STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WAQAS IBRAR (16-07-2059, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4855-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WAQAS IBRAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued September 15, 2020 – Decided November 25, 2020
Before Judges Fisher, Moynihan, and Gummer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 16-07-2059.
James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; James K. Smith, Jr., of
counsel and on the briefs).
Erin M. Campbell, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Esther Suarez, Hudson County
Prosecutor, attorney; Erin M. Campbell, on the brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
Found guilty by jury on two counts of the second-degree vehicular
homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(a), of Tyler Sellers and Sabore Worell, who were
struck and killed by the car he was driving (defendant's car) as they crossed
Route 440 (the highway) at a traffic-controlled intersection, defendant Waqas
Ibrar appeals from those convictions, arguing:
IN A CASE WHERE CAUSATION WAS THE
MAJOR ISSUE . . . DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A
FAIR TRIAL BY THE STATE'S ACCIDENT
RECONSTRUCTION EXPERT'S OPINION
TESTIMONY THAT, BASED UPON HIS
INTERPRETATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE
STATUTE, THE [DECEDENTS'] DISREGARD OF
THE TRAFFIC SIGNALS WAS "NOT A FACTOR IN
THE CRASH." (Not Raised Below) THE ERROR
WAS NOT CORRECTED BY THE JURY CHARGE,
WHICH FAILED TO GIVE THE JURORS
GUIDANCE ON THE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES
OF PEDESTRIANS ENTERING A CROSSWALK.
A. The Expert Testimony.
B. The Jury Charge And Summations.
C. It Was Improper For The State's Expert To
Give A Legal Opinion That Under "Title
39," The [Decedents] Had The Right Of
Way Notwithstanding The "Don't Walk"
Signal, And That Their Disregard Of The
Traffic Signal [W]as "Not A Factor" In The
Crash.
A-4855-17T1
2
D. The Error Was Not Corrected When The
Judge Simply Read Two Sections Of
[N.J.S.A.] 39:4-32 To The Jury In His
Charge Without Explaining How The Laws
Governing Pedestrians Crossing
Intersections Applied In This Case.
In his pro se brief, defendant adds:
[DEFENDANT'S] RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS
PREJUDICED BY THE PROSECUTOR'S
ELICITATION OF IMPROPER TESTIMONY FROM
THE STATE'S ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION
EXPERT AND BY THE PROSECUTOR'S
IMPROPER COMMENTS DURING SUMMATION.
Unpersuaded, we affirm.
At trial, the jury considered evidence proffered in support of the parties'
varied theories on the cause of the accident. The State's accident reconstruction
expert,1 Sergeant Bruce Miller, expressed the State's theory that the passenger
side of defendant's car struck the decedents while they were in the center lane
of the southbound side as they lawfully finished crossing the highway, where
the speed limit was incorrectly posted at forty miles per hour, though the actual
speed limit was fifty miles per hour. Defendant argued the decedents' crossing
against the traffic signal was an intervening cause.
1
Following the assistant prosecutor's voir dire, defendant did not object when
the State offered its witness as an expert.
A-4855-17T1
3
Miller examined defendant's car, viewed, photographed and diagramed
the crash scene, met with the officers who responded to the crash scene and
reviewed their reports and photographs, as well as video footage of the crash
and a crash data retrieval (CDR) report of information retrieved from the event
data recorder (EDR) recovered from defendant's car. He testified as to
defendant's car's speed, engine RPMs, accelerator and brake compression and
steering at various times relative to the deployment of the car's airbags . We
synopsize that testimony in table form:
TRG2 (in speed accelerator RPMs brake steering3
seconds) (mph) pedal
-4.7 110.6 compressed 5500 off +1.5
100%
-4.2 110.6 100% 5500 off +1.5
-3.7 110.0 95% 5400 off +3.0
-3.24
-2.7 108.7 100% 5100 off +3.0
2
Miller testified these letters stood for "[t]riggering of the airbag"; the time in
seconds relates to the time the airbag triggered.
3
Miller explained this figure was the number of degrees in which the car was
being steered. A positive reading means the car was being steered toward the
driver side, a negative reading meant steering toward the passenger side.
4
At trial, -3.2 seconds was noted as a TRG entry, but the assistant prosecutor
did not ask Miller about any measurements specifically relating to it.
A-4855-17T1
4
-2.2 107.5 100% 5100 off +4.5
-1.7 106.3 100% 4900 off +3.0
-1.2 105.6 13% 5200 off +4.5
-0.7 105 0% 4900 off -4.5
-0.2 99.4 0% 4300 on +45.0
0.0 96.9 0% 4100 on +36.0
Miller said he deduced defendant had not applied the brake at -0.2
seconds, but had removed his foot from the accelerator at -1.2 seconds, the point
at which he testified defendant likely saw the decedents, as also evidenced by
the car's "rock in the steering wheel" followed by its swerve to the left. Miller
also opined that pedestrian collisions do not usually trigger airbags, and that th e
airbags deployed in defendant's vehicle when he struck the guardrail after he
struck the decedents.
From the video, Miller perceived both decedents in the crosswalk at
"about the midway point . . . on the other side of the . . . metal guardrail . . . that
divides . . . the north and southbound lanes" of the highway. He calculated their
walking speed at 3.75 feet per second using the time elapsed on the video's clock
and the measurements of the crash site. Using that speed as a constant, he
A-4855-17T1
5
calculated that 13.86 seconds elapsed from the time the decedents entered the
highway from the eastern side and crossed "three lanes of northbound traffic to
[the point] where they were struck." Based on the speed of defendant's vehicle
at the point of impact—105 miles per hour—he also calculated defendant's car
was 2153 feet from the point of impact when the decedents entered the
crosswalk.
Miller obtained from the New Jersey Department of Transportation the
schematic for the traffic-control devices for the intersection, including the
position and duration of three-cycle pedestrian signals: seven-second white
"walk," thirty-one-second flashing red "don't walk" and seven-second steady red
"don't walk" signals. He calculated the decedents entered the crosswalk "as the
signal went to . . . flashing."
Miller testified when "[t]he walk is white, you can enter the crosswalk.
When it's steady, you're not allowed by law to enter the crosswalk[,]" and when
it is flashing, "[y]ou can still enter the crosswalk." He continued his colloquy
with the assistant prosecutor:
[Assistant prosecutor:] And, if you're in the crosswalk
during that flashing sign, are you allowed, by the law,
to continue to cross?
[Miller:] Yes, you are.
A-4855-17T1
6
[Assistant prosecutor:] Okay. And, what is specifically
the law in that regard?
[Miller:] It is [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-32 I believe. [N.J.S.A.]
39:4-32[(c)], as in Charlie.
[Assistant prosecutor:] All right. I'm going to show you
joint exhibit S-140. You just mentioned a New Jersey
motor vehicle statute. And, . . . is that the statute that
you were referring to?
[Miller:] Yes, it is.
[Assistant prosecutor:] And, is [(c)] located in that
statute?
[Miller:] Yes, it is.
[Assistant prosecutor:] Move to publish, Your Honor,
S-140.
[The trial court:] Any objection? It's agreed to?
[Defendant's attorney:] No objection.
Miller then read aloud N.J.S.A. 39:4-32(c), which provides: "A pedestrian
crossing or starting across [the] intersection on a [']go['] or green signal, but who
is still within [the] crosswalk when the signal changes, shall have the right of
way until the pedestrian has reached the opposite curb or place of safety."
Defense counsel objected when the assistant prosecutor asked Miller what
"place of safety" meant, prompting the trial court to conduct a N.J.R.E. 104
hearing.
A-4855-17T1
7
Miller testified at the hearing that The Manual of Uniform Traffic Control
Devices (the Manual) is used by law enforcement to determine a "place of
safety," but could not confirm that the Manual designated a center median in a
roadway as such. After the hearing, the trial court agreed with defense counsel's
argument that Miller could not testify that, as a matter of law, the median barrier
was not a place of safety. Defense counsel, however, "one-hundred percent"
accepted that Miller could testify that the decedents had the right to get "all the
way across" to the other side of the highway once they entered the crosswalk
because "the law says they're entitled to go to the other end" of the crosswalk,
telling the trial court he would "cross-examine [Miller] on that." Defense
counsel said he was "not even going to suggest that [the decedents were]
required to stop at [the] barrier."
The next trial day, Miller opined defendant's speed and lack of control
were contributing factors to the crash, but the decedents' actions were not a
factor because "they were in the crosswalk. They were at the halfway mark
when the signal changed to 'don't walk.' And according to [N.J.S.A. 39:4-32(c)],
if they're in the crosswalk once the signal changes, they have the right of way to
make it to the opposite curb."
A-4855-17T1
8
Defendant now argues Miller "testified that based on his interpretation of
[N.J.S.A. 39:4-32(c)], the [decedents] had the right of way even after having
entered the crosswalk in the face of a flashing '[d]on't [w]alk' signal," thus
improperly giving a legal opinion to the jury—an area beyond the scope of his
expertise—thereby denying defendant's right to a fair trial.
Although we review a trial court's rulings on evidence for abuse of
discretion, Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382
(2010), including the grant or denial of an application to preclude expert
testimony, Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52-53 (2015), here defendant did
not object to Miller's opinion that the decedents had the right of way according
to his interpretation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-32(c). Hence, we heed our Supreme
Court's directive that,
except in extraordinary circumstances, a claim of error
will not be entertained unless it is perfectly clear that
there actually was error. In other words, if upon a
timely objection a different or further record might
have been made at the trial level, and the claim of error
might thereby have been dissipated, we will neither
reverse on an assumption that there was error nor
remand the matter to explore that possibility.
[State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 333 (1971).]
Nor will we reverse unless the error was "of such a nature as to have been clearly
capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. In the context of a jury trial,
A-4855-17T1
9
relief will be afforded when the possibility of an unjust result is "sufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a resul t it
otherwise might not have reached." Macon, 57 N.J. at 336.
Recognizing that it is the court's function, not that of an expert, to interpret
the law, Bedford v. Riello, 392 N.J. Super. 270, 278 (App. Div. 2007), modified
on other grounds, 195 N.J. 210 (2008), we determine Miller did not interpret the
law. Like defendant's accident reconstruction expert, Robert Klingen, Miller
cited an authority as the basis for his opinion that decedents had the right of way
when crossing the highway. 5
Neither expert gave an opinion about what the law was as much as they
gave opinions based on their perceptions of what the law was. And Miller was
well-crossed about his reliance on the statute in forming his opinion. As
defendant states in his merits brief, "[w]hen asked [on cross-examination] about
the conclusions in his report that 'driver actions [were a] major cause' and
'[p]edestrian actions [were] not a factor,' Miller agreed that his conclusions were
5
Klingen was asked on direct examination, "[b]ased upon your understanding
of the law, would a pedestrian be permitted to enter the intersection from the
curb during this flashing [']don't walk ['] signal?" Klingen answered, "[n]o," and
explained his answer was based on the Manual, and that "[t]he flashing [']don't
walk['] . . . means you cannot enter the crosswalk at that point. And it's just
letting you know the signal is about to change and it allows you to complete
your crossing if you've already started."
A-4855-17T1
10
based 'on the fact that [he] found that the right of way was violated by the
driver'"; and he explained "that his conclusion was based on the speed of the
driver as set forth in the EDR report and the 'timing sequence of the light'" ; and
when asked "where [he] got authority for his testimony that 'when you enter the
[']
intersection on the flashing don't walk ['] . . . you're permitted to enter the
intersection and cross,' Miller responded, 'Title 39.'"
During summation, defense counsel stressed the importance of Miller's
faulty perception of the law to his conclusion: He "had to give you that the
right-of-way was in the favor of the pedestrians . . . because otherwise causation
becomes a serious problem [for the State]." Counsel continued, rhetorically
asking the jury: "What was his interpretation of what he saw and what he was
able to conclude from the evidence that he had? He said three things." Among
the State's expert's assumptions defense counsel delineated was: "The law says
that pedestrians can enter the crosswalk on a flashing [']don't walk.[']" Counsel
then played back Miller's testimony on that point, including Miller's concession
that the Manual provided "[a] flashing upward hand symbolizing a [']don't walk[']
signal indicates . . . that a pedestrian shall not start to cross the roadway" and
contrasted that testimony to the replayed testimony of Klingen.
A-4855-17T1
11
We disagree with defendant's contention that Miller rendered an opinion
on the law. The fact that the trial court did not sua sponte prohibit Miller from
including his interpretation of the traffic statute as a basis for his opinion on the
factors that caused the accident did not amount to plain error. The judge need
not have, and should not have, struck what defendant claimed to be Miller's
"incorrect" testimony that the pedestrians had the right of way. As defense
counsel told the jury in summation: "[Y]ou ultimately have to determine who
had the right[-]of[-]way." It was left for the jury to consider what caused the
accident.6
As the jury in this case was instructed, whether the expert's reliance on,
and understanding of, the law on which his opinion was based was correct was
a decision it had to make in determining "whether the facts on which the answer
or testimony of [the] expert is based actually exist"; the jury's acceptance or
rejection of the expert testimony depended, to some extent, upon its "findings
as to the truth of the facts relied upon." See Model Jury Charges (Criminal),
"Expert Testimony" (rev. Nov. 10, 2003).
6
Defendant does not argue that Miller improperly testified that defendant's
conduct was the proximate cause of the accident, see Kreis v. Owens, 38 N.J.
Super. 148, 155-56 (App. Div. 1955), or improperly compared defendant's
negligence to that of the decedents, see Nesmith v. Walsh Trucking Co., 123
N.J. 547, 548-49 (1991).
A-4855-17T1
12
Defense counsel's decision to allow the State's expert to testify about the
law without objection, and his examination of the defense expert's perception of
the law, also evokes our Supreme Court's ruling that when counsel acquiesces
to a "mistake" or "error" at trial, such as the introduction of otherwise
inadmissible evidence, that mistake is generally no longer a basis on appeal.
State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013). "[I]f a party has 'invited' the error, he
is barred from raising an objection for the first time on appeal." Ibid.Defense counsel's extensive cross-examination of Miller, his introduction
of expert testimony contravening the State's expert and his emphasis of the
experts' contrasting theories appear part of a plan to discredit the State's
evidence which included defendant's operation of his car at speeds in excess of
100 miles per hour that resulted in a horrific collision with the decedents, whose
bodies were thrown 148.68 feet and 135.67 feet, respectively, from the
crosswalk.7 Any error—which we do not suggest occurred—is disqualified
under the invited-error doctrine because defendant "induced, encouraged in or
consented to" it, see ibid., and he cannot now "manipulat[e] the system" and lead
the court into error in pursuit of a failed trial tactic, see id. at 561-62.
7
Worrell's severed leg came to rest 212.47 feet from the area of impact.
A-4855-17T1
13
Defendant also argues the trial court's jury instructions "fail[ed] to address
the contested issue" of whether the decedents, "who had entered the crosswalk
on a flashing '[d]on't [w]alk' signal, still had the right[-]of[-]way." Specifically,
defendant contends the trial court should have instructed the jury (1) on that
section of the Manual that proscribes pedestrians from starting across a roadway
on a flashing "don't walk" signal, but allows pedestrians to continue crossing if
they started to cross on a steady walk signal, and (2) on N.J.S.A. 39:4-32(d),
which provides: "No pedestrian shall leave a curb or other place of safety and
walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for
the driver to yield or stop."
Although defendant relies on State v. Parkhill, 461 N.J. Super. 494 (App.
Div. 2019), in which we held the trial court committed plain error by failing to
fully instruct the jury on causation and the motor vehicle provision regulating
pedestrian crossings outside a crosswalk, id. at 497, the trial court in this case
delivered both prongs of the causation instruction to the jury, see id. at 503-04,
as well as instructions on N.J.S.A. 39:4-32(a) and (c), both of which regulate
pedestrian crosswalk crossings. Indeed, defense counsel anticipated the
instructions and addressed both prongs in summation.
A-4855-17T1
14
Reading the charge as a whole, see State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 207
(2008), the instruction allowed the jury to consider whether "but-for"
defendant's conduct the decedents' deaths would not have occurred and whether
the decedents' volitional act of crossing the highway rendered the result of
defendant's actions "too accidental in its occurrence or too dependent on
another's volitional act to have a just bearing on [defendant's] liability." See
State v. Eldridge, 388 N.J. Super. 485, 500 (App. Div. 2006) (emphasis in
original); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c).
We agree with the trial court's decision not to include the Manual's
provisions in the charge. It was not the law. Defendant's expert cited the
Manual, published by the United States Department of Transportation, Federal
Highway Administration, to discredit the State's expert. The trial court correctly
refused to give the Manual status by quoting it, an act that would have invaded
the jury's province to analyze the experts' bases of opinion.
We also determine the statutes the trial court quoted in its charge amply
provided the jury with the law necessary to determine who had the right-of-way.
Subsection (a) pertained to the prohibition against crossing against a stop signal
at a crosswalk. Subsection (c) pertained to pedestrians "crossing or starting
across the intersection on a 'go' or green signal." Because the decedents were
A-4855-17T1
15
already in the highway—whether it was against or with a traffic signal—
subsection (d) is inapposite because it pertains to pedestrians leaving a curb or
other place of safety and walking into the path of a vehicle that is so close so as
to make stopping or yielding impossible. Those were not the circumstances of
this case.8
The balance of defendant's arguments regarding the jury charge are
without sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). The trial court
was not required to make defendant's arguments in charging the jury. See State
v. Pleasant, 313 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 1998), aff'd, 158 N.J. 149(1999) ("[A] defendant is not entitled to have the jury instructed in his own
words . . . . He is only entitled to an adequate instruction of the law."). Further,
although defendant argues the trial court's response to the jury's request to
"explain causation"' was insufficient, the court responded to the exact request
made by the jury. See State v. Parsons, 270 N.J. Super. 213, 221 (App. Div.
1994) ("An appropriate judicial response [to a juror's request for clarification]
requires the [trial court] to read the question with care to determine precisely
8
We note that defendant, in his merits brief, acknowledges that although his
counsel proposed that subsection (d) be included in the charge, he added that
they would "deal with" that issue later; we do not see that defendant later raised
the issue or explained why it was applicable.
A-4855-17T1
16
what help is needed [and then respond accordingly]."). The jury did not ask for
"reference[s] to the facts of the case," which defendant contends should have
been included in the court's response.
We fully appreciate a trial court's duty to mold jury instructions to the
facts of the case, Toto v. Ensuar, 196 N.J. 134, 144 (2008), and tailor the charge
to enable the jury to review the evidence in the context of the parties' theories,
Reynolds v. Gonzalez, 172 N.J. 266, 288-89 (2002). But, during the charge
conference, defendant expressed that there was no need for that exercise:
I understand there's language in the model jury charge
that the [c]ourt can supplement each version of the
State's version of the events and the defense version of
the events. Neither one of us are asking the [c]ourt to
do that. So I don't think we need to do that in this
particular case. I think it's pretty clear what both sides
are arguing.
Finally, in his pro se brief defendant argues the assistant prosecutor's
summation deprived defendant of a fair trial because he: misrepresented and
mischaracterized the defense expert's testimony and disparaged him; provided
the jury with an improper factual example of causation; wrongfully implied and
invited the jury to speculate, without evidential support, defendant was racing;
improperly urged the jury to find defendant guilty because he lied to police; and
implied there was additional evidence to prove defendant's guilt. Defendant
A-4855-17T1
17
argues these averred improprieties cumulatively denied defendant the right to a
fair trial.
We do not discern the same freighted weight to the assistant prosecutor's
remarks as does defendant. The comments were sufficiently related to the
evidence presented at trial and were within the bounds of the considerable
leeway afforded prosecutors in making "vigorous and forceful closing
argument[s] to the jury." See State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 559 (1995).
Just as defense counsel attempted to disparage the State's expert's
causation testimony, the assistant prosecutor attempted to discredit the defense
expert's opinion and basis therefor. In this battle of the experts, we discern no
impropriety in the State's attempt to "balance the scales" regarding the expert
testimony. See State v. Munoz, 340 N.J. Super. 204, 216 (App. Div. 2001). The
assistant prosecutor's comments pertained to the evidence presented and the
rational inferences that could be drawn therefrom.
Defendant also argues the assistant prosecutor's attempt to exemplify
causation misrepresented the law. Defense counsel's objection interrupted the
assistant prosecutor's example of someone throwing a brick from an overpass
onto a speeding car that then crashes into other cars. The assistant prosecutor
never completed that part of his argument, agreeing with the trial court to "move
A-4855-17T1
18
on" with his summation. The trial court instructed the jury that the court was
the sole source of the law and that the jury should disregard any contrary
instruction.
The assistant prosecutor's comment about defendant's friend trailing
behind from the restaurant they simultaneously left prior to the crash pertained
to a portion of defendant's initial statement to police.9 That statement supported
the State's contention that defendant was traveling much faster than his friend
who arrived at the accident site after defendant, contradicting defendant's
statement that his speed was fifty to fifty-five miles per hour. The assistant
prosecutor did not ascribe the nefarious interpretation of that comment advanced
by defendant, that defendant was "engaged in some sort of competitive speeding,
racing[] or other orchestrated untoward activity."
The assistant prosecutor's argument to the jury that if defendant lied to
police about his speed, he is guilty, connected defendant's attempt to evade
responsibility with his consciousness of guilt. The assistant prosecutor prefaced
that remark by stating the untruth was "one last bit of evidence" to meet the
State's burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . The
9
Defendant told police that after eating at the restaurant, they—everyone in his
part—left and that his friend was following him, "going in the same direction."
A-4855-17T1
19
comment, viewed in context, see State v. Darrian, 255 N.J. Super. 435, 454-55
(App. Div. 1992), did not invite jury speculation or suggest unpresented
evidence.
Save for the objection to the assistant prosecutor's causation example,
defendant did not object to the remarks now challenged, "suggest[ing] that
defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they
were made." State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 84 (1999). "The failure to object also
deprive[d] the court of an opportunity to take curative action." Ibid. We
determine none of the assistant prosecutor's remarks warrant reversal because,
individually or cumulatively, they were not so egregious to substantially
prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515,
575 (1996).
The balance of defendant's arguments lacks sufficient merit to warrant
discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
A-4855-17T1
20