A.L. VS. SHARON RYAN MONTGOMERY, PSY.D. (L-3195-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1630-15T4
A.L.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHARON RYAN MONTGOMERY, PSY.D.,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________________
Argued telephonically November 1, 2017 –
Decided November 17, 2017
Before Judges Simonelli and Haas.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-
3195-15.
Adrian E. Bermudez argued the cause for
appellant (Mr. Bermudez, attorney; A.L., on
the pro se brief).
Christina M. Scarpa argued the cause for
respondent (Giblin, Combs, Schwartz &
Cunningham, LLC, attorneys; Ms. Scarpa, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
This is the fifth time plaintiff A.L. has been before this
court in connection with his long-running dispute with his former
spouse over parenting time with their three children, only one of
whom is still under the age of eighteen. In this case, plaintiff
filed a complaint in the Law Division seeking damages against
defendant, a court-appointed psychologist in the Family Part post-
judgment proceedings, because he was unhappy with a report the
psychologist prepared at the request of the judge in that
proceeding.
In this appeal, plaintiff challenges the Law Division's
November 5, 2015 order granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment and dismissing plaintiff's complaint after the court
found that defendant was protected by judicial immunity under P.T.
v. Richard Hall Community Mental Health Center, 364 N.J. Super.
546 (Law Div. 2000), aff’d o.b., 364 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div.
2003), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 150 (2004).1 We affirm.
The parties are fully familiar with the facts and lengthy
procedural history of this litigation and, therefore, only a brief
summary as set forth in our earlier opinions is necessary here.
Plaintiff and K.L. married in 1993, and divorced in 2004. K.L.
v. A.L., (K.L. I), Nos. A-5645-09 and A-3401-10 (App. Div. Apr.
1
Plaintiff also appeals from the Law Division's October 15, 2015
order, denying his request to file a reply to one of defendant's
submissions on the summary judgment motion. We conclude that
plaintiff's contentions regarding this order are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
2 A-1630-15T4
16, 2012) (slip op. at 2-3), certif. denied, 212 N.J. 1999 (2012).
They have three children, born in 1995, 1997, and 2000. Id. at
3. At the time of the divorce, K.L. and plaintiff agreed to share
joint legal and physical custody of the children, with each parent
spending equal parenting time with them. Ibid.
K.L. remarried in 2007. Id. at 4. Around that time, the
shared parenting time arrangement began to disintegrate. Ibid.
Plaintiff asserted that K.L. and her husband were "engag[ing] in
a campaign to alienate the children from him." Ibid. K.L.
disputed plaintiff's line of attack, and alleged that after
plaintiff lost his job and she remarried, plaintiff "focused his
frustration on the children and 'instituted an overly harsh,
disciplinarian parenting style that the children were unfamiliar
with.'" Ibid.
Several Family Part judges addressed the multiple post-
judgment motions the parties thereafter filed. K.L. v. A.L.,
(K.L. III), Nos. A-2952-12 and A-1623-13 (App. Div. Nov. 10, 2014)
(slip op. at 5), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 220 (2015).2 With the
consent of plaintiff and K.L., the judge handling the post-judgment
motions then being considered appointed defendant "on June 4,
2
Following the example set in our prior opinions, because we have
no reason to distinguish among the Family Part judges involved,
we do not.
3 A-1630-15T4
2008, to conduct a 'best interest evaluation regarding parenting
time and custody.'" K.L. I, supra, (slip op. at 4). After
interviewing family members and other collateral sources,
administering psychological tests, and reviewing court documents
and correspondence between family members, defendant submitted a
ninety-eight page report to the judge on June 20, 2009. Id. at
5-6. Among other things, defendant recommended that plaintiff and
K.L. continue to share joint legal and physical custody of the
children, continue psychotherapy with their children, and continue
to work with a parenting coordinator.3 Id. at 6.
When the disputes between plaintiff and K.L. also continued,
and in the face of additional post-judgment motions, the parties
consented to have the judge again appoint defendant to "evaluate
and make recommendations regarding [A.L.'s] recent allegations of
parental alienation, as well as the [parents'] acknowledgment that
the psychiatrist appointed [by the judge in an earlier order was]
no longer involved with the family." Id. at 9. The judge's
October 18, 2011 order appointing defendant instructed her to
3
After we issued our decision in Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J.
Super. 184, 205 (App. Div. 2012), in which we concluded that
parenting coordinators should only be appointed if both parties
consent, the judge in this case determined it was no longer
appropriate to require the parties to use a parenting coordinator
because plaintiff declined to consent. K.L. v. A.L., (K.L. II),
No. A-1582-11 (App. Div. Apr. 8, 2013) (slip op. at 2-4).
4 A-1630-15T4
"review the present assertions of [plaintiff] since her [first]
report was issued and to make any further recommendations she
deems appropriate[.]" The order also directed plaintiff and K.L.
to cooperate with defendant during her evaluation. See K.L. III,
supra, (slip op. at 14).
During that period, plaintiff and K.L. were battling over
plaintiff's holiday parenting time and, in light of their ongoing
allegations against each other, the judge decided to conduct a
plenary hearing after defendant provided her report. Id. at 15-
16. Defendant completed her sixty-three page written report on
July 8, 2012 and submitted it to the court. Id. at 17. Once
again, defendant based her recommendations on her "interviews of
family members and the professionals involved with the family[,]"
together with a review of pertinent documents. Id. at 25.
In her report,
[defendant] found that both parents failed to
appreciate the impact that the litigation and
their inability to accept any responsibility
for their own contributions to the problem had
on their children. With [K.L.], it was not
so much what she did but what she did not do,
and with [plaintiff], it was his pursuit of
equal parenting time that led him to lose
sight of the children and what his effort to
achieve equal time was doing to them.
. . . .
[Defendant's] recommendations included
referral to a therapist for "therapeutic
5 A-1630-15T4
mediation" to address [plaintiff's]
relationship with [the parents'] first child
and develop a parenting plan that the child
could realistically follow; referral of family
members to an "experienced therapist in high-
conflict divorces and in child alignments;"
and possible restructuring of the parenting
plan "to provide greater consistency and
few[er] transitions" given the ages of the
children. With regard to sanctions for non-
compliance, [defendant] suggested a "make-up
time policy."
[Id. at 26-28 (seventh alteration in
original).]
The judge conducted the plenary hearing in July and September
2012. Id. at 17. Although plaintiff retained his own expert, who
prepared a written report that was admitted in evidence, he did
not call the expert as a witness at the hearing. Id. at 17, 45-
46. Plaintiff's attorney also moved defendant's 2009 evaluation
report into evidence. Id. at 22.
The judge provided the parents' attorneys with a copy of
defendant's July 2012 report under a protective order. Id. at 17.
Neither party called defendant as an expert witness at the hearing.
"At the hearing, the judge recognized that the expert reports were
hearsay, admissible subject to cross-examination pursuant to Rule
5:3-3(g). Ibid. He indicated that the reports would be admitted
into evidence as part of the court's record but not considered for
the truth." Id. at 17 n.6.
6 A-1630-15T4
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge entered a series
of orders, including one establishing therapeutic parenting time
between plaintiff and the parents' first child. Id. at 33. In
February 2013, the judge issued several additional orders based
on the parties' persistent litigation. Id. at 36.4
With this history in mind, we now turn to the matter that
forms the basis for the present appeal. On October 22, 2014,
plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in the Law Division,
which he later amended on November 13, 2014. In his eight-count
amended complaint, plaintiff accused defendant of negligence
(count one); gross negligence (count two); breach of contract
(count three); unjust enrichment (count four); and fraud/fraud in
performance (count five), in performing her duties as a court-
appointed psychologist. Plaintiff also asserted that defendant
violated his right to due process (count six), and the New Jersey
Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) (count seven). Alleging that
defendant's "conduct . . . was malicious, willful[,] and wanton[,]"
4
In January 2015, K.L.'s husband filed a petition to adopt K.L.'s
and plaintiff's first child, who was then nineteen years old. In
re Adoption of an Adult by A.S.C., No. A-5447-14 (Mar. 30, 2016)
(slip op. at 2). The child consented to the adoption. Ibid.
After the Family Part judge entered a final judgment of adoption,
plaintiff filed a motion to intervene in the litigation, which the
judge denied. Id. at 2-5. We affirmed, id. at 13-14, and the
Supreme Court denied certification. In re Adoption of an Adult
by A.S.C., 227 N.J. 246 (2016).
7 A-1630-15T4
plaintiff sought punitive and exemplary damages (count eight).
Defendant filed an answer and denied plaintiff's allegations.
Defendant thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment,
asserting, among other things, that she was entitled to judicial
immunity because she prepared her report and recommendations at
the request of the Family Part judge. Following oral argument,
Judge Estela De La Cruz rendered a comprehensive written opinion
on November 5, 2015, granting defendant's motion and dismissing
plaintiff's complaint.5
In finding that defendant was cloaked with judicial immunity
for the work she performed as a court-appointed psychologist for
the Family Part, Judge De La Cruz relied upon then-Judge Helen
Hoens' exhaustive opinion on the subject in P.T., supra, 364 N.J.
Super. at 546, a case with facts that are closely analogous to
those presented here. In P.T., the Family Part appointed a
psychologist "to conduct an evaluation and render a report to the
[c]ourt with recommendations as to [the plaintiff's] further
contact and visitation with his daughter." Id. at 548. The
psychologist "conducted her evaluation and prepared and filed with
the court her formal report and recommendations." Ibid.
5
In her November 5, 2015 order, the judge also denied plaintiff's
motion to amend his pleadings.
8 A-1630-15T4
At some point thereafter, the plaintiff sued the psychologist
in the Law Division alleging, as plaintiff does in this case, that
the court-appointed psychologist failed to consider and apply
certain research, delayed her report, allowed her personal
feelings to influence her recommendations, and fraudulently held
herself out as an expert. Id. at 548-49. The plaintiff also
asserted that the psychologist violated his constitutional rights.
Id. at 549.
In concluding that the psychologist was protected by judicial
immunity, Judge Hoens found that the court-appointed expert
was charged with conducting an evaluation,
with preparing a report of her findings and
with making a recommendation to the court for
its consideration and review. She did so. In
that context, she was not charged with
privately representing a party, in the sense
that a public defender assigned to represent
a litigant is charged with representation as
his or her principal role. Nor is there any
evidence or any suggestion that she did
perform such a role. On the contrary, the
evidence is that her role, like that of the
law guardian, was one which called upon her
to look beyond the concerns of the adult
parties and to look to the best interests of
the child. . . . Her role was to assist the
Family Part with her evaluation and her
recommendations, without regard to the
interests of the adults, much like the
function performed by the law guardian. That
being the case, . . . [the psychologist]
enjoys absolute immunity from litigation in
connection with her duties and her role in
this underlying litigation.
9 A-1630-15T4
[Id. at 555-56 (citation omitted).]
Under these circumstances, Judge Hoens observed "that to deny
the protection of this court-appointed expert would be to exert a
chilling effect on the court itself in the performance of its
functions." Id. at 558-59. Thus, Judge Hoens concluded:
The role played by the psychologist in this
setting is one which that individual must be
free to perform without fear of reprisal by
parties to the proceedings who are, in the
end, disappointed with the result or with the
recommendations provided to the court.
Moreover, it is essential to the proper
functioning of the proceeding in which such
an expert is appointed that the court be able
to rely on the findings and the
recommendations, a result which will not be
served if the experts are unwilling to serve
at all or are reluctant to perform their
assigned task with complete candor. These
concerns transcend the particular litigation
and the interests of the specific parties, for
the role assigned to the expert in this
context is integral to the judicial process.
[Id. at 559.]
Applying these principles to the present case, Judge De La
Cruz found that, like the court-appointed psychologist in P.T.,
defendant was selected by the Family Part to provide her candid
evaluation and assessment of the issues facing plaintiff, K.L, and
their children, so that the judge in that proceeding could make
an informed decision concerning the measures that would further
the best interests of those children. Thus, as in P.T., defendant
10 A-1630-15T4
was appointed to serve the children by providing a candid report
to the judge, and owed no duty to either plaintiff or K.L.
Judge De La Cruz noted that "[p]laintiff's core argument
boils down to nothing more than a preference that [defendant]
should have reached a different conclusion, than the one rendered
in her report." Under these circumstances, the judge concluded
that defendant, "based on her role as a [c]ourt-appointed
psychologist, is afforded [j]udicial [i]mmunity, and any claims
against her based on her role in conducting an evaluation and
rendering a written report are to be dismissed. . . ." 6 This
appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff presents the following contentions:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
CONTROLLING LEGAL PRINCIPLES WHICH PRECLUDE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THE MOVANT REFUSES TO
COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY OR R. 4:46-2 AND A
DISPUTE OVER GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS
EXISTS.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY CONSIDER
AFFIDAVITS OF TWO NATIONALLY NOTED EXPERTS
6
Judge De La Cruz discerned "no conduct on [defendant's] part[]
that [rose] to the level of gross negligence." The judge also
found that plaintiff failed to provide any evidence concerning his
other claims. As the judge observed, defendant "simply conducted
an investigation, made findings, and submitted a report to the
Family" Part judge, who was "not legally bound by the findings or
assertions of" the court-appointed psychologist.
11 A-1630-15T4
SUPPORTING THAT DEFENDANT'S WILLFUL
MISCONDUCT AND OBSTRUCTION OF COURT FUNCTION
IN VIOLATION OF LAW VOIDS IMMUNITY UNDER
STATUTES, PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO NOTE DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM TO CONDUCT A CUSTODY EVALUATION WHEN NO
CUSTODY ISSUE WAS BEFORE THE COURT,
ESTABLISHED A PATTERN OF
FRAUD/MISREPRESENTATION AND THE CLEAR DISPUTE
OF GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT, PRECLUDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO NOTE THAT AN
EXPERT'S STATEMENT THAT DEFENDANT
SUPPRESSED/ALTERED EVIDENCE OF HARM TO
CHILDREN TO A TRIER OF FACT ESTABLISHED ISSUES
OF CREDIBILITY AND THE CLEAR DISPUTE OF
GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT, PRECLUDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
POINT V
A MULTITUDE OF ERRORS SUCH AS CONFLATING THE
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DISMISSAL AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, CONTRADICTORY FINDINGS ON AMENDED
PLEADINGS AND [MISSTATING] RELIEF SOUGHT,
COMPEL REVERSAL OF THE ORDERS DATED OCTOBER
15, 2015 AND NOVEMBER 5, 2015.
Our review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo,
applying the same legal standard as the trial court. Nicholas v.
Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 477-78 (2013). Summary judgment is
appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
12 A-1630-15T4
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c).
We have considered plaintiff's contentions in light of the
record and applicable legal principles and conclude they are
without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Because defendant was a court-
appointed psychologist, charged by the Family Part with assisting
it in determining the best interests of the children, she owed no
duty to plaintiff and was obviously cloaked with judicial immunity
against the type of vexatious litigation plaintiff filed against
her in this case. P.T., supra, 364 N.J. Super. at 560. We are
satisfied that Judge De La Cruz properly granted summary judgment
to defendant, and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed
in her thoughtful and thorough written opinion.
Affirmed.
13 A-1630-15T4