R.M. VS. K.E.L., SR.(FV-04-0300-17, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0322-16T2
R.M.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
K.E.L., SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted October 23, 2017 – Decided November 28, 2017
Before Judges Whipple and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
Docket No. FV-04-0300-17.
Evan F. Nappen, attorney for appellant (Daniel
G. Spafford, on the brief).
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant K.E.L. appeals from a final restraining order
("FRO") entered against him pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act of 1991 ("PDVA"), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, based on
an unspecified act of domestic violence against plaintiff R.M.
Because we find the trial court failed to apply the two-part test
required by Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 126 (App. Div.
2006) to support restraints, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
We derive our factual summary from the July 20, 2016 trial.
Plaintiff and defendant filed for, and obtained, mutual temporary
restraining orders ("TROs") based upon events that occurred on
July 5, 2016. Defendant testified that, while staying at a hotel
on that date, plaintiff accused defendant of stealing $30 from her
and telephoning other people, including prostitutes. According
to defendant, plaintiff scratched, punched and kicked him, and
threatened to push him out the hotel room's window.
Plaintiff denied punching defendant, but testified that the
parties "get very jealous over each other[,] and fights[] and
arguments happen." Plaintiff did not acknowledge any acts of
violence by defendant against her on July 5, 2016. Rather,
plaintiff recounted an incident that occurred one year prior when
defendant "threw [her] out of the vehicle," causing her to break
a tooth. Plaintiff did not press charges against defendant at
that time because she did not wish to testify.
The parties were never married and never lived together, but
they dated for seven years. When asked by the court whether they
needed FROs or whether they could just stay away from each other,
both parties responded the police wanted them to file for
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restraining orders.1 Plaintiff also testified she needed an FRO
"for my mother so he doesn't come around the house . . . because
he does not like my mother at all and he says horrible things like
he wanted to put a bullet in my mother's head."
In an oral decision, rendered at the conclusion of trial, the
court issued FROs to both parties, finding:
I will tell you that it's clear to me that
you're in a very long[-]term highly
dysfunctional relationship, that at some point
someone is going to get hurt. I think you
both have probably committed acts of domestic
violence towards each other. . . .
You both have given me enough information to
think that at one point or another both of you
have been involved in what is a very abusive
situation and you both need to concentrate on
your own health and your own getting
yourselves together.
On appeal, defendant argues the court erred by issuing the
FRO without making a finding that he committed a predicate offense,
and because plaintiff is not in need of further protection.
Plaintiff has not appealed the FRO issued against her.
Ordinarily, "[i]n our review of a trial court's order entered
following trial in a domestic violence matter, we grant substantial
deference to the trial court's findings of fact and the legal
1
It is unclear whether the parties were referencing TROs or FROs;
neither party presented the testimony of a police officer at trial.
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conclusion based upon those findings." D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J.
Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154
N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)), certif. denied, 216 N.J. 587 (2014).
"The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding
on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible
evidence." Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms
Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484
(1974)).
However, reversal is warranted when a trial court's findings
are "so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made[,]"
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279
(2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), including
factual findings "'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent
with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as
to offend the interests of justice[.]'" Rova Farms, supra, 65 at
484 (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154,
155 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 40 N.J. 221 (1963)). See also
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605
(2007) (discussing "limited" appellate review). Consequently,
when a reviewing court concludes there is insufficient evidentiary
support for the trial court's findings, we reverse. Our review
of a trial court's legal conclusions is always de novo. Manalapan
Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
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Substantively, a trial court hearing an application for an
FRO must make two determinations: (1) whether the plaintiff has
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed
an act of domestic violence; and, if so, (2) whether a restraining
order is necessary to protect the plaintiff. Silver, supra, 387
N.J. Super. at 125-27.
Pursuant to the first Silver prong, a plaintiff seeking an
FRO under the PDVA must demonstrate the defendant committed any
one or more of the fourteen crimes and offenses enumerated in
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). "A defendant may not 'consent' to the entry
of an order, and a court may not enter one unless there is a
finding of domestic violence by the court." Franklin v. Sloskey,
385 N.J. Super. 534, 541-42 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Chernesky v.
Fedorczyk, 346 N.J. Super. 34, 39 (App. Div. 2001)).
In making the second determination pursuant to Silver, the
court must consider the factors elucidated in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-
29(a)(1) to -(6), and, as noted, must determine that issuance of
an FRO is necessary to protect the victim from further acts of
violence. Silver, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 126. Those factors
include consideration of any previous history of domestic violence
between the parties, and whether there is evidence of immediate
danger to the victim. Id. at 127-28. See also, A.M.C. v. P.B.,
447 N.J. Super. 402, 417 (App. Div. 2016).
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Here, the trial court concluded the parties "probably
committed acts of domestic violence towards each other" without
specifying which act or acts under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) were
committed. Nor did the court establish defendant's factual basis
for any acts of domestic violence on July 5, 2016. See Chernesky,
supra, 346 N.J. Super. at 41. As such, the first Silver prong was
not sufficiently analyzed by the court.
We reach the same conclusion as to the second Silver prong.
The trial court made a conclusory finding that an FRO was needed
because "at some point someone is going to get hurt," apparently
referencing the court's previous observation of the parties'
underlying "abusive situation" and "dysfunctional relationship."
Furthermore, plaintiff testified that her mother -- not plaintiff
-- needed the protection of a restraining order because, in part,
defendant "doesn’t come around the house." It is unclear from the
record, however, whether plaintiff resides with her mother. In
her brief response to the judge, plaintiff may have assumed an FRO
prohibiting defendant from contact with her mother's home would,
therefore, also protect plaintiff. Thus, the court did not engage
in the analysis required by Silver to satisfy the second prong.
We, therefore, remand to the trial court for a proper analysis of
both Silver prongs.
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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.2 The restraints remain in place pending the outcome
of the remand. We do not retain jurisdiction.
2
Because the trial court did not make credibility findings, we
offer no recommendation as to whether this matter should be retried
before a different judge. See Ducey v. Ducey, 424 N.J. Super. 68,
71 (App. Div. 2012).
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