ROBERT J. TRIFFIN VS. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS Â HERNANDO COUNTY(DC-7774-15, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1956-15T2
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
HERNANDO COUNTY,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
JOHN GIORDANO and MELISSA
GIORDANO,
Defendants.
—————————————————————————————————————-
Argued March 2, 2017 – Decided June 7, 2017
Before Judges Hoffman and Whipple.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Special Civil Part, Monmouth
County, Docket No. DC-7774-15.
Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause
pro se.
James H. Rohlfing argued the cause for
respondent (Law Offices of William E. Staehle,
attorneys; Jaunice M. Canning, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from the December 8, 2015
Law Division order dismissing his complaint against defendant
Board of County Commissioners Hernando County (the Board) without
prejudice. Plaintiff argues "the trial court committed reversible
error when it . . . dismissed plaintiff's complaint in
contravention of the mandatory venue selection provisions of 15
U.S.C.A. § 1692[i]." Because we conclude this venue selection
statute has no relevance to whether the trial court had personal
jurisdiction over the Board, we reject plaintiff's arguments and
affirm.
I.
The Board, a public entity in the State of Florida, issued a
$176.93 refund check to John and Melissa Giordano of Middletown.
The check concerned a Florida property in Hernando County. The
Giordanos cashed the check with Friendly Check Cashing (Friendly)
in New Jersey. The Board's bank declined to pay the check and
returned it to Friendly because the Giordanos had previously cashed
the check electronically.
Friendly then assigned its rights to plaintiff, who filed
this action against the Giordanos and the Board in Monmouth County.
Only the Board filed an answer, in which it asserted lack of
jurisdiction as a defense. The Board promptly filed a motion to
2 A-1956-15T2
dismiss plaintiff's claims against it based upon lack of personal
jurisdiction, and plaintiff filed his opposition. After hearing
oral argument, the motion court granted the Board's motion and
dismissed plaintiff's claims against the Board without prejudice.
II.
We review a trial court's determination as to jurisdiction
de novo. YA Global Invs., L.P. v. Cliff, 419 N.J. Super. 1, 8
(App. Div. 2011). The court's factual findings, however, will not
be disturbed if "supported by substantial, credible evidence."
Ibid. "[W]e do not disturb the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the trial judge unless . . . they are so manifestly
unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and
reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of
justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J.
474, 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J.
Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)). Nevertheless, we do not defer
to a trial court's application of the law to the facts. Manalapan
Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
New Jersey may exercise long-arm jurisdiction if it comports
with due process of law. R. 4:4-4(b)(1); see also Charles Gendler
& Co. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 469 (1986) (stating
New Jersey courts exercise jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants to the extent permitted by the United States
3 A-1956-15T2
Constitution). To satisfy due process, the exercise of
jurisdiction must be adequate and reasonable; that is, the non-
resident defendant must have (1) sufficient minimum contacts with
the forum state and (2) reliance upon those contacts to establish
personal jurisdiction do not "offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'" Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, 164
N.J. 38, 65 (2000) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102 (1945)).
The "adequacy" of minimum contacts depends on the type of
jurisdiction sought. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
Rules, cmt. 3.1.1. on R. 4:4-4 (2016). "There are two types of
personal jurisdiction: specific and general." Jacobs v. Walt
Disney World Co., 309 N.J. Super. 443, 452 (App. Div. 1998).
Specific jurisdiction is established when a
defendant's acts within the forum-state give
rise to the cause of action. In contrast,
when the defendant's presence in the state is
unrelated to the subject matter of the
lawsuit, general jurisdiction may be obtained
based on the defendant's continuous and
substantial contacts with the forum.
[Ibid. (citations omitted).]
Inquiry into specific jurisdiction centers around "the
relationship [between] the [non-resident] defendant, the forum,
and the litigation." Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J.
317, 323 (1989) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204,
97 S. Ct. 2569, 2579, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683, 698 (1977)). Specifically,
4 A-1956-15T2
"[t]he record must demonstrate that the [non-resident] defendant
has purposefully availed [it]self of the privilege of engaging in
activities within the forum state, thereby gaining the benefits
and protections of its laws." Waste Mgmt. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,
138 N.J. 106, 120-21 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183, 115 S.
Ct. 1175, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1128 (1995); see also Lebel, supra, 115
N.J. at 324 ("The question is whether 'the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.'" (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559,
567, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501 (1980))).
The burden to prove the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts
with the forum state rests with the plaintiff, most readily
accomplished "through the use of 'sworn affidavits, certifications
or testimony.'" Walt Disney World, supra, 309 N.J. Super. at 454
(quoting Catalano v. Lease & Rental Mgmt. Corp., 252 N.J. Super.
545, 547-48 (Law Div. 1991)). Where plaintiff cannot prove
sufficient contacts to establish specific jurisdiction, it makes
the existence of continuous and systematic activity highly
unlikely. Id. at 453 ("[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome the
challenge to general jurisdiction must show substantially more
than mere minimum contacts to establish this form of personal
jurisdiction.").
5 A-1956-15T2
"[T]he venue section of the Federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (Act), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692i, requires that debt
collection actions be filed either in the county where the debtor
lives or in the county where the debtor signed the contract
underlying the debt." Rutgers-The State University v. Fogel, 403
N.J. Super. 389, 391 (App. Div. 2008). However, "for purposes of
section 1692i, venue must be laid in the state judicial unit which
has jurisdiction over the claim, if that unit is smaller than a
county." Id. at 399. More specifically, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692i
states:
(a) Venue. Any debt collector who brings any
legal action on a debt against any consumer
shall—
(1) in the case of an action to enforce
an interest in real property securing the
consumer's obligation, bring such action
only in a judicial district or similar
legal entity in which such real property
is located; or
(2) in the case of an action not
described in paragraph (1), bring such
action only in the judicial district or
similar legal entity—
(A) in which such consumer signed
the contract sued upon; or
(B) in which such consumer resides
at the commencement of the action.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a defines "consumer" as "any natural person
obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt." Consequently,
6 A-1956-15T2
if a defendant is not a natural person, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692i is
irrelevant to a court's jurisdiction over a defendant concerning
a debt collection claim. Moreover, personal jurisdiction is a
distinct legal requirement from venue. See R. 4:4-4 (addressing
in personam jurisdiction); R. 4:3-2 (addressing venue).
Plaintiff argues that because 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692i required
him to file his complaint against the Giordanos in Monmouth County,
the motion court should have found it had jurisdiction over the
Board. This argument clearly lacks merit. While plaintiff
correctly notes he had to file his debt collection claim against
the Giordanos in Monmouth County, see U.S.C.A. § 1692i, he
incorrectly asserts this venue provision enables him to sue a
defendant in a court that lacks personal jurisdiction over it.
See R. 4:4-4(b)(1); Charles Gendler & Co., supra, 102 N.J. at 469;
Fogel, supra, 403 N.J. Super. at 399.
The Board's only contact with New Jersey was the check it
issued to the Giordanos, who then cashed it with a New Jersey
company after previously cashing it electronically. This contact
is inadequate to satisfy "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." Blakey, 164 N.J. at 65 (quoting Int'l Shoe
Co., supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 158, 90 L. Ed. at 102).
Further, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692i is irrelevant to whether the trial
7 A-1956-15T2
court had personal jurisdiction over the Board, which is not a
natural person. See U.S.C.A. § 1692a.
Affirmed.
8 A-1956-15T2