State v. Gallegos

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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
3 Plaintiff-Appellee,
4 v. No. A-1-CA-34930
5 VICTOR W. GALLEGOS,
6 Defendant-Appellant.
7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY
8 James Waylon Counts, District Judge
9 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
10 Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General
11 Santa Fe, NM
12 for Appellee
13 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
14 Kimberly Chavez Cook, Assistant Appellate Defender
15 Santa Fe, NM
16 for Appellant
17 MEMORANDUM OPINION
18 BOHNHOFF, Judge.
1 {1} Defendant Victor W. Gallegos was convicted of possession of
2 methamphetamine. Defendant raises three challenges on appeal: (1) Defendant’s
3 Confrontation Clause rights were violated because a substitute analyst testified to the
4 conclusion reached by the primary analyst who did not testify; (2) the district court
5 committed fundamental error by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense
6 of possession of paraphernalia; (3) the failure of defense counsel to request the lesser
7 included offense instruction amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. This is a
8 memorandum opinion and because the parties are familiar with the facts and
9 procedural posture of the case, we set forth only such facts and law as are necessary
10 to decide the issues raised. We affirm.
11 BACKGROUND
12 {2} Alamogordo, New Mexico police executed a search warrant at the home of
13 Defendant. The warrant was based on information supplied by a confidential
14 informant that Defendant possessed a large quantity of heroin at his home. When the
15 search warrant was executed, Defendant was at home with a tenant who rented a room
16 in the house and two other visitors. The police did not find any heroin but instead
17 found morphine, drug paraphernalia (a syringe, Q-tips, a knife with residue, a piece
18 of a balloon with residue, and a small baggie with a hole in the corner), and remnants
19 of methamphetamine in plastic baggies in a dresser in Defendant’s bedroom.
3
1 {3} Defendant was charged in a three-count criminal information with possession
2 of morphine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of methamphetamine.
3 At the two-day trial, Alamogordo police officer Joseph Singer testified about the
4 search of Defendant’s home. Officer Kyle Garrett testified to his participation in the
5 search and his discovery of baggies that contained a clear crystal substance in them.
6 Sergeant David Kunihiro testified that the baggies appeared to contain
7 methamphetamine and he further testified about the drug paraphernalia found in
8 Defendant’s home. In addition to the law enforcement testimony, Andrew Barber
9 (Barber), a forensic scientist from the state forensic laboratory in Las Cruces, testified
10 regarding the lab tests of the baggies that were suspected to contain
11 methamphetamine.
12 {4} Barber testified as an expert witness in the field of chemistry and as an analyst
13 of controlled substances. Barber stated that he had reviewed the work of the analyst
14 who performed the original analysis of the contents of the bags. The prosecutor then
15 asked Barber what his conclusions were. Defense counsel objected, arguing lack of
16 foundation because Barber was not present when the evidence was received by the lab
17 and he was not involved in the testing. The district court then raised the question of
18 a possible Confrontation Clause issue under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
19 (2004), because defense counsel could not question the person who actually
4
1 performed the testing. The prosecutor responded by arguing that State v. Huettl, 2013-
2 NMCA-038, 305 P.3d 956, holds that an expert can review data and give opinions.
3 After the district court reviewed Huettl it stated that there may not be a Crawford
4 issue, but noted that there nevertheless was insufficient foundation on the chain of
5 custody and, on that basis, sustained defense counsel’s other objection regarding lack
6 of foundation. Defense counsel did not follow up on the court’s comments by making
7 any argument or objection regarding Crawford or Huettl.
8 {5} The prosecutor then continued to examine Barber, questioning him about the
9 bar codes used to mark each item received by the lab and the chain of custody shown
10 on the original evidence receipt. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The
11 district court ruled that there was no foundation as to relevance because the prosecutor
12 had not shown that the sample tested was even related to Defendant’s case and
13 sustained the objection. Barber was then excused, subject to recall.
14 {6} Barber was recalled the next day and his direct examination continued. Barber
15 explained his role as a technical reviewer, saying that he reviewed the data and formed
16 his own opinion. When asked, “on your review what did you do in particular to these
17 items?” Barber stated, without eliciting any objection:
18 In my review, I went through all those steps that we discussed. I checked
19 to see if the description of the evidence was consistent with the evidence
20 received, and that the methods and procedures that he used were
5
1 consistent with—and that the data are consistent with—the conclusions
2 that he reached in the end.
3 The prosecutor then asked Barber, “and based on the data review did you form your
4 own opinion?” Barber replied, “yes” to which the prosecutor asked “what was that?”
5 Defense counsel again objected based on lack of foundation for the opinion and asked
6 to conduct voir dire, which request the district court granted. Defense counsel
7 established that another analyst, Eric Young (Young), had performed the initial work
8 and then presented Barber with the resulting data, Barber did not observe Young’s
9 work, and Barber drew a conclusion from the data that was given to him by Young.
10 Defense counsel then stated that he still had the same objection, that there was no
11 foundation for Barber to draw a bottom-line conclusion:
12 there’s inadequate foundation for him to draw and articulate a conclusion
13 as to what any of this stuff adds up to, he didn’t run the test, he wasn’t
14 there when the test was run, he didn’t have any hands-on role in this
15 analysis, he’s got stuff after the fact, and now he’s here as kind of a
16 human tape recorder to say what [Young] might say, and I can’t cross-
17 examine [Young].
18 The prosecutor responded by stating, “[Barber] is here as an expert [and] experts can
19 testify to the data and to the procedures and policies[.] . . . He can, as an expert, testify
20 to data, he is not testifying to what [Young] told him. . . . He has drawn an opinion
21 that is consistent with the data presented to him.” The district court stated that “Huettl
22 seems to say that someone who didn’t perform the test can examine the data and arrive
6
1 at a conclusion and testify as to that but there’s not yet a foundation as to what he
2 looked at,” so defense counsel’s objection (based on lack of foundation for Barber to
3 draw a conclusion) was sustained.
4 {7} The prosecutor asked Barber to explain the data he analyzed. Barber stated that
5 in this case morphine was involved, to which defense counsel again objected, the
6 objection was sustained, and the jury was told to disregard the statement. Then the
7 prosecutor asked Barber to describe the machine and how the machine worked in
8 regards to the analysis in question. Barber explained how the analysis resulted in a
9 printout from the machine, the analyst compares the data in the printout against the
10 data from a certified referent standard for a specific drug to determine if the data from
11 the evidence matches that from the referent, and that he drew his own conclusions
12 based on the data in the report from the machine. Defense counsel then objected. In
13 a bench conference the prosecutor argued that Barber testified that he formed an
14 opinion from the machine not from the analyst and that his conclusion was based on
15 the machine’s data. Defense counsel responded by stating that there was not an
16 adequate foundation for this testimony because “ I don’t know what machine he used.
17 I don’t know if he used a sewing machine, I don’t know if he used a washing
18 machine.” The district court sustained the objection, stating that there was no
19 foundation because the prosecutor had not established what machine was used.
7
1 {8} Barber testified that a gas chromatography mass spectrometer (GCMS) was
2 used and that the GCMS separates out the components of the sample so they can be
3 compared for consistency with the referent. Barber further testified that the machine
4 was working, gas chromatography mass spectrometry is a generally accepted method
5 of analysis of unknown substances, the GCMS generated a report, which he reviewed,
6 and Barber drew his conclusion based on the review of that report. Defense counsel
7 objected and the district court overruled the objection but gave defense counsel
8 permission to voir dire Barber. On voir dire, defense counsel elicited that Barber did
9 not specifically observe Young put the evidence into the GCMS and did not know
10 from his own observation what went into the machine. Defense counsel then repeated
11 the same objection and the district court overruled the objection. Barber then testified:
12 Prosecutor: So what were those conclusions, based on your review?
13 Barber: In giving my opinion, just based on the technical review, I
14 can say that the conclusions that [Young] reached were
15 consistent with the conclusions that I would reach in
16 reviewing the data.
17 Prosecutor: What specifically were your conclusions, not what the
18 analyst, but what did you conclude based on your tech
19 review of the data from the machine?
20 Barber: Well, just from the data on the machine, I concluded that
21 the data was consistent with methamphetamine being in
22 two items, and morphine being in one item.
23 (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel did not object to this line of questioning.
8
1 {9} The last objections from defense counsel occurred when Barber was asked to
2 identify which bags contained the methamphetamine. While explaining the contents
3 of the bags, Barber stated, “the description that he gave” and “his description was that
4 there were two[.]” (Emphasis added.) The district court sustained defense counsel’s
5 objections to both of these statements. The prosecutor then asked Barber to testify
6 based only on his conclusions and he testified that there was in fact methamphetamine
7 in the two bags. Defense counsel had no questions for Barber on cross-examination
8 and Barber was then excused.
9 {10} The district court granted a directed verdict on count one (morphine
10 possession), ruling that the morphine may have been located in a common area of the
11 house and the State had not presented sufficient evidence that Defendant exercised
12 control over it. The district court also granted a directed verdict on count two (drug
13 paraphernalia possession), reasoning that the search warrant was for heroin, there was
14 no proof that heroin was in the home, and no proof that the items found in the home
15 were paraphernalia related to use or trafficking of heroin. The prosecutor moved to
16 amend the information in count two to include, as alleged paraphernalia, the baggies
17 found that contained remnants of methamphetamine. However, defense counsel
18 objected and the district court denied the motion as unduly prejudicial.
9
1 {11} After hearing all of the testimony the district court and counsel discussed the
2 jury instructions. During this discussion, defense counsel did not request a lesser
3 included offense instruction for the possession of methamphetamine charge. After
4 closing arguments the jury returned a verdict of guilty on count three (possession of
5 methamphetamine). At the sentencing hearing Defendant was sentenced to eighteen
6 months’ imprisonment plus one year for habitual offender enhancement, with 330
7 days of pre-sentence confinement credit.
8 DISCUSSION
9 1. Defendant Failed to Raise Any Specific Objection Regarding the
10 Confrontation Clause and Therefore Failed to Preserve the Now Claimed
11 Error
12 {12} Defendant argues that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated when
13 Barber, a substitute analyst, testified to the conclusions reached by the primary
14 analyst, Young. The State argues that Defendant failed to preserve the claimed error,
15 that there is no Confrontation Clause violation, and that even if there were a preserved
16 violation the error was harmless.
17 {13} The bulk of Barber’s testimony was based on his own independent conclusions
18 that the substance contained in the two bags was methamphetamine. Barber based his
19 expert opinion on his review of the raw data produced by Young. Under Huettl, 2013-
20 NMCA-038, ¶¶ 35-36, Barber’s independently derived conclusions based on the data
10
1 obtained by Young did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Barber was testifying to
2 the conclusions he had formed in analyzing the data, even though that data was
3 created by a different analyst.
4 {14} However, Defendant challenges Barber’s additional testimony that: “In giving
5 my opinion, just based on the technical review, I can say that the conclusions that
6 [Young] reached were consistent with the conclusions that I would reach in reviewing
7 the data.” (Consistency Testimony) Defendant argues this evidence is based on
8 conclusions reached by Young, is testimonial, and thus violated the Confrontation
9 Clause and was inadmissible unless defense counsel had the opportunity to cross
10 examine Young. See id. ¶¶ 37-38.
11 {15} Even assuming that Barber’s Consistency Testimony violated the Confrontation
12 Clause, Defendant failed to preserve this argument. The preservation rule, requiring
13 a party to object to a claimed error below, is not a mere formality. The purpose of the
14 preservation requirement is to allow the district court an opportunity to cure errors,
15 thereby dispensing with the need for an appeal. See Vill. of Angel Fire v. Bd. of Cty.
16 Comm'rs of Colfax Cty., 2010-NMCA-038, ¶ 15, 148 N.M. 804, 242 P.3d 371. In
17 order to preserve an error for appeal, “it is essential that the ground or grounds of the
18 objection or motion be made with sufficient specificity to alert the mind of the
19 [district] court to the claimed error or errors, and that a ruling thereon then be
11
1 invoked.” State v. Lopez, 1973-NMSC-041, 84 N.M. 805, ¶ 23, 508 P.2d 1292.
2 Objections are preserved for review only if counsel states clearly the grounds for the
3 objection. See State v. Casteneda, 1982-NMCA-046, ¶ 10, 97 N.M. 670, 642 P.2d
4 1129. An objection requires specificity so that the “appellate court does not have to
5 guess at what was and what was not an issue at trial.” State v. Lucero, 1993-NMSC-
6 064, ¶ 11, 116 N.M. 450, 863 P.2d 1071; see, e.g., State v. Phillips, 2000-NMCA-028,
7 ¶¶ 16-23, 128 N.M. 777, 999 P.2d 421 (holding that defendant’s general relevancy
8 objection to admission of evidence of drug use, possession, and distribution did not
9 preserve for appellate review an objection to improper admission of evidence of prior
10 bad acts).
11 {16} More specifically, New Mexico courts have held that Sixth Amendment
12 Confrontation Clause objections must be made with specificity. See State v. Lucero,
13 1986-NMCA-085, ¶¶ 12-17, 104 N.M. 587, 725 P.2d 266 (concluding that the
14 Confrontation Clause issue was not preserved because defendant’s objection asked
15 merely for an evidentiary ruling and did not alert the district court to a constitutional
16 error). A defendant’s failure to object on Confrontation Clause grounds or general
17 constitutional grounds results in abandonment of the argument on appeal. State v.
18 Mora, 1997-NMSC-060, ¶ 47 n.1, 124 N.M. 346, 950 P.2d 789; see State v. Silva,
19 2008-NMSC-051, ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 815, 192 P.3d 1192 (holding that because counsel
12
1 did not assert that refusing the opportunity to ask questions generally would violate
2 defendant’s constitutional rights or specifically infringe his Sixth Amendment or
3 Confrontation Clause rights, the claimed error was not preserved as such), holding
4 modified by State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 12-16, 284 P.3d 1076.1
5 {17} Defendant never objected on Confrontation Clause grounds to Barber’s
6 Consistency Testimony. Indeed, Defendant did not object on any grounds to Barber’s
7 testimony specifically about Young’s conclusions. Instead, Defendant’s objections
8 during Barber’s examination focused only on the claimed foundational and hearsay
9 shortcomings of Barber’s testimony about Young’s testing and data, all of which
10 Huettl holds does not violate the Confrontation Clause. See Huettl, 2013-NMCA-038,
11 ¶¶ 35, 39.
12 {18} Defendant could have objected when Barber referred to the consistency
13 between the data and Young’s opinion, or between Young’s opinion and Barber’s
14 opinion. If Defendant had objected on Confrontation Clause grounds to that
15 testimony, then the district court could have given a curative instruction or otherwise
1
19 This Court may exercise discretion to review issues not preserved if they
20 involve general public interest, fundamental error, or fundamental rights. Rule
16 12-321(B) NMRA. However, we will not consider these exceptions if they are not
17 raised on appeal. See State v. Jason F., 1998-NMSC-010, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 111, 957
18 P.2d 1145 (declining to apply the preservation exceptions when they were not argued
19 on appeal). Defendant herein has not asserted any of these possible bases for review
20 of his Confrontation Clause argument.
13
1 addressed the concern. It is essential that objections be made with sufficient specificity
2 to alert the mind of the district court and invoke a ruling—and remedial action if
3 appropriate—on the claimed error. Lopez, 1973-NMSC-041, ¶ 23. We therefore hold
4 that Defendant waived any error in connection with the Consistency Testimony. We
5 decline to address, as unnecessary, the State’s alternative argument that any such error
6 was harmless.
7 2. The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error in Not Giving a
8 Lesser Included Offense Jury Instruction
9 {19} Citing State v. Meadors, 1995-NMSC-073, 121 N.M. 38, 908 P.2d 731, and
10 State v. Darkis, 2000-NMCA-085, 129 N.M. 547, 10 P.3d 871, Defendant contends
11 that possession of drug paraphernalia—that is, the baggies—was a lesser included
12 offense of the methamphetamine charge. On that basis, he argues not only that
13 Defendant had a right to have the jury instructed on that lesser offense but also the
14 district court was obligated to give the instruction whether or not it was requested.
15 Defendant did not request the instruction and in fact vigorously objected when the
16 State sought to amend the paraphernalia charge to include the baggies, which
17 amendment if granted presumably would have resulted in the giving of the instruction.
18 Defendant maintains, however, that because he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and
19 intelligently waive his right to a lesser included offense instruction, the district
20 committed fundamental error in not giving it.
14
1 {20} State v. Boeglin, 1987-NMSC-002, ¶ 1, 105 N.M. 247, 731 P.2d 943, informs
2 our consideration of Defendant’s argument. In that case, the defendant was tried for
3 first degree murder. At multiple points during the trial, the trial court inquired whether
4 the defendant wished to have the jury instructed on second degree murder as well. Id.
5 ¶ 4. Defense counsel stated on the record that he recommended that the second degree
6 murder instruction be given. Id. ¶ 5. Each time the defendant declined the suggestion,
7 notwithstanding the court’s, the prosecutor’s, and his own counsel’s explanation of
8 the pros and cons of the decision. Id. ¶ 6. After the defendant was convicted of first
9 degree murder, he asserted on appeal that the court erred in not giving the second
10 degree murder instruction. Id. ¶ 7. Our Supreme Court rejected the argument,
11 reasoning that defendants are free to make, and will be bound by, their own all-or-
12 nothing strategy decisions:
13 This Court prefers not to compel defendants to avail themselves of rights
14 they believe may not be advantageous and long has held that defendants’
15 rights, even fundamental constitutional rights, may be waived. . . . We
16 hold that, consistent with the constitutional guarantees of a fair trial, the
17 defendant in a first degree murder prosecution may take his chances with
18 the jury by waiving instructions on lesser included offenses and cannot
19 be heard to complain on appeal if he has gambled and lost.
20 Id. ¶15. Thus, if a defendant waives his or her right to have the jury instructed on a
21 lesser included offense, there is no error when the trial court respects that decision and
22 the instruction is not given. Id. ¶ 30.
15
1 {21} Defendant stresses that the Boeglin Court noted that, “The record in this case
2 clearly demonstrates that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
3 waived his right to have the jury instructed on second degree murder.” Id. ¶ 16.
4 However, the Court did not mandate or even suggest that its decision hinged on this
5 fact. Id. ¶¶ 4-19. Moreover, as is reflected in two recent decisions by this Court, which
6 the parties have discussed in their appellate briefs, a defendant’s waiver need not be
7 express or on the record. In State v. Flores, No. 30,301, mem. op. *1 (N.M. Ct. App.
8 A.K. Marsh. 13, 2012) (non-precedential), the defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide
9 by reckless driving. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in not instructing
10 the jury on the lesser included offense of careless driving. Id. at *5. We noted that,
11 during closing argument, defense counsel urged that, while the defendant may have
12 been negligent, he was not reckless. Id. While there was “no record on appeal of
13 whether a careless driving instruction was requested or voluntarily waived by [the
14 d]efendant, [it appeared from defense counsel’s closing argument] that [the d]efendant
15 made a tactical decision to go for ‘all or nothing’ on the reckless driving charge and
16 did not request the instruction.” Id. Because “on appeal, we do not second-guess the
17 tactical decisions of litigants and both parties are entitled to the benefits and should
18 be liable for the risks of their respective trial strategies,” id. (alterations, omissions,
16
1 internal quotation marks, and citation omitted), we concluded that the district court did
2 not err in not giving the lesser included instruction. Id.
3 {22} Similarly, in State v. Chavez, No. 34,155, mem. op. ¶¶ 1-2 (N.M. Ct. App. June
4 16, 2015) (non-precedential), following his conviction for second degree murder, the
5 defendant contended on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on
6 involuntary manslaughter. We again noted New Mexico’s judicial policy of permitting
7 criminal defendants to make strategic decisions to waive rights, including the right to
8 instruct the jury on a lesser included charge. Id. ¶ 7. And consistent with the
9 procedural posture of Flores, we did not insist on an on-the-record, knowing,
10 intelligent, and voluntary waiver. Id. On the contrary, it was sufficient that “[t]he
11 decision not to request the instruction may have been a conscious decision attributable
12 to trial strategy, and, if that is the case, we will not second-guess the tactical decisions
13 of counsel below.” Chavez, No. 34,155, mem. op. ¶ 7 (emphasis added).
14 {23} The procedural posture of the case at bar is similar to that of Flores. During
15 both opening statement and closing argument, defense counsel stressed, as a key
16 element of Defendant’s case, that the State could not prove that he possessed either
17 the methamphetamine or the paraphernalia. Defense counsel pointed in particular to
18 the fact that not only Defendant but also his tenant and his house visitors could have
19 possessed the methamphetamine that was found in the baggies. This record supports
17
1 the conclusion that Defendant and his counsel consciously chose to take Defendant’s
2 chances on acquittal of the methamphetamine possession charge and forego the
3 potential downside (as well as upside) of permitting the jury the opportunity of
4 convicting him on a drug paraphernalia charge that encompassed the baggies. “[T]he
5 defendant . . . may take his chances with the jury by waiving instructions on lesser
6 included offenses and cannot be heard to complain on appeal if he has gambled and
7 lost.” Boeglin, 1987-NMSC-002, ¶ 15.
8 {24} In any event, even assuming the district court therefore erred in not sua sponte
9 giving the instruction, that failure would not rise to the level of fundamental error.
10 Fundamental error in connection with the giving or failure to give a jury instruction
11 must “take from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which
12 no court could or ought to permit him to waive[,]” State v. Garcia, 1942-NMSC-030,
13 ¶ 24, 46 N.M. 302, 128 P.2d 459, or which “confus[es] or misdirect[s] the jury
14 resulting in a plain miscarriage of justice,” Flores, No. 30,301, mem. op. at *6. There
15 is no basis for concluding that the jury was confused in this case. Had the jury been
16 persuaded that the State had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements
17 —including possession—of the methamphetamine possession charge, it readily could
18 and presumably would have acquitted Defendant. “[T]he failure to have the
18
1 instruction on the lesser included offense did not preclude the jury from making this
2 determination.” Id.
3 3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
4 {25} In the alternative to his argument that the district court erred in failing to give
5 a lesser ncluded offense instruction on drug paraphernalia possession, Defendant
6 argues that his trial counsel’s failure to request such an instruction amounted to
7 ineffective assistance of counsel contrary to the Sixth Amendment to the United States
8 Constitution.
9 {26} In order to establish any entitlement to relief based on ineffective assistance of
10 counsel, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that: (1) counsel’s performance
11 fell below that of a reasonably competent attorney; (2) no plausible, rational strategy
12 or tactic can explain counsel’s conduct; and (3) counsel’s apparent failing prejudiced
13 the defense of the case. See State v. Herrera, 2001-NMCA-073, ¶ 36, 131 N.M. 22,
14 33 P.3d 22.
15 {27} Defendant asserts that there is no reasonable strategic justification for counsel’s
16 failure to request the lesser included offense instruction. We disagree. As discussed
17 above, Defendant and defense counsel reasonably could have elected to pursue an all-
18 or-nothing strategy of seeking acquittal on the methamphetamine charge based on a
19
1 determination that the evidence that Defendant possessed the baggies, and thus the
2 methamphetamine, was weak.
3 {28} Defendant therefore has failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective
4 assistance of counsel. If Defendant wishes to pursue the matter further, habeas corpus
5 proceedings would be the appropriate venue. See State v. Baca, 1997-NMSC-059, ¶
6 25, 124 N.M. 333, 950 P.2d 776 (“A record on appeal that provides a basis for
7 remanding to the [district] court for an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance
8 of counsel is rare. Ordinarily, such claims are heard on petition for writ of habeas
9 corpus[.]”); State v. Martinez, 1996-NMCA-109, ¶ 25, 122 N.M. 476, 927 P.2d 31
10 (“This Court has expressed its preference for habeas corpus proceedings over remand
11 when the record on appeal does not establish a prima facie case of ineffective
12 assistance of counsel.”).
13 CONCLUSION
14 {29} We affirm Defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine.
15 {30} IT IS SO ORDERED.
16 _________________________________
17 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge
18 WE CONCUR:
19 ___________________________________
20
1 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge
2 ___________________________________
3 EMIL J. KIEHNE, Judge
21