DCPP VS. F.P. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.O.B., JR.(FG-09-0248-15, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4533-15T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
F.P.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP
OF A.O.B., JR.,
Minor.
_________________________________
Submitted May 24, 2017 – Decided June 13, 2017
Before Judges Simonelli, Gooden Brown and
Farrington.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson
County, Docket No. FG-09-0248-15.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Anastasia P. Winslow,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Samuel
J. Fillman, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor (Christopher A.
Huling, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant F.P., the biological mother of A.O.B., Jr.
(Andrew),1 born in 2008, appeals from the June 7, 2016 Family Part
judgment for guardianship, which terminated her parental rights
to the child.2 On appeal, defendant contends that the trial judge
erred in finding respondent New Jersey Division of Child Protection
and Permanency (Division) proved all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence. Defendant also contends
that the judge improperly admitted her drug screen results into
evidence, and erred in drawing a negative inference from her
failure to appear at the guardianship trial. We affirm.
We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's
involvement with defendant and her family. Instead, we incorporate
by reference the factual findings set forth in Judge Lourdes I.
Santiago's comprehensive June 7, 2016 written opinion. However,
we add the following comments.
1
Pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d)(12), we use a fictitious name for
the child.
2
Andrew's biological father, O.G.B., died prior to the child's
birth.
2 A-4533-15T3
Defendant has an extensive history of drug abuse. She has
seven other children, two of whom died in infancy, and five of
whom did not remain in her care due to her substance abuse and
mental health history, which includes a diagnosis of bipolar
disorder. In 2007, defendant became involved with the Division
with respect to her eighth child, Andrew, when she was seven months
pregnant and tested positive for heroin and cocaine even while
attending a methadone clinic. Both she and Andrew tested positive
for cocaine at his birth. Following Andrew's release from the
hospital, the Division placed him in a resource home, where he
remained for two years.
A subsequent reunification failed due to defendant's
continued substance abuse. The Division removed Andrew, after
which he was in three separate placements. In February 2014, the
Division placed Andrew with his current resource family, who has
successfully managed his special needs, including a hearing
impairment and diagnosis of attention-deficit-hyperactivity-
disorder, and wants to adopt him.
From the time of Andrew's first removal in 2008 until the
guardianship trial in 2016, defendant's involvement with the
Division was marked by her continued substance abuse despite having
engaged in substance abuse and mental health treatment; non-
compliance with services; refusal to submit to court-ordered drug
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screening; failure to document her alleged need for pain
medication; inconsistent visitation with Andrew; and a failed
reunification. The Division offered defendant a myriad of
services, including psychological and psychiatric evaluations,
multiple substance abuse assessments and treatment programs,
mental health treatment and counseling, parenting skills classes,
homemaker services, assistance with transportation and housing,
and visitation. At least two of the treatment programs defendant
attended addressed co-occurring drug dependency and mental health
issues. However, defendant did not benefit from services and
denied having a substance abuse problem. She eventually ended all
services, including visitation, and failed to appear for the
guardianship trial without providing support for her claim she was
injured as the result of a motor vehicle accident.3
The Division considered, and properly rejected, alternative
relative placement options defendant had offered. This included
an aunt in South Carolina, who was rejected after an evaluation
conducted pursuant to the Interstate Compact on Placement of
Children did not find this placement appropriate for Andrew, and
3
Defendant's attorney represented to Judge Santiago on the first
day of trial that defendant said she had been injured as the result
of a motor vehicle accident, did not want an adjournment, and
requested that the trial proceed without her.
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there was no indication this placement would be in his best
interests.
The expert psychological evidence Judge Santiago found
credible confirmed that defendant's long history of substance
abuse, repeated relapses, non-compliance with services, denial of
a drug abuse problem, and parenting deficiencies rendered her
unable to provide a safe and stable home for Andrew and the delay
of placement would add to the harm Andrew had experienced.
Notably, defendant's expert psychologist admitted defendant was
unable to care for Andrew at the time of the trial or in the
foreseeable future.
The expert bonding evidence Judge Santiago found credible
revealed that Andrew had an insecure attachment and emotionally
detached relationship with defendant, merely viewed her as someone
to accommodate, and did not rely on her to meet his needs. The
expert opined that Andrew has special needs requiring stability
and consistency in order to ensure proper development, defendant
could not meet those needs, and another failed reunification would
put Andrew on a maladaptive pathway, which would impact his
development. The expert concluded that Andrew would not experience
a strong emotional reaction if he was permanently separated from
defendant. Conversely, the expert found that Andrew had secure
attachment with his resource mother and looked to her to meet his
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needs. The expert concluded that Andrew would suffer enduring
harm if removed from his resource family.
Judge Santiago reviewed the evidence presented at the trial,
made detailed factual findings as to each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a), and thereafter concluded the Division met by clear and
convincing evidence all of the legal requirements for a judgment
of guardianship. The judge's opinion tracks the statutory
requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), accords with N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420 (2012), N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88 (2008), In re
Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337 (1999), In re Guardianship
of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365 (1999), and N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986), and is more than amply
supported by the record. F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 448-49.
We reject defendant's argument that the judge improperly
admitted her drug screen results into evidence. The Division
provided a certification, which confirmed the documents concerned
defendant; were made in the regular course of business; and were
made at or about the time of the drug screen reflected therein.
The certification also stated that the documents were in the
custody and control of the certifying supervisor. Accordingly,
the documents were admissible under N.J.R.E. 801(d), N.J.R.E.
803(c)(6), and R. 5:12-4(d). See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
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Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328 (2010) (citation omitted); N.J.
Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. M.G., 427 N.J. Super. 154, 173
(App. Div. 2012).
We have considered defendant's contention that Judge Santiago
erred in drawing a negative inference from her failure to appear
at the guardianship trial in light of the record and applicable
legal principles and conclude it is without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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