Rojo v. Loeper Landscaping, Inc.

STOWERS, Justice,

dissenting.

I dissent from the majority opinion that an agreement to commute periodic workers’ compensation payments into a lump sum payment, does not require approval by a hearing officer. The majority opinion directly contradicts legislative intent and New Mexico precedent.

The New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act was intended to serve claimants best interests and prevent them from becoming dependent on welfare. Codling v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 89 N.M. 213, 215, 549 P.2d 628, 630 (Ct.App.1976). See also 82 Am.Jur.2d Workmen’s Compensation § 654 (1976). The New Mexico legislature has determined that periodic compensation payments, simulating wages, best serve claimants’ interests. NMSA 1978, § 52-5-12(A) (Repl.Pamp.1987). See also Codling, 89 N.M. at 215, 549 P.2d at 630. This comports with the general rule that lump sum awards, instead of periodic payments, in a worker’s compensation action are the exception. Boughton v. W. Nuclear Inc., 99 N.M. 723, 724, 663 P.2d 382, 383 (Ct.App.1983) (citing Padilla v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 97 N.M. 354, 639 P.2d 1208 (Ct.App. 1981)). “[L]ump sum payments are justified only when ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist.” Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 102 N.M. 333, 335, 695 P.2d 483, 485 (1985) (citation omitted).

To further these goals, the legislature established several requirements which must be met before commuting periodic compensation payments into a lump sum payment. The parties must agree, or special circumstances must exist which clearly demonstrate that a lump sum payment is in the claimant’s best interests. NMSA 1978, § 52-5-12(A) (Repl.Pamp.1987).

Once the parties have agreed, the “lump sum payment agreement * * * shall be presented to the hearing officer for approval * * NMSA 1978, § 52-5-13 (Repl.Pamp.1987). Next, the hearing officer determines whether the agreement is “fair, equitable and consistent with provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act * * NMSA 1978, § 52-5-14(A) (Repl. Pamp.1987). If the agreement meets these criteria, the hearing officer “shall approve the agreement * * Id. “Amounts payable as compensation may be converted to a lump sum settlement by agreement of the parties after having been approved by the hearing officer.” NMSA 1978, § 52-5-14(B) (Repl.Pamp.1987). Only after approval is the agreement binding. The court in Odom v. Tosco Corp., 12 Ark.App. 196, 672 S.W.2d 915 (1984), faced issues similar to those at bar. There, the parties formed a joint petition settlement agreement; however, the claimant died before a hearing to approve the agreement was held. That court determined that the settlement agreement was “not effective because a joint petition hearing had not been conducted and Commission approval had not been rendered prior to the claimant’s death.” Id., 12 Ark.App. at 200, 672 S.W.2d at 919.

In this case, as in Odom, an agreement was never approved. In fact, at the hearing, the parties did not even agree. Although Western and Rojo had previously signed a written lump sum settlement agreement, Western rejected the agreement prior to approval. Without an agreement the hearing officer lacked authority to approve the agreement, absent special circumstances not indicated here. NMSA 1978, § 52-5-12(A) (Repl.Pamp.1978). The mandatory “shall” language used throughout Sections 52-5-12 through 52-5-14, indicates that a hearing officer must approve an agreement to commute periodic compensation payments into a lump sum payment. Legislative authority for court approval of lump sum settlement agreements, after a hearing, dates back to 1959. NMSA 1953, § 59-10-5(B) (Pocket Supp.1959).

The majority focus on the criteria for approving an agreement, Section 52-5-14(A). However, those criteria may only be considered once the parties have agreed and have presented their agreement to the hearing officer for approval. When Section 52-5-14(A) is read in context, the true legislative intent requiring agreement approval becomes clear.

Since the parties failed to agree at the critical hearing stage, the hearing officer properly refused to approve the written settlement agreement and the Court of Appeals properly affirmed. For the foregoing reasons I would affirm the decision of the Workers’ . Compensation Administration hearing officer and the Court of Appeals. I also concur with the points raised in Chief Justice Scarborough’s dissent.