Lucero v. Tachias

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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 AGREPINA LUCERO , and RONALD O.
3 LUCERO, and SARAH E. LUCERO,
4 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
5 v. No. 33,558
6 MICHAEL H. TACHIAS and
7 ROWENA E. TACHIAS, RESTIE
8 SANDOVAL and ANNIE SANDOVAL;
9 DANIEL LUCERO and YOLANDA
10 LUCERO; SANDOVAL COUNTY
11 BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;
12 and ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO
13 MAY CLAIM A LIEN, INTEREST OR
14 TITLE ADVERSE TO THE PLAINTIFFS,
15 Defendants-Appellees,
16 ERNESTO TACHIAS,
17 Intervenor.
18 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANDOVAL COUNTY
19 George P. Eichwald, District Judge
20 Crowley & Gribble, P.C.
21 Clayton E. Crowley
22 Albuquerque, NM
23 for Appellants
24 Lakins Law Firm, P.C.
1 Charles Norman Lakins
2 Albuquerque, NM
3 for Appellees
4 MEMORANDUM OPINION
5 HANISEE, Judge.
6 {1} Appellants Agrepina Lucero, Ronald Lucero, and Sarah Lucero (Plaintiffs)
7 appeal from the district court’s ruling that Plaintiffs did not prove their claim of
8 adverse possession to the disputed land and are thus not entitled to quiet title in their
9 favor. The district court entered its findings and conclusions on September 10, 2013
10 [RP Vol.II/390], to which Plaintiffs responded by filing their September 24, 2013,
11 “motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 1-059 NMRA” (motion). [RP
12 Vol.II/427, 437, 472] The district court subsequently denied Plaintiffs’ motion, and
13 in its January 17, 2014, order doing so expressly stated “[t]his order shall constitute
14 a final and appealable order.” [RP Vol.II/480] Plaintiffs now appeal from the district
15 court’s denial of their motion. [RP Vol.II/480, 481]
16 {2} While acknowledging the district court’s language expressing finality in its
17 order, our notice nonetheless proposed to dismiss, in pertinent part because matters
18 remain below to be decided. As provided in our notice, while the district court’s
19 findings and conclusions set forth that Appellees (Defendants) and Ernesto Tachio
20 (Intervenor) are entitled to damages [RP Vol.I/66, 68; II/412-14, 315], the district
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1 court has yet to determine the amount of damages to which they are entitled. Because
2 the matter of damages remains to be decided, we conclude that there is not a final
3 order or judgment for purposes of appeal. See generally Valley Improvement Ass’n v.
4 Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 1993-NMSC-061, ¶¶ 1, 8, 116 N.M. 426, 863 P.2d
5 1047 (holding that because the district court awarded damages, but failed to quantify
6 them, the district court’s judgment was not final); B.L. Goldberg & Assocs., Inc. v.
7 Uptown, Inc., 1985-NMSC-084, ¶ 3, 103 N.M. 277, 705 P.2d 683 (recognizing that
8 an order or judgment is generally not considered final unless all issues of law and fact
9 have been determined and the case disposed of by the trial court to the fullest extent
10 possible); Curbello v. Vaughn, 1966-NMSC-179, ¶¶ 1-3, 76 N.M. 687, 417 P.2d 881
11 (stating that where the district court had entered findings and conclusions but had not
12 entered an order or judgment carrying out the findings and conclusions, no final order
13 had been entered in the case for purposes of appeal).
14 {3} Recognizing that “there are damages issues left to be tried and that those issues
15 are not final” [MIO 2], Plaintiffs argue that this Court should nonetheless consider
16 their appeal. As support for their argument, Plaintiffs provide that the trial below was
17 bifurcated between equitable and legal issues [MIO 1], that the present appeal
18 addresses the equitable issues relating to injunctive relief [MIO 2-3, 9], and that “the
19 judicial policy of orderly proceedings favor[s] appellate review at this stage of the
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1 proceedings” because “there will most likely be two damages trials instead of one.”
2 [MIO 2] While Plaintiffs urge us to consider the merits of their appeal despite the
3 outstanding damages matter, we decline to do so because we disfavor piecemeal
4 appeals. See Executive Sports Club, Inc. v. First Plaza Trust, 1998-NMSC-008, ¶¶ 8,
5 11, 125 N.M. 78, 957 P.2d 63 (recognizing New Mexico’s strong policy of
6 disfavoring piecemeal appeals).
7 {4} In recognition that the order from which they appeal lacks finality, Plaintiffs
8 request this Court to treat their appeal as interlocutory, “at least with regard to those
9 Findings and Conclusions which are interlocutory in nature.” [MIO 5] Without
10 commenting on whether the merits of this case would be appropriate for interlocutory
11 review, we decline Plaintiffs’ request for two preliminary reasons. First, even if we
12 were to treat Plaintiffs’ docketing statement as a non-conforming application for
13 interlocutory appeal, it was not filed in this Court within fifteen days of the district
14 court’s January 17, 2014, order, as required by Rule 12-203(A) NMRA (mandating
15 that an application for interlocutory appeal be filed within fifteen days after the entry
16 of the order appealed from). And second, as required by NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-
17 4(A) (1999) and Rule 12-203(B), the district court must certify the order for
18 interlocutory review by stating that “the order or decision involves a controlling
19 question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
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1 that an immediate appeal from the order or decision may materially advance the
2 ultimate termination of the litigation.” Section 39-3-4(A). The order from which
3 Plaintiffs appeal, however, does not contain this required language, and we decline to
4 exercise jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal absent this required certification
5 language. See generally State v. Lobato, 2006-NMCA-051, ¶ 38, 139 N.M. 431, 134
6 P.3d 122 (recognizing that incorporation of the mandated certification language is
7 required to permit interlocutory review). In so declining, we reject Plaintiffs’
8 argument that the holding in Healthsource, Inc. v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 2005-
9 NMCA-097, 138 N.M. 70, 116 P.3d 861, supports their arguments for interlocutory
10 relief. [MIO 9-10] Healthsource is instructive for its ruling that while Rule
11 1-054(B)(2) may provide finality to one party, it does not extend finality to a second
12 party if issues remain pending against such party. Healthsource, Inc., 2005-NMCA-
13 097, ¶¶ 14-15. Any analogy between Rule 1-054 and the requisite certification
14 language for interlocutory appeal, we believe, is misguided.
15 {5} For the reasons provided in our notice and above, we dismiss for lack of a final
16 order.
17 {6} IT IS SO ORDERED.
18
19 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
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1 WE CONCUR:
2
3 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
4
5 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
6