JAMIELYN ROSSBACH VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM (POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4967-17T4
JAMIELYN ROSSBACH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE
AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT
SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
_____________________________
Argued November 12, 2019 – Decided December 9, 2019
Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and
Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the
Treasury, PFRS No. 3-87227.
M. Scott Tashjy argued the cause for appellant (The
Tashjy Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; M. Scott Tashjy, of
counsel and on the briefs).
Christopher Robert Meyer, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal,
Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher
Robert Meyer, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Jamielyn Rossbach appeals from the final agency decision of
the Board of Trustees (Board), Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS),
denying her application for ordinary disability retirement benefits. The Board
adopted the initial decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) affirming
the denial of Rossbach's application for ordinary disability retirement benefits.
Rossbach argues for the first time on appeal that, despite being aware she
may suffer from a mental disorder, the Board failed to cancel her original
application and evaluate her for a "psychological/psychiatric" disability. For
the following reasons we affirm.
I.
Rossbach was employed by Monmouth County as a corrections officer
from March 1999 to September 30, 2012. In June 2011, Rossbach was
hospitalized for what she understood to be viral meningitis and acute
disseminated encephalomyelitis (ADEM). Thereafter, Rossbach began seeing
multiple physicians for her symptoms—including dizziness, vision impairment,
stiff neck, and headaches—but none offered an "opinion as to the cause of all
her conditions."
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In May 2012, Rossbach submitted a pro se application for ordinary
disability retirement benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6. Rossbach
described her disability as, "acute disseminated encephalomyelitis,
disorientation in crowds, trouble following conversations with more than one
person, balance and muscle coordination, dizziness, headaches, neck pain."
Rossbach submitted two conflicting medical reports in support of her
application: (1) an August 2012 medical examination form completed by
Norman P. Einhorn, O.D., M.S., a neuro-optometrist, indicating Rossbach is not
totally and permanently disabled or unable to perform her job duties or any other
job; and (2) a September 2012 medical examination form completed by David
J. Frank, M.D., a neurologist, indicating that Rossbach is totally and
permanently disabled and no longer able to perform her job duties or any other
job.1
The Board's medical expert, Steven Lomazow, M.D., a neurologist,
evaluated Rossbach "for any possible neurological causes of disability in
conjunction with her application for ordinary disability as a corrections officer."
1
In a earlier June 2012 report, Dr. Frank stated: Rossbach "does not appear to
be able to return to her previous occupation as a corrections officer." She was
"maintained on out-of-work status" by Dr. Frank.
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After reviewing Rossbach's application and medical records, Dr. Lomazow
issued an October 22, 2012 report in which he concluded:
I am not presented with any objective evidence
whatsoever that Ms. Rossbach has a neurological
disease. The logical conclusion why seven neurologists
could not find anything wrong with her is because there
is not anything neurologically wrong with her. She
appears to have an ongoing problem with a conversion
reaction. While there may be other reasons why Ms.
Rossbach cannot perform her job as a County
Correction Officer, it is not neurological in nature so,
therefore, there is no objective basis on my examination
or quite frankly that of any other practitioner with
respect to any neurologic disability whatsoever
including any that might inhibit her from performing
her job as a County Correction Officer. As noted
above, it is conceivable that her disability might lie in
a different sphere, i.e., psychiatric but this is not the
point of my examination. Once again, from a
neurologic standpoint there is no disability to qualify
her for an ordinary disability with respect with her
ability to perform her job as a County Correction
Officer.
On December 10, 2012, the Board denied Rossbach's application,
determining she was "not totally and permanently disabled from the
performance of [her] regular and assigned duties." The Board informed
Rossbach she qualified for deferred retirement. Rossbach appealed.
The Board transferred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law. An
ALJ conducted a hearing in August 2016, where Rossbach and Steven Greco,
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Ph.D., a neuropsychologist, testified. Dr. Lomazow did not testify at the hearing
because he had evaluated Rossbach for a neurological disability; Dr. Greco
explained Rossbach's disability was neuropsychological.
Rossbach recounted her 2011 hospitalization, symptoms, and visits to
multiple physicians, including Dr. Greco who testified he has treated Rossbach
for over four years (over eighty visits). Dr. Greco opined Rossbach suffers from
conversion disorder. He explained:
[C]onversion disorder is when a patient presents as
though they have neurological symptoms. It could
either be motor [or sensory symptoms]. So naturally
with those symptoms you're going to go to a physician
to make sure you're okay. But then as you keep going
and keep getting all diagnostic tests and they come back
normal . . . they start saying [there] is a psychological
reason to why they're having these physical symptoms.
Now, the reason patients end up with a conversion
disorder, it's not a one to one correlation, but there's
usually a lot of trauma in the background with the
patient. They've usually been exposed to something
that they have not been able to handle. And
psychologically these emotions manifest physically.
Hence, then once it's ruled out that it's not a medical
neuropsychological disorder so you have to have an
incompatibility between medical findings and the
patient's symptoms. Once that's established and you
have those motor sensory symptoms you can meet
criteria for conversion disorder.
According to Dr. Greco, Rossbach's 2011 medical crisis "set into motion"
her physical symptoms and resulting conversion disorder. He noted conversion
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disorder is a "complex psychological disorder" and "statistically there's no
cure." Dr. Greco stated Rossbach "will not be able to handle gainful
employment given the intensity, frequency and type of psychological disorders"
she suffers from, and "should not work as a correction officer."
Because Dr. Lomazow did not testify, the parties agreed to the following
stipulations regarding his qualifications and the evaluation he was requested to
perform:
1. Dr. Lomazow was requested to evaluate Ms.
Rossbach to determine neurologic causes of disability
only, in conjunction with her application for ordinary
disability.
2. As part of his medical education, Dr. Lomazow did
not participate in or complete a residency in psychiatry
or psychology.
3. Dr. Lomazow is not professionally qualified to
practice psychiatric medicine and is not a psychiatrist.
4. Dr. Lomazow is not professionally qualified to
practice in the field of psychology or neuro-psychology
and is not a psychologist or neuro-psychologist.
5. Dr. Lomazow is not qualified to perform and
interpret a Neuropsychological Examination as was
performed by Dr. Greco on [June 12, 2012].
In his March 29, 2017 initial decision, the ALJ made the following
findings of fact:
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1. On December [10], 2012, the Board denied
Rossbach's application for ordinary disability
retirement benefits.
2. On December 11, 2012, the Board determined that
Rossbach, with her years of service, qualified for a
deferred retirement.
3. Rossbach enrolled in the PFRS on March 1, 1999, as
a correction officer employee of Monmouth County.
4. The Board reflected Rossbach's resignation and
termination date as September 30, 2012.
....
6. Rossbach at the time of the application for ordinary
disability retirement was age thirty-two.
7. No medical evidence presented within six-months of
the May 24, 2012, application for ordinary disability
retirement objectively found petitioner disabled.
8. Petitioner did submit a June 2013, report by Dr.
Greco, more than six months after the denial of ordinary
disability benefits. This report did not set forth a
permanent disability, just that petitioner could not
perform her duties.
9. Dr. Greco's . . . cognitive evaluation reflected
petitioner as normal.
10. Dr. Greco's June 2013, report reflected no objective
neurological medical reason for petitioner's condition.
11. Petitioner did submit an April 2016 report by Dr.
Greco. This report did psychologically opine that
petitioner suffered from PTSD and conversion disorder,
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but again did not set forth a permanent disability, rather
a disability with a poor diagnosis.
Due to the "existence of the conflicting medical reports of the two treating
doctors as to totality and permanency," the ALJ concluded he "need not consider
the report of the Board's expert," and would "not attribute a negative inference
from[] his failure to testify." The ALJ noted Dr. Lomazow's "expertise and
examination" of Rossbach related to her alleged diagnosis for neurological
conditions. Therefore, the value of his testimony was questionable.
The ALJ concluded "that as of the date of the denial by the Board, the
petitioner had not met her burden of proof that she was totally or permanently
disabled as a result of a physical medical condition." In reaching that
conclusion, the ALJ engaged in the following analysis of the evidence, or lack
thereof:
There are concerns regarding the mental health aspects
of petitioner's claim. The original application for
disability occurred on May 24, 2012, three requests
were made for medical documentation. None of the
medical documentation supported an objective medical
illness . . . . The report of Dr. Greco did not issue until
more than six months later [on] June 30, 2013, though
there was reference in Dr. Frank's report in July 2012.
Dr. Greco's report issued well after six months from the
time of the original disability filing. That report was
insufficient on its face to support a psychological
permanency. During that time petitioner[] did not seek
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to amend the pension application or submit a new
pension application based upon the mental health
disability. Accordingly, the Board did not have the
petitioner examined for a mental health disability. The
parties did not address issues of notice or reliance. This
tribunal is unable to determine whether any
accommodation should be made to petitioner to allow
an amendment to the retirement application at this time,
and to allow the petitioner be reexamined by a
psychologist or psychiatrist. The 2016[] report of Dr.
Greco again fails to confirm permanency of the
disability.
I CONCLUDE the December [10], 2012, denial of the
physical disability pension, and the December 28, 2012
appeal, limited the jurisdiction of this tribunal to a
consideration of the denial of the physical disability
pension. Rossbach has not shown she was totally and
permanently disabled, from a physical disability at the
time of the application.
The ALJ recommended denial of petitioner's application for ordinary
disability benefits. Rossbach filed exceptions to the initial decision. On May
8, 2017, the Board adopted the ALJ's initial decision affirming the Board's denial
of Rossbach's application for ordinary disability retirement benefits. This
appeal followed.
On appeal, Rossbach raises the following points:
POINT I
THE BOARD FAILED TO EVALUATE OFFICER
ROSSBACH FOR PSYC[H]OLOGICAL [OR]
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY EVEN [THOUGH] IT
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WAS ADVISED, BY [ITS] MEDICAL EXPERT,
THAT THE DISABILITY SHE SUFFERED WAS
LIKELY CAUSED BY A PSYCHOLOGICAL [OR]
PSYCHIATRIC DISEASE. (Not Raised Below).
POINT II
THE BOARD FAILED TO CANCEL OFFICER
ROSSBACH'S APPLICATION FOR DISABILITY
BENEFITS AND OFFICER ROSSACH SHOULD
HAVE BEEN EVALUATED FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL [OR] PSYCHIATRIC
DISABILITY. (Not Raised Below).
II.
"Our review of administrative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd. of
Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing In re
Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)). "Judicial review of an agency's final
decision is generally limited to a determination of whether the decision is
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or lacks fair support in the record." Mattia
v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 455 N.J. Super. 217, 221 (App. Div.
2018) (quoting Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 431 N.J.
Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2013)). "A reviewing court 'may not substitute its own
judgment for the agency's, even though the court might have reached a different
result.'" In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 191
N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action
A-4967-17T4
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was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the person challenging the
administrative action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div.
2006) (citations omitted).
"Generally, courts afford substantial deference to an agency's
interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing."
Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196
(2007) (citation omitted). "Such deference has been specifically extended to
state agencies that administer pension statutes," because "a state agency brings
experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating
a legislative enactment within its field of expertise." Piatt v. Police & Firemen's
Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law
Enf't Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)). We are
not bound, however, "by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its
determination of a strictly legal issue." Richardson, 192 N.J. at 196 (quoting In
re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 658 (1999)).
III.
A PFRS "member can qualify for ordinary disability benefits if [she] is
disabled for any reason; the disability need not have a work connection." Russo,
206 N.J. at 28 (citing Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195). A PFRS member who meets
age and service criteria may be retired on an ordinary allowance:
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provided, that the medical board, after a medical
examination of such member, shall certify that such
member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the
performance of his usual duty and of any other
available duty in the department which his employer is
willing to assign to him and that such incapacity is
likely to be permanent and to such an extent that he
should be retired.
[N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1).]
An application for physical or mental health medical disability retirement
must "be supported by at least two medical reports" and such "documentation
must be received within six months" of the application's filing date, otherwise
"the retirement will be cancelled and the member must complete a new disability
application for a future retirement date." N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.1(d)(1)-(2). The
petitioner bears the burden of proving she is entitled to ordinary disability
benefits. See Patterson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 194 N.J.
29, 50-51 (2008) (stating that a PFRS "member who seeks accidental disability
benefits must prove a disabling permanent mental injury and, in so doing, must
produce such expert evidence as is required to sustain that burden").
Rossbach contends the Board had knowledge of her
psychological/psychiatric disability as early as October 2012 when Dr.
Lomazow issued his report. She argues "the Board had the affirmative
obligation to schedule an independent psychiatric examination to appropriately
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evaluate [her] for her alleged disabling condition," citing N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.26.
Rossbach further contends the Board "should have cancelled the retirement
application, and thereupon require[d] [her] to refile with supporting medical
documentation of her psychiatric/psychological disability." We are
unpersuaded by these arguments.
Rossbach inaccurately asserts Dr. Lomazow, in his October 2012 report,
concluded she suffered from a psychological disorder. Dr. Lomazow did not
examine Rossbach for a psychological or psychiatric disorder, much less render
a psychological or psychiatric diagnosis. Rather, Dr. Lomazow stated "it is
conceivable that her disability might lie in a different sphere, i.e., psychiatric
but this is not the point of my examination."
Rossbach contends the Board failed to comply with N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.26 by
not obtaining an "'independent medical evaluation' when the medical evidence
submitted is not sufficient." We disagree. N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.26 addresses medical
evaluations for the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) members;
Rossbach is a PFRS member. The corresponding PFRS regulation, N.J.A.C.
17:4-6.13, does not impose a duty on the Board to schedule an independent
medical evaluation. On the contrary, it only requires that the physician
designated to perform the medical examination "not be a member's personal
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physician." 2 Moreover, whether a PERS or PFRS member, "[t]he applicant for
ordinary disability retirement benefits has the burden to prove that he or she has
a disabling condition and must produce expert evidence to sustain this burden."
Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 404 N.J. Super.119,
126 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Patterson, 194 N.J. at 50-51).
Lastly, Rossbach claims the Board should have cancelled her application
because documentation supporting a mental disability was not provided. We
disagree.
An ordinary disability retirement benefit application must be "supported
by at least two medical reports" submitted "within six months of the date of the
disability retirement application. N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.1(d). Rossbach submitted
two medical reports within six months of filing her disability application. 3 An
application can only be canceled by the Board pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.1(d)
if two medical reports are not timely submitted. That did not occur here.
2
We further note that N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.26 does not require a second evaluation
for a mental disability when the application originated from a physical medical
disability claim and an evaluation for a physical disability has already been
obtained.
3
Rossbach timely submitted Dr. Einhorn's August 2012 report and Dr. Frank's
September 2012 report in support of her May 2012 application for ordinary
disability retirement benefits based on her alleged physical medical condition.
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The Board concluded Rossbach did not prove she had a total and
permanent physical disability. The record fully supports that determination.
Dr. Lomazow and seven of Rossbach's neurologists found no objective
medical evidence of any neurological disease or condition, much less a total and
permanent physical disability caused by such a disease or condition. Repeated
neurological testing revealed a normal neurological examination and did not
support a diagnosis of ADEM, the medical condition identified in Rossbach's
application. Moreover, Dr. Greco agreed there was no objective neurological
evidence for her symptoms.
The Board must distinguish between a physical and a mental disability
when granting ordinary disability retirement benefits. N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1).
The regulations also distinguish between a "physical disability retirement" and
a "mental health medical disability retirement." N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.1(d)(1)-(2).
Either type of application must be supported by at least two medical reports.
Ibid.Rossbach's application listed her disability as ADEM and her symptoms
as: "disorientation in crowds, trouble following conversations with more than
one person, balance and muscle coordination, dizziness, headaches, and neck
A-4967-17T4
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pain." These are physical medical conditions. Noticeably absent are any
identified mental health conditions.
Despite repeated requests from the Board for additional documentation,
Rossbach did not submit a medical report in support of a mental disability until
June 2013, more than a year after filing her application.4 Moreover, Rossbach
did not attempt to amend her application or submit a new application based on
a mental health disability.
In sum, the Board's final decision was not arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable and is supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence
in the record. Rossbach did not meet her burden of proving she has a disabling
physical medical condition.
Affirmed.
4
We note that the June 2013 report did not confirm permanency of Rossbach's
alleged mental health disorder.
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