DocketNumber: 696
Citation Numbers: 490 P.2d 680, 83 N.M. 238
Judges: Cowan, Wood, Sutin
Filed Date: 10/29/1971
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/11/2024
OPINION
Convicted of reteiving stolen property in excess of $2500.00, defendant appeals. Section 40A-16-11, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 6, Supp.1971). The appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The State asserts defendant may not have the evidence reviewed as to its sufficiency because defendant’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of the case-in-chief was denied and not renewed at the close of all the evidence. See State v. Phipps, 47 N.M. 316, 142 P.2d 550 (1943); State v. Vargas, 42 N.M. 1, 74 P.2d 62 (1937). We do not reach this procedural problem; our review is on the basis of fundamental error.
State v. Torres, 78 N.M. 597, 435 P.2d 216 (Ct.App.1967) states:
“The doctrine of fundamental error is resorted to in criminal cases only if the ■ innocence of the defendant appears indisputable, or if the question of his guilt is- so doubtful that it would shock the conscience to permit his conviction to stand. State v. Sanders, 54 N.M. 369, 225 P.2d 150 (1950). If there is a total absence of evidence to support a conviction, as well as evidence of an exculpatory nature, then an appellate court has the duty to see that substantial justice is done and to set aside the conviction. State v. Salazar, 78 N.M. 329, 431 P.2d 62 (1967). * * *”
Three “oil field” drilling bits disappeared from drilling locations in eastern Oklahoma. These locations were in the general vicinity of Fort Smith, Arkansas. The bits were recovered from a house in Hobbs, New Mexico. Defendant was in the Fort Smith area at the time the bits disappeared and was staying in the house in Hobbs, as a visitor, at the time thé bits vere recovered.
Two other men are connected with the house where the bits were located: Meissner, who was also staying in the house and was present when the bits were found; and Sewell, who had rented the house. The detective who discovered the bits testified that Sewell had taken some of defendant’s property and disappeared. According to defendant, this property was defendant’s car and clothes.
Other evidence is: (1) Defendant had rented the house immediately prior to' the time Sewell became the renter; (2) Meissner and defendant returned from Arkansas together in defendant’s car; (3) the detective, acting on the basis of information received from an unidentified person, went to a bar looking for a person (unidentified) reported to be trying to sell bits and then went to the house where the bits were found; and (4) defendant, in response to the detective’s question, stated he did not have a bill of sale for the bits.
Section 40A-16-11, supra, defines the crime of receiving stolen property as '“ * * * buying, procuring, receiving or concealing anything of value, knowing or having reason to believe the same to have .been stolen or acquired by fraud or embezzlement.” See State v. Carlton, 82 N.M. 537, 484 P.2d 757 (Ct.App.1971). There is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence that defendant bought, procured, received or concealed the bits. The jury was instructed on aiding and abetting but there is neither evidence nor inference that defendant participated in any way in any buying, procuring, receiving or concealing of the bits. See State v. Salazar, 78 N.M. 329, 431 P.2d 62 (1967). Defendant was present in the house' where the bits' were found, but presence alone is. insufficient. State v. Grove, 82 N.M. 679, 486 P.2d 615 (Ct.App.1971); State v. Harrison, 81 N.M. 324, 466 P.2d 890 (Ct.App.1970). .
Here, there is a total absence of evidence to support the conviction. In addition, there is evidence of an 'exculpatory nature. Defendant testified hé had been in the Fort Smith area visiting relatives.' He also testified that he stayed-at the house in Hobbs' where the bits were found because he was having marital difficulties. Other exculpatory . evidence is that' the house where the bits were found had been rented by Sewell, and that Sewell had disappeared.
We recognize that the doctrine of fundamental error is to be applied sparingly and is not to be used to excuse failure to make proper objection in the trial court. State v. Aull, 78 N.M. 607, 435 P. 2d 437 (1967), cert. denied 391 U.S. 927, 88 S.Ct. 1829, 20 L.Ed.2d 668 (1968); State v. Sanders, 54 N.M. 369, 225 P.2d 150 (1950). We also recognize that fundamental error must go to the foundation of the case. State v. Garcia, 46 N.M. 302, 128 P. 2d 459 (1942). We apply the doctrine within these limitations. We do not hold that the innocence of defendant is indisputable. We do hold that the absence of evidence against defendant, together with the exculpatory evidence, makes his guilt so doubtful “ * * * that it would shock the conscience to permit his conviction to stand. * * * ” State v. Torres, supra.
The judgment and sentence is reversed. The cause is remanded with directions to discharge the defendant.
It is so ordered.