IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF CHERYL ACKERMAN, M.D., LICENSE NO. 25MA06096100 TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND SURGERY IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY (NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS)

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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4389-15T1
IN THE MATTER OF
THE LICENSE OF CHERYL
ACKERMAN, M.D.,
License No. 25MA06096100
TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND
SURGERY IN THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY
________________________________________________________________
Argued February 14, 2017 – Decided July 24, 2017
Before Judges Espinosa and Suter.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Board of
Medical Examiners.
Michael Confusione argued the cause for
appellant Cheryl Ackerman, M.D. (Hegge &
Confusione, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Confusione, of
counsel and on the brief).
Pavithra Angara, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent New Jersey
State Board of Medical Examiners (Christopher
S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Andrea
Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Ms. Angara, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Cheryl Ackerman, M.D., appeals from the denial by the State
Board of Medical Examiners (Board) of her petition to amend a
consent order. We affirm.
Dr. Ackerman is a board-certified dermatologist and
internist, who was licensed to practice medicine in New Jersey in
1994. In January 2011, she was referred to the Board's
Professional Assistance Program (PAP), following a number of
patient complaints. In October 2011, while represented by counsel,
Dr. Ackerman entered into a Private Letter Agreement (PLA) with
the Board in which she agreed to participate in the PAP.
Dr. Ackerman began therapy sessions with a psychologist
pursuant to PAP's directives. However, the Board temporarily
suspended her license in February 2012 after receiving a letter
from PAP's Executive Medical Director expressing his concern about
her fitness to remain in practice and advising that she had failed
to provide required psychiatric reports. After the Board refused
Dr. Ackerman's petitions for reinstatement, she filed an appeal.
We remanded the matter for a hearing before the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ordered Dr. Ackerman to
"undergo updated evaluations and diagnostic testing" with Dr.
Mijail Serruya, a board-certified neurologist. Dr. Serruya found
that Dr. Ackerman did not display signs of "frontotemporal dementia
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or any other active neurodegenerative process." Although certain
aspects of Dr. Ackerman's behavior "could be concerning for frontal
lobe dysfunction," he opined that these aspects were mild. Dr.
Serruya later modified his report following his review of
additional materials. He concluded that a differential diagnosis
of certain symptoms included "an agrammatic primary progressive
aphasia" that could "be related to frontotemporal dementia
processes." Dr. Serruya's recommendations included an updated
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of Dr. Ackerman's brain, a fluoro-
deoxyglucose positron emission tomography (FDG-PET) scan and
follow-up neuropsychology.
Dr. Ackerman, represented by counsel, entered into a consent
order in the OAL that reinstated Dr. Ackerman's license, subject
to certain conditions, which included the following:
[Dr. Ackerman] shall resume the practice of
medicine only in the employ of another
physician approved by the Board and shall not
engage in solo practice absent approval from
the Board. [Dr. Ackerman] shall report to the
Board the name and address of the physician
with whom she is employed. This physician
shall evaluate [Dr. Ackerman's] skills to
practice medicine and report any concerns
regarding [Dr. Ackerman's] practice to the
Board's Medical Director . . . . [Dr.
Ackerman] is permitted to seek Board approval
to practice in a solo setting after she has
practiced in an employment setting for two (2)
years.
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Within ninety (90) days of the entry of this
consent order, [Dr. Ackerman] shall obtain an
FDG-PET scan of her brain. Within ten (10)
days of the scan, a report shall be provided
to [the] Medical Director of the Board, Dr.
Serruya and a neurologist of [Dr. Ackerman's]
choosing who shall be identified to the
Board. . . . If the results of the FDG-PET
scan show marked problems, [Dr. Ackerman]
shall be required to have yearly follow-up
treatment related to such problems, at her own
expense, with a neurologist of her choosing.
[Dr. Ackerman's] failure to obtain the FDG-
PET scan and provide copies of the results
within the time period specified above shall
result in the entry of an Order of automatic
suspension of [Dr. Ackerman's] license without
notice. [Dr. Ackerman] shall have the right
to apply for removal of the automatic
suspension on five (5) days notice but in such
event shall be limited to a showing that
information of her failure to obtain the FDG-
PET scan and/or provide copies of the results
in a timely manner was false.
Within the next twelve (12) months, and at
yearly intervals thereafter, [Dr. Ackerman]
shall arrange for follow-up neurological
examinations with a neurologist of her
choosing. Within thirty (30) days of each
such examination, [Dr. Ackerman's]
neurologist shall provide a full report to the
Board's Medical Director . . . . Prior to
[Dr. Ackerman's] first examination with her
neurologist, [Dr. Ackerman] shall undergo an
MRI (with and without contrast) of her brain.
The results of this scan shall be provided to
[Dr. Ackerman's] neurologist for his/her
evaluation.
[Dr. Ackerman] shall continue to attend
treatment with Ben J. Susswein, Ph.D. Dr.
Susswein shall provide quarterly reports to
the Board's Medical Director . . . regarding
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[Dr. Ackerman's] ongoing fitness to practice
medicine.
In March 2016, with new counsel, Dr. Ackerman filed an
emergent motion with the Board to amend the consent order, seeking
the removal of all restrictions on her medical license and all
prior public Board orders posted on the Board's website, and the
issuance of a declaration that she had complied with all
psychological reporting obligations imposed by the Board and a
guarantee that no further conditions would be placed on her license
and no further psychological testing would be required. She
further asked that if a hearing should become necessary, it be
held in the OAL. The Attorney General opposed the motion.
In April 2016, the Board denied Dr. Ackerman's petition to
amend the consent order. In the order denying her petition, the
Board rejected Dr. Ackerman's contention that the ALJ had directed
the entry of a consent order that reinstated her license without
any restrictions. The Board found the conditions imposed were
reasonable and that the consent order was valid and entered into
with the advice of counsel.
The Board's findings also included a review of Dr. Ackerman's
submissions to the Board, stating her "writings indicate extremely
problematic thought processes," and a "continued inability to
follow the Board's prior direction." The Board stated,
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"[c]ollectively, these issues cause the Board great concern about
the status of [Dr. Ackerman's] mental health, her ability to
control her impulses and her own insight into her condition and
abilities."
The Board also noted that Dr. Ackerman failed to refer to Dr.
Serruya's addendum to his final report, in which he substantially
modified his initial opinion and expressed deep reservations about
her ability to practice medicine. His concern that certain
symptoms could be related to frontotemporal dementia was
consistent with prior diagnoses by other physicians.
The Board reaffirmed its finding that "it is not in the
interest of public safety to permit [Dr. Ackerman] to practice
absent, at the very least, the protections embodied in the
[c]onsent [o]rder to which she agreed."
In March and April 2016, Dr. Ackerman's counsel engaged in
communications with the Attorney General's office, contending she
was unable to secure malpractice insurance. However, only one
rejection letter was submitted as proof. The Deputy Attorney
General referred her attorney to N.J.S.A. 45:9-19.17 and N.J.A.C.
13:35-6.18 for the definition of when malpractice insurance is
"not available" and provided additional direction regarding the
proof necessary to make that showing. The Board represents that
Dr. Ackerman has not made the requisite showing to date.
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In her appeal, Dr. Ackerman argues the Board erred in denying
her request to amend the consent order. She contends she cannot
obtain malpractice insurance or secure employment if her license
is listed as "restricted." She argues the Board can suspend or
revoke her license only upon proof of one of the statutory grounds
set forth in N.J.S.A. 45:1-21, and there is not substantial,
credible evidence in the record to support the Board's claim that
its action is warranted by subsection (i), which permits suspension
or revocation when the physician "[i]s incapable, for medical or
any other good cause, of discharging the functions of a licensee
in a manner consistent with the public's health, safety and
welfare." She also argues the Board's action constitutes
discrimination against her in violation of the Rehabilitation Act,
29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a). We have considered these arguments in light
of the record and applicable law and conclude they lack merit.
Our review of the Board's decision is limited. Circus
Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 9
(2009). We must sustain the agency's action in the absence of "a
'clear showing' that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,
or that it lacks fair support in the record." Ibid. Additionally,
we give "great deference" when an agency interprets a statute
"within its scope of authority." In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1 Et Seq.,
431 N.J. Super. 100, 114-15 (App. Div.) (quoting N.J. Ass'n of
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Sch. Adm'rs v. Schundler, 211 N.J. 535, 549 (2012)), certif.
denied, 216 N.J. 8, and 216 N.J. 363 (2013). "If there is any
fair argument in support of the course taken by the agency or any
reasonable ground for difference of opinion among intelligent and
conscientious officials, the decision" should not be disturbed.
Lisowski v. Borough of Avalon, 442 N.J. Super. 304, 330 (App. Div.
2015) (quoting City of Newark v. Nat. Res. Council in Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 539, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983, 101
S. Ct. 400, 66 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1980), certif. denied, 227 N.J. 374,
and certif. denied, and appeal dismissed, 227 N.J. 380 (2016)).
In this case, the agency action directly implicates the
Board's expertise in the field of medicine. See In re License
Issued to Zahl, 186 N.J. 341, 353 (2006). The Board's order
articulated findings that fell within its superior knowledge
regarding the standard to be applied in determining the fitness
of a physician to practice. The findings were also supported by
specific references to the record before it. In short, there is
no clear showing that the Board's decision was arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable.
Affirmed.
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