
Financial Officer (CFO).
The Dubai Proceedings
Having received no payment from Pacific or Rahulan, Vama commenced
a civil action against them in Dubai. On August 23, 2016, a Dubai court officer
served notice of the action on defendants by delivering it to a receptionist named
Adeel Gawanico at "Bur Dubai- Sheikh Zayed Road – Guidance Phone No.:
0506539145." The notices stated delivery to Pacific was made "in the area of
Technopark Co," and to Rahulan "in the area of Sheik Zayed Road." A month
later, on September 22, 2016, the Dubai Court of First Instance entered an order
for execution of provisional attachments on Pacific and Rahulan's bank
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3
accounts. According to Shah, the court served provisional attachments on
defendants' bank accounts a few days later.
Defendants did not file a responsive pleading or participate in the
proceedings. On January 17, 2017, the Dubai Court of First Instance issued a
judgment against them for 21,852,500 AED plus interest. Rahulan certified he
did not learn of the judgment until May 2017, when he asked his Dubai counsel
to investigate after Shah called him and mentioned the lawsuit.
Rahulan asserted that he never received notice of the lawsuit. He certified
he could not have received notice personally, as he had "left Dubai (U.A.E.) on
May 1, 2016 and was living in New Jersey throughout the pendency of the civil
proceedings and the entry of [a] criminal judgment against [him]." Moreover,
Pacific's correct address "was and is: Pacific Control Systems (L.L.C.), Post
Box 37316, Techno Park, Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai, [UAE]. Techno Park is a
large complex with numerous businesses which is miles away from Bur Dubai.
Therefore, it is clear that the [process] server went to the wrong address." He
averred that no one named Adeel Gawanico had ever worked for Pacific, and
Pacific's actual receptionist was not authorized to accept important documents.
In addition, Rahulan certified that he never received notification from the banks
about the provisional attachments served on his and Pacific's accounts.
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On June 19, 2017, defendants filed an appeal challenging the Dubai
judgment. The Dubai Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment without
considering the merits of the case, finding that the appeal was untimely because
appeals in Dubai must be filed within thirty days of the issuance of the judgment
being challenged. In its opinion, the court noted that Pacific received notice of
the judgment through service on its accountant Sobish Sondran on February 20,
2017, and Rahulan had been notified by publication on March 28, 2017.
Rahulan certified that Pacific did not employ an individual named Sobish
Sondran, and he was not aware of any such published notice.
The New Jersey Proceedings
In November 2018, Vama applied to the Clerk of the Superior Court to
record the Dubai judgment in New Jersey. The Clerk refused to docket the
judgment because Vama had not submitted an exemplified copy.
In response, on December 5, 2018, defendants filed this declaratory
judgment action against Vama, seeking: (1) nonrecognition of the Dubai
judgment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.6(c), on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, lack of notice, lack of due process, and violation of public policy;
and (2) injunctive relief to preclude enforcement and execution of the Dubai
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judgment.2 Defendants also applied for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against plaintiff. The trial court denied the application
for injunctive relief without prejudice, finding defendants had failed to
demonstrate they would suffer irreparable harm.
Vama filed an answer and counterclaim seeking recognition of the Dubai
judgment pursuant to the Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act
of 2015 (the Recognition Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.1 to -16.11. Vama alleged
that the balance due on the Dubai judgment was $5,949,998.70 plus interest at
nine percent per annum and attorney's fees. Defendants filed an answer to
Vama's counterclaim. 3
In February 2019, the Dubai Court of First Instance issued a decision in a
separate action brought by two directors of Pacific, dismissing Rahulan from his
2
The complaint initiating this action was filed by Pacific and Rahulan against
Vama. The caption was subsequently amended to designate Vama as plaintiff
and Pacific and Rahulan as defendants. See n.3, infra. In this opinion we will
likewise refer to the parties in that fashion.
3
Included with the answer to Vama's counterclaim, Rahulan filed a third-party
complaint against Shah, alleging various torts committed in the course of
responding to Rahulan's refusal to pay the judgment. The third-party action was
severed from this case. The same order also amended the caption, naming Vama
as plaintiff and Pacific and Rahulan as defendants.
A-1020-19T1
6
management role in the company. In July 2019, the Dubai Court of Appeal
affirmed. Rahulan participated in both proceedings through his UAE counsel.
Defendants moved for summary judgment for nonrecognition of the Dubai
judgment. Rahulan asserted that he left Dubai in May 2016 to travel to the
United States and has remained here ever since. He claimed he never received
proper notice of the proceedings in Dubai and first learned of the judgment from
Shah during a threatening phone call in May 2017. Defendants filed an appeal
of the Dubai judgment on June 11, 2017, only to have the Dubai Court of Appeal
rule the appeal was time-barred.
Rahulan further claimed that plaintiff was aware of his address in New
Jersey, telephone number, and email address at the time the action was
commenced in Dubai. Both Rahulan and Pacific claimed that Gwanico never
worked for them. Vama did not produce evidence of Gwanico's employment.
Defendants argued that in addition to lacking in personam jurisdiction, the
Dubai courts lacked the judicial independence that American courts require to
enforce a foreign money-judgment. They point to a 2017 United States
Department of State report on the UAE, that states that Dubai "court decisions
remained subject to review by the political leadership. Authorities often treated
noncitizens differently from citizens. The judiciary consisted largely of
A-1020-19T1
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contracted foreign nationals subject to deportation, further compromising its
independence from the government . . . ."
In his supporting affidavit, Rahulan stated that he "did not endorse" the
first check made payable to Vama, was not "aware of its issuance at the time,"
and was not "aware of why this check was issued." He made identical statements
regarding the second check. Rahulan asserted that he ultimately learned both
checks were signed by Narasimhan, Pacific's former CFO, without his
knowledge or consent.
Vama opposed the motion, arguing that, in accordance with legal
procedure in Dubai, the Dubai court served legal notice on defendants at their
business office and by publication in a local newspaper in Dubai. Vama claimed
that personal service on Pacific's receptionist was valid.
Judge Stephan C. Hansbury found there were no material facts in dispute
and issued a September 24, 2019 order and written statement of reasons granting
summary judgment to defendants. The judge identified the controlling issue as
"whether the UAE judiciary system afforded [d]efendants sufficient due process
as to legitimize the Dubai [j]udgment consistent with this State's standards."
Because the Dubai judgment was entered by default, the judge shifted the burden
of proof to Vama pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(d).
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The judge concluded that American due process standards applied when
examining a foreign country's legal procedures. As to Rahulan, the judge
determined that service upon the receptionist did not comport with "American
due process standards" or "meet our sense of due process," citing Rule 4:4-4.
The judge noted that the address served was incorrect, and Pacific did not
employ an Adeel Gawanico, the purported receptionist. More fundamentally,
Rahulan was not living in Dubai at the time service was attempted. Moreover,
Vama was aware of Rahulan's email address and telephone number.
The judge determined that service upon Pacific also violated due process ,
explaining that Rule 4:4-4(a)(6):
requires service of a corporation on an officer, director,
trustee or managing or general agent, someone
designated by law or someone authorized to accept
service or in charge of that office. The reason is clear.
It must be someone with a fiduciary-like duty to the
corporation. In our system of due process, service
cannot be accomplished by dropping off papers at the
reception door.
While the method of service of process used by Vama may be permitted in UAE,
the judge found it "is repugnant to the public policy of this State or of the United
States," quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(c)(3).
Lastly, the judge rejected Vama's assertion that Rahulan's counsel could
not also represent Pacific, finding the summary judgment motion was properly
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9
brought, because "Rahulan remains President at this time." The judge did not
reach the other issues raised by Vama. This appeal followed.
The Delaware Proceedings
In October 2018, Vama filed a parallel application in the Superior Court
of Delaware seeking recognition of the Dubai judgment in that state. Defendants
opposed the application. Following discovery and an evidentiary hearing at
which Rahulan testified but Vama presented no witnesses, defendants moved for
dismissal. (Pa908). Commissioner Katharine L. Mayer issued a written opinion
granting defendants' motion to dismiss. 4
Commissioner Mayer found that Rahulan has resided in the United States
since May 1, 2016. During May 2016 and January 2017, Rahulan and Shah
emailed each other regarding Pacific's debts. A few days later, the Dubai
judgment was entered. "Rahulan testified that the signatures on the checks were
not his and he believe[d] that his signature was fraudulently copied." He stated
that he learned of the Dubai court proceedings in the Spring of 2017, months
after the entry of judgment.
4
Under the Delaware law, a Commissioner issues a recommendation on
dispositive pretrial motions, which is not considered a decision of the court. See
Del. Code Ann, tit. 10, § 512(b)(1)(a) and (b); Franklin v. State, 855 A.2d 274,
276-77 (Del. 2004).
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Based on the translated Dubai judgment, which set forth the evidence
considered by the Dubai court, Commissioner Mayer found:
[T]here is no record of an "Adeel Gawanico" having
ever been an employee of [Pacific]. In addition, "Bur
Dubai" is not the address for [Pacific] and is located
approximately 20 kilometers away from the
headquarters. Later, after the appellate court issued an
opinion on the [j]udgment, it was served upon someone
by the name of "Sobish Sondran." Again, there is no
record of an employee by that name. Finally,
[d]efendants were given notice of the [j]udgment by
publication. The notice is dated March 28, 2017, and
indicates that [Pacific] and "[Rahulan] Dilip, whose
address is unknown[,]" were notified of a judgment
obtained by Vama. The notice does not state where it
was publicized and for how long. Rahulan testified that
he has not been personally served by any authorities,
including anyone acting on behalf of the [UAE].
[(footnotes omitted).]
The Superior Court of Delaware dismissed Vama's recognition
application, applying preclusive effect to the trial court's decision in this case
under the doctrine of res judicata. Vama F.Z. Co. v. Pac. Control Sys., No.
N18J-07985 DCS (De. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2019). The Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed. Vama F.Z. Co. v. Pac. Control Sys. (L.L.C.), No. 487 (Del. Aug. 26,
2020).
Vama raises the following points for our consideration:
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POINT I
THE UAE JUDICIARY AFFORDED THE
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS SUFFICIENT DUE
PROCESS AS TO LEGITIMIZE THE DUBAI
JUDGMENT CONSISTENT WITH THE UNIFORM
FOREIGN COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT (N.J.S.A. 2A: 49A-16.6, et seq).
A. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that Defendants-
Respondents Were not Properly Notified of the Dubai
Proceeding and Were not Afforded the Opportunity to
Defend Themselves.
POINT II
VAMA SUFFICIENTLY MET THE BURDEN FOR
RECOGNITION AS REQUIRED BY THE
RECOGNITION ACT. (N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.6, et
seq.).
A. The Court Erred By Allowing Mr. Rahulan, Who
Had Been Removed from [Pacific's] Management by
the Courts of Dubai, to Represent [Pacific] and Oppose
[Vama's] Application.
"A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that
flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference."
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)
(citations omitted). In contrast, we afford deference to a trial court's factual
findings that are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record,
A-1020-19T1
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considering the proofs as a whole. Alderiso v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean Cnty., Inc.,
167 N.J. 191, 198 (2001).
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard
under Rule 4:46-2(c) that governs the trial court. Steinberg v. Sahara Sam's
Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344, 349-50 (2016). We consider the factual record, and
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts, "in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party" to decide whether the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. IE Test, LLC v. Carroll, 226 N.J. 166,
184 (2016) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540
(1995)). That said, the non-moving party cannot successfully oppose a summary
judgment motion by merely raising an insubstantial fact in dispute or by relying
on evidence that is not competent. Accordingly, "once the moving party
presents sufficient evidence in support of the motion, the opposing party must
'demonstrate by competent evidential material that a genuine issue of fact
exists[.]'" Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479-80 (2016) (alteration
in original) (quoting Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229, 241 (1957)).
The Recognition Act authorizes New Jersey courts to recognize "final,
conclusive, and enforceable" foreign-country judgments that "grant[] or den[y]
recovery of a sum of money," unless an exception enumerated in N.J.S.A.
A-1020-19T1
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2A:49A-16.4(b) or (c) applies. N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(a). Where an exception
applies, "[a] party against whom a foreign-country judgment is entered may file
an action for a declaration that the foreign-country judgment shall not be subject
to recognition." N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.6(c).
N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(b) prohibits recognition of a foreign-country
judgment under three circumstances:
(1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system
that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process of law,
as determined by the court using standards developed
by the American Law Institute and the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law to govern
resolution of transnational disputes;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
In turn, under N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(c), the court:
may determine, in its discretion, not to recognize a
foreign-country judgment if:
(1) the defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court
did not receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient
time to enable the defendant to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud that deprived
the losing party of an adequate opportunity to present
its case;
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(3) the judgment or the cause of action on which the
judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of
this State or of the United States;
....
(7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that
raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the
rendering court with respect to the judgment; or
(8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading
to the judgment was not compatible with the
requirements of due process of law, as determined by
the court using standards developed by the American
Law Institute and the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law to govern resolution of
transnational disputes.
The burden of proof for nonrecognition rests with the party resisting
recognition except when the foreign-country judgment is entered by default.
N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(d). Where the judgment is entered by default, the party
seeking recognition must prove the following:
(1) the rendering court had jurisdiction over the
defendant in accordance with the law of the country of
origin of judgment;
(2) the defendant was served with initiating process in
accordance with the law of the country of origin; and
(3) the rendering court had jurisdiction over the
defendant on a basis provided pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
2A:49A-16.5].
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[N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(d).]
Vama argues that there were two material facts in dispute precluding
summary judgment: (1) whether service of process upon defendants was made
at the correct address; and (2) whether Gawanico was an employee of Pacifico,
who was authorized to accept service on behalf of defendants. For the reasons
that follow, we disagree.
Defendants did not file a responsive pleading or otherwise participate in
the Dubai proceedings. The judge correctly determined that the Dubai judgment
was entered by default and properly shifted the burden of proof to Vama
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(d).
The judge also found that Vama did not meet its burden of proof by
demonstrating that Pacific and Rahulan were served with process in compliance
with Dubai law or this State's due process requirements. We concur. The fact
that service was attempted by a court officer is not controlling.
Service of Pacific was made upon an individual, who, according to
Rahulan, was not even employed by Pacific. Vama provided no competent
evidence that the corporation was served at the correct address or that Gawanico
was a Pacific employee, much less an individual authorized to accept process on
its behalf. Indeed, the proof of service listed an incorrect service address.
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Rahulan has lived in the United States since May 1, 2016. Therefore,
service months later by publication in Dubai did not provide Rahulan with
adequate notice and opportunity to defend the Dubai proceedings. Serving a
purported Pacific receptionist, who was not authorized to accept service on
Rahulan's behalf, was similarly defective. Moreover, the notice sent by Vama's
counsel in August 2016 to Ruhalan's prior address in Dubai was likewise
inadequate. Thus, Rahulan was not afforded due process.
In addition, the attempted service of process on defendants did not provide
due process under New Jersey law. See Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244, 250 (3d Cir.
1995) (affirming the district court's decision declining to recognize a Korean
judgment because the person against whom it was entered in Korea was not
accorded due process protections under New Jersey law).
"Personal service is the primary method of service in New Jersey." City
of Passaic v. Shennett, 390 N.J. Super. 475, 483 (App. Div. 2007) (citing R.
4:43-3, -4). Other methods are appropriate only "[i]f personal service cannot be
effectuated 'after a reasonable and good faith attempt.'" Ibid. (quoting R. 4:4-
3(a)).
Personal service of a competent adult in this State is accomplished by
delivering process to that individual personally, or by leaving a copy with a
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competent household member at least fourteen years old at the individual's
dwelling or usual place of abode, or by delivering a copy to a person authorized
to accept service on the individual's behalf. R. 4:4-4(a)(1). If service cannot be
effected in this manner, and the serving party submits an affidavit confirming
his or her diligent efforts and inquiry, then personal service upon an individual
outside of the United States may be effected by delivering notice "in accordance
with any governing international treaty or convention to the extent required
thereby, and if none, in the same manner as if service were made within the
United States, except that service shall be made by a person specially appointed
by the court for that purpose." R. 4:4-4(b)(1)(B).
Personal service upon a corporation is accomplished by serving:
any officer, director, trustee or managing or general
agent, or any person authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process on behalf of the
corporation, or on a person at the registered office of
the corporation in charge thereof, or, if service cannot
be made on any of those persons, then on a person at
the principal place of business of the corporation in this
State in charge thereof, or, if there is no place of
business in this State, then on any employee of the
corporation within this State acting in the discharge of
his or her duties, provided, however, that a foreign
corporation may be served only as herein prescribed
subject to due process of law.
[R. 4:4-4(a)(6).]
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If service upon a corporation cannot be made in accordance with these
provisions, and the serving party submits an affidavit confirming diligent efforts
and inquiry, then personal service may be accomplished by:
mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested,
and, simultaneously, by ordinary mail to . . . a
corporation . . . that is subject to suit under a recognized
name, addressed to a registered agent for service, or to
its principal place of business, or to its registered office.
[R. 4:4-4(b)(1)(C).]
By any measure, the service of process on defendants did not meet these
standards. Here, it is undisputed that the Dubai court officer did not deliver
notice to Rahulan personally or to his dwelling or usual place of abode. Further,
there is no evidence that the officer delivered notice to someone authorized to
accept service on Rahulan's behalf. Vama provided no competent evidence that
Gawanico was authorized to accept service on Rahulan's behalf. Regardless,
service on Pacific's alleged receptionist does not suffice to serve Rahulan
personally under this State's standards. The attempted service of Rahulan is
particularly troubling given that Rahulan's email address and New Jersey
telephone number were known when service was attempted.
As to service upon Pacific, it is undisputed that the court officer did not
deliver notice to an "officer, director, trustee or managing or general agent" of
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Pacific, "or on a person at the registered office or principal place of business in
charge thereof." R. 4:4-4(a)(6). Rahulan certified that Pacific's receptionist was
not authorized to accept service. Generally, service upon a receptionist is
permissible only if the corporation has no place of business in New Jersey and
the receptionist is discharging his or her duties in New Jersey. R. 4:4-4(a)(6).
Moreover, although Vama denies Rahulan's certification that Gawanico was not
employed by Pacific, a denial alone is insufficient to create a genuine dispute,
especially since Vama declined the opportunity to serve any discovery demands
or depose anyone with knowledge relevant to this matter. Put simply, Vama
proffered no competent evidence that Gawanico was employed by Pacific, much
less that she was authorized to accept service on its behalf.
Given these facts, recognition of the Dubai judgment was barred by
N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(b)(2). In addition, the judge properly exercised his
discretion to not recognize the Dubai judgment under N.J.S.A. 2A:49A -
16.4(c)(1).
The judge also concluded that while this method of service of process may
be permitted in UAE, it "is repugnant to the public policy of this State or of the
United States," quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(c)(3). We concur. For the
reasons we have stated, defendants were not afforded meaningful notice and
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opportunity to be heard, the two core elements of due process in this State and
country. The inadequate opportunity to be heard extended to the appellate
proceeding. Defendants' appeal was dismissed as untimely without considering
the merits of the arguments they raised. The failure to properly serve defendants
clearly thwarted their ability to file the appeal within thirty days of the issuance
of the judgment.
Our court rules permit a defendant to move for relief from the operation
of a judgment when the judgment is void. See R. 4:50-1(d). "A judgment may
be set aside as void for lack of personal jurisdiction without the need of the
defendant to show a meritorious defense." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J.
Court Rules, cmt. 5.4.2 on R. 4:50-1(d) (2021) (citing Peralta v. Heights Med.
Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86 (1988); City of Passaic v. Shennett, 390 N.J. Super.
475, 486 (App. Div. 2007); Jameson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J.
Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2003); L.L.C. v. Simmons, 392 N.J. Super. 520, 530
(Law Div. 2006)). Defendants filed their appeal within a reasonable time after
learning of the judgment entered against them. See R. 4:50-2. The dismissal of
the appeal as untimely "is repugnant to the public policy of this State or of the
United States." N.J.S.A. 2A:49-16.4(c)(3). For this additional reason, the judge
properly exercised his discretion in not recognizing the Dubai judgment .
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In light of our ruling, we do not reach these additional grounds raised by
defendants. Any issues raised by Vama but not otherwise addressed were found
to lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in our opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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