CAROL LEONARD, ETC. VS. CITY OF NEW BRUNSWICKÂ (L-4433-14, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5560-15T4
CAROL LEONARD, Administrator
Ad Prosequendum and General
Administrator of the Estate
of DEVINE I. NICHOLS, Deceased,
and CAROL LEONARD, Individually,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX, STATE
OF NEW JERSEY,
Defendants.
——————————————————————————————————————
Argued October 17, 2017 – Decided November 14, 2017
Before Judges Hoffman and Gilson.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No.
L-4433-14.
Alan Roth argued the cause for appellant
(Bendit Weinstock, PA, attorneys; Mr. Roth and
Nikhil S. Agharkar, on the briefs).
Mark D. Mory argued the cause for respondent
(Dvorak & Associates, LLC, attorneys; Lori A.
Dvorak, of counsel; Christine Klimczuk, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Carol Leonard, individually and on behalf of the
estate of her deceased son, Devine Nichols, appeals from the July
22, 2016 Law Division order granting the summary judgment dismissal
of her complaint against defendant, the City of New Brunswick (the
City). Plaintiff seeks to hold the City liable for her son's
accidental drowning based upon its ownership and operation of Boyd
Park, an improved property within the city, under the Tort Claims
Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3. Because we agree with the Law
Division that under the TCA, the City is entitled to immunity from
liability as a matter of law, we affirm.
This case arises out of tragic facts. We consider these
facts, and all reasonable inferences from them, in the light most
favorable to plaintiff as the responding party on the City's
summary judgment motion. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
142 N.J. 520, 535 (1995).
On August 5, 2012, eleven-year-old Devine Nichols accompanied
his older sister to Harvey Park. At around 2:30 p.m., Devine's
sister returned home without him, believing he would remain in
Harvey Park to play soccer. Later that evening, a witness
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testified that she was at Boyd Park when she saw Devine and his
friend walking in the middle of the Raritan River, during low
tide. The witness further testified that it began raining heavily
about five minutes after she saw the boys.
The following day, the dead bodies of Devine and his friend
were found in the river. The medical examiner's officer declared
their deaths an accidental drowning.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed this wrongful death action
against the City, the County of Middlesex, and the State.1 The
City denied negligence and asserted immunity under the TCA.
Plaintiff submitted an expert report in which the expert opined
that the park created a dangerous condition in not restricting
access to the river. She also faulted the City for failing to
post warning signs concerning the dangers created by "tidal changes
and resulting strong currents." After the parties conducted
discovery, the City moved for, and the trial court granted, summary
judgment. This appeal followed.
Public entity liability in New Jersey under the TCA is
limited. Polzo v. Cty. of Essex, 209 N.J. 51, 55 (2012).
Generally, a public entity is "immune from tort liability unless
1
In an October 24, 2014 order, the trial court granted the State's
motion to dismiss with prejudice. Plaintiff and the County of
Middlesex stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice, which the
court filed on April 15, 2016.
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there is a specific statutory provision imposing liability."
Kahrar v. Borough of Wallington, 171 N.J. 3, 10 (2002).
The central issue presented concerns the scope of the City's
immunity under the TCA, which governs damage claims against public
entities. Manna v. State, 129 N.J. 341, 346 (1992). Particularly,
the parties dispute the application of N.J.S.A. 59:4-8, which
immunizes public entities from injuries caused by conditions on
their unimproved public properties. Plaintiff argues Devine was
last seen at Boyd Park, and the City was negligent in failing to
install fences or barricades restricting access from Boyd Park
into the river, or warning signs alerting the public to hazardous
conditions. In opposition, the City contends they are immune from
liability because Devine drowned in the Raritan River, which it
maintains is unimproved.
Our review of an order granting summary judgement is de novo,
and we must apply the same standards as the trial court under Rule
4:46. See N.J. Div. of Taxation v. Selective Ins. Co., 399 N.J.
Super. 315, 322 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Prudential Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998)).
Typically, a public entity may be liable for injuries caused
by a condition on its property if plaintiff establishes:
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(1) that the property was in a dangerous
condition at the time of the accident, (2)
that there was proximate cause between the
injury and dangerous condition, (3) that the
dangerous condition created a reasonably
foreseeable risk of the kind of injury that
was incurred[,] and (4) that the public entity
had notice in sufficient time to protect
against the condition or that the condition
had been created by an act or omission of a
public employee acting within the scope of his
[or her] employment.
[Brown v. Brown, 86 N.J. 565, 575 (1981); See
also N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.]
N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 also requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
public entity's conduct was "palpably unreasonable." See Muhammad
v. N.J. Transit, 176 N.J. 185, 195 (2003).
The TCA qualifies these liability-imposing principals with
specific immunities, including those set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:4-8
and N.J.S.A. 59:4-9. Both of these immunities cover "unimproved"
public property or waterways. Public property remains unimproved
unless the property has been substantially, physically modified
from its natural state, "and when the physical change creates
hazards that did not previously exist and that require management
by the public entity." Troth v. State, 117 N.J. 258, 269-70
(1989).
Specifically, N.J.S.A. 59-4:8 mandates that:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee
is liable for an injury caused by a condition
of any unimproved public property, including
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but not limited to any natural condition of
any lake, stream, bay, river or beach.
Similarly, N.J.S.A. 59:4-9 provides a related immunity for
injuries caused by the condition of unimproved portions of
"submerged lands" and the "beds of navigable rivers":
Neither a public entity nor a public employee
is liable for any injury caused by a condition
of the unimproved and unoccupied portions of
the tidelands and submerged lands, and the
beds of navigable rivers, streams, lakes,
bays, estuaries, inlets and straits owned by
the State.
Our Supreme Court has noted the TCA's unimproved-property
immunity serves "the legislature's avowed purpose of encouraging
the public to use unimproved recreational property at its own
risk." Troth, supra, 117 N.J. at 272. "Underlying these
determinations is the New Jersey Legislature's policy judgment
that the public should be permitted to use unimproved public
property in its natural condition, but under the cloak of
immunity." Kowalsky v. Long Beach Twp., 72 F.3d 385, 388 (3d Cir.
1995).
Here it is important to first identify the relevant property
in order to determine whether it remains unimproved. Plaintiff
argues the relevant property is Boyd Park because circumstantial
evidence demonstrates Devine was in the park the day preceding his
death, and the park allows "easy access to the Raritan River."
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The City counters that the relevant property is the Raritan River,
which caused Devine to drown.
We measure the relevant property in terms of the accident's
situs. See id. at 389-90. From our review, the record clearly
establishes that the Raritan River caused Devine's death, thereby
making it the relevant property. To hold otherwise would
impermissibly broaden the scope of N.J.S.A. 59:4-8.
We next turn to whether the Raritan River was improved,
thereby rendering it outside of the scope of N.J.S.A. 59:4-8.
Although plaintiff correctly asserts Boyd Park is an improved
property,2 she fails to demonstrate improvement to the Raritan
River, such that it would qualify as an improved public property.
As the motion judge aptly noted, "the fact that Boyd Park is
improved land in parts does not make the river an improved part
of the property."
To the extent that Devine's drowning might have been produced,
in part, by the condition of the river bed below the water itself,
N.J.S.A. 59:4-9 separately insulates the City from liability for
such a dangerous condition within "submerged lands." N.J.S.A.
2
According to the City, "Boyd Park contains a playground,
amphitheater, tow path for jogging, walking and riding, and a boat
dock operated by the County of Middlesex."
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59:4-9 therefore provides an additional basis for immunity here,
particularly since no one witnessed the actual drowning.
Therefore, examining the totality of plaintiff's evidence,
we conclude "a reasonable jury could not find that [Devine's]
accident occurred on property [that] is 'improved' under N.J.S.A.
59:4-8." Kowalsky, supra, 72 F.3d at 390. Plaintiff fails to
demonstrate a disputed genuine issue of material fact.
Accordingly, we affirm the motion court's grant of summary
judgment.
Affirmed.
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