DCPP VS. C.M. AND S.J.IN THE MATTER OF R.C., N.A.J., J.J.-C., S.J.-C.AND S.J.-C.(FN-07-0220-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2414-15T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
C.M.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
S.J.,
Defendant.
____________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF R.C., N.A.J.,
J.J.-C., S.J.-C. and S.J.-C.,
Minors.
_____________________________________
Argued November 8, 2017 – Decided November 21, 2017
Before Judges Fisher and Fasciale.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County,
Docket No. FN-07-0220-15.
Mary Potter, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney; Ms. Potter, on the brief).
Michael Antenucci, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Christopher
S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Andrea
M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Mr. Antenucci, on the brief).
James J. Gross, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for minors (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney; Mr. Gross, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
The Division of Child Protection and Permanency commenced
this Title Nine action against defendant C.M. (Carolyn, a
fictitious name, as are all names used in this opinion), alleging
that in October 2014 she abused or neglected her then six-year-
old child, Samuel, by striking him with a belt. We conclude the
evidence fully supported the trial judge's factual findings, and
we agree with the trial judge that this form of physical punishment
was excessive within the meaning of controlling legal principles.
Title Nine defines an abused or neglected child, in part, as
a child "whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been
impaired" by a parent's failure to "exercise a minimum degree of
care . . . in providing the child with proper supervision or
guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be
inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, including the
infliction of excessive corporal punishment." N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.21(c)(4)(b). This appeal focuses not so much on whether Carolyn
inflicted physical punishment on the six-year-old child with a
2 A-2414-15T3
belt – there seems to be no dispute about that – but whether such
conduct violates the statute's "excessive corporal punishment"
provision.
The judge heard from only one witness during a brief, one-
day evidentiary hearing. That witness, a Division representative,
briefly testified about photographs she took of the child a day
after the abuse. She testified that the photographs, which were
admitted in evidence, revealed the child still retained red marks
on his arms and legs from having been struck by Carolyn with a
belt the day before. The Division representative also testified
that Carolyn admitted inflicting this punishment:
[Carolyn] stated that she held [Samuel's]
hands down and beat him on his hands with the
belt. And she admitted to, also, hitting
[Samuel's twin sister] with the belt. She,
also, stated that she can't believe that she
can't beat her own children.
This punishment, according to the information obtained from
Carolyn by the witness, was inflicted because Samuel misbehaved
by "ripp[ing] up" some "collectible comics."
In addition, the Division representative testified that, in
the aftermath of a February 2014 referral, Carolyn entered into
an agreement not to physically punish her children.1
1
Carolyn argues the existence of this agreement was not proven
because such a document was not moved into evidence. But, the
3 A-2414-15T3
Carolyn did not testify, nor did she call any witnesses.
After hearing summations, the trial judge rendered an oral
decision, finding that events occurred as recounted by the Division
representative. Referring to Carolyn's agreement not to physically
punish her children, and her insistence of a right to "beat her
own children," the judge concluded that Carolyn had used excessive
corporal punishment.
Carolyn appeals the order memorializing this finding of
abuse, arguing:
[SAMUEL] WAS NOT AN "ABUSED OR NEGLECTED
CHILD" DUE TO HIS MOTHER'S DISCIPLINE AS HIS
PHYSICAL CONDITION WAS NOT "IMPAIRED," HE
REQUIRED NO MEDICAL TREATMENT, [CAROLYN]
ACCEPTED FULL RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPLIED WITH
COUNSELING RESULTING IN [SAMUEL'S] RETURN
HOME.
We find insufficient merit in this argument to warrant further
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
We write further only to emphasize our rejection of Carolyn's
contention that the Supreme Court's decision in New Jersey Division
of Youth & Family Services v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 36 (2011)
compels a different result because, there, the Court concluded
Division representative testified that such an agreement existed,
defense counsel did not object to that testimony, and Carolyn did
not testify or otherwise refute the Division representative's
testimony. Consequently, the trial judge was entitled to find that
such an agreement existed.
4 A-2414-15T3
that a parent's "slap of the face of a teenager as a form of
discipline – with no resulting bruising or marks – does not
constitute 'excessive corporal punishment' within the meaning of
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b)." We find a qualitative difference
between slapping the face of a teenager without sufficient force
to leave a mark and the striking of a six-year-old with a belt
with enough ferocity to leave visible marks a day later. These
distinguishing circumstances and Carolyn's breach of her earlier
agreement not to physically punish her children, fully supported
the judge's conclusions.
Affirmed.
5 A-2414-15T3