ROBERT J. TRIFFIN VS. ATTORNEY TRUST ACCOUNT OF THE LAW OFFICES OF RAMON CAMEJO (DC-004559-18, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4966-18T3
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ATTORNEY TRUST
ACCOUNT OF THE LAW
OFFICES OF RAMON A.
CAMEJO and
OSRIC J. SPIVEY,
Defendants-Respondents.
__________________________
Submitted November 2, 2020 – Decided November 19, 2020
Before Judges Sabatino and Currier.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Docket No. DC-004559-18.
Robert J. Triffin, appellant pro se.
Respondents have not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin, the assignee of a dishonored check in the
amount of $1,625.14, appeals the Special Civil Part's final judgment dated
October 17, 2019, dismissing his claims against the drawer of that check. Triffin
contends the trial court misapplied the New Jersey version of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC"), in finding the drawer was not liable to pay him the
amount of the check.
We affirm the dismissal for the sound reasons set forth by Judge John G.
Hudak in his post-trial oral opinion dated May 9, 2019. As described by the
judge, the uncontroverted business records presented at trial by the drawer show
the drawer's bank account had already been debited the check amount before the
check was presented to Triffin's assignor. Under those circumstances, N.J.S.A.
12A:3-414(c) clearly discharges the drawer from liability. That provision
instructs that "[i]f a draft is accepted by a bank, the drawer is discharged,
regardless of when or by whom acceptance was obtained." Ibid.
The arguments Triffin raises under other UCC provisions in an effort to
negate the discharge mandated by Section 3-414(c) are clearly without merit and
do not warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
We need not comment here on whether Triffin would have had remedies
against other parties, including but not limited to the payee named on the check
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(who Triffin was unable to serve with process) or the banks that processed the
transactions, other than to say they are beyond the scope of this appeal.
Affirmed.
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