IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT RECORD OF M.D v. (L-3447-19, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0663-19T2
IN THE MATTER OF THE
EXPUNGEMENT OF THE APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
INVOLUNTARY CIVIL November 9, 2020
COMMITMENT RECORD APPELLATE DIVISION
OF M.D.V.1
Submitted October 7, 2020 – Decided November 09, 2020
Before Judges Alvarez, Sumners, and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-3447-
19.
Law Offices of Jef Henninger, attorney for appellant
M.D.V. (Jef Henninger, of counsel and on the brief;
Morgan Rice, on the brief).
Respondent Camden County did not file a brief.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALVAREZ, P.J.A.D.
1
Because the underlying dispute concerns M.D.V.'s application for
expungement of his commitment records, we use initials to preserve his
anonymity. Rule 1:38-3(f)(2) makes the records regarding these proceedings
confidential.
On September 23, 2019, M.D.V.'s petition for the expungement of his
commitment record was denied "with prejudice," nunc pro tunc to an earlier
December 14, 2018 order that stated the denial was "without prejudice." We
now reverse the "with prejudice" designation. Given the nature of the remedy,
nothing in the statutory scheme bars multiple applications.2
The context for this decision can be briefly described. The framework
for the expungement of a record of commitment to "any institution or facility
providing mental health services" is found in N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.8 to -80.11.
The Law Division judge conducted the evidentiary hearing on M.D.V.'s
petition on August 10, 2018, during which petitioner and his mother testified.
M.D.V. also proffered a psychiatric evaluation—the expert, however,
had not reviewed petitioner's 2004 commitment history. The judge found a
"note" from a second expert to be a net opinion. After the hearing, the court
allowed petitioner the opportunity to supplement the record and submit revised
expert reports. Since the judge had not received any further submissions by
October 24, 2018, she dismissed the matter because "the evidentiary exhibits
presented were insufficient to determine that the legal standard in N.J.S.A. []
2
The act does prohibit petitions "in which the defendant was found not guilty
of a crime because of insanity or from a determination that the defendant was
incompetent to stand trial." N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.10. That explicit limitation is
not relevant to the issues addressed in this opinion.
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30:4-80.9 was satisfied." Additionally, the judge determined petitioner and his
mother were not credible witnesses because, among other reasons, their
testimony was contradicted by the commitment records.
Petitioner then filed a reconsideration motion, explaining that a
supplemental report had been prepared by the psychiatrist and timely
submitted to the court. As a result, the judge vacated the dismissal and
reconsidered the petition in light of the additional submission.
On December 14, 2018, the judge authored a comprehensive, cogent,
and thoughtful twenty-eight-page decision on the merits, denying the
unopposed petition. She reasoned, applying the statutory two-prong test found
in N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.9, that petitioner's proofs did not establish he was not
likely to be dangerous to public safety, or that granting him the requested relief
would not run contrary to the public interest.
The judge's 2018 decision is solidly anchored in the record. She could
not have granted the application because she found the psychiatric evidence
was insufficient, and petitioner and his mother were incredible witnesses. See
N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.9.
The statement of reasons indicated the petition was denied "with
prejudice," however, the corresponding order indicated the denial was "without
prejudice." M.D.V. refiled his petition on August 28, 2019, and subsequently
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brought the discrepancy to the judge's attention. She issued the nunc pro tunc
order now on appeal and dismissed the application a second time.
M.D.V. does not challenge the denial of his petition on the merits, nor
could he, as any notice of appeal would be more than a year out of time. R.
2:4-1 ("appeals from final judgments of courts . . . shall be filed within 45
days[.]"). This opinion addresses only the propriety of the judge's decision
making the denial "with prejudice."
"[M]atters of law are subject to a de novo review." Balsamides v.
Protameen Chems., Inc., 160 N.J. 352, 372 (1999). "[A]n issue of statutory
interpretation is a question of law." McGovern v. Rutgers, 211 N.J. 94, 108
(2012).
"When construing a statute, our primary goal is to discern the meaning
and intent of the Legislature." State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010). "To
determine that intent, 'we look first to the plain language of the statute, seeking
further guidance only to the extent that the Legislature's intent cannot be
derived from the words that it has chosen.'" McGovern, 211 N.J. at 108
(quoting Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 553 (2009)).
Courts may also "draw inferences" regarding the legislative intent,
"based on the statute's overall structure and composition . . . ." State v.
Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513, 532 (2018) (quoting State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 68
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(2017)). In this case, we also consider the "remedial goals" of expungement
statutes that are to be liberally construed. Miah v. Ahmel, 179 N.J. 511, 525
(2004); State v. T.P.M., 189 N.J. Super. 360, 367-68 (App. Div. 1983).
N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.8 provides:
[a]ny person who has been . . . committed to any
institution or facility providing mental health services
. . . may apply to the court by which such commitment
was made, or to the Superior Court by verified petition
setting forth the facts and praying for the relief
provided for in this act.
The statute vests in the Superior Court the authority to grant relief when
"the petitioner will not likely act in a manner dangerous to the public safety
. . . [and] the grant of relief is not contrary to the public interest[.]" N.J.S.A.
30:4-80.9. It does not limit the number of petitions that a person seeking
expungement can file.
Ordinarily, a "dismissal with prejudice constitutes an adjudication on the
merits as fully and completely as if the order had been entered after trial."
Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 243 (1998) (quotations
omitted). In this case, the adjudication was on the merits after a bench trial,
and is at first glance available for a "with prejudice" designation.
The process is derived, however, from a statutory scheme that does not
expressly prohibit multiple applications. We view the omission as consistent
with the statute's remedial purpose. See Ahmel, 179 N.J. at 525. By not
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limiting the number of petitions that may be filed, the Legislature allowed for
improvement and stabilization of a petitioner's life situation over time. This
interpretation of the legislative silence on whether more than one petition may
be filed dovetails with "the statute's overall structure and composition" calling
for highly individualized proof. See Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 532; N.J.S.A.
30:4-80.9.
The dismissal should therefore have been "without prejudice"—which
"generally indicate[s] that there has been no adjudication on the merits of the
claim, and that a subsequent complaint alleging the same cause of action will
not be barred simply by reason of its prior dismissal." Barow, 153 N.J. at 243(alterations in original) (quotations omitted).
At a subsequent hearing, M.D.V. might produce more comprehensive
psychiatric evidence. M.D.V. and his mother might credibly testify. These
key differences could satisfy the statute. Accordingly, a future petition should
not be barred simply because of the prior dismissal.
This scenario calls for a fact-sensitive analysis similar to that employed
when courts rule upon petitions for the expungement of criminal convictions.
See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 to -32. When applying that statute, which also serves a
remedial purpose, trial judges must determine whether expungement advances
the public interest, balancing "the risks and benefits to the public of allowing
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or barring expungement" with the desires and interests of the applicant. In re
Kollman, 210 N.J. 557, 574, 577 (2012). In the process, they weigh
enumerated factors established by the proofs presented during the hearing. Id.
at 574-77; N.J.S.A. 2C:52-9.
The fact-sensitive analysis relevant to criminal expungements parallels
that applicable to a commitment expungement petition. At the hearing, a
petitioner must establish his or her history of voluntary or involuntary
hospitalization, recovery, treatment, reputation in the community, and present
status. N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.9. A petitioner's current circumstances are the only
way he or she can demonstrate "substantial[] improve[ment] or . . . substantial
remission . . . ." N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.8.
It has been said that our civil commitment expungement statute aims "to
eliminate any stigmas that might attach to a person who was committed to a
psychiatric hospital." In re D.G., 162 N.J. Super. 404, 408 (Essex Cty. Ct.
1977). There, a trial court granted expungement to a petitioner who had been
admitted for possible "schizophrenic or manic-depressive psychosis," but
maintained steady employment since his discharge from the hospital, and who
had no contacts with the mental health system after commitment. Id. at
405-07. D.G.'s application was granted because his return to "psychiatric
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balance and soundness of mind" indicated a "restoration which forms the spirit
and policy in the statute." Id. at 409.
Although the law in this area is scant, the legislative purpose is self-
evident: "to eliminate any stigmas that might attach to a person who was
committed to a psychiatric hospital[,]" and to "eliminat[e] to the greatest
possible extent petitioner's exposure to discrimination." Id. at 408. The plain
language of the statute details the necessary proofs for the grant of a petition,
and by silence on the subject, does not ban subsequent petitions should a first
application fail.
Thus, we reverse the judge's order making the dismissal "with
prejudice." Each expungement application, as the statute permits, should be
afforded a new determination on the merits of the petitioner's situation at that
time. The dismissal should have been "without prejudice."
Reversed. The court shall enter a new judgment designating the
dismissal as without prejudice.
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