STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ANDREW J. FEDE (004-04-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1296-15T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANDREW J. FEDE,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________
Submitted March 7, 2017 – Decided July 10, 2017
Before Judges Reisner and Sumners.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. 004-
04-15.
Martyrson Imbert, and Andrew Ucheomumu (The
Ucheomumu Law Group) of the Maryland Bar,
admitted pro hac vice, attorneys for appellant
(Mr. Imbert and Mr. Ucheomumu, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Elizabeth Rebein,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Andrew J. Fede appeals his conviction for
obstruction of justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1, following a trial de
novo in the Law Division. We affirm.
We summarize the facts pertinent to our review. On March 16,
2015, Cliffside Park Police officers responded to a 911 call
reporting a domestic dispute involving a male and a female at an
apartment on Palisades Ave. After the police knocked on the
apartment door, defendant partially opened the door, keeping a
chain lock engaged. The police repeatedly requested to enter to
determine if there was an injured person needing assistance, but
defendant refused in an angry, uncooperative, and hostile manner.
Defendant acknowledged that a woman lived with him in the apartment
but stated she was not present, and that police needed a search
warrant to enter.
At one point, when defendant told the police that he would
not allow them entry, one of the officers replied, "Sir if you let
us in, if you let us look, then you can sign a complaint against
all of us." Defendant repeated that the police needed a search
warrant to enter. Eventually, one of the police officers used a
baton to break the chain, and a subsequent search of the apartment
2 A-1296-15T4
revealed that no female was present. Defendant was arrested and
charged with obstruction of justice.1
The municipal court judge found there was sufficient evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of obstruction
of justice. Specifically, he determined that police had a right
to enter the apartment under the emergency-aid doctrine to
investigate a 911 report of domestic violence.
Upon a trial de novo on the record, Judge Frances A. McGrogan
found defendant guilty anew. In her written decision, she rejected
defendant's argument that the municipal court judge erred in
finding that defendant had a duty to unchain his door lock to
allow police to conduct a warrantless search of his home. Similar
to the municipal court, Judge McGrogan reasoned that the police
1
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a), provides that:
A person commits an offense if he purposely
obstructs, impairs or perverts the
administration of law or other governmental
function or prevents or attempts to prevent a
public servant from lawfully performing an
official function by means of flight,
intimidation, force, violence, or physical
interference or obstacle, or by means of any
independently unlawful act. This section does
not apply to failure to perform a legal duty
other than an official duty, or any other
means of avoiding compliance with law without
affirmative interference with governmental
functions.
3 A-1296-15T4
had a reasonable basis to believe there was a need to enter the
apartment to aid a possible harmed person, but that "defendant
prevented the officers from entering his apartment by purposefully
refusing to unchain his door, thereby creating an obstacle, which
prevented the police from performing their official function [in
violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a)]." The judge noted that
"[w]ithout further investigation, the police had no way of knowing
whether there was an injured person outside their line of sight.
Once the officers explained their purpose, [defendant had] an
obligation to allow [them] into his home without interference."
Before us, defendant argues that:
I. UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, IT IS NOT A CRIME FOR
ANYONE TO REFUSE TO UNCHAIN THEIR DOOR FOR THE
POLICE TO CONDUCT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH.
II. THE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY HELD THAT THE
APPELLANT'S REFUSAL TO UNCHAIN THE DOOR LOCK
TO HIS APARTMENT TO ALLOW THE POLICE TO
CONDUCT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF HIS HOME IS
AN OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED
STATE[S].
"We begin our review with the well-settled proposition that
appellate courts should give deference to the factual findings of
the trial court." State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 (2015) (citing
State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999)). When the Law
Division conducts a trial de novo on the record developed in the
4 A-1296-15T4
municipal court, our appellate review is limited. State v.
Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005).
Because the Law Division judge is not in a position to gauge
the credibility of witnesses, he or she should "give due, although
not necessarily controlling, regard" to the credibility findings
of the municipal court judge. Ibid. (quoting State v. Johnson,
42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964)). Furthermore, when the Law Division
agrees with the municipal court, the two-court rule must be
considered. "Under the two-court rule, appellate courts
ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of
fact and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent
a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." Reece, supra,
222 N.J. at 166 (quoting Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 474).
However, an appellate court does not afford any special deference
to the legal determinations of the trial court. Templo Fuente De
Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).
Having considered defendant's contentions and the applicable
legal principles, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated
in Judge McGrogan's written decision. We add only that further
support is found in Reece, supra, 222 N.J. at 171-72, where our
Supreme Court held that a defendant is guilty of obstruction of
justice by attempting to close a door on police officers to prevent
them from lawfully performing an official function under the
5 A-1296-15T4
emergency-aid doctrine. Defendant's appellate arguments are
without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(2).
Affirm.
6 A-1296-15T4