DCPP VS. T.T.R. AND F.T.S., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF F.K.-A.S. (FG-04-0144-19, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0575-19T2
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
T.T.R.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
F.T.S.,
Defendant.
_____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF F.K-A.S.,
a minor.
_____________________________
Submitted October 1, 2020 – Decided October 22, 2020
Before Judges Sumners, Geiger, and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
Docket No. FG-04-0144-19.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender,
of counsel; Carol A. Weil, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Sookie Bae, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Laura Dwyer, Deputy Attorney General, on
the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel; David B. Valentin,
Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Following a five-day trial concluding on August 7, 2019, Judge Francine
Axelrad rendered an eighty-plus-page oral opinion and entered a September 18,
2019 order terminating the parental rights of T.T.R. (Teresa) 1 and F.T.S. (Fred)
to their almost four-year-old daughter F.K-A.S. (Flora). Only Teresa appeals
that order. The Division and Law Guardian oppose. For the reasons that follow,
we reject Teresa's contentions that the Division of Child Protection and
1
We use pseudonyms or initials to protect the privacy of the child and parents.
R. 1:38-3(d)(12). We use first names for ease of reference; we mean no
disrespect.
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Permanency (Division) failed to meet its statutory burden under the four-prong
best interests test, codified at N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), by clear and convincing
evidence.
I.
The Division first became involved in Flora's life within weeks of her July
2015 birth, when Teresa tested positive for PCP while at the hospital after
fleeing Fred due to a domestic violence incident. Flora was subsequently placed
with a maternal aunt in Virginia. The placement, however, was short-lived
because the Division's found the placement unsatisfactory during a visitation
was conducted. In January 2016, Fred was granted custody of Flora and ordered
to supervise all of Teresa's contact with the child.
Thereafter, Flora's placements continued to be brief. In March 2016, Flora
was removed from Fred's custody when the Division learned both Teresa and
Fred were arrested and incarcerated as the result of a drug raid at their home
because Fred was allegedly selling drugs there. In addition, contrary to the
placement plan, Teresa admitted to being home alone with Flora while Fred was
at work. For the next few months, Flora was placed with her parents' neighbor
until she decided she could no longer take care of Flora. The Division then
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3
placed Flora with a resource parent, P.M. (Penny), who continues to care for her
and wants to adopt.
In August 2017, the Division's permanency plan to terminate parental
rights followed by adoption with Penny was approved. The Division then filed
a complaint for guardianship three months later. After three trial dates in May
2018, the Division withdrew its complaint before a decision was rendered. This
was followed by the Division's efforts – which it deemed unsuccessful – to
reunify Flora with Fred. Consequently, the Division filed a new complaint for
guardianship, which is the subject of this appeal.
II.
In reviewing a decision by a trial court to terminate parental rights, we
give "deference to family court[s'] fact[-]finding" because of "the family courts'
special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters[.]" Cesare v. Cesare, 154
N.J. 394, 413 (1998). The judge's findings of fact are not disturbed unless they
are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant
and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Id. at 412(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
"[T]he conclusions that logically flow from those findings of fact are, likewise,
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4
entitled to deferential consideration upon appellate review." N.J. Div. of Youth
& Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 89 (App. Div. 2006).
Here, the judge carefully reviewed the evidence presented, and thereafter
concluded the Division had met, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the
legal requirements for a judgment of guardianship. Her oral opinion tracks the
statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), accords with In re
Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337 (1999), In re Guardianship of DMH, 161
N.J. 365 (1999), and New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. F.M.,
211 N.J. 420 (2012), and is supported by substantial and credible evidence in
the record. We therefore affirm substantially for the reasons the judge expressed
in her comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion. We add the following remarks
as to each prong.
A. Prongs One and Two
As to prong one, the Division must prove that "[t]he child's safety, health,
or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship[.]" N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1). "[T]he relevant inquiry focuses on
the cumulative effect, over time, of harms arising from the home life provided
by the parent." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 289
(2007).
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"Serious and lasting emotional or psychological harm to children as the
result of the action or inaction of their biological parents can constitute injury
sufficient to authorize the termination of parental rights." In re Guardianship of
K.L.F., 129 N.J. 32, 44 (1992) (citing In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 18
(1992)). As a result, "courts must consider the potential psychological damage
that may result from reunification[,] as the 'potential return of a child to a parent
may be so injurious that it would bar such an alternative.'" N.J. Div. of Youth
& Family Servs. v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. 451, 480-81 (App. Div. 2012)
(quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 605 (1986)).
"The absence of physical abuse or neglect is not conclusive." A.W., 103
N.J. at 605 (quoting In re Guardianship of R., 155 N.J. Super. 186, 194 (App.
Div. 1977)). "A parent's withdrawal of . . . solicitude, nurture, and care for an
extended period of time is in itself a harm that endangers the health and
development of the child." DMH, 161 N.J. at 379. "Courts need not wait to act
until a child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect."
Id. at 383 (citation omitted).
As to prong two, the Division must prove that "[t]he parent is unwilling
or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child[ren] or is unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home . . . and the delay of permanent placement will
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add to the harm." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). That harm may include evidence
that separating the children from their resource parents "would cause serious and
enduring emotional or psychological harm . . . ." Ibid.
The Division can establish the second prong by proving that a "child will
suffer substantially from a lack of stability and a permanent placement[,] and
from the disruption of" a bond with the resource parents. K.H.O., 161 N.J. at
363. Because they are related, evidence supporting the first prong may also
support the second prong "as part of the comprehensive basis for determining
the best interests of the child." DMH, 161 N.J. at 379.
Teresa argues Judge Axelrad's finding that the Division met its burden
under the first prong is not supported by the record and thus was error. She cites
to the proposition that "particularized evidence" is needed to establish "the
specific circumstance." New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v.
G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 606 (2007) (citation omitted). Teresa contends she was
never found to have neglected or harmed her daughter. The fact that there were
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 summary findings on January 7 and October 27, 2016, based
on her stipulation that her family was in need of services, does not satisfy prong
one. She further argues the judge erred in finding the Division had proven prong
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one, by merely citing domestic violence that caused Flora's first removal,
parental drug use, and prior incarcerations.
Based on the judge's credibility findings of the Division's witnesses – a
Division caseworker and Dr. Linda Jeffrey, Ph.D. – there is clear and convincing
evidence to support the judge's finding that a continued parental relationship
with Teresa would harm Flora based on her mother's history of being unable to
provide a home that properly nurtures and cares for her. The judge cited
"[Teresa's] continued drug abuse, . . . domestic violence in the home, . . .
incarcerations of the parents[,] and the inability to care for [Flora]." Under
prong two, the judge cited the caseworker's and Dr. Jeffrey's respective
testimony regarding Teresa's inadequate use of services offered by the Division
since Flora's birth and inability to provide a home "to date." In particular, the
judge pointed to Dr. Jeffrey's diagnosis of Teresa's "lack of attunement . . . lack
of anticipating [Flora's] needs" in her own "self-reporting." The judge stressed
Teresa's "[b]ad behavior [with Division workers] in front of [Flora] many times"
goes to "the [second] prong [being] unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm
facing the child or unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the
child."
A-0575-19T2
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Significantly, Judge Axelrad had a front row seat to Teresa's belligerent
and disrespectful behavior during the trial. While the judge was delivering her
oral decision, the following occurred:
[THE COURT]: I give significant weight to Dr.
Jeffrey’s opinions, particularly including [Teresa's]
severe chronic adjustment disorders, lack of emotional
security, paranoia and anger, lack of emotional
maturity, inability to self-regulate, and to follow rule-
governed behavior and to role model for her daughter,
as well as Dr. Jeffrey’s conclusions that [Teresa] is
unable to provide a minimal level of safe parenting, and
that [Flora] would be at risk if reunified with her now
or in the foreseeable future.
[TERESA]: Okay.
THE COURT: And I’m going to address that
specifically when I address Dr. Jeffrey’s testimony.
[TERESA]: Okay.
THE COURT: However, let me state that the testimony
from the lips of Dr. Jeffrey regarding her observations,
results of the psychological tests, clinical diagnoses and
conclusions unimpeded, because Ms. Robinson did not
attend court on those two days, days 3 and 4, July 16
and July 22nd, came to life in my courtroom in full
illustration by [Teresa's] conduct during each of the
days –
[TERESA]: You’re God damned right.
THE COURT: – that she did appear for trial. These are
my observations reflected at times on the record, and
also reflected on the record by [Teresa's] comments,
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similar to the type of comments that are being made
now by her on the phone.
[TERESA]: Stop, they just want to know I’m a
(inaudible).
THE COURT: And in about one minute, [Teresa], I am
going to hang up the phone.
[TERESA]: (Inaudible) shut the fuck up.
THE COURT: Okay. I’ll reflect for the record that she
just told me to shut the fuck up. I’ve now had enough,
and I’m hanging up. She is now disconnected from this
proceeding.
I will also note for the record that when I reference –
this [c]ourt has given her due process, this [c]ourt has
tolerated the disrespect that she has shown for the
[c]ourt and to her attorneys. I will not tolerate her
continuing to talk over me so that I cannot conduct
myself and give this opinion, and I will not tolerate that
disrespect and profanity. I have now hung up that
phone. Her attorney is here. Her attorney can provide
her a copy of the transcript if she wishes.
I’ll also note for the record while I’m at it, and the
record does reflect, that this [c]ourt entered orders, for
the reasons that are clear on the record, that Ms.
Robinson was not permitted to be present in the
courtroom during the [c]ourt’s decision, that she could
participate by phone. But as is clear, she is unable to
conduct herself in a mature manner.
Additionally, while I’m at it, I did use the full F word
here just to reflect on the record. And what I’m going
to do throughout this proceeding is I am going to say
simply the F word, because as – when I reference
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various of the contact sheets, they use the – that word,
because that is a word in Ms. Robinson’s vocabulary
that she said to – as she said to the [c]ourt, she said to
the caseworkers over and over again. So I am going to
simply, for the decency of the record, say the F word,
rather than saying that word. But let the record reflect
she actually used the words.
So my observations of [Teresa's] demeanor during [the
caseworker's] testimony. While she was discussing
problems with [Teresa's] attendance and participation
in services, [Teresa] began muttering, using profanity
directed to the [c]ourt and the attorneys in front of the
sheriff’s officer as she left the courtroom during the
break. Later on, she had a full[-]fledged outburst. Her
attorney had to take her aside to calm her down. She
was confrontational and disrespectful to the [c]ourt
when I addressed her respectfully and asked her to calm
down so that I could hear the testimony.
As for Teresa's argument that there has been no finding that she abused or
neglected her daughter, we agree with the Law Guardian's position this court
determined in N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.P., 408 N.J. Super. 252,
259-60 (App. Div. 2009) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.M.,
136 N.J. 546, 556-59 (1994)) that a finding of abuse or neglect is unnecessary
to satisfy prong one.
In addition, although a parent's incarceration is not a per se justification
for termination of parental rights, it is "unquestionably relevant" to the decision.
Matter of Adoption of L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 136-37 (1993). Incarceration is
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probative of abandonment but does not justify termination as a matter of law.
Id. at 137. "[I]ncarceration alone—without particularized evidence of how a
parent's incarceration affects each prong of the [best interests of the child]
standard—is an insufficient basis for terminating parental rights." N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Services v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 556 (2014). Thus, when
determining whether incarceration constitutes abandonment, courts should
consider the "nature of the contact between parent and child before and after
incarceration, the efforts made by the parent to maintain contact with the child
following imprisonment, and the attempts during incarceration to undertake as
much responsibility for the child's welfare as possible." L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 138.
Here, Teresa's incarceration was just one factor relied upon by the judge in
finding she harmed Flora. The fact that it occurred when Flora was a baby is
disconcerting, given how much she relied on her parents at that point.
B. Prong Three
As to prong three, the Division is required to make "reasonable efforts to
provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the
child's placement outside the home[,] and the court [will] consider[] alternatives
to termination of parental rights[.]" N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). This prong
"contemplates efforts that focus on reunification of the parent with the child and
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assistance to the parent to correct and overcome those circumstances that
necessitated the placement of the child into foster care." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at
354.
Within the meaning of prong three, "reasonable efforts" include, but are
not limited to:
(1) consultation and cooperation with the parent in
developing a plan for appropriate services;
(2) providing services that have been agreed upon, to
the family, in order to further the goal of family
reunification;
(3) informing the parent at appropriate intervals of the
child's progress, development, and health; and
(4) facilitating appropriate visitation.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c).]
"Whether particular services are necessary in order to comply with the
[reasonable] efforts requirement must . . . be decided with reference to the
circumstances of the individual case before the court[.]" DMH, 161 N.J. at 390.
The Division
must encourage, foster and maintain the bond between
the parent and child as a basis for the reunification of
the family. [It] must promote and assist in visitation
and keep the parent informed of the child's progress in
foster care. [It] should also inform the parent of the
necessary or appropriate measures he or she should
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pursue in order to continue and strengthen that
relationship and, eventually, to become an effective
caretaker and regain custody of his or her children.
[Id. at 390 (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c)).]
A court is required to consider alternatives to the termination of parental
rights. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). "[A]ssessment of relatives is part of the
Division's obligation to consult and cooperate with the parent in developing a
plan for appropriate services that reinforce the family structure." N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super. 568, 583 (App. Div. 2011).
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(a) requires the Division to initiate a search for
relatives who may be willing and able to provide the care and support required
by the child within thirty days of accepting a child into its care or custody. The
Division must assess each interested relative and, if it determines that the
relative is unable or unwilling to care for the child, inform them of its reasons
for a denial of placement. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(a)-(b).
"It is the policy of [the Division] to place, whenever possible, children
with relatives when those children are removed from the custody of their
parents." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.F., 353 N.J. Super. 623, 636
(App. Div. 2002). "The Division's statutory obligation does not permit willful
blindness and inexplicable delay in assessing and approving or disapproving a
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relative known to the Division[.]" K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super. at 582. It cannot
ignore relatives "based upon an arbitrary, preordained preference for the foster
placement" and "must perform a reasonable investigation of . . . relatives that is
fair, but also sensitive to the passage of time and the child's critical need for
finality and permanency." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J.
Super. 69, 87 (App. Div. 2013).
Teresa argues the judge erred in accepting the Division's claim it had to
proceed with termination of her parental rights because none of her relatives
were available to care for Flora. She claims the Division presented insufficient
evidence that it sought out her family members for a possible Kinship Legal
Guardianship. K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super. at 578-80 (holding that even when a
parent affirmatively asks the Division not to explore a specific relative, the
agency is obligated to explore relative placements independent of the parent's
participation in the process); N.J.S.A. 9:6B-4(b). In particular, she points to the
Division's failure to seek out her maternal grandmother A.W. (Amy) to care for
Flora.2 She also contends reasonable services were not provided to her because
2
The Law Guardian contends this argument was not raised at the guardianship
hearing and we should not consider it. However, "[p]arental rights and
ineffective assistance of counsel being matters of great public interest, we have
considered the parties' arguments on this issue." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. B.H., 391 N.J. Super. 322, 343 (App. Div. 2007).
A-0575-19T2
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the Division did not address her actual needs, i.e. trauma-based therapy, as
enumerated by her psychiatrist.
The record supports Judge Axelrad's findings that "[t]here are no
alternatives to termination of parental rights" and the Division made reasonable
efforts to offer Teresa services to address her problems that led to Flora's
removal. The Division ruled out Amy because she had a pending Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children evaluation and a scheduled bonding
evaluation with Flora, which she failed to attend on two occasions. This clearly
evidenced Amy's lack of interest in accepting the responsibility to care for Flora.
As for services offered to Teresa, the record supports the judge's decision that
the Division made more than reasonable efforts to reunify Teresa with her
daughter[,] by offering her the following services: psychological evaluations,
psychiatric evaluations, individual therapy with three different providers,
substance abuse evaluations and treatment, random urine screens, visitation,
therapeutic visitation services, and bonding evaluations.
C. Prong Four
Under prong four, the Division must demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that "[t]ermination of parental rights will not do more harm than good."
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). The prong characterizes a child's need for
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permanency as "an important consideration." M.M., 189 N.J. at 281. "The
question to be addressed under that prong is whether, after considering and
balancing the two relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the
termination of ties with her natural parents than from the permanent disruption
of her relationship with her foster parents." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355. In order
to weigh any potential harm from terminating parental rights against a child's
separation from his or her foster parents, a court must consider expert testimony
on the strength of each relationship. J.C., 129 N.J. at 25. "[W]here it is shown
that the bond with foster parents is strong and, in comparison, the bond with the
natural parent is not as strong, that evidence will satisfy . . . N.J.S.A. 30:4C -
15.1(a)(4)." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 363.
Teresa's contends the Division did not satisfy prong four. She argues Dr.
Jeffrey, who performed bonding evaluations of Flora with Teresa, Fred, and
Penny, failed to focus on the effect termination of her parental rights would have
on Flora, instead emphasizing the bond between Flora and Penny. Teresa also
contends she never had the chance to parent and bond with Flora because the
Division took care and custody of Flora within days of her birth and Teresa
thereafter only had a few months to bond with her when Fred had custody of
Flora for a few months. Flora's admitted attachment to Penny does not
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demonstrate, according to Teresa, that terminating Flora's ties to her family
would not do her more harm than good.
In finding the Division satisfied prong four, Judge Axelrad relied upon
Dr. Jeffrey's opinion that Flora would suffer severe and enduring harm if she
was removed from Penny's care based on the strong attachment developed
between them, and it would do more harm than good to Flora to place her in
Teresa's care and custody. Dr. Jeffrey found that Teresa's bond with Flora was
insecure. The judge also referred to Teresa's "anger-management" problems, as
evidenced during the trial, i.e., during Dr. Jeffrey's testimony and the judge's
oral decision, as indication that Teresa would not be able to overcome the harm
Flora would suffer if she were removed from Penny. As for the limited time to
bond with Flora, the judge reasoned if Teresa had done what the Division had
asked of her to aid in reunification, she would not have "allow[ed] another year
to pass with her child securely bonding to the resource parent." Considering the
credible evidence cited by the judge, she properly determined the Division
satisfied prong four by clear and convincing evidence.
In sum, we conclude the judge's termination of Teresa's parental rights
was in Flora's best interests.
Affirmed.
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