BOUND BROOK FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC A/S/O ENSHI SHEN Â VS. AMERIPRISE AUTO & HOME INSURANCE(L-3596-15, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2477-15T2
BOUND BROOK FAMILY
CHIROPRACTIC a/s/o
ENSHI SHEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
AMERIPRISE AUTO & HOME
INSURANCE,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Argued October 30, 2017 – Decided November 17, 2017
Before Judges Whipple and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No.
L-3596-15.
Charles Rabolli, Jr., argued the cause for
appellant (Messineo, Messineo & Messineo, LLC,
attorneys; Mr. Rabolli and Tariq J. Messineo,
on the briefs).
Joseph A. Massood argued the cause for
respondent (Massood & Bronsnick, LLC,
attorneys; Tara M. McCluskey, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Ameriprise Auto & Home (Ameriprise) appeals from a
January 15, 2016 order vacating an arbitration award. We dismiss
this appeal for a lack of jurisdiction.
We discern the following facts from the record. On May 8,
2011, Enshi Shen suffered injuries from a motor vehicle accident.
To treat her injuries, Shen underwent a course of chiropractic and
acupuncture treatment with plaintiff Bound Brook Family
Chiropractic (Bound Brook).
At the time of the accident, Shen had a health insurance
policy with United Healthcare Insurance (United) and an automobile
insurance policy with Ameriprise. Pursuant to the automobile
insurance policy, Shen elected United as her primary healthcare
provider and Ameriprise as her secondary healthcare provider in
the form of a personal injury protection (PIP) benefit.
Bound Brook initially submitted healthcare insurance claims
to United for services provided to Shen. When United did not
render full payment, Bound Brook submitted claims for the unpaid
services to Ameriprise as a secondary insurer. Ameriprise,
however, refused to render payment, requiring submission of
explanation of benefits from United before it would pay.
On August 15, 2014, Bound Brook filed a demand for
arbitration, claiming Ameriprise owed it a balance of $9,229.40.
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On August 24, 2015, the arbitrator denied Brook Bound's claim and
entered an award in Ameriprise's favor.
On October 19, 2015, Bound Brook filed an order to show cause
with a verified complaint in Superior Court, asserting the
arbitrator erroneously applied the law to the facts under N.J.S.A.
2A:23A-13(c)(5). After oral arguments, the trial judge vacated
the arbitration award and found Ameriprise was obligated to pay
Bound Brook for the services provided to Shen, as well as interest,
attorney's fees, and costs. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Ameriprise argues, among other things, the trial
court exceeded its jurisdictional bounds when it vacated the
arbitration award and that this court should exercise its
supervisory function in reversing the trial court's decision.
Because appellate review is statutorily prohibited with only
narrow exceptions, we dismiss this appeal.
Under the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act,
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35, disputes regarding PIP benefits may be
submitted to alternative dispute resolution. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
5.1. The final determination of the arbitrator is binding on the
parties, but is subject to "vacation, modification or correction
by the Superior Court in an action filed pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2A:23A-13 for review of the award." N.J.A.C. 11:3-5.6(g).
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Under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(c), the trial court vacated the
arbitration award and ordered Ameriprise to render payment to
Bound Brook.
Any further appellate review is statutorily barred with only
narrow exceptions.
Upon the granting of an order confirming,
modifying or correcting an award, a judgment
or decree shall be entered by the court in
conformity therewith and be enforced as any
other judgment or decree. There shall be no
further appeal or review of the judgment or
decree.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-18(b).]
Despite this proscription, our Supreme Court has stated, "there
may be other limited circumstances where public policy would
require appellate court review." Mt. Hope Dev. Assocs. v. Mt.
Hope Waterpower Project, L.P., 154 N.J. 141, 148 (1998). No such
circumstances are presented here.
Because we lack jurisdiction, we do not address the merits
of the underlying arguments or the motion judge's decision.
Moreover, this decision "is confined to the special jurisdictional
context before us, and should not invite routine requests for
appellate review in other PIP arbitration cases." Kimba Med.
Supply v. Allstate Ins. Co., 431 N.J. Super. 463, 483 (App. Div.
2013).
Dismissed.
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