IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF K.K. (ATCC-1719-18, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2321-18T2
IN THE MATTER OF THE
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF K.K.1
_____________________________
Argued telephonically November 21, 2019 –
Decided December 9, 2019
Before Judges Mayer and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Cumberland County, Docket No. ATCC-
1719-18.
Amy Beth DeNero, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant K.K. (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Amy Beth DeNero, on the
brief).
Brendan Joseph Kavanagh argued the cause for
respondent Cumberland County Counsel (Kavanagh &
Kavanagh, LLC, attorneys; Brendan Joseph Kavanagh,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
1
We use initials to preserve the minor's privacy. R. 1:38-3(f)(2).
K.K., a minor, appeals from an order of civil commitment limited to a
procedural issue regarding her commitment proceeding. She contends her
procedural due process rights were violated because the commitment hearing
was not held within fourteen days from "initial inpatient admission" under Rule
4:74-7A. We disagree and affirm.
The question before this court is when does the fourteen-day period for
scheduling a minor's commitment hearing commence. K.K. argues calculation
of the fourteen-day period commences the day the minor is admitted to a facility
through a voluntary parental admission. Under K.K.'s interpretation of the rule,
a facility admitting a minor through a voluntary parental admission would have
to immediately apply to the court in anticipation of a possible involuntary
commitment to schedule a hearing within fourteen days.
The civil commitment judge rejected K.K.'s interpretation of the rule,
concluding the fourteen-day period should be calculated from the date of the
temporary involuntary commitment order, after the minor has been in the care
of the facility for up to seven days. For the reasons expressed in this opinion,
we are satisfied the commencement of the time period for calculating the
scheduling of a minor's initial commitment hearing begins upon the issuance of
a temporary involuntary commitment order.
A-2321-18T2
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The facts are undisputed. K.K.'s parents voluntarily admitted her to a
hospital facility for mental health issues. The seven-day voluntary parental
admission began on December 7, 2018. Before the seven-day period expired,
the hospital determined K.K. required further observation and treatment. On
December 13, 2018, the hospital applied for and received a temporary order of
commitment. The December 13 order scheduled K.K.'s initial commitment
hearing for December 27, 2018.
Counsel for K.K. asked the court to reschedule the initial hearing in
accordance with Rule 4:74-7A(b)(2). K.K.'s attorney argued the rule required
an initial commitment hearing for a minor be held within fourteen days of the
minor's initial inpatient admission to the facility. Counsel asserted that the
fourteen-day time period commenced on December 7, 2018, the date K.K.'s
parents voluntarily admitted their daughter to the hospital. According to
counsel's calculation, the initial commitment hearing should have been
scheduled no later than December 22, 2018. The court declined to reschedule
K.K.'s commitment hearing.
On December 27, 2018, K.K. appeared with her counsel for the initial
commitment hearing. Counsel renewed her objection to the proceeding, arguing
A-2321-18T2
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K.K.'s procedural due process rights were violated because the commitment
hearing was untimely.
The hearing judge determined the date of conversion from a seven-day
parental admission of a minor to an involuntary commitment triggers the
fourteen-day time period for scheduling the initial commitment hearing. The
judge found,
[there is] impossibility that exists on many of these
cases when a seven-day is converted. After seven or
[fourteen] days even, it's impossible to date back to the
initial day of admission even on the seven[th]-day and
then have a hearing within fourteen days say if the
conversion happens at the fourteenth day or the
fifteenth day.
Recognizing the potential impossibility of scheduling an initial
commitment hearing under K.K.'s interpretation of the rule, the judge explained,
[M]y decision is going to be . . . something that can be
applied to all cases and not just this fact-sensitive case
which in this particular case, perhaps if we mobilized
somehow, we could get here before the fourteen days,
but that wasn't possible.
So what I'm going to use as sort of a benchmark is the
day of conversion from the seven-day [parental
admission] to the involuntary status. The day of
conversion to involuntary status was on December 14th
which would mean that the hearing has to be held
before [December] 28th.
A-2321-18T2
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Today being the 27th, I am . . . satisfied - - as satisfied
as I can be with respect to all of the contradictions and
confusions in this very unclear nebulous arena with
respect to youth hearings for civil commitments, but I'm
as satisfied as I can be at this time that we are within
the time frame necessary and . . . we can proceed with
the hearing or in the commitment.
On appeal, K.K. raises the following arguments:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR
OF LAW BY ORDERING [K.K.]'S CONTINUED
COMMITMENT AS CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES OF DUE PROCESS AND THE NEW
JERSEY COURT RULE INDISPUTABLY
REQUIRE[S] THAT A MINOR COMMITTEE'S
INITIAL CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARING BE
HELD WITHIN [FOURTEEN] DAYS OF THE
MINOR'S INITIAL ADMISSION TO THE
FACILITY.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT UTILIZED
THE DATE OF [K.K.]'S CONVERSION FROM A
[SEVEN]-DAY PARENTAL ADMISSION TO AN
INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITTEE AS THE
TRIGGER FOR THE [FOURTEEN]-DAY TIME
LIMIT AS THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF R. 4:74-
7A(d)(1) CLEARLY REQUIRES THAT A MINOR'S
HEARING MUST BE SCHEDULED WITHIN
[FOURTEEN] DAYS OF THE INITIAL ADMISSION
TO THE FACILITY.
A-2321-18T2
5
Where the trial court makes its own "interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts," it is owed no special deference
on appeal. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,
378 (1995). The traditional canons of statutory interpretation govern court rules.
State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 67 (2017). The statutory interpretation analysis
begins with the plain meaning of the language. Wiese v. Dedhia, 188 N.J. 587,
592 (2006). The words of the rule must be "ascribe[d] . . . their ordinary meaning
and significance . . . in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the
legislation as a whole." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citations
omitted).
When the language of a rule is susceptible of more than one plausible
interpretation, a court may consider extrinsic evidence such as legislative
history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction to aid its
analysis. Id. at 492-93. Courts should interpret rules "sensibly rather than
literally," State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, 134 N.J. 393, 401 (1993)
(quoting Schierstead v. Brigantine, 29 N.J. 220, 230 (1959)), to avoid absurd or
unreasonable results. State v. Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005) (quoting State v.
Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 (1966)).
A-2321-18T2
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The rule governing civil commitment of a minor provides for voluntary
admission by a parent for up to seven days. R. 4:74-7A(d)(1). However,
[i]f further hospitalization is then required, the
applicant shall proceed in accordance with R. 4:74-7(e).
If an application for commitment is made during such
admission, the final hearing shall be held within 14
days of the initial inpatient admission to the facility,
adjournable only in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)
of this rule.
[R. 4:74-7A(d)(1) (emphasis added).]
The terms "commitment" and "admission" are not defined in the rule.
Throughout the rule, "admission" frequently refers to voluntary treatment,
including treatment at the request of a minor's parents. See R. 4:74-7A(c)
("Irrespective of whether the standard of involuntary commitment stated by this
rule is met, any minor 14 years of age or over may request admission to a
[defined facility] . . . on a finding that the minor's request is informed and
voluntary"); R. 4:74-7A(d)(1) ("This rule shall not be construed to require any
court procedure or approval for the admission of a minor by the minor's parent
. . . to a [defined facility] . . . provided the admission is independently approved
by a physician on the staff of the facility").
On the other hand, "commitment" often refers to involuntary, judicially
ordered treatment. See R. 4:74-7A(b)(2) ("order of temporary commitment");
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R. 4:74-7A(b)(4) ("final order of commitment pursuant to R. 4:74-7(f) may be
entered"); R. 4:74-7A(b)(5) ("[t]he commitment shall be judicially reviewed");
R. 4:74-7A(d)(1) ("[i]f an application for commitment is made during such
[parental] admission"); R. 4:74-7A(d)(2) ("The [defined facility] shall [upon the
admitting parent's request] discharge the minor as soon as practicable but no
later than 48 hours after the request unless the facility obtains a temporary order
of commitment.").
As the judge expressed in her oral decision, the "consensus [is] there is no
consensus" on the exact meaning of the term "initial inpatient admission" for
calculating the date of a minor's initial commitment hearing. Based on the
ambiguity in the language of the rule, we look to extrinsic evidence and canons
of statutory construction to resolve the issue. DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-93.
Rule 4:74-7A was drafted by the Mental Commitments Subcommittee
(Subcommittee) of the Civil Practice Committee (Committee) to address the
concerns of mental health care providers, advocates for children, and the New
Jersey Supreme Court regarding the constitutional rights of minors in civil
commitment proceedings. Throughout the text of the rule and in the committee
reports preceding adoption of the rule, the terms "commitment" and "admission"
are not defined and often are used interchangeably.
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The rules governing civil commitments have been periodically reviewed
to establish substantive standards and ensure the commitment process affords
the requisite constitutional protections. See In re Commitment of N.N., 146 N.J.
112, 119-24 (1996) (discussing legislative history of the commitment statute and
rule). Recognizing that the statute governing civil commitment only applied to
adults, during the 1992-1994 rules cycle, the Subcommittee reviewed the rule
related to civil commitment of minors. Report of the Mental Commitments
Subcommittee of the Civil Practice Committee, Dec. 1993 at 2. The
Subcommittee recommended "commitment hearings for minors within 14 days
of a minor's initial commitment." Id. at 17. It explained:
The Subcommittee is of the opinion that where
the period of commitment for a minor is likely to be
only 28 days, a hearing should be scheduled within the
first 14 days of initial commitment rather than 20 days
into a 28 day program. The Subcommittee believes that
14 day hearings for minors will provide a meaningful
opportunity to be heard within a reasonable time after
admission and that 14 days are sufficient for hospital
authorities to conduct assessments, and for the minor
and his or her family to prepare for the hearing. . . .
Additionally, if the rule is changed to require the
scheduling of hearings for minors within 14 days of
initial commitment, R. 4:74-7(c)(4) must also be
amended to provide for the service of notices of hearing
not less than five days prior to the hearing.
[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
A-2321-18T2
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In the 1994-1996 rules cycle, the Committee sought public input regarding
the civil commitment of minors. Based on that input, the Committee drafted
proposed Rule 4:74-7A, governing civil commitment of minors, and sought
additional public comment. 1996 Civil Practice Committee Report at 231-32.
Near the end of the 1994-1996 rules cycle, the Supreme Court decided
N.N. The Court directed the Civil Practice Committee to recommend a rule
implementing the substantive standards it established in N.N., 146 N.J. at 138;
see Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmts. 1-2 on R. 4:74-7A
(2020).
Following the Court's instruction, the Subcommittee proposed a rule
incorporating the standards framed in N.N. Memorandum from the Mental
Commitments Subcommittee to Civil Practice Committee Members (Nov. 19,
1996). In the Subcommittee's memorandum, it used the words "admission" and
"commitment" interchangeably. Ibid. In January 1997, the Court adopted the
Committee's proposed rule governing civil commitment of minors. 1998 Civil
Practice Committee Report at 213. Neither the legislative history nor the text
of the rule provide clear guidance in defining the terms "admission "and
"commitment."
A-2321-18T2
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Having determined the plain language and legislative history of Rule 4:74-
7A do not resolve the issue on appeal, we examine intent and purpose of the
rule. McClain v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 237 N.J. 445, 461 (2019). The
legislative history, while not binding, provides insight into legislative intent and
"overall policy and purpose" of the rule. In re City of Plainfield's Park-Madison
Site, 372 N.J. Super. 544, 552-53 (App. Div. 2004) (citing Cedar Cove, Inc. v.
Stanzione, 122 N.J. 202, 213 (1991)). "The construction that will best effectuate
the [rule's] ultimate objectives is to be preferred." Cedar Cove, 122 N.J. at 213.
K.K.'s interpretation of Rule 4:74-7A does not further the objective and
purpose of the procedural portion of the rule regarding the scheduling of the
initial commitment hearing. The legislative history of the rule, as established in
the Committee reports, Subcommittee memorandum, and the Court's decision in
N.N., evidences the purpose of scheduling hearings within fourteen days of
initial inpatient admission is to provide the minor, his or her family, and the
hospital facility with the opportunity to prepare for the hearing. The rule also
seeks to encourage and destigmatize the use of voluntary commitments as a
treatment option for minors.
The immediate docketing of commitment proceedings for minors on the
date of voluntary parental admission, as suggested by K.K., would undermine
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the laudable goals of promoting least restrictive mental health treatment,
encouraging voluntary commitment and minimizing the stigma associated with
seeking treatment for mental health issues. Under K.K.'s interpretation of the
rule, upon the day of a minor's admission to a facility, the hospital staff would
be required to assess the minor instantaneously and decide immediately whether
to seek commitment of the minor. Such a procedure would cause an unnecessary
rush to medical judgment and stigmatize voluntary parental admissions of
minors in need of mental health services. As a result, parents may be dissuaded
from seeking critical care for their child.
Moreover, under K.K.'s interpretation of Rule 4:74-7A, where a minor's
custody status is converted from a voluntary parental admission to temporary
order of commitment after seven days, a hearing would have to be held seven
days thereafter. Such a construction is inconsistent with the intent and purpose
of the rule. The compressed schedule under K.K.'s reading of the rule would
unduly truncate the parties' abilities to assess the minor patient, determine
whether commitment of the minor is necessary, serve notice of the commitment
hearing, and formulate arguments to be presented at the hearing. See In re
Commitment of Z.O., 197 N.J. Super. 330, 336-37 (App. Div. 1984) (rejecting
a similar argument under the repealed commitment statute).
A-2321-18T2
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Applying K.K.'s reading of Rule 4:74-7A would significantly decrease the
time period for parties to prepare for the commitment hearing and would not
further the objective or purpose of the rule. K.K.'s interpretation would create
an "impossibly compressed time schedule," and we "cannot ascribe . . . the intent
to create a time schedule that would not work." Z.O., 197 N.J. Super. at 336-
37.
We also reject K.K.'s claim that the trial court's analysis and application
of Rule 4:74-7A violated her constitutional liberty interests and due process
protections. The State's authority to involuntarily commit people for psychiatric
treatment is circumscribed by the constitutional rights accorded to the
individuals to be committed. In re Commitment of S.L., 94 N.J. 128, 136 (1983).
Procedural due process requires notice and a judicial hearing, at which the
individual to be committed has the right to be represented by counsel and present
evidence. Id. at 137.
Aside from her asserted six-day delay in the scheduling of the initial
commitment hearing, K.K. received every other procedural and substantive due
process right accorded in such a proceeding. She was represented by counsel in
a judicial hearing. K.K. had the chance to present evidence on her own behalf,
and her counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine testifying witnesses. We
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are satisfied that K.K.'s constitutional rights were not violated as a result of
scheduling her commitment hearing on December 27, 2018.
We understand from K.K.'s merits brief that judicial calculation of the
fourteen-day time period for scheduling a minor's initial commitment hearing
may vary throughout the State. We suggest that the Office of the Public
Defender seek a clarification from the Civil Practice Committee regarding the
date for commencement of the fourteen-day period for scheduling an initial
commitment hearing in accordance with Rule 4:74-7A(d).
Affirmed.
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