SHARON YANG VS. BIAO XUE (SC-000741-19, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5295-18T1
SHARON YANG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BIAO XUE,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________
Submitted November 2, 2020 – Decided November 18, 2020
Before Judges Fasciale and Rothstadt.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. SC-000741-
19.
Sharon Yang, appellant pro se.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
In this breach of contract case, plaintiff appeals from a July 16, 2019
judgment of no cause of action entered in favor of defendant after a small claims
trial. Judge Gary K. Wolinetz conducted the bench trial, took testimony from
the parties, and rendered an oral decision. He concluded that plaintiff failed to
sustain her burden of proof, which is self-evident from her arguments on appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm.
The parties are divorced. Their dispute occurred after their adult daughter
incurred expenses for eye surgery. To cover part of the doctor's bill, defendant's
insurance company allegedly mailed plaintiff a check payable to defendant for
$1,185.12. Plaintiff asserted she sent the check to defendant and asked him to
endorse it and pay the doctor. She then filed a breach of contract complaint
against defendant alleging he "pocketed th[e] money and refused to pay the
doctor." In her complaint, she sought $1,185.12 in damages because—as she
alleged in her complaint—"the doctor is chasing after [p]laintiff for this
payment."
Plaintiff testified that defendant wrote the doctor notifying him that the
daughter did not live with him and that he asked that the doctor stop sending
him bills for the balance due. She also stated that three people from defendant's
insurance company told her defendant had cashed the check. Plaintiff conceded,
however, that she did not have proof that he cashed the check or that he had
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deposited the check into his bank account. At trial, plaintiff offered to "go and
find [the] proof."
Defendant testified that he had been estranged from his daughter for years,
who he said was of "full age [and] with full responsibility of her own course."
He said they were "totally strangers." Defendant stated that no one consulted
him about paying for the eye procedure before it was performed. He also
asserted that plaintiff lacked standing to sue him, as any unpaid balance is
between the daughter and doctor. Defendant explained that he never received
an insurance payment with directions to pay the doctor, and—contrary to
plaintiff's testimony at trial—he did not tell anyone that the money was his own
or that he could do with it what he wanted. He testified that he had no
recollection of receiving the insurance check.
The judge found that plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant received the check. The judge asked plaintiff for any
specific relevant evidence which would corroborate her trial testimony, such as
a letter from the insurance company, defendant, anyone else, or for "any
evidence whatsoever?" He asked her to "show me any evidence . . . that states
that a check was mailed to [defendant] in that amount of money." Responding
to those questions, plaintiff said "I'm sorry, . . . all the conversations with the
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insurance company [were] on the phone. I wasn't expecting to get any
evidence."
Before the judge rendered his decision, he gave the parties the
"opportunity just to present whatever other evidence or any other statements
[they would] like to make." Plaintiff responded by explaining that her daughter
overheard the conversations she had with representatives at the defendant's
insurance company, and that she could produce her daughter, who could testify
to what she overheard. Plaintiff also offered to look for any notes that she may
have made while communicating with insurance representatives. The judge
explained, however, that the time to produce evidence was at the trial, not at
some time in the future.
The judge then rendered his findings of fact and conclusions of law. In
finding that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof, the judge rejected
plaintiff's testimony about what insurance representatives may have told her on
the phone because those individuals did not present certifications or testify at
the trial. The judge found that there were no corroborating documents
confirming conversations with those representatives and no proof that defendant
received or cashed the check.
On appeal, plaintiff raises the following arguments:
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[POINT I]
THE [JUDGE] ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
REQUEST FOR RESCHEDULING ANOTHER
COURT HEARING SO SHE COULD BRING
EVIDENCE TO PROVE DEFENDANT HAD
RECEIVED THE PAYMENT OF $1[,]185.12
INTENDED FOR HIS DAUGHTER'S EYE
SURGERY. A JUDGMENT BASED ON LIES IS NOT
A FAIR AND JUST ONE.
[POINT II]
THE JUDGMENT IS BASED ON THE FALSE
ASSUMPTION THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT
RECEIVE THE CHECK OF $1[,]185.12, BUT HE
DID.
We afford a deferential standard of review to the factual findings of the
trial court on appeal from a bench trial. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins.
Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974). These findings will not be disturbed
unless they are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the
competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests
of justice." Id. at 484 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Fagliarone v.
Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)). However, our
review of a trial court's legal determinations is plenary. D'Agostino v.
Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.
Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
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There is no basis to re-open the trial or set aside the judge's factual
findings. He had the opportunity to observe the parties' testimony and found
that plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proof. At trial, plaintiff did not
establish that defendant received an insurance check earmarked for his estranged
daughter's eye surgery expense, or that he cashed such a check and deposited it
into his own account, or that he was contractually obligated to give plaintiff that
money. And from plaintiff's contentions on appeal, she does not explicitly argue
otherwise.
Rather, plaintiff maintains—like she did at trial—that she did not produce
evidence at trial because defendant "misled [her] on purpose" into believing that
he would admit receiving and cashing the check. She infers this because before
appearing for trial, defendant purportedly never disputed having done so. She
therefore believed he would admit these things. Instead, she asserts that
defendant lied to the judge, which then "caught [her] by surprise [,]" leading to
her appearing at trial unprepared to prove her case. Under these circumstances,
there was no reason to re-schedule the trial.
Defendant testified he had no recollection of receiving the check or
cashing it. The judge could have found defendant was not credible, but he
accepted that testimony knowing that the parties had a contentious relationship.
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We cannot second guess the judge's assessment of the parties' testimony, since
plaintiff conceded she lacked sufficient proof to establish her breach of contract
claim.
Affirmed.
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