STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SALAAM REEVEY (11-03-0410, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0767-19T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SALAAM REEVEY, a/k/a
DESMOND REEVEY,
SALAAM D. REEVEY,
DESMOND S. REEVEY,
SALAAM DESMOND REEVEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted January 5, 2021 – Decided January 25, 2021
Before Judges Mawla and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 11-03-0410.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent (Ednin D. Martinez, Assistant Prosecutor,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from an August 13, 2019 order denying his petition for
post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
I.
To provide context for our decision, we briefly recount the relevant facts
and procedural history as detailed in our opinion affirming defendant's
convictions and sentence:
On the night of September 4, 2010, defendant and an
accomplice, Larry Austin, approached a group of five
people walking toward the light rail station in Jersey
City. After brandishing a pistol, Austin led three men
from the group down an alleyway, where he struck two
of them with the end of the pistol before shooting and
killing the third. During these assaults, Austin took
possessions from each of the men, including a wallet
and cell phone.
As these events transpired, defendant was acting as a
lookout for Austin. The two surviving victims testified
that defendant "didn't say much," and did not touch
them at all. Defendant was ultimately arrested and
charged with murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or -
3(a)(2) (count one); felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(3) (count two); three counts of first-degree
robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (counts three, four, and
five); two counts of first-degree aggravated assault
causing serious bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)
(counts six and seven); two counts of third-degree
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1(b)(2) (counts eight and nine); possession of a
weapon with an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)
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(count ten); and unlawful possession of a weapon,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count eleven).
Following trial, a jury convicted defendant on counts
three, four, and five of the lesser-included offense of
second-degree robbery, as well as the two counts of
third-degree aggravated assault.
[State v. Reevey, No. A-2035-13 (App. Div. Feb. 3,
2016) (slip op. 1-3).]
Before the sentencing court, defendant's trial counsel submitted a brief in
which he relied on State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985), and argued
for concurrent rather than consecutive sentences. He contended defendant's role
in the robbery "was inherently passive" and that the "crimes and their obje ctives
were clearly part of a single period of aberrant behavior by [defendant]."
Trial counsel further contended that "[d]efendant's single act was that of
accomplice" and that his "crime and objective were one in the same, one act."
He acknowledged that the "crimes involved separate acts of violence" but they
were "perpetrated by [Austin, the] primary actor." Finally, counsel stressed that
"[d]efendant's actions were committed so closely in time and place as to indicate
a single period of aberrant behavior."
In addition, during oral argument, defendant's trial counsel noted that
"[defendant] still maintains his innocence" and that "in no way did he know what
was going to go on in Mr. Austin's mind." He also conceded that defendant
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"can't dispute some of the [Yarbough] factors" but argued that the "equities cry
out that . . . [the court] consider the concurrent aspect under [Yarbough]."
After merging the aggravated assault and robbery counts and considering
the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, the court sentenced defendant
to a ten-year custodial term on count three (which addressed the victim who
died), and seven years each on counts four and five. The sentencing court
ordered that defendant's sentences run consecutively for a total of twenty-four
years, with an 85% period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act
(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
In rejecting defendant's request for concurrent sentences, the sentencing
court noted the "conduct that occurred here [involved] separate acts of violence."
Additionally, the court cited State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436 (2001), for the
proposition that "crimes involving multiple victims represented especially
suitable circumstances for the imposition of consecutive sentences."
On direct appeal, defendant argued that his sentence was excessive and
unduly punitive. Defendant's appellate counsel contended that "[w]hile
consecutive sentences were likely warranted because there were multiple
victims, . . . the sentencing court violated Yarbough [g]uideline [five] by
imposing the same sentence on counts four and five."
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We rejected these arguments and affirmed. Regarding the Yarbough
argument, we stated:
Defendant finally argues that, pursuant to State v.
Yarbough, the sentencing judge should not have
imposed equal seven-year sentences for his two
additional robbery convictions. In Yarbough, our
Supreme Court specifically noted that "successive
terms for the same offense should not ordinarily be
equal to the punishment for the first offense." The
sentencing judge acknowledged this requirement, and
thus sentenced defendant to a ten-year prison term for
the first robbery conviction, but only seven-year prison
terms for each of the additional robbery convictions.
Defendant provides no support for the assertion that the
two additional robbery convictions cannot be for equal
lengths. Defendant's twenty-four-year sentence was
not excessive.
[Reevey, slip op. at 10 (citations omitted).]
On October 16, 2018, defendant filed a timely PCR petition in which he
alleged ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel on the "narrow
issue" of "consecutive versus concurrent" sentencing. After hearing oral
arguments, Judge John A. Young issued an August 14, 2019 order and
corresponding opinion in which he concluded that defendant failed to establish
a prima facie case that either his trial or appellate counsel was constitutionally
ineffective under the two-part test detailed in Strickland v. Washington, 466
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U.S. 668 (1984), and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). The court accordingly
denied defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing.
With regard to defendant's trial counsel, the judge explained that contrary
to defendant's contentions, defendant's trial counsel had argued "that [defendant]
played a passive role in the offense." Further, the judge concluded defendant
failed to establish prejudice because the sentencing court noted defendant's
"active participation" and found "[defendant] acted as an accomplice that night
to help Mr. Austin accomplish what he was set out to do." Additionally, Judge
Young noted and rejected trial counsel's argument that defendant was convicted
of a "single act."
As to defendant's appellate counsel, Judge Young relied upon State v.
Gaither, 396 N.J. Super. 508, 515 (App. Div. 2007), and explained appellate
counsel is "not required to present every non-frivolous legal claim."
Additionally, the judge cited State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 429 (2001), and found
defendant did not have a "reasonable likelihood of succeeding on [the concurrent
sentencing] claim in his appeal" because of the multiple victims in this case.
Before us, defendant raises the following point for our consideration:
THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE
DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
CASE OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSELS'
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INEFFECTIVENESS FOR NOT ADEQUATELY
PURSUING THE IMPOSITION OF CONCURRENT
SENTENCES; IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS
MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR THE PCR
COURT TO ADDRESS THE NARROW YARBOUGH
ISSUE RAISED AT THE PCR HEARING. (Partially
Raised Below).
We disagree with defendant's argument and affirm substantially for the
reasons stated by Judge Young in his written decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We
offer the following additional comments.
II.
"[W]here the [PCR] court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we may
exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the trial court has drawn
from the documentary record." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373
(App. Div. 2014) (citation omitted). We review a PCR court's legal conclusions
de novo. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415-16 (2004) (citing Toll Bros., Inc. v.
Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002)).
A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-part test
pronounced in Strickland by demonstrating that "counsel's performance was
deficient," that is, "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."
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466 U.S. at 687; see also Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. This test applies to appellate
counsel as well. State v. Loftin, 191 N.J. 172, 197-98 (2007).
The first prong requires a showing that "counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. A
defendant, however, must overcome a strong presumption that counsel rendered
reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. "The test is not whether defense
counsel could have done better, but whether he met the constitutional threshold
for effectiveness." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543 (2013). Further, the failure
to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel. State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990) (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688).
Under the second prong, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's
errors prejudiced the defense such as to deprive defendant of a fair and reliable
outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To prove this element, a defendant must
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.
Moreover, a defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary
hearing by simply raising a PCR claim. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.
154, 170 (App. Div. 1999) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992)).
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An evidentiary hearing is required only when: 1) a defendant establishes a prima
facie case in support of PCR, 2) the court determines there are disputed issues
of material fact that cannot be resolved by review of the existing record, and 3)
the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims
asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10).
"A prima facie case is established when a defendant demonstrates 'a
reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light
most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" Id. at
355 (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)). In other words, there are "material issues of
disputed fact which cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record."
State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 1998). Mere bald assertions
are insufficient. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.
Defendant argues that he established a prima facie claim that his trial and
appellate counsel's performance was constitutionally ineffective because they
failed to assert that "defendant's 'limited intent[]' [in the robberies] translated 'as
being a simple act,' thereby satisfying a compelling Yarbough factor for
imposition of concurrent sentences," and argues a remand is necessary to
"address [his] narrow Yarbough claim." We disagree as defendant's arguments
are factually unsupported by the record and legally meritless.
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When deciding whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences,
the court considers the following guidelines established in Yarbough:
(a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly
independent of each other;
(b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or
threats of violence;
(c) the crimes were committed at different times or
separate places, rather than being committed so closely
in time and place as to indicate a single period of
aberrant behavior;
(d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims;
(e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be
imposed are numerous.
[100 N.J. at 643-44.]
"The Yarbough factors are qualitative, not quantitative; applying them
involves more than merely counting the factors favoring each alternative
outcome." State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 348 (2019) (citations omitted). "When
a sentencing court properly evaluates the Yarbough factors in light of the record,
the court's decision will not normally be disturbed on appeal." State v. Miller,
205 N.J. 109, 129 (2011) (citing State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 182 (2009)).
"Crimes involving multiple deaths or victims who have sustained serious
bodily injuries represent especially suitable circumstances for the imposition of
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consecutive sentences." Carey, 168 N.J. at 428 (citations omitted). Indeed, "that
principle resonates most clearly in cases in which a perpetrator intentionally
targets multiple victims (e.g., a double murder or robbery)." Id. at 429. The
multiple-victims factor under Yarbough "is entitled to great weight and should
ordinarily result in the imposition of at least two consecutive sentences."
Molina, 168 N.J. at 443 (citations omitted).
Here, defendant has failed to establish that either his trial or appellate
counsel was constitutionally defective in their performance, or that he was
prejudiced. The record from the sentencing proceeding clearly establishes that
defendant's trial counsel repeatedly argued defendant did not "take part in . . .
separate acts of violence," which warranted concurrent sentencing under
Yarbough. Indeed, trial counsel argued in the sentencing brief that
"[defendant's] crime and objective were one in the same, one act" and that "the
jury found [defendant] guilty of one act."
Further, although appellate counsel did not raise the concurrent sentencing
argument that defendant now contends should have been asserted, appellate
counsel did argue that defendant's sentence was excessive on alternative
grounds. As Judge Young noted, appellate counsel is not constitutionally
deficient for failing to "advance any grounds insisted upon by defendant."
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Gaither, 396 N.J. Super. at 515 (quoting R. 3:22-6(d)); see also Worlock, 117
N.J. at 625.
Moreover, even if we were to indulge defendant's argument that he
satisfied the performance prong of the Strickland test, defendant has failed to
establish that he was prejudiced by his trial or appellate counsel's defective
performance as defendant did not have a reasonable likelihood that he would
have succeeded in receiving a concurrent sentence. Indeed, the jury convicted
defendant as an accomplice and was therefore "legally accountable" for Austin's
actions. See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6. These separate crimes involving three victims
clearly warranted consecutive sentences. See Carey, 168 N.J. at 429.
Because we agree with Judge Young that defendant did not establish a
prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, we likewise conclude he
did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's request for an evidentiary
hearing. See Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462. To the extent we have not addressed
any of defendant's arguments it is because we have concluded that they are
without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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