IN THE MATTER OF JUSTINE BRANHAM, CITY OF NEWARK(CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1791-15T4
IN THE MATTER OF
JUSTINE BRANHAM, CITY
OF NEWARK.
—————————————————————————
Submitted September 12, 2017 – Decided September 28, 2017
Before Judges Hoffman and Gilson.
On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
Commission, Docket No. 2011-312.
Fusco & Macaluso Partners, LLC, attorneys for
appellant Justine Branham (Amie E. DiCola, on
the brief).
Kenyatta Stewart, Acting Corporation Counsel,
attorney for respondent City of Newark
(Corinne E. Rivers, Assistant Corporation
Counsel, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent Civil Service
Commission (Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney
General, on the statement in lieu of brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Justine Branham, an officer with Newark Police
Department (NPD), appeals from the December 18, 2015 final agency
decision of the Civil Service Commission (Commission), dismissing
her appeal of a six-day suspension from work. The Commission
concluded Branham released her right to pursue the administrative
appeal as part of a settlement of a civil discrimination suit she
had filed against the City of Newark (City). We affirm.
I.
Branham's six-day suspension resulted from an incident that
occurred on May 17, 2010. Following the incident, the NPD deputy
director charged Branham with violating department rules and
regulations, alleging insubordination, failure to take
responsibility for her own actions, and failure to obey orders.
Branham appealed her suspension to the Commission, which
referred the case to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL).
Approximately ten months after Branham appealed her suspension to
the Commission, she filed a discrimination suit in the Law
Division; her complaint included two paragraphs specifically
referencing her six-day suspension. At Branham's request, the OAL
stayed its proceedings pending the outcome of the civil suit.
On November 11, 2013, Branham settled her civil suit for a
sum of money, signing a broadly-worded release (the Release),1
1
The first paragraph of the Release states, in pertinent part:
I release and give up any and all claims and
rights which I may have against you. This
Releases all claims, including those of which
I am not aware and those not mentioned in this
Release. This Release applies to claims
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which made no exception for the pending appeal before the
Commission.
Following the settlement, the City moved for summary decision
in the OAL matter. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that
neither she nor the Commission could enforce the civil settlement
or remand the matter back to the civil court. Accordingly, the
ALJ dismissed the matter for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Upon review, the Commission adopted the ALJ's recommendation
to dismiss the appeal, but based the dismissal on another ground.
The Commission held that it had the ability to determine whether
the terms of a duly executed settlement included the settlement
of the disciplinary appeal. The Commission then found that
Branham's civil settlement included a release of the claims at
issue in the administrative appeal. The Commission therefore
upheld the dismissal of the administrative appeal, which left the
six-day suspension in place. This appeal followed.
II.
Our review of actions by an administrative agency is limited.
In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). We "should not disturb
an administrative agency's determinations or findings unless there
is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2)
resulting from anything which has happened up
to now.
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the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3)
the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In re
Application of Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate
of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008); Circus Liquors, Inc. v.
Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 9-10 (2009).
However, "because questions of law are the province of the judicial
branch, we are in no way bound by an agency's interpretation of a
statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue." Russo
v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27
(2011) (citations omitted). This court "appl[ies] de novo review
to an agency's interpretation of a statute or case law." Ibid.
As a matter of public policy, the courts of this State favor
the enforcement of settlement agreements. Brundage v. Estate of
Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008); see also Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120
N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (holding that settlements will usually be
honored "absent compelling circumstances"). This policy
acknowledges the self-evident "notion that the parties to a dispute
are in the best position to determine how to resolve a contested
matter in a way which is least disadvantageous to everyone."
Jennings v. Reed, 381 N.J. Super. 217, 226-27 (App. Div. 2005)
(quoting Peskin v. Peskin, 271 N.J. Super. 261, 275 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 137 N.J. 165 (1994)); see also Dragon v. N.J.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 405 N.J. Super. 478, 491 (App. Div.)
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(recognizing general ability to settle administrative proceedings)
certif. denied, 199 N.J. 517 (2009). "Consequently, courts 'strain
to give effect to the terms of a settlement wherever possible.'"
Jennings, supra, 381 N.J. Super. at 227 (quoting Dep't of Pub.
Advocate v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 206 N.J. Super. 523, 528
(App. Div. 1985)).
Once the parties agree on the essential terms "and manifest
an intention to be bound by those terms, they have created an
enforceable contract." Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J.
427, 435 (1992). "An agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract
which, like all contracts, may be freely entered into and which a
court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other compelling
circumstances,' should honor and enforce as it does other
contracts." Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25
(App. Div.) (quoting Honeywell v. Bubb, 130 N.J. Super. 130, 136
(App. Div. 1974)), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983). To undo a
settlement agreement, there must be "clear and convincing
evidence" warranting such action. De Caro v. De Caro, 13 N.J. 36,
42 (1953).
Branham makes three arguments. First, she contends that the
administrative appeal is not a claim or right within the meaning
of the release in the civil settlement. Second, she claims that
the disciplinary administrative appeal is not barred by collateral
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estoppel. Finally, she contends that she could not have settled
her administrative matter without the "consent" of her counsel in
the administrative matter. We reject these arguments and conclude
they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add the following comments.
Our plenary review of the Release confirms the plain intention
of the parties to resolve all of Branham's claims, without
exception. There is nothing ambiguous about the language selected
by the parties to memorialize their agreement.
Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the Release, see N.J.S.A. 52:14B-9(d) ("[u]nless precluded by law,
informal disposition may be made of any contested case by
stipulation, agreed settlement, or consent order"), confirm that
Branham released and gave up "any and all claims and rights" which
she had against the City. The parties reached the settlement at
the courthouse, with the benefit of counsel; both attorneys
questioned Branham in open court, confirming that the parties had
reached "a full and final settlement." The Commission properly
enforced the Release in the absence of any proof that it was the
product of fraud, overreaching, or unconscionability.
The Commission, like a court, cannot rewrite contracts to
favor a party, for the purpose of giving that party a better
bargain. Relief is not available merely because enforcement of
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the contract causes oppression, improvidence, or because it
produces hardship to one of the parties. Brunswick Hills Racquet
Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 N.J. 210, 223
(2005). Neither an agency nor a court can "'abrogate the terms
of a contract' unless there is a settled equitable principle, such
as fraud, mistake, or accident, allowing for such intervention."
Id. at 224 (quoting Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v. Middletown
Donut Corp., 100 N.J. 166, 183 (1985)). The record is bereft of
any such evidence.
Affirmed.
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